6. No detailed reorganization of the District government, as provided by predecessor bills. Instead, the mayor and Council are empowered to reorganize District agencies. That, I might say parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, is one of the major differences between this and the so-called Kefauver-Taft bill. That is, we leave reorganization to be considered separately, thinking of reorganization itself, partly a matter of home rule.

I think one of the papers here, the Daily News, pointed out one time that reorganization is of the essence of home rule; and if we are going to have an elected council, its suggestions should be welcomed in the reorganization of the executive branch of the city gov

ernment.

7. A referendum on the act, providing that it shall take effect only after approval by a majority of those voting in an election. Also a referendum on all Council actions is required on petition of 20 percent of the registered voters, and automatically on all bond issues.

8. Budget and debt limitations, forbidding appropriations in excess of anticipated revenues, limiting debt to 5 percent of the assessed valuation, making the mayor responsible for carrying out the budget. That, I think, gives a pretty concise picture of what the bill itself does.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said many times that no question can be buried until it is settled. The question of home rule-or, as I choose to put it-a voice in local self-government, has been on the doorstep of Congress for many years. It will continue to be here until we work out and adopt some plan to let these taxed people in the District have a voice in their own government. No principle is more ingrained in Americans than that taxation without representation violates every concept of democracy.

This is not a simple question with which we wrestle. We have a dual problem: Legislation for the people who live in the District of Columbia and legislation in behalf of the people of the entire country for whom this is their capital city. It is a dual problem, and we have two responsibilities, and we have tried to recognize that dual responsibility in the shaping of this bill.

In this bill-S. 1976--we do not presume to give any local body authority to levy a tax upon the Federal Government or its property. In my opinion, we could not legally do so if we desired to. No city or State can impinge on national sovereignty.

This bill, by means of the locally elected council and by means of a representative in the House with the standing of a Territorial government, comes down to a clear-cut proposition that the people who provide most of the revenue for the District of Columbia and who must live under the conditions of its government are entitled to a real voice in the levying of taxes, the spending of the revenues, and the formulation of the regulations under which they must live, whether it be the placement of windows in their kitchens, or chains on their automobiles when snow is on the streets, or their conduct in public and toward their neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, local self-government is the very foundation of representative government, of free government, of freedom itself. The dual problem we have here has its difficult aspects, but we dare not confess our inability to solve the problem of providing a voice in local self-government for the people who live in this city toward

which the whole world looks in these days when our country seeks to lead freedom's cause.

Mr. Chairman, if you have any questions, I will be glad to answer them if I can or perhaps I may want to call on my assistant or Mr. Van Arkel.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Senator Case. We appreciate your forthright, forceful statement in presenting your views on this bill. Mr. Abernethy, any questions?

Mr. ABERNETHY. Yes, I have a few. Senator, let us route an ordinance passed by a council under your bill. As I understand your bill, it makes no difference whether the ordinance relates to cats running at large, as was facetiously referred to here in the papers sometime ago, or chains on the automobiles when snow is on the streets, as you referred to in your statement. When that ordinance is proposed, it cannot become law, no matter how silly or how asinine or how insignificant it may be, unless and until it either has the direct or indirect, may I say, approval of the Congress. When I say indirect, I mean by that that the Congress takes no action to veto it or repeal it. Is that not true?

Senator CASE. Yes; I think that is substantially true. Let me say, if I may, that in my own State an act of the legislature does not take effect until the first of July following the session of the legislature, unless an emergency clause is attached. The attachment of an emergency clause requires a larger proportionate vote.

That gives an opportunity in the State for the referendum to operate. I think that was the idea of it there, that it makes it possible for a referendum. However, if there is an emergency, we do provide that the ordinance could take effect in 30 days, but we still provide some time there so that the Congress could review the action if it desires to do so.

Mr. ABERNETHY. I think the charters under which most all municipalities operate, where they have the exclusive authority to legislate for themselves, provide that the ordinance does not take effect immediately; probably 10 or 15 days from the date it is adopted, unless it be an ordinance of an emergency character.

