SIR, Notwithstanding all that has been said and written during the last few months upon National Defence and Army Organisation, no very definite conclusions appear to have been yet established, and even such as exist seem in some respects erroneous.

The prevalent tone of public opinion seems to be, that wars for the future will be made on a great scale, and will be suddenly undertaken without previous warning; that we should therefore maintain large forces for our own safety, and to preserve ourdue influence in Europe. There is also, apparently, a very general notion that we are deficient of matériel, and that our army is defective in organisation, in numbers, and in intelligent preparation. My experience does not confirm the major part of these views, so far as they relate to the defences of the United Kingdom, although I believe that our military arrangements require certain reforms.

The great Continental Powers of Europe feel themselves called upon to keep vast masses of soldiers ready for the field, because their frontiers are open and contiguous to each other for long distances, and are often, in fact, mere geographical lines of demarcation; and therefore the ambition or the warlike propensities of one compel the rest, for their safety, to arm heavily. And no doubt the modern means of rapid communication of orders by the telegraph, and of concentration of men and matériel by railway, do give great facilities for entering on a campaign, and for the sudden movements of great armies. Our insular position, however, very much neutralises all these powers of concen

tration and quick movements so far as attack on our shores is concerned. We hold a powerful position in Europe and in the world, not so much on account of the numerical strength of our army, but on account of our great maritime power, our colonial and foreign possessions, the freedom of our institutions, and partly, we may hope, from the energy and enterprise of our national character.

In considering the danger of a possible invasion of this country, we should always bear in mind the great difficulties inherent to all expeditions across the sea. The Crimean expedition is a striking instance in point. Those who were engaged in the arrangements connected with it are aware that the assembling of the ships and their preparationmore especially those for the cavalry, artillery, and munitions of war-and the necessary rafts for disembarkation, occupied many anxious weeks; preparations which were notorious, and could not be concealed.

In the voyage from Varna to the Crimea the Allies were favoured with fine weather, they were not attacked by the enemy's fleet, and the disembarkation was equally quiet and unopposed. A moderate gale would have dispersed the ships, and even a slight attack might have thrown the whole into confusion, and have disconcerted our plans. Every thoughtful person present at the time was struck with the helplessness of a great crowd of transports laden with men, horses, guns, and stores.

Favoured in every respect, the French and English only succeeded in landing 50,000 men with proportionate field artillery. Even

after our landing on an open beach, and when we were without any base of operations, the Russians did. not fire a shot or attempt opposition, otherwise the expedition might then have been exposed to danger of failure. The successful landing in the Crimea, therefore, by no means bears -out the view that the operation is one which can be hastily undertaken or easily accomplished.

With regard to this country, for many years after the great war which terminated at Waterloo, our defensive arrangements both by land and sea fell to a very low, and, what now appears to us to have been, a dangerous condition. In the celebrated correspondence between Sir John Burgoyne and the late Duke of Wellington in 1846, it was pointed out that our standing army at home did not exceed 30,000 men; that the militia were not embodied; that our dockyards and harbours were feebly defended; that militia stores were deficient, and the field-artillery reduced to a skeleton. On the other hand, France, at that very time, had, it was stated, at least 150,000 men always ready for the field. She had a fleet almost as numerous as our own, and a long line of coast, with numerous harbours, great and small, in comparative proximity to our shores; steam, moreover, had to a certain extent bridged the Channel. Sir John Burgoyne pointed out that the temporary loss of our command at sea was therefore possible, and that the success of an invasion under such circumstances was probable. The Duke -considered that the French could readily land 40,000 men provided with artillery.

