gers involved in this course also, as in fact for the first century and a half these dangers did not make themselves felt; but in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Madison sounded the note of warning:

Experience proves a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The Executives of the states are little more than ciphers. The Legislatures are omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised on the encroachments of the latter, a revolution will be inevitable.

It will be our task later on to consider what light another century has thrown upon this comment of Mr. Madison. At present the question is, by what method can public opinion, in its widest significance, be most effectively brought to bear upon the powers of government, and we have reached the conclusion that to this end the public attention should be concentrated upon individuals. It is evident that this can only be effectually done in the executive branch, because, according to the well-known saying, "Deliberation is the work of many: execution is the work of one." The ideal constitution of the executive is a single head, surrounded by a staff of his own selection, appointed and removed at his pleasure, one man being at the head of each department; all subordinates to be appointed by the heads of departments, subject to their responsibility to the single head of all, every position being held by a single man. Thus, and thus only, can discipline, subordination, and responsibility be maintained. Thus, and thus only, can the people, by the election of the single head, express their approval or disapproval of administration as a whole. Boards, committees, or commissions at every point weaken efficiency and divide responsibility. Either one strong-willed man will direct the whole action, at the same time that he gets but a fraction of the credit or blame, and, as he cannot get the honor which accrues from the first, will be tempted to the gain

which is concealed by the absence of the last or else each will make concessions to the others, with resulting weakness and uncertainty, for which neither can be blamed, especially by a multitude who cannot weigh considerations, but if they are to see a thing must have it placed before them in the plainest possible light.1

Equally, if not more, fatal, is the separate election, whether by the people or by their representatives, that is, a legislature, of the different subordinate parts of the executive chain. We shall see how in several experiments of popular government a multiplicity of elections, even in the executive branch, has been held to be necessary for due control on the part of the people. The fact is, as experience has clearly shown, that it is just the reverse. A subordinate separately elected is independent of his superior, may defy his orders, and intrigue against him with impunity. A superior who cannot control his subordinates of course cannot ask for election upon a promise of, or a reference to, good administration, which is beyond his power; and so election comes to turn upon other considerations, and to bring into power men whose success depends, not upon doing good work, but upon their skill in massing votes, by whatever methods. If the people elect a number of separate, and therefore independent, officials and affairs go wrong, they cannot, with the means at their command, tell where they have made a mistake, or how to apply the remedy, become confused and indifferent, and leave the management of the elections, or rather of the nomination of candidates, to those who wish to make use of the offices, not for the purpose of good administration, but as rewards for party service. It is often urged that the wisdom of a board of three or

1 If you want to get a real political opinion out of an Englishman you must ask him a very plain short question, and not a highly complex one. London Spectator, January, 1885.

But

more men is a safer reliance than that of one man. while a superior can always avail himself of the opinions of those beneath him, it is better, so far as action is concerned, that it should possess the vigor of a single will, even with the risk of sometimes going wrong, than that it should be stamped with the indecision of multiplied counsel; and this is especially true if the object is to fix the personal responsibility which most readily attracts the attention and influences the decision of the multitude. It is urged again that it is impossible for one head to select successfully all the individuals of a complex administrative system. But he does not need to do so. He can select the heads of the departments immediately about him and hold them responsible for their subordinates, and they can do the same in their turn. The world is full, and nowhere more so than in the United States, of the most wonderful examples of private administration on just these terms in railways, factories, retail shops, and industrial enterprises of all kinds. Considered as purely executive work there has perhaps never been anything superior to that of the first Napoleon. He failed only when he sent his lieutenants into Spain, where with a hostile population intervening they were removed from his personal control, or when his insane ambition led him to aspire to anything so far beyond human power as the conquest of all Europe.

How the executive power thus constituted can be restrained by the action of a legislature is a much less simple question, as is shown by the fact that no nation has yet worked it out satisfactorily. Probably the best definition that has ever been given of the true function of legislatures is that of critics with the power of the purse, but the line between this and dictators with the same power is so far from being laid down with precision that it may easily be and almost always is overstepped.

If the executive is to conduct and be responsible for administration, it must of necessity be furnished with such agents as are requisite for that purpose, or to put the case still more strongly, as it thinks are necessary, because otherwise it cannot be held responsible. The legislature may, indeed, lay down general lines upon which appointments to office shall be made, but as soon as it undertakes to interfere peremptorily and beyond the point of criticism with individual appointments it encroaches upon executive power, responsibility is divided and weakened, and the control of the people loses its force. The same is true of laws. It is for the executive to submit such laws as it may think fitted for the wants of administration; and for the legislature, after suggesting any modifications, to accept or reject those laws. If the legislature undertakes of its own motion to impose such laws upon the executive as it thinks fit, then it encroaches upon the executive power, and the latter can no longer be held responsible. We shall have occasion later on to test these principles in the light of facts, but we may glance for a moment at one notable feature in existing popular governments, and that is the veto power. In the United States, from the federal government through the states to the cities, a veto power is nearly everywhere given to the executive, and is regarded as a very important part of his attributes. In the formation of the French constitution of 1791 there was a fierce conflict as to whether a veto power, after supposed English precedents, should be given to King Louis XVI. It may look like presumption to question anything which has so far crystallized into tradition, but an analysis will show that it involves an absurdity. What sort of executive government is that which has no power to say what shall be but only what shall not be done? Imagine the captain of a ship with a veto upon sailing directions furnished by the crew or even by the owners; the man

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ager of a railway or factory with a veto upon working rules prepared by the directors; the general of an army with a veto upon tactics or strategy prepared by his staff or even by the king, or emperor, or president, from whom his authority is derived. Anybody who has to conduct an administrative work with success must have the power to say what he wants and why he wants it. It is for the person or body for whom the work is done to approve or reject his plans. It is sometimes remarked that the royal veto in Great Britain has not been exercised for one hundred and fifty years. In fact, the veto is exercised more or less every year, only it has passed from the executive to the legislature, where it properly belongs. The importance of this will appear at a later stage.

That the executive shall be able thus to state and advocate its plans it is necessary that its representatives should be in contact with the legislature, and have at least the same right of speech as the members of that body. That conception of the separation of executive and legislative which excludes this, on the one hand throws the real executive power into the hands of the legislature, and on the other, while depriving the executive of all honest and legitimate power, shields it from publicity and encourages intrigue. The men who fill such a place will be likely to correspond to it in character, and the effect upon the legislature will be just as bad. Whether the men who fill the high executive offices in popular governments shall be elected by the legislature or the people is another important question, to which we shall have to seek the answer in the lessons of experience.

Of the importance and effect of organization in government there can be no better illustration than the history of the period from the Declaration of Independence of Great Britain to the final establishment of the Constitution of the United States. There is probably no in