The thronging and excited Federals were completely disordered by success, and the counter-attack of one or two Confederate brigades in good order drove them back to the line of the captured works. Then, about 6, there began one of the most remarkable struggles in history. While Early, swiftly drawing back from Block House, checked Burnside's attack from the east, and Anderson, attacked again and again by parts of the V. corps, was fully occupied in preserving his own front, Lee, with Ewell's corps and the few thousand men whom the other

fighting the new line was ready and the Confederates gave up the barren prize to Hancock. Lee had lost 4000 prisoners as well as 4500 killed and wounded, as against 7000 in the Army of the Potomac and the IX. corps.

There were other battles in front of Spottsylvania, but that of the 12th was the climax. From the 13th to the 20th the Federals gradually worked round from west to east, delivering a few partial attacks in the vain hope of discovering a weak point. Lee's position, now semicircular, enabled him to concentrate on interior lines on each occasion. In the end the

Frota The Wilderness and Cold Harbor, by permission of Hugh Rees, Limited.

generals could spare, delivered all day a series of fierce counterstrokes against Hancock. Nearly all Wright's corps and even part of Warren's (in the end 45,000 men) were drawn into the fight at the Salient, for Grant and Meade well knew that Lee was struggling to gain time for the construction of a retrenchment across the base of it. If the counter-attacks failed to gain this respite, the Confederates would have to retreat as best they could, pressed in front and flank. But the initial superiority of the Federals was neutralized by their disorder, and, keeping the fight alive by successive brigade attacks, while the troops not actually employed were held out of danger till their 1 The tension was so great that, after threatening to deprive Warren of his command, Meade sent General Humphreys, his chief of staff, to direct the V. corps' attack.

Federals were entrenched facing E. between Beverly's house (Burnside's old "Gayle ") and Quisenberry's, Lee facing W. from the new works south of Harrison's through the Court House to Snell's Bridge on the Po. In the fork of the Po and the Ny, with woods and marshes to obstruct every movement, Grant knew that nothing could be done, and he prepared to execute a new manoeuvre. But here, as in the Wilderness, Lee managed to have the last word. While the Union army was resting in camp for the first time since leaving Culpeper, Ewell's corps suddenly attacked its baggage-train near Harris's house. The Confederates were driven off, but Grant had to defer his intended manoeuvre for two days. When the armies left Spottsylvania, little more than a fortnight after breaking up from winter quarters, the casualties had reached the totals of 35,000 out of

The next manœuvre attempted by Grant to bring Lee's army to action "outside works " was of an unusual character, though it had been foreshadowed in the improvised plan of crushing Lee against Burnside's corps on the 9th. Hancock was now (20th) ordered to move off under cover of night to Milford; thence he was to march south-west as far as possible along the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and to attack whatever

Masint HILL

the Shenandoah Valley. He therefore suspended his advance and entrenched. The main army began to move off, after giving Lee time to turn against Hancock, at 10 a.m. on the 21st, and marched to Catlett's, a place a few miles S.W. of Guinea's bridge, Warren leading, Burnside and Wright following. But no news came in from Hancock until late in the evening, and the development of the manœuvre was consequently delayed, so that on the night of the 21st-22nd Lee's army slipped across

Hamilton's Crossing

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From The Wilderness and Cold Harbor, by permission of Hugh Rees, Limited.

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Warren's front en route for Hanover Junction. The other Confederate forces that had opposed Hancock likewise fell back. Grant's manœuvre had failed. Its principal aim was to induce Lee to attack the II. corps at Milford, its secondary and alternative purpose was, by dislodging Lee from Spottsylvania, to force on an encounter battle in open ground. But he was only offered the bait-not compelled to take it, as he would have been if Hancock with two corps had been placed directly athwart the road between Spottsylvania and Hanover Junction-and, having unimpaired freedom of action, he chose to retreat to the Junction. The four Union corps, therefore, could only pursue him to the North Anna, at which river they arrived on the morning of the 23rd, Warren on the right, Hancock on the left, Wright and Burnside being well to the rear in second line. The same afternoon Warren seized Jericho Ford, brought over the V. corps to the south side, and repulsed a very sharp counterstroke made by one of Lee's corps. Hancock at the same time stormed a Confederate redoubt which covered the Telegraph Road bridge over the river. Wright and Burnside closed up. It seemed as if a battle was at hand, but in the night reports came in that Lee had fallen back to the South Anna, and as these were more or less confirmed by the fact that Warren met with no further opposition, and by the enemy's retirement from the river bank on Hancock's front, the Union generals gave orders, about midday on the 24th, for what was practically a general pursuit. This led incidentally to an attempt to drive Lee's rearguard away from the point of passage, between Warren's and Hancock's, required for Burnside, and in the course of this became apparent that Lee's army had not fallen back, but was posted in a semicircle to which the North Anna formed a tangent. On the morning of the 25th this position was reconnoitred, and found to be more formidable than that of Spottsylvania. Moreover, it divided the two halves of the Union army that had crossed above and below.