Our condition and state of preparation are, however, more satis factory now than in those days. The regular troops at home amount to 100,000 men; we have 135,000 militia, and 170,000 volunteers; and shall shortly have 336 field

guns manned, horsed, and equipped, which is almost double the amount we have had at any time since Waterloo. Whether as regards the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, or the guns, ammunition, and equipments generally, the fieldartillery of this country can, in my opinion, compare favourably with that of any other nation. The establishments of the individual batteries are on a more liberal scale than is usual in time of peace with other Powers, and there is a depot of about 2600 men to supplement them in time of war. We have upwards of 7000 garrison gunners for the fortresses, besides 15,000 militia and 37,000 volunteer artillerymen; so that, with respect to this particular branch of the army, and one which is so especially important for defensive purposes, we have every reason to congratulate ourselves on our position, as compared with that of 1846. Again, without dwelling on the present condition of France, it is, I think, evident that our nearest neighbour will not, for many years, be so predominant in Europe, and will not possess the same aggressive power as heretofore. It may perhaps be argued that if France is weaker, Prussia or other Powers will Powers will be proportionately stronger; but as a matter of fact, the very geographical position of France, her long line of coast with its numerous harbours some of them fortified, and in such close comparative proximity to our own

affords her facilities such as no other nation can possess; indeed, of late years, when the invasion of England has been discussed, it has almost always been considered, and very naturally, that the danger would lie in that direction. The difficulties of maritime expeditions increase rapidly according to the distance to be traversed, especially in rough northern seas.

I therefore look upon an invasion

As regards our home defences, the modern fortifications of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pembroke, Portland, Dover, the mouths of the Thames and Medway, and of other places, are approaching completion, after ten years of labour. These great works are now receiving their armaments, and those armaments are probably the most powerful in the world, and are rapidly progressing. No doubt much remains to be done with respect to the numerous and important commercial ports and rivers, but the manufacture of heavy guns is proceeding with vigour, and with the great means of our arsenal in the production of ordnance and ammunition, it is a question more of money than anything else. We should also bear in mind that the development of the new auxiliary defence by torpedoes adds considerable facilities for protecting our harbours and rivers. The necessary arrangements connected with them are now in hand; they can be applied to any position, and do not require long to mature; so that, combined with land armaments and with the assistance of small gunboats, we ought to feel certain of being able to close the entrance of every harbour and creek on the coast to a hostile fleet. We have ample supplies of military stores; and in all that relates to the produc

I have dwelt somewhat at length on the difficulties of maritime expeditions and of landing on an enemy's coast, because the great and singular advantages of our insular position appear to me to have been somewhat overlooked in the late discussions, and because I am anxious to show that a sudden and unforeseen invasion of this country is impossible. Should an enemy break through our blockade of his ports and succeed in defeating our fleets, and, favoured with fair weather, approach our coasts, even then we have the power, by means of land batteries, gunboats, and torpedoes, of preventing his entering our harbours, and of forcing him to the hazardous attempt of landing on an open beach, and entering on a campaign without a base of operations. It is at such a critical juncture that the Militia and Volunteer Artillery might be expected to prove useful auxiliaries to the Royal Artillery, not only with the heavy ordnance in our coast batteries, but also with movable guns of position. At all hazards the enemy should be attacked on landing.

No doubt it is possible that in spite of every effort on our part such a contingency may arise, and then the struggle must be fought out on land. Still it must be carried on upon terms advantageous to us in every way. The enemy must be comparatively limited in numbers, weak in artillery, and in some confusion. On the other hand we have all the inner lines of communication, the railways and telegraphs in our possession; and certainly, under these circumstances, if we retain any of our ancient courage and determination, we ought to be able to defeat such a rash attempt, and

to drive our foes back into the

sea.

There seems to be a general impression that our main arsenal at Woolwich is very open to attack, and that we should therefore maintain another more inland. To this argument I demur. Now that the great forts on the Thames at and below Gravesend are approaching completion, some of them being already armed, and considering that the river itself is a difficult one in parts for large vessels, and considering also how easy it is to close it with lines of torpedoes, Woolwich, under these circumstances, appears to me as safely as it is conveniently placed. We have depots of guns, ammunition, and stores also at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Weedon, and other places.

As regards manufacture, Messrs Armstrong at Newcastle, Sir J. Whitworth & Co. at Manchester, and other firms, are capable, in case of need, of turning out guns and munitions rapidly, in large quantities; consequently, there seems no necessity to incur the expense of a second manufacturing arsenal. Our policy in this matter has been, to manufacture partly ourselves and to encourage the trade; and this seems as sound in principle as it is economical to the State.