But I do not see the analogy between that and the question that I raised. The question that I raised is this: Here is a council to which the Congress has delegated the responsibility which it is supposed to exercise; and that responsibility is this, to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District.

Now, when the Congress delegates that power, if it can do so-and you say it can-and the council acts by passing an ordinance which requires people to keep the cats off the streets, it cannot become law and does not become law until the Congress of the United States indirectly approves of it by its failure to veto it. That is correct; is it not?

Senator CASE. There are two modifications that should be suggested there. One is that we do have a provision in the bill for the passage of a resolution. That resolution could be immediately effective and

Mr. ABERNETHY. You cannot take away from the Congress the exclusive power it has to legislate.

Senator CASE. No; and if Congress wants to, it could step in and it could pass a law which would override that. But we do provide on page 15 that "Resolutions shall be used to express simple determinations, decisions, or directions of the District Council of a special or temporary character for the purpose of initiating, effecting, or carrying out its administrative duties and functions under the laws and ordinances governing the District."

Mr. REDDEN. I wonder if it would not be the positive duty of Congress before the 30-day period expired to consider every act of legislation proposed by the council to see if they desired to repeal it or to prohibit its passage?

Senator CASE. The Congress certainly could if it wants to; or by silence

Mr. REDDEN. You cannot exercise your duty just by your silence. Would it not be a duty of Congress to examine everything they did and determine if they wanted to be silent on it or act?

Senator CASE. May I say, Mr. Redden, that my theory of creating a council grows out of a debate I heard in the House of Representatives some years ago when either the First or the Second Reorganization Act was proposed. It was a debate that was participated in, if I recall correctly on the First Reorganization Act, by Mr. Vinson, who was then a Member of the House and who is now Chief Justice; and by Mr. Cox of Georgia, in which they pointed out that the original AAA Act was held unconstitutional because it was a delegation of legislative power. But in connection with that they developed a theory that Congress could create an agent of the Congress and set up objectives; and then if an agency of the Congress should make findings in accord with those stated objectives, then it could to that extent do what we might loosely describe as delegate legislative power.

But technically the later acts-the Reorganization Act, the AAA Act, and other acts which we have had under price fixing and price regulation—have been held constitutional on the theory that if the Congress set up prescribed objectives, it could create an agent.

I remember very clearly that the distinction was drawn between the President as the Chief Executive and the President as an agent of the Congress. It was pointed out that the reorganization orders would come to the Congress not as Executive orders, not come to the Congress as a decree by the President, not come as a delegation of legislative power; but that the President or anybody else that the Congress might have designated as the agent John Doe-might submit a finding within the terms of the act, and that that was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

Of course the quick and short answer to the question of whether or not the Congress can do this is that for many years the city of Washington did have a legislative body of a character something like this, up until about 1872; and it was never held unconstitutional or that the Congress could not create such a body.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Was it ever attacked?

Senator CASE. Although acts of the body were held unconstitutional in the same way that acts of State legislatures are sometimes held unconstitutional.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Was the question ever directly raised in the courts, as to whether or not the Congress could set up

Senator CASE. Yes. In two or three cases at least the court expressed itself to the effect-there is a case cited, let me say, at page 12 of the Senate committee report in which the court said:

It must be remembered that Congress in the government of the Territories as well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution, that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and may not necessarily be the same in all Territories. We are accustomed to that generally adopted for the Territories of a quasi State government, with executive, legislative, and judicial officers, and a legislature endowed with the power of local taxation and local expenditure, but Congress is not limited to this form. In the District of Columbia it has adopted a different mode of government, and in Alaska still another.

Mr. ABERNETHY. I am getting off the track on the question I raised a moment ago. Although I have a very high regard for your opinion, Senator, I would like to differ with you on this, that according to my information the question as to the constitutionality of the legislative body elected by the people in the District of Columbia has never been directly raised in the courts.

