[264 B.C.] structure she had half erected tumble to the ground only to commence her work anew after a little time. Between the capable Roman official and the governing board existed a perfect understanding, whereas at Carthage these two classes were at constant war, the officials often being forced to take stand against their superiors and make common cause with their political opponents.

Both Carthage and Rome had dominion over people of many races besides their own. Rome admitted to citizenship district after district of these aliens, even leaving a legal way of entrance open to the Latins themselves; whereas Carthage shut herself off entirely from all her dependencies, extending to them not the slightest hope that she would ever admit them to such equality. Rome permitted the communities that were of kindred race to have a share in the spoils of war, and sought by specially favouring the rich and influential of tributary states to reconcile them to Roman dominion. Carthage not only kept for herself all the fruits of victory, but deprived tributary cities of their most useful privilege-free trade. Rome never entirely denied independence to even the weakest of her subject states, and never burdened them with heavy taxes; Carthage sent representatives far and wide and laid even the ancient Phoenician cities under exorbitant toll, treating their inhabitants little better than they would slaves In the African-Carthaginian alliance there was thus not a single commonalty, with the exception of Utica, which did not aspire to bettering its political and material condition through the fall of Carthage, whereas in the RomanItalian alliance there was not one which by rebelling against a rule that promoted its material welfare, without directly challenging the political opposition party, would not have lost more than it gained. When the Carthaginian statesmen thought to have linked to Carthage Phoenician dependencies by arousing their fear of a Libyan revolt, and the dominant states by the payment of oracle money to their temple, they were carrying mercantile practices over into a field where these did not belong. Experience showed that the Roman symmachy, despite the less solid front it opposed to Pyrrhus, held together like a wall of rock; while that of Carthage fell apart like a spider-web as soon as a hostile power set foot on the soil of Africa. This was evidenced at the landing of Agathocles and Regulus, and also in the war against the mercenaries, while the spirit that prevailed in Africa is shown by the fact that the Libyan women voluntarily sacrificed their jewels to the mercenaries to carry on the war against Carthage. In Sicily she appears to have acted with greater moderation, hence to have obtained better results. Her dependencies there were allowed relative freedom in their trade with other lands, using metal money exclusively from the first in their domestic commerce, and enjoying in every respect greater liberty of action than was accorded to Sardinians and Libyans. Had Syracuse fallen into her hands, all this would have soon been changed; but no such thing occurred, and under the wise moderation of Carthaginian rule, favoured by the unfortunate disarray of the Sicilian Greeks, a distinctly Phoenician party arose in Sicily; Philinus of Acragas, for example, writing the history of the great war after the loss of the island to the Romans entirely from a Phoenician point of view. Still, on the whole, the Sicilians, as subjects and as Hellenes, must have borne an aversion to their Phoenician masters equal to that shown by the Tarentians and the Samnitians towards Rome.

The revenues of Carthage undoubtedly exceeded those of Rome, but this was offset by the greater likelihood of her sources of supply, tributes, and

[264-241 B.C.]

toll, running dry at the moment when she needed them most, and by the far greater expense entailed by her system of warfare. From a military point of view the resources of both states, though differing in kind, were fairly equal. At the conquest of Carthage her population (including women and children) numbered seven hundred thousand, and must have remained about the same up to the end of the fifth century of Rome. At this time Carthage could, in case of necessity, place a force of forty thousand hoplites in the field. But, desirable as it seemed to her that the great body of her citizens should be trained to military service, she could not bestow upon artisans and factory-workers the rugged physical strength of the countryman, nor could she overcome in the Phoenician his inborn aversion to the work of war. In the fifth century of Rome there fought in the Sicilian army a general's guard or "sacred body" of twenty-five hundred Carthaginians; a century later with the exception of the officers there was to be found in all the Carthaginian forces, notably in her Spanish army, not a single Carthaginian. The main body of the Carthaginian army was formed of Libyans, this people furnishing recruits, who, in the hands of capable officers, developed into unequalled foot-soldiers and light cavalrymen. To these were added soldiers from all the dependent states of Libya and Spain, the celebrated sling-shooters of the Balearic Isles who seemed to have occupied a position between that of allied troops and mercenaries, and lastly the soldiery gathered in, in case of necessity, from other lands. Such a military force could be increased to almost any strength, and in courage, skill in handling weapons, and in the ability of its officers could compare favourably with that of the Romans. But when mercenaries had to be employed, a long time must elapse before it could be got in readiness, whereas the Roman militia could at any moment be sent into the field. There was further nothing to hold the Carthaginians together but the hope of gain and loyalty to the flag, in contrast to the Romans who were united by all the ties that bound them to the fatherland. To the Carthaginian officer of the usual type, the hired troops fighting under him, yes, even the Libyan peasants, were of no more account than are cannon balls in our day; hence shameful deeds were committed, as for example the betrayal of the Libyan troops by their commander Himilco, which had for result a serious Libyan revolt. The term "Punic faith " as used thereafter in connection with the Carthaginians came to be a standing reproach that injured them not a little. All in all, Carthage experienced every ill that fellah and mercenary armies can bring into a land, finding on more than one occasion that paid allies were more dangerous than sworn foes.

