opinion exists, but the need for methods by which it can be brought into efficient action upon representatives, who, if they are left to themselves and are not individually persons with a sense of honor and a character to lose, will be at least as bad in public life as they could be in private.1

1 "American Commonwealth," Vol. I., Chap. XLV., p. 539.

IN

CHAPTER XIX

GOVERNMENT BY LEGISLATURE (Continued)

N the last two chapters we have considered the organization of our government and its effect upon the characters both of the electors and the elected. We have now to examine its effect upon legislation and administration. For this purpose two features are to be kept in mind. The first is that every member of either branch of the legislature is at liberty to introduce a bill upon any subject he pleases, with the single exception, more apparent than real, that bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, and that all of such bills stand, so far as weight of authority goes, upon a precisely equal footing. The second point to be noted is that neither the President nor any member of his Cabinet has any right, not merely to introduce or propose bills but even to criticise them publicly; in other words, that no person representing the whole country, or who is responsible for the administration of the government, has a single word to say about any proposed legislation till, having passed both houses, it is presented for the President's signature, when he must either accept or reject it.

The result of the first condition is that there is no single subject within the limits of the Federal Constitution which may not within every recurring year be brought up for the most revolutionary treatment. It may be, indeed it most probably is, true that nothing will be done, but the mere proposal to do something is enough to alarm and to a greater or less extent paralyze the interests which

are involved. Take, for example, the tariff, and, for the moment, irrespective of the questions of protection or free trade. The business of the country can adapt itself to high duties or to low duties, but what it can never encounter with successful results is constantly changing duties. Now not only has the tariff been frequently and actually changed in the last fifty years, but it is absolutely impossible to say at the opening of any session of Congress whether the tariff will or will not and in what particulars or to what extent it may be changed. A resolution as to any one article referred to the committee of Ways and Means and it is perfectly certain that such will not be wanting—is enough to open the whole subject, and once it is in possession of that committee every resource of logrolling and lobbying will be exhausted by the private interests contending for advance or reduction, not to speak of enthusiasts who are working for what, according to their lights perfect or imperfect, they believe to be for the public welfare.

And here the second condition comes into play. Of the committee which has exclusive control of the subject every member represents a district and no more. The chairman holds his place by gift of the Speaker, either because he represents a powerful local interest or is a man of weight and influence in the party, which is of course the same as that of the Speaker. Suppose this interest to be manufactures, or shipping, or banking, or wool-growing, or sugar-raising. It is perfectly natural that the chairman should regard the welfare of the country as identified with the success of that particular interest and should bend all his efforts to promote it. But there are other members of the committee of both parties just as much convinced of the importance of their local interests. perfectly logical result of this is not that all of these interests should be weighed in the scales of the national

The

welfare, but that concessions to one set should be purchased by concessions to another. Next come those who, animated by a real desire to benefit the country, have yet to employ precisely the same methods as the others, though, as has been shown, with a decided disadvantage. On an even if not a better footing than any of them come the agents of powerful private interests, and it is these which constitute the greatest danger.

It has been shown that the only cement which holds a majority of the House together is party and that the names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all.

In former days it was the offices of the government service which furnished the motive power, but such measure of civil service reform as has been achieved has greatly diminished this resource and it has been replaced by the obvious substitute of money. There can be no question that bribery in elections of late years has greatly increased. It was publicly stated that Mr. John Wanamaker, head of the great Philadelphia dry-goods house, was made Postmaster-General under President Harrison in consideration of his having furnished four hundred thousand dollars from his own or the contributions of others towards the party campaign fund. There is no source from which so much money can be obtained as from the men who are seeking for high protective duties upon great staple articles, whether so-called raw materials-sugar, wool, iron, copper, and so forth-or manufactures of dry goods, hardware, drugs, liquors, and the like. It is quite natural, therefore, that the Republican party, which has had control of the government substantially for the last thirty years, should pose to-day as the advocate of high protection, an obvious reason for this being that experience has taught them where the sinews of party warfare were to come from. There is no pretence except in the campaign

speeches of party orators and the tirades of party newspapers that the duties are adjusted with an eye to the welfare of the country. In like manner when the tidal wave of disgust with the Republicans in 1890 gave to the Democrats the executive and both houses of the legislature, though the main cause of their wretched failure was undoubtedly the loss for a generation of the experience of party discipline, the result was not a little helped by their enforced attitude in favor of a reduction in the tariff and their consequent rigid exclusion from the graces of the great interests which hold the purse-strings.

If now we compare what has been said of the quality of men who naturally gravitate towards Congress with the influences which govern their work when they get there, we can find abundant explanation for our failures in government without visiting our condemnation upon universal suffrage.

It remains to consider the relation of administration to tariff legislation thus obtained, and it will serve as an illustration of the working of the whole government. The President can by message urge upon Congress in general terms an advance or reduction or a simplification of customs duties, but he can do no more, while even so much is very likely to excite resentment. He would not think of entering into details which would probably win for him only ridicule and humiliation. The Secretary of the Treasury can, if he pleases, plead the wants of his department before the committee, where he will be treated with a certain condescension as a suppliant and a subordinate, having considerably less influence than any great private interest, first on account of jealousy of executive interference, and then because he is not backed by any pecuniary service to the party.

It is not surprising, therefore, that our customs administration is full of contradictions, absurdities, and oppor