"That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they have, at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper." Now, I should suppose that the venerable judges took their positions under the constitution. They were not ignorant that the people had the power to change the constitution, and they knew, therefore, that the tenure of their offices was limited by the will of the people. That very will is about to be visited upon these judges, and yet our sympathies are invoked in such a manner as to prevent its execution. There is no faith, there is no vested right about the matter. There is no injury, there is no wrong about it. If the people choose to amend their constitution as they have done here, if they choose to settle a great principle, no human being has a right to gainsay or thwart their design. If it is the will of the people, it must be submitted to. The principle is settled, and the operation of it cannot be made accountable to any man. It seems to me that there is a great mistake here. Gentlemen on this floor who have so much regard for the judges, argue upon the assumption, that when this convention fix a period at which the duties of each judge are to terminate, that judge, as a matter of course, is to go out of office-that he cannot be re-appointed. I believe that if a man is a good judge he will be re-appointed; and those who do not deserve to be reappointed probably will not be. But the whole argument, from first to last, is based upon the supposition, that whenever the judicial tenure expires, no man is to be re-appointed. That there is a misapprehension in this respect, I think no man can doubt. The gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) has spoken of the chief justice of the commonwealth, and of other men, and has spoken eloquently of their services, as if he believed that there was no possibility of the re-appointment of these men after their term of service has once expired. I do not believe any thing of the kind. I believe that if their judicial tenure expired this day, or next month, they would be re-appointed. As regards the judges of the supreme court, I will say that there is not a man in this house, however much he may worship them, who entertains a better or more exalted opinion of them than myself. Mr. PORTER begged to correct the gentleman from Bucks, (Mr. M'Dowell.) He (Mr. P.) worshipped nothing in the shape of huma nity. Mr. M'DowELL resumed. Probably not; but whether it be worship or not, I know that the gen tleman from Northampton serves a friend with fully as much zeal as he opposes an enemy; and I know that when he serves a friend, he does so with as warm a heart as any man in this commonwealth. When the feelings of such a man are brought out in a matter of friendship, they come very near to worship, if not quite. I say, however, that the argument is not a proper one-that it is not right to appeal to our sympathies and to say that those judges must be turned out of office. Are we to be the Are we to exercise the power of impeachment? judges and to say, that these men shall be turned out at a particular day! No, sir; we are not about to say any such thing; and it would be as absurd for us to do that as to attempt to re-appoint any judge. I deny the power of this convention to re-appoint. What have we done by the vote of Saturday? We undertook to resolve ourselves into the appointing power, and to re-appoint the judges of the supreme court for the term of fifteen years. And it has been done mainly on the ground of sympathy. Look at the course of the gentleman from Northampton. See the beautiful consistency with which he acts. His sympathies have induced him to ask us to be an appointing power in relation to the judges of the supreme court, but in relation to none other. And how is this justified? We have been told that it is necessary to place the judges of the supreme court beyond the operation of this principle, because it is necessary that their decisions should be permanent and consistent. Let us examine this argument. In the first place, how is the consistency of the decisions of the supreme bench to be destroyed? There are at present five judges; and say that one of them, for instance, is to go out in three years. That leaves a majority of the present judges still on the bench. Well. Another is to go out in three years more. That still would leave a majority of the present judges for the purpose of initiating, if you choose, the new members into the habits and customs of the old. So that no At the end of three years more, another is to go out. inconsistency in the decisions can possibly arise. I ask gentlemen whether, when they vote to graduate the termination of the judicial tenure, they do not vote with a view to keep the decisions of the court consistent with the present; and not with a view to introduce new decisions? But, independent of this, I am at a loss to understand these new systems of decision. My experience as a lawyer has taught me to believe, that the judges of the supreme court decide abstract questions of law, and I do not understand this idea about change in the principles of law. The laws remain in the commonwealth as they have remained. The judges construe the acts of assembly, and I do not see what change is to come about even if a sudden change were made in regard to the incumbents. These