The faults of such a military system could not be overlooked by the Carthaginian rulers who were constantly trying to amend them; treasuries were kept filled and arsenals stocked that more mercenaries might be hired at any moment; and particular attention was given that branch of the service that corresponded in ancient times to our modern artillery-war-machines in the use of which Carthaginians were more expert than the Siceliotes, and elephants there having superseded the ancient war-chariots. But the chief bulwark of the nation, the navy, was the object of special pride and care. In the construction, as in the navigation of ships, the Carthaginians far surpassed the Greeks. In Carthage were built the first ships having three banks of oars, and the rigging of their sailing ships mostly quinqueremes rendered them as a rule swifter than those of the Greeks; the rowers, slaves belonging to the state, who never left the galleys, were admirably drilled, and the captains were skilled and fearless. In this respect Carthage was decidedly superior to Rome, who with her own few ships and those of allied

[241-195 B.C.] Greece could not think of measuring forces on the open sea with a power that at that time ruled supreme over the western Mediterranean. If we summarise the knowledge gained by a close comparison of the resources of the two great powers, we find that at the beginning of their conflict they stood on very nearly equal ground. To this, however, we feel obliged to add that Carthage, though exerting all her powers of genius and wealth to provide herself with artificial means of offence and defence, could not yet make good her lack of native troops, or compensate the need of an independent alliance. That Rome could be endangered only in Italy, Carthage only in Libya, was not to be denied, and equally undeniable was it that Carthage could not long escape such a peril.d

The inevitable conflict between such neighbouring rivals as Rome and Carthage, came soon and lasted long. It brought forth great figures and impressive events on both sides. In the first Punic war the Carthaginians, after the defeat of their fleet in the Ægates, lost their possessions in Sicily, and the groups of islands belonging to it, and were obliged to pledge themselves to the payment of thirty-two hundred talents. Immediately afterwards the bloody war, of more than four years' duration (241-237), against the rebellious mercenaries broke out, in which the Libyan cities also took part, and in which Hamilcar's generalship finally won the victory over the mutineers. In the meantime the Romans had taken possession of Sardinia, and the Carthaginians, who did not yet feel strong enough for a fresh war, had not only to relinquish formally the possession of that island, but also to pay an additional tribute of twelve hundred talents. Corsica was also snatched from them at the same time with Sardinia. After the suppression of the revolt Hamilcar crossed to Gades (Cadiz) with the army, to begin a war of conquest on the Pyrenæan peninsula. For nine years he fought successfully against the Spanish tribes, until in 229 he met death in battle. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, who succeeded him, was able by peaceful means, rather than by war, to extend further the bounds of Carthaginian sovereignty. In 221, when Hasdrubal had fallen by the hand of a Gaul, the army chose Hamilcar's famous son Hannibal commander-in-chief, a choice no one in Carthage dared oppose.

In the years 221 and 220 Hannibal completed the conquest of Spain as far as the Ebro; in 219 he took Saguntum, in spite of an alliance existing between it and Rome. This was the cause of the second Punic war (218–201), in which the Carthaginians, under the spirited leadership of Hannibal, who made his way across the Pyrenees and the Alps even into Italy, at first achieved great successes, but at last were overcome by the inexhaustible military resources and the marvellous endurance of the Romans, who carried on the war in four places at once.

After the defeat at Zama (202) peace was granted in 201 to Rome's humbled rival under the following hard conditions: surrender of all but ten ships of war and of all elephants, the payment of ten thousand talents, the indemnification of Massinissa, and the promise not to take up arms again without the consent of the Romans. By wise measures Hannibal sought gradually to uplift his oppressed fatherland; but in this way prejudiced the interests of the aristocracy, who before this had been unfavourable to him, and who, with the help of the Romans, exiled him from Carthage (195).

After that Carthage was ruined within by controversies between the aristocratic and the popular parties, and threatened from without by Massinissa

1 For a detailed account of the Punic wars, see Vol. V.

[195 B.C.-697 A.D.]

who, set at the side of the Carthaginians by the Romans to watch them, and relying on his protectors, took from them one piece of their territory after another. The Romans, to be sure, from time to time sent commissioners to the spot, but only to give either no decision at all, or one unfavourable to the Carthaginians. Marcus Cato came there in 157 as one of these commissioners, and because the Carthaginians declined his offer to deliver an arbiter's judgment (presumably an unfavourable one), he was from that time on extremely embittered against them, and consequently closed every speech in the senate with the words, "Censeo ceterum, Carthaginem esse delendam" ("Moreover, I think Carthage must be destroyed").

When the Carthaginians at last, after the expulsion of the party of Massinissa (151) resisted the latter and were defeated, the Romans declared this a breach of peace, and in 149 sent the consuls, Manius, Manilius, and Lucius Marcius Censorinus, with eighty-four thousand men to Sicily. The Carthaginians begged for peace, but were required first to give three hundred children of the nobility as hostages, and to surrender all arms and munitions of war. When the Romans thereupon gave them the further command to abandon their city and settle again further inland, all classes and ranks united for the most desperate defence.