With respect to the position of our depots, it should always be borne in mind that we are a great maritime Power, that we have to supply the navy with guns and munitions of war, and that our chief land defences are on the coast, and our depots should be placed accordingly. In short, we should adapt our arrangements to the requirements of the service, and not provide for imaginary campaigns in the heart of England when our natural defences lie elsewhere. Not only that, but, for all foreign expeditions, it is essential that our depots should

be at hand; therefore, for offensive or defensive purposes, we should keep our strength and our munitions near the coast, because it is the point of departure for foreign war, and the strongest line for national defence. Our exceptionally fortunate position renders it unnecessary to map out the country into districts and to maintain large corps d'armée, as in reality we have no neighbours -we stand apart in the ocean. The requirements of an army for home defence, in all that relates to supplies, camp equipage, and transport, are of a very modified character, as compared to those of troops engaged in a distant campaign in a hostile country. But, on the other hand, in entering on a Continental war, we have always at the commencement to encounter the special difficulties of transporting our troops with all their impedimenta across the seas, and we must therefore make our arrangements accordingly.

Passing now to the next portion of the subject, and in considering what should be the organisation of our forces, and in comparing it with that of other nations, it is to be observed that the duties required of our troops are more varied, and in many respects more onerous, than those of others, and our system cannot consequently be so simple.

The great military Powers of Europe have one main object in view-namely, to protect themselves from powerful neighbours; the whole of their army is at home; their military systems, therefore, are devoted to the creation of the largest possible army at the smallest cost, and to be ready in the shortest time.

Our circumstances, however, are different. In the first place, our insular position gives us considerable advantages so far as home defence is concerned, and renders unneces

sary the colossal arrangements considered essential by the Continental Powers; and therefore, were our responsibilities limited to the protection of the United Kingdom, our military organisation might be simple and cheap. We could adopt the Prussian or some similar plan, so far as required, and feel secure. But, on the other hand, our colonial possessions and our empire of India require a large number of troops to protect them; in fact, at present we have 80,000 men abroad, threefourths of whom are in the East.

These troops are so dispersed over the world that they cannot be relied on for assistance at home in case of need; and the very distance of our foreign dependencies, especially of India, renders it impossible to adopt altogether the cheap and efficient short service plan, and therefore our whole army system is complicated and overborne by the nature of our empire.

There are many officers who, perceiving the great difficulties of reconciling these somewhat conflicting varieties of service, are disposed to cut the matter short by creating two separate and distinct armies the one for permanent duty in India, the other for home defence. There are, however, great objections to this proposal. An army of English soldiers, permanently localised in a country and climate such as India, far away from English associations, and ever resident amidst inferior Eastern races, is apt to become turbulent in spirit and lax in discipline, and these defects in time become chronic. Those who are acquainted with the circumstances connected with the dissolution of the local European army in India, in 1859, would be able to urge strong reasons against the renewal of such a system. But there are other and still greater objections. The distinguishing features of the English army have been

its love of enterprise and its varied experience from service in all quarters of the globe. The army has, in this respect, been imbued with the national character, and both officers and men have derived great advantages from the various and enlarged nature of their duties. To create a local army for India would cut off our forces from their widest field of enterprise in the East; and it may be feared that if the home army were to be limited to the defence of these shores, it would be

found, after a few years of peace, to have dwindled away into a mere lifeless local militia, without ambition or experience, and would probably be unprepared and ignorant in the hour of need.

The chief defects of our present military arrangements, as regards men, appear to consist, not so much in deficiency of numbers as in want of unity and elasticity of system. The army, the militia, the pensioners, and the volunteers, have all distinct organisations, and instead of being parts of one whole, are rivals, and in a degree almost antagonistic to each other, both in feeling and in fact; and there is no sufficient trained reserve.

The army consists of men regularly trained, enlisted for service all over the world, passing most of their time abroad. The militia is only available for home, or occasionally in war for colonial duties. It is not permanently embodied, the men are but partially trained, and the officers, as a rule, are not professional soldiers.

The volunteers, though patriotic in spirit, are hardly soldiers in the strict sense of the word; they are civilians, under arms occasionally, subject to no military law, and generally without professional leaders. It is sometimes supposed that in their organisation they represent to