1738 the Commons prohibited the publication of debates or proceedings as well during the recess as the sitting of Parliament, and resolved to proceed with the utmost severity against offenders.1

That is to say, the increasing power of party and of corrupt influence at once increased the predominance of Parliament and its disinclination to have its doings made known.

In the years following, the reporters, being in fear of parliamentary privilege, became cautious and resorted to evasions and disguises. The debates were assigned to the "Senate of Great Lilliput" and the "Political Club," and the speeches were attributed to Mark Antony, Brutus, and other worthies.2

The writers were accordingly not held to accuracy, and the supposed reports were made the vehicle of ridicule and invective of the fiercest kind. This abuse of reporting was urged as a reason why it should be suppressed, but it seems as if only the most perverted motives of selfinterest could have avoided the conclusion, that the way to get correct and impartial reports was to publish an authorized version of them. The crisis came in the winter of 1771. The details of the contest between the House of Commons and the printers who undertook to report its proceedings may be read in the pages of May. The House was completely and finally beaten.

Thus ended this painful and embarrassing conflict. Its results were decisive. The publication of debates was still asserted to be a breach of privilege, but the offence was committed with impunity. Another contest with the press, supported by a powerful opposition and popular sympathy, was out of the question, and henceforth the proceedings of both houses were freely reported. Parliament as well as the public has since profited by every facility which has been afforded to reporting. 8

The effects were not long in making themselves felt. The history of parliamentary reform will be touched upon

1 lbid., p. 415.

• Ibid., p. 416.

Ibid., p. 427.

later. It is sufficient here to say that in 1832, with the first parliamentary reform act, the English government was established substantially upon the basis on which it has been carried on for the last sixty years. The governing power is in the hands of an executive ministry, nominally appointed by the sovereign, but practically a committee in accordance with the wishes of the majority of Parliament, or rather of the House of Commons. This ministry has the guidance and control of legislation, and is responsible for that as well as administration. As this responsibility is to Parliament, the ministry must resign upon any serious adverse vote of the parliamentary majority, their defence consisting in a dissolution of Parliament and an appeal to the country. The sovereign is supposed to have no official but only a personal influence. The maxim is that the king can do no wrong. If any wrong is done, it is because his ministers have given him bad advice, and they must be sacrificed, as he cannot be. It is evident that the only way in which the sovereign can get any ministers, or any government carried on, is by subordinating his will to theirs.

It may be well to sum up the results at which we have arrived in this chapter. We have seen that the Long Parliament rose in resistance to the arbitrary power of the Crown; that it was successful in that resistance, but wholly failed as an instrument of government on account of its discordant elements and the want of leadership and discipline, which alone can make it possible for a large body of men to govern; that the consequent anarchy led to its displacement by a military dictator; that his rule failed, where even the best despotism must always fail, in its inability to provide a competent successor; that the recurrence of anarchy upon his death led to the restoration of the Stuarts; that the Parliament again successfully resisted the arbitrary power of the Crown, and by a

formal legislative act annulled the supposed divine right of hereditary succession and vested the royal authority in another person; that Parliament was again falling into anarchy, but was rescued from it by the crystallizing of power in the hands of an executive ministry; that the question for the next century and a half was, whether the responsibility of this ministry, which, unless it was to be a mere lawless despotism, must be responsible to somebody, should be to the Crown, to Parliament, or to the nation; that from an early period, indeed, the principle was settled that the ministry must be responsible to, that is, hold their places at the pleasure of, the parliamentary majority, but for a long time the majority was held in subjection to the will of the Crown, by means of offices and pensions and other forms of bribery; that while a certain dependence upon public opinion was always maintained by the organized efforts of the party in opposition, the full transfer of power to the will of the nation as a motive force was not accomplished till the time of the first parliamentary reform. It must be observed, however, that even then and now the responsibility of government by the ministry is not directly to the people, but only indirectly through Parliament, a fact carrying important consequences, which we shall have to discuss presently. Our next task will be to examine the working and effects of this system of ministerial government.

CHAPTER V

CABINET GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN

ALMOST, if not quite, all of the modern political

writers are agreed that the essential feature of the British government consists in the position and functions of the Cabinet. It may be said also that the most important difference, next to the degree of extension of the suffrage, between the British and all other parliamentary or representative governments consists in the modification or absence of this feature. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to inquire into the exact nature of the institution and the conditions of its working. The British Cabinet is not known to the law at all, but as a matter of usage it consists of certain members of the Privy Council.

Its numbers are indefinite and variable, for it is competent to the statesman who is charged with the formation of a particular ministry, with the consent of the sovereign, to determine the number of ministers who shall have seats in the Cabinet.

The first Cabinet of George I. consisted of eight members; the first of George III. of fourteen members. Of late years it has reached fifteen and sixteen, which seems, in the opinion of most statesmen, to be quite as large as is desirable. There are certain officers of state who under modern usages would form a part of any cabinet; namely, the first lord of the treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer, the principal secretaries of state, now five in number, the first lord of the admiralty and the lord high chancellor, and by custom the lord president of the coun

cil and the lord privy seal. To these are added other ministerial functionaries, never less than three, and rarely so many as seven or eight, selected more for their personal and political weight, or for the claims of the individual, rather than from the special importance of the office he may hold.1

Of these persons one is called the Premier, who may be either a peer or a commoner. The distinction is personal and not official. It might be conferred on one who held no departmental position whatever. Usually, however, the prime minister has held the office of first lord. of the treasury, either alone or in connection with that of the chancellor of the exchequer. By modern usage it is understood that no one but the premier is the direct choice of the Crown, whilst his colleagues in office are selected by himself, subject, of course, to the approval of the Crown. He is emphatically and especially the king's minister, the one in whom the Crown constitutionally places its confidence, but he stands between his colleagues and the sovereign, and is bound to be loyal to both.2

The office of prime minister, as it is now exercised, is a proof and a result of the necessity, which now exists in our political system, for the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of one man, in whom the sovereign and the nation can alike confide, and from whom they have a right to expect a definite policy and a vigorous administration.8

Upon the resignation or dismissal of a ministry, in consequence of an adverse vote in Parliament, it is customary for the sovereign to send for some recognized party leader, in one or other house of Parliament, and intrust him with the formation of a new administration. Or should the position of parties be such that no particular person appears to the king to be specially eligible for the post of prime

1 A. Todd, "Parliamentary History of England," Vol. II., pp. 189 et seq.

2 Mr. Gladstone, quoted by A. Todd, Vol. II., p. 183.

$ Ibid., p. 174.