force of the enemy he met. It was hoped that this bold stroke by an isolated corps would draw Lee's army upon it, and the rest of the Army of the Potomac would, if this hope were realized, drive down upon Lee's rear while Hancock held him up in front. Supposing, however, that Lee did not take the bait, the manœuvre would resolve itself into a turning movement with the object of compelling Lee to come out of his Spottsylvania lines on pain of being surrounded.

The II. corps started on the night of the 20th-21st. The alarm was soon given. At Milford, where he forced the passage of the Mattapony, Hancock found himself in the presence of hostile infantry from Richmond and heard that more had

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Grant gave up the game as drawn and planned a new move. This had as its objects, first, the seizure of a point of passage

and anvil battle was again taken up, the "anvil" being Smith's XVIII. corps, which had come up from the James river to White House on the 30th; but once more the lure failed because it was not made sufficiently tempting.

on the Pamunkey; secondly, the deployment of the Army of the Potomac and of a contingent expected from the Army of the James, and thirdly, the prevention of Lee's further retirement, which was not desired by the Union commanders, owing to the proximity of the Richmond defences and the consequent want of room to manœuvre. On the 27th Sheridan's cavalry and a light division of infantry passed the Pamunkey at Hanover Town, and the two divided wings of the Army of the Potomac were withdrawn over the North Anna without mishap-thanks to exactitude in arrangement and punctuality in execution. On the 28th the Army of the Potomac had arrived near Hanover Town, while at Hawes's Shop, on the road to Richmond, Sheridan

The last episode of the campaign centred on Cold Harbor, a village close to the Chickahominy, which Sheridan's cavalry seized, on its own initiative, on the 31st. Here, contrary to the expectation of the Union staff, a considerable force of Confederate infantry-new arrivals from the James-was met, and in the hope of bringing on a battle before either side had time to entrench, Grant and Meade ordered Sheridan to hold the village at all costs, and directed Wright's (VI.) corps from the

From The Wilderness and Cold Harbor, by permission of Hugh Rees, Limited.

had a severe engagement with the enemy's cavalry Lee was now approaching from Hanover Junction via Ashland, and the Army of the Potomac swung round somewhat to the right so as to face in the presumed direction of the impending attack. The Confederate general, however, instead of attacking, swerved south, and planted himself behind the Totopotomoy. Here he was discovered, entrenched as always, on the 29th, and skirmishing all along the line, varied at times by more severe fighting, occupied that day and the 30th. On the morning of the 31st the Union army was arranged from right to left in the order VI., II., IX. and V. corps, Sheridan having meantime drawn off to the left rear of the infantry.

Now, for the last time in the campaign, the idea of a hammer

extreme right wing, and Smith's (XVIII.) from Old Church, to march thither with all possible speed, Wright in the night of the 31st of May and Smith on the morning of the 1st of June. Lee had actually ordered his corps commanders to attack, but was too ill to enforce his wishes, and in the evening Wright and Smith themselves assaulted the Confederate front opposite Cold Harbor. The assault, though delivered by tired men, was successful. The enemy's first or skirmish line was everywhere stormed, and parts of the VI. corps even penetrated the main line. Nearly 800 prisoners were taken, and Grant at once prepared to renew the attack, as at Spottsylvania, with larger forces, bringing Hancock over from the right of the line on the night of the 1st, and ordering Hancock, Wright and Smith to

