posterous to prove rules and maxims; wherein I had the example of Mr. Littleton and Mr. Fitzherbert, whose writings are the institutions of the laws of England: whereof the one forbeareth to vouch any authority altogether; the other never reciteth a book, but when he thinketh the case so weak in credit of itself as it needeth surety; and these two I did far more esteem than Mr. Perkins or Mr. Standford, that have done the contrary. Well will it appear to those that are learned in the laws, that many of the cases are judged cases, either within the books, or of fresh report, and most of them fortified by judged cases and similitude of reason; though in some cases I did intend expressly to weigh down authorities by evidence of reason, and therein rather to correct the law, than either to sooth a received error, or by unprofitable subtlety, which corrupteth the sense of the law, to reconcile contrarieties. For these reasons I resolved not to derogate from the authority of the rules, by vouching of the authorities of the cases, though in mine own copy I had them quoted for although the meanness of mine own person may now at first extenuate the authority of this collection, and that every man is adventurous to control; yet surely, according to Gamaliel's reason, if it be of weight, time will settle and authorise it; if it be light and weak, time will reprove it. So that, to conclude, you have here a work without any glory of affected novelty, or of method, or of language, or of quotations and authorities, dedicated only to use, and submitted only to the censure of the learned, and chiefly of time.

Lastly, there is one point above all the rest I account the most material for making these reasons indeed profitable and instructing; which is, that they be not set down alone, like short dark oracles, which every man will be content to allow still to be true, but in the mean time they give little light and direction; but I have attended them, a matter not practised, no not in the civil law to any purpose, and for want whereof, the rules indeed are but as proverbs, and many times plain fallacies, with a clear and perspicuous exposition, breaking them into cases, and opening their sense and

use, and limiting them with distinctions, and sometimes shewing the reasons whereupon they depend, and the affinity they have with other rules. And though I have thus, with as much discretion and foresight as I could, ordered this work, and as I may say, without all colours or shews, husbanded it best to profit; yet nevertheless not wholly trusting to mine own judgment having collected three hundred of them, I thought good, before I brought them all into form, to publish some few, that by the taste of other mens opinions in this first, I might receive either approbation in mine own course, or better advice for the altering of the other which remain: for it is great reason that that which is intended to the profit of others, should be guided by the conceits of others.

6H.8. Dy.

fo. 1. et 2.

Litt. cap. Discont.

REGULA I.

In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur.

IT were infinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.

As if an annuity be granted pro consilio impenso et impendendo, and the grantee commit treason, whereby he is imprisoned, so that the grantor cannot have access unto him for his counsel; yet nevertheless the annuity is not determined by this non-feasance; yet it was the grantee's act and default to commit the treason, whereby the imprisonment grew; but the law looketh not so far, and excuseth him, because the not giving counsel was compulsory, and not voluntary, in regard of the imprisonment.

So if a parson make a lease, and be deprived, or re2 H. 45. sign, the successors shall avoid the lease; and yet the 26 H. 8. 2. cause of deprivation, and more strongly of a resigna

tion, moved from the party himself: but the law re

gardeth not that, because the admission of the new incumbent is the act of the ordinary.

5 H. 7.35. So if I be seised of an advowson in gross, and an usurpation be had against me, and at the next avoidance I usurp arere, I shall be remitted: and yet the presentation, which is the act remote, is mine own act; but the admission of my clerk, whereby the

inheritance is reduced to me, is the act of the ordinary.

So if I covenant with I. S. a stranger, in consideration of natural love to my son, to stand seised to the use of the said I. S. to the intent he shall infeoff my son; by this no use will rise to I. S. because the law doth respect that there is no immediate consideration between me and I. S.

So if I be bound to enter into a statute before the 12 H. 4. mayor of the staple at such a day, for the security of H. 8. Dy. f. 1. a hundred pounds, and the obligee, before the day, accept of me a lease of an house in satisfaction; this is no plea in debt upon my obligation: and yet the end of this statute was but security for money; but because the entering into this statute itself, which is the mediate act whereto I am bound, is a corporal act which lieth not in satisfaction, therefore the law taketh no consideration that the remote intent was for money.

So if I make a *feoffment in fee, upon condition 37 R. that the feoffee shall infeoff over, and the feoffee be Chest. disseised, and a descent cast, and then the feoffee bind himself in a statute, which statute is discharged before the recovery of the land: this is no breach of the condition, because the land was never liable to the statute, and the possibility that it should be liable upon recovery the law doth not respect.

So if I enfeoff two, upon condition to enfeoff, and one of them take a wife, the condition is not broken; and yet there is a remote possibility that the jointtenant may die, and then the feme is intitled to dower.

So if a man purchase land in fee-simple, and die without issue; in the first degree the law respecteth dignity of sex, and not proximity; and therefore the remote heir on the part of the father shall have it, before the near heir on the part of the mother: but, in any degree paramount the first the law respecteth it not, and therefore the near heir by the grandmother on the part of the father shall have it, be

* M. 40 et 41. El. Julius Winnington's case, ore report per le tresreverend Judge, le Sur Coke, lib. 2.

37 R. Dacres case, obiter.

fore the remote heir of the grandfather on the part of the father.

This rule faileth in covinous acts, which though they be conveyed through many degrees and reaches, yet the law taketh heed to the corrupt beginning, and counteth all as one intire act.

As if a feoffment be made of lands held in knight's service to I. S. upon condition that he within a certain time shall infeoff I. D. which feoffment to I. D. shall be to the wife of the first feoffer for her jointure, etc. this feoffment is within the statute of 32 H. VIII. nam dolus circuitu non purgatur.

In like manner this rule holdeth not in criminal acts, except they have a full interruption; because when the intention is matter of substance, and that which the law doth principally behold, there the first motive must be principally regarded, and not the last Op. Catte-impulsion. As if I. S. of malice prepense discharge a lyn et aupistol at I. D. and miss him, whereupon he throws down his pistol and flies, and I. D. pursueth him to kill him, whereupon he turneth and killeth I. D. with a dagger; if the law should consider the last impulsive cause, it should say that this was in his own defence; but the law is otherwise, for it is but a pursuance and execution of the first murderous intent.

tres in case de Stoel.

44 Ed. 3.

Lit.cap.de discent.

21 Eliz.

24 H. 8. fo. 4. Dy. 21 R.

But if I. S. had fallen down, his dagger drawn, and I. D. had fallen by haste upon his dagger, there I. D. had been felo de se, and I. S. shall go quit.

Also you may not confound the act with the execution of the act; nor the intire act with the last part, or the consummation of the act.

For if a disseisor enter into religion, the immediate cause is from the party, though the descent be cast in law; but the law doth but execute the act which the party procureth, and therefore the descent shall not bind, et e converso.

If a lease for years be made rendering rent, and the lessee make a feoffment of part, and the lessor enter, the immediate cause is from the law in respect of the forfeiture, though the entry be the act of the party; but that is but the pursuance and putting in