gentlemen who contend that it is right to keep the present judges on the bench of the supreme court do so upon two grounds. First, upon the ground of sympathy, with which we have nothing to do; and next, on the ground that the decisions should be permanent and without change. And yet the gentleman from Northampton introduces his amendment, which says, that this convention shall re appoint all the judges and let all their commissions terminate at one moment. Does the gentleman care nothing about the consistency of the decisions beyond fifteen years? Give us consistency for fifteen years, says the gentleman, and give us what you please after that time. He may indeed tell us, that there is no reasonable probability that all the judges will live so as to go out of office at the same time; but he has no right to assume any such position. I call upou him to prove it. I say they won't die. Mr. PORTER said, he would refer the gentleman for proof to the life insurance offices. : Mr. M'DOWELL resumed. Well, if they get insured probably they may die. I say that the judges will not die in fifteen years, not one of them-and I ask him to prove it. I say they will continue there until the expiration of fifteen years, and I will prove it, because they are alive now. If they are all bad judges they will die. If they are good judges, they will never die. If any judges die within fifteen years, it will be the bad, and not the good-and therefore this is a ruinous measure throughout. I regret the course I have been obliged to take on this question. I have as much true sympathy and as much regard for the rights of the jugdes as any man in or out of this convention: but I can never consent that the judges of the supreme court shall be re-appointed by this body unless, at the same time, we consent to re-appoint all the judges and magistrates of the commonwealth. I know of no principle that is to govern the one case, which ought not also to govern the other. I have exercised my mind on this subject. I have been desirous to save the judges of the supreme court, if gentlemen call it saving; but I could not do it without being guilty of what I deem to be an act of serious inconsistency; because I see neither principle nor reason in exempting the judges of the supreme court from the operation of this new provision. They are, it is true, great and learned men; but I suppese it will not be asserted that they are more so than many of the judges of the court of common pleas. There are as sound and as great jurists in the court of common pleas as on the bench of the supreme court, and I can not see the force of the only which has been brought forward-except that of sympathy-that there should be no revolution in the administration of justice. But I do fear that difficulty may arise, if, as the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, purports, that the tenure of all the judges is to terminate at the same time; and I, for one, will not give power to the governor and senate to re-appoint all at the same time. reason I regret the course I have felt obliged take the more, because some of my friends have voted against me. I have voted to limit the term of the judicial tenure, and I am determined, so far as my course is concerned, to carry out this principle in the most cautious and judicious manner that we can. I am free to say that, to be entirely consistent with ourselves, we ought all to have voted for the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) as being the most consistent proposition which has been offered. At the same time, I did not feel myself exactly at liberty to go for it, because it throws upon one governor and one senate the whole appointing powe But so far as regards the principle, I say it is the only consistent proposition which has been offered. As to the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, I would rather have it carried that the judicial tenure of the present judges should not be touched at all. I object to resolving ourselves into an appointing power, and to say we re-appoint these judges and they shall continue in office for fifteen years. For these reasons, I must vote in favor of the motion to re-consider. The convention then adjourned. MONDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 19, 1838. There being no quorum of members in attendance, a call of the house was ordered, which was proceeded in for some time, when the further proceedings were dispensed with, a quorum having appeared. SCHEDULE. The question recurring on the motion of Mr. EARLE, to re-consider the vote given on Saturday, on agreeing to the amendment to the amendment to the sixth section of the report of the committee appointed to prepare and report a schedule to the amended constitution, in the following words, viz: 66 The judges of the supreme court who shall be in commission at the time of the adoption of the amendments to this constitution, shall hold their offices for the term of fifteen years thereafter, if so long they shall behave themselves well." Mr. PORTER. of Northampton, rose and said that he would not detain the convention long with what he was about to say. By the vote which had been taken on Saturday last on his amendment, he should suppose that the convention regarded it as improper to turn out all the judicial officers in February, 1839, as was