Thus began a last fearful conflict (third Punic war, 149-146), which ended with the conquest of Carthage by Publius Cornelius Scipio. Fire raged in the city seventeen days. A large portion of the inhabitants perished, the survivors were led into slavery. The city was razed to the ground, and the whole Carthaginian territory, with the exception of a few tracts that were given to the cities in alliance with the Romans, especially to Utica and Hippo, was made into the Roman province of Africa.

In 122, it was decided, on the proposal of Gaius Gracchus, to rebuild the city under the name of Junonia, and to plant there a colony of six thousand Roman citizens. However, the fall of Gracchus prevented the execution of the project. Julius Cæsar took it up again, but was not able to carry it out. The restoration did not begin, then, until under Augustus, who populated the city with three thousand Roman colonists and numerous natives from the vicinity.

The new city reached a high prosperity in the time of the empire, so that it took the second position, after Alexandria, among the cities of the empire outside of Rome. It was the seat of the Roman proconsul and of most of the other Roman officials, later also of a Christian bishop, and by reason of its favourable situation it soon became once more a rich seat of commerce, in which, however, there was no lack of schools of grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, and the other liberal arts.

LAST DAYS OF CARTHAGE

In 439 A.D. it was taken by the Vandals under Genseric, and was for almost a century the capital of the Vandal kingdom, until in 533 it was incorporated in the eastern Roman Empire by Justinian's general, Belisarius. The latter restored the ruined fortifications, and called the city in honour of his emperor, Justiniana.e

The western conquests of the Saracens were suspended near twenty years, till their dissensions were composed by the establishment of the house of Omayya; and the caliph Moawiya was invited by the cries of the Africans themselves. The successors of Heraclius had been informed of the tribute

[697 A.D.]

which they had been compelled to stipulate with the Arabs; but instead of being moved to pity and relieve their distress, they imposed, as an equivalent or a fine, a second tribute of a similar amount. The ears of the Byzantine ministers were shut against the complaints of their poverty and ruin; their despair was reduced to prefer the dominion of a single master; and the extortions of the patriarch of Carthage, who was invested with civil and military power, provoked the sectaries, and even the Catholics, of the Roman province to abjure the religion as well as the authority of their tyrants. The first lieutenant of Moawiya acquired a just renown, subdued an important city, defeated an army of thirty thousand Greeks, swept away fourscore thousand captives, and enriched with their spoils the bold adventurers of Syria and Egypt. But the title of conqueror of Africa is more justly due to his successor Okbaben Nafi [Akbah]. He marched from Damascus at the head of ten thousand of the bravest Arabs; and the genuine force of the Moslems was enlarged by the doubtful aid and conversion of many thousand Barbarians. It would be difficult, nor is it necessary, to trace the accurate line of the progress of Akbah. The interior regions have been peopled by the Orientals with fictitious armies and imaginary citadels. In the warlike province of Zab, or Numidia, fourscore thousand of the natives might assemble in arms; but the number of three hundred and sixty towns is incompatible with the ignorance or decay of husbandry; and a circumference of three leagues will not be justified by the ruins of Erbe or Lambesa, the ancient metropolis of that inland country. As we approach the seacoast, the wellknown cities of Bugia and Tangier define the more certain limits of the Saracen victories. A remnant of trade still adheres to the commodious harbour of Bugia, which in a more prosperous age is said to have contained about twenty thousand houses; and the plenty of iron which is dug from the adjacent mountains might have supplied a braver people with the instruments

of defence.

The remote position and venerable antiquity of Tingi, or Tangier, have been decorated by the Greek and Arabian fables; but the figurative expressions of the latter, that the walls were constructed of brass, and that the roofs were covered with gold and silver, may be interpreted as the emblems of strength and opulence. The province of Mauritania Tingitana, which assumed the name of the capital, had been imperfectly discovered and settled by the Romans; the five colonies were confined to a narrow pale, and the more southern parts were seldom explored by the agents of luxury, who searched the forests for ivory and the citronwood, and the shores of the ocean for the purple shellfish. The fearless Akbah plunged into the heart of the country, traversed the wilderness in which his successors erected the splendid capitals of Fez and Morocco, and at length penetrated to the verge of the Atlantic and the great desert.

The river Sus descends from the western sides of Mount Atlas, fertilises, like the Nile, the adjacent soil, and falls into the sea at a moderate distance from the Canary, or Fortunate, Islands. Its banks were inhabited by the last of the Moors, a race of savages without laws, or discipline, or religion; they were astonished by the strange and irresistible terrors of the oriental arms; and as they possessed neither gold nor silver, the richest spoil was the beauty of the female captives, some of whom were afterwards sold for a thousand pieces of gold. The career though not the zeal of Akbah was checked by the prospect of a boundless ocean. He spurred his horse into the waves, and raising his eyes to heaven, exclaimed with the tone of a fanatic: "Great God! if my course were not stopped by this sea, I would still go on, to the un