My understanding is that that issue has never come before the courts, but it has been referred to perhaps in some other opinions. But that is beside the point of what I have in mind right now. I appreciate the forthright manner in which you have approached this subject. I want to say, Senator, you are the first witness in fact, you are the only witness-who has ever appeared before this committee and stated positively that there was no such thing as true home rule. I will say that Senator Kefauver did, when he appeared before this committee year before last, I believe it was, after he was asked the direct question-and it happened that the question was propounded by me finally stated that there was no such thing as true home rule in the District.

Let us get back to my point. When the council passes an ordinance, it does not become law unless it has the indirect approval of the Congress of the United States. That is correct; is it not?

Senator CASE. I would say that is true, with the exception of these exceptions that could be covered by resolutions for temporary purposes.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Does your bill abolish the District Committee? Senator CASE. It does not.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Does it abolish the District Committee of the Senate?

Senator CASE. It does not.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Does it eliminate in any shape, manner or form the duties that are put upon you and put upon me by our constituents when we are elected and sent to Congress and required to raise our hands and agree to uphold the Constitution? Does your bill in any manner eliminate our responsibility to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District of Columbia?

Senator CASE. I certainly appreciate the way that you are bringing this up, because I think you are dealing with a point that ought to be clearly understood. The use of the word "exclusive" in the Constitution there, if my memory runs correctly, is that "exclusive" was intended to mean that the State of Maryland and the State of Virginia, which ceded to the Government the territory for the District of Co

lumbia, should no longer have any right of jurisdiction over that area; and the use of the word "exclusive" I think was designed to say that Maryland and Virginia no longer have anything to do with the District of Columbia.

Then as to the exercise of that power, I would contend that the Congress is exercising it by creating an agent to make findings in the same way that we have created the agent of the President to legislate. No one can contend that the several reorganization plans which the President sends up here are not of themselves new legislation. They amend old laws; they wipe out existing bodies; they create new bodies; and they certainly are legislation. But the President is not acting as the administrative branch of the Government. He is acting as the agent of the Congress, and it is on that basis that the constitutionality of the reorganization powers rest.

It is on that theory that I hold this is constitutional that we can create an agent of the Congress and retain in the Congress the right just as we do to amend laws affected by a reorganization act. We retain here the right to amend any of these acts of the council.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Senator, section 8 of the Constitution, article I, reads as follows: "The Congress shall have power" and then it enumerates to do so-and-so, to do so-and-so, to do so-and-so; and it gets on down to this particular provision and reads this way:

"The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation"or let us eliminate "exclusive" and just say "exercise legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District of Columbia."

As I understand you, we can delegate that. Let us go back to some other provisions in that same section of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes." I realize we can delegate the power to collect, but do you know of anyone to whom we can delegate the power to fix the taxes of the United States?

Senator CASE. I would say that the Congress does and has passed legislation which has given to agencies of the Government the right to prescribe fees and to change the rates of them within stated objectives.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Let me put it this way. We have an income tax which is laid by the Congress. Do you believe that we could place the power in a council elected by the people or nominated or selected by the President, as your bill provides, to fix the amount of the income tax that the people of the United States pay?

Senator CASE. I think that is a moot question because I do not think Congress would consider turning that

Mr. ABERNETHY. The question is: Could they? That is the question.

Senator CASE. Let me say that in the Roach case, Roach v. Van Riswick (1879) (11 D. C. 171), the court said it may be admitted that the term "exclusive" has reference to the States and simply imparts their exclusion from legislative control of the District, and does not necessarily exclude the idea of legislation by some authority subordinate to that of the Congress and created by it.

Mr. ABERNETHY. Let us pick out another one. The Congress has the power to regulate the value of money. Do you think it is possible for us to delegate that to a group of people elected by the constituency? Senator CASE. I do not know. I heard once if a man started studying the subject of money, before very long he would go crazy. But it