proposed by the amendment of the delegete from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey.) He considered that an important principle had been established by this decision of the body, viz: that by the new constitution, it would be unfair and unjust to deprive men of the offices they had held under the old. If this position had been estab. lished, he would ask if gentlemen had not, consequently, put an end to the judicial tenure of the commonwealth? If any thing could be said to have been settled by this convention, and by an almost unanimous vote, too, it was the principle, that by the adoption of a new constitution every man who held under the old was ipso facto turned out of office. He wished to know what tenure they have under the new constitution? what tenure they are entitled to? The convention had decided that they ought to be turned out. If principle was to govern in anything, this body had declared that those men who are in office shall continue under the new constitution. What, he would ask, was the tenure? Why, in regard to the judges of the supreme court, they are to hold their offices for fifteen years. He would call again-for he had already called in vain, for the reason, if any there were, why the men at present in office should have the tenure they have now. The convention had decided that they shall held for a limited time-that they shall not be turned With regard to that symmetry, of which the gentleman from Fayette (Mr. Fuller) had spoken, we knew only of that which is fixed in the constitution. But, some gentlemen had said, if we adopt this tenure in regard to the supreme court, we should do so as respects the judges of the common pleas, the associate judges, and justices of the peace. Now, he begged to remind gentlemen that the supreme court is a creature of the constitution that cannot be changed. It is provided for, and grows out of that instrument. out. In regard to the court of common pleas, it is created by the constitution, but it is in the power of the legislature, at any time they think proper, to take away from that court its entire jurisdiction. That, however, could not be done in reference to the supreme court. The judges of the common pleas are the creatures of the legislature; and the language of the constitution of 1790 is that "until it shall be otherwise directed by law, there shall be appointed in each county not fewer than three, nor more than four judges." The justices of the peace are under the control of the legislature. He had a word or two to say in relation to the associate judges and the justices of the peace. The difference between them and the law judges was important. They do not appropriate the whole of their time to the duties of their office, as was the case with the latter. He would ask gentlemen who had talked so much about principle, and of the want of adherence to it on the part of others, how their objections tallied with their avowal now that they do not object so much to the tenure of the supreme court, as to the effect of establishing a principle in respect to the court of common pleas. The avowal had been distinctly made, that, although it might be right to permit the judges of the supreme court to remain in office, as the constitution of 1790 guarantees, yet that it would not answer their views in regard to the court of common pleas. He supposed that there would be no great difficulty in bringing this as an argument to bear upon the argument of the reformers here, when gentlemen were found changing their grouud between Saturday and Monday, and trying to bring about a reconsideration of the vote taken in reference to the supreme court. What, he would ask, does this avowal amount to in relation to the president judges? Why, certain gentlemeu do not like the common pleas judges, and they want to get rid of them. And, in order to effect that object, they would not hesitate to sacrifice the supreme court judges. He would suppose, for instance, that the president judge of the thirteenth or fifteenth district, or of the eleventh, or that the president judge of the seventeenth or the seventh, should happen to be objectionable to certain lawyers in any of those districts. Mr. AGNEW explained :—As his district had been referred to, he begged to say that he was not among those who complained of the president judge. Mr. WOODWARD would also explain that the remarks of the gentleman had no application to the eleventh district. Mr. PORTER resumed: The application he had made to these districts was merely hypothetical. He had not supposed that the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Agnew) had any complaint to enter against these judges. Such an idea had not entered his (Mr. P's) mind. But, he merely supposed these president judges to be objectionable to some gentlemen, as perhaps accounting for the course they had thought proper to pursue. He was sorry to see gentlemen taking these remarks to themselves. He did not believe that any gentleman here would suffer his personal feelings to operate on him. He thought they were governed by purer and loftier motives. He would certainly acquit them of being influenced by any such feelings. He would suppose that they would throw their personal prejudices on the altar of principle which should govern us all. His friend from Fayette, (Mr. Fuller) in the course of |