The resolution to make this plain, unvarnished frontal assault on entrenchments has been as severely criticized as any action of any commander in the Civil War, and Grant himself subsequently expressed his regret at having formed it. But such criticisms derive all their force from the event, not from the conditions in which, beforehand, the resolution was made. The risks of failure were deliberately accepted, and the battle-if it can be called a battle-was fought as ordered. The assault was made at the time arranged and was repulsed at all points, with a loss to the assailants of about 8000 men: Thereafter the two armies lay for ten days less than a hundred yards apart. There was more or less severe fighting at times, and an almost ceaseless bickering of skirmishers. Owing to Grant's refusal to sue for permission to remove his dead and wounded in the terms demanded, Lee turned back the Federal ambulance parties, and many wounded were left to die between the lines. It was only on the 7th that Grant pocketed his feelings and the dead were buried.

This is one of the many incidents of Cold Harbor that must always rouse painful memories-though to blame Lee or Grant supposes that these great generals were infinitely more inhuman here than at any other occasion in their lives, and takes no account of the consequences of admitting a defeat at this critical moment, when the causes for which the Union army and people contended were about to be put to the hazard of a presidential election:

The Federal army lost, in this month of almost incessant campaigning, about 50,000 men, the Confederates about 32,000. Though the aggregate of the Union losses awed both contemporaries and historians of a later generation, proportionately the losses of the South were heavier (46% of the original strength as compared with 41% on the Union side), and whereas within a few weeks Grant was able to replace nearly every man he had lost by a new recruit, the Confederate government was almost at the end of its resources.

See A. A. Humphreys, The Campaign of Virginia, 1864-65 (New York, 1882); Military History Society of Massachusetts, The Wilderness Campaign; Official Records of the Rebellion, serial numbers 67, 68 and 69; and C. F. Atkinson, The Wilderness and Cold Harbor (London, 1908). (C. F. A.)

In or before 1681 Wildman became prominent among those who were discontented with the rule of Charles II., being especially intimate with Algernon Sydney. He was undoubtedly concerned in the Rye House Plot, and under James II he was active in the interests of the duke of Monmouth, but owing to some disagreements, or perhaps to his cowardice, he took no part in the rising of 1685. He found it advisable, however, to escape to Holland, and returned to England with the army of William of Orange in 1688. In 1689 he was a member of the convention parliament.

Wildman was postmaster - general from April 1689 to February 1691, when some ugly rumours about his conduct brought about his dismissal. Nevertheless, he was knighted by William III. in 1692, and he died on the 2nd of June 1693. Sir John, who was the author of many political pamphlets, left an only son, John, who died childless in 1710.

WILES, IRVING RAMSAY (1861- ), American artist, was born at Utica, New York, on the 8th of April 1861. He studied under his father, the landscape painter, Lemuel Maynard Wiles (1826-1905), in the Art Students' League, New York, and under Carolus Duran, at Paris. His earlier work was as an illustrator for American magazines, and later he devoted himself with great success to portraiture. He became a full member of the National Academy of Design (1897) and a member of the American Water Color Society.

WILFRID (c. 634-709), English archbishop, was born of good parentage in Northumbria, c. 634. When serving in King Oswio's court, he attracted the notice of the queen, Eanfled, who, fostering his inclination for a religious life, placed him under the care of an old noble, Cudda, now a monk at Lindisfarne. Later on Eanfled enabled him to visit Rome in the company of Benedict Biscop. At Lyons Wilfrid's pleasing features and quick intell gence made Annemund, the archbishop, desire to adopt him and marry him to his niece. Resisting his offers, the youth went on to Rome, received the papal benediction, and then, in accordance with his promise, returned to Lyons, where he stayed for three years, till the murder of his patron, whose fate the executioners would not let him share. On his return home, Oswio's son Alchfrid gave him a monastery at Ripon, and, before long. Agilbert, bishop of the Gewissae, or West Saxons, ordained him priest

The rest of his life is largely a record of wandering and misfortune. For three years (665-668) he ruled his monastery at Ripon in peace, though acting as bishop in Mercia and Kent during vacancies in sees there. On Archbishop Theodore's arrival (668) he was restored to his see, and spent in it nine years of ceaseless activity, especially in building churches, only to be driven out through the anger of King Ecgfrith's queen (677)