to her majesty, to have every of the same to be managed by men of fidelity, that shall be waged by her own pay, than either to be letten out to the fermours benefits, or to be left at large to the booty and spoil of ravenous ministers, that have not their reward; let the experiment and success be in this one office, and persuade for all the rest.

Laus Deo.

His double Reading to the Hon. SOCIETY OF GRAY's Inn. 42 Eliz.

I HAVE chosen to read upon the statute of uses made 27 Hen. VIII. a law, whereupon the inheritances of this realm are tossed at this day, like a ship upon the sea, in such sort, that it is hard to say which bark will sink, and which will get to the haven; that is to say, what assurances will stand good, and what will not. Neither is this any lack or default in the pilots, the grave and learned judges: but the tides and currents of received errors, and unwarranted and abusive experience have been so strong, as they were not able to keep a right course according to the law, so as this statute is in great part as a law made in the parlia ment, held 35 Reginæ; for in 37 Reginæ, by the notable judgment upon solemn arguments of all the judges assembled in the exchequer-chamber, in the famous cause between Dillon and Freine, concerning an assurance made by Chudleigh, this law began to be reduced to a true and sound exposition, and the false and perverted exposition, which had continued for so many years, though never countenanced by any rule or authority of weight, but only entertained in a popular conceit, and put in practice at adventure, grew to be controled; since which time, as it cometh to pass always upon the first reforming of inveterate errors, many doubts and perplexed questions have

risen, which are not yet resolved, nor the law thereupon settled: the consideration whereof moved me to take the occasion of performing this particular duty to the house, to see if I could, by my travel, bring the exposition thereof to a more general good of the com monwealth.

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Herein, though I could not be ignorant of the difficulty of the matter, which he that taketh in hand shall soon find; or much less of my own inability, which I had continual sense and feeling of; yet because I had more means of absolution than the younger sort, and more leisure than the greater sort, I did think it not impossible to work some profitable effect; the rather because where an inferior wit is bent and conversant upon one subject, he shall many times with patience and meditation dissolve and undo many of the knots, which a greater wit, distracted with many matters, would rather cut in two than unknit: and at least, if my invention or judgment be too barren or too weak; yet, by the benefit of other arts, I did hope to dispose or digest the authorities or opinions which are in cases of uses in such order and method, as they should take light one from another, though they took no light from me. And like to the matter of my reading shall my manner be, for my meaning is to revive and recontinue the ancient form of reading, which you may see in Mr. Frowicke's upon the prerogative, and all other readings of ancient time, being of less ostentation, and more fruit than the manner lately accustomed: for the use then was, substantially to expound the statutes by grounds and diversities; as you shall find the readings still to run upon cases of like law and con trary law; whereof the one includes the learning of a ground, the other the learning of a difference: and not to stir concise and subtle doubts, or to contrive a multitude of tedious and intricate cases, whereof all, saving one, are buried, and the greater part of that one case, which is taken, is commonly nothing to the matter in hand; but my labour shall be in the ancient course, to open the law upon doubts, and not to open doubts upon this law.

EXPOSITIO STATUTI.

THE exposition of this statute consists, upon the matter without the statute: upon the matter within the statute.

Three things are to be considered concerning these statutes, and all other statutes, which are helps and inducements to the right understanding of any statute, and yet are no part of the statute itself.

. 1. The consideration of the statute at the common law.

2. The consideration of the mischief which the statute intendeth to redress, as also any other mischief, which an exposition of the statute this way or that way may breed.b

3. Certain maxims of the common law, touching exposition of statutes. rent

Having therefore framed six divisions, according to the number of readings upon the statute itself, I have likewise divided the matter without the statute into six introductions or discourses, so that for every day's reading I have made a triple provision.

1. A preface or introduction.

2. A division upon the law itself.

3. A few brief cases, for exercise and argument. The last of which I would have forborn: and, according to the ancient manner, you should have taken some of my points upon my divisions, one, two, or more, as you should have thought good; save that I had this regard, that the younger sort of the bar were not so conversant with matters upon the statutes; and for their ease I have interlaced some matters at the common law, that are more familiar within the books.

1. The first matter I will discourse unto you, is the nature and definition of an use, and its inception and progression before the statute.

2. The second discourse shall be of the second spring of this tree of uses since the statute.

3. The third discourse shall be of the estate of the assurances of this realm at this day upon uses, and

what kind of them is convenient and reasonable, and not fit to be touched, as far as the sense of law and natural construction of the statute will give leave; and what kind of them is convenient and meet to be suppressed. 4. The fourth discourse shall be of certain rules and expositions of laws applied to this present purpose.

5. The fifth discourse shall be of the best course to remedy the same inconveniencies now a-foot, by construction of the statute, without offering violence to the letter or sense.

6. The sixth and last discourse shall be of the best course to remedy the same inconveniencies, and to declare the law by act of parliament: which last I think good to reserve, and not to publish.

THE nature of a use is best discerned by considering what it is not, and then what it is; for it is the nature of all human science and knowledge to proceed most safely, by negatives and exclusives, to what is affirmative and inclusive:

First, an use is no right, title, or interest in law; and therefore master attorney, who read upon this statute, said well, that there are but two rights:

Jus in re: Jus ad rem.

The one is an estate, which is Jus in re; the other a demand, which is Jus ad rem: but a use is neither; so that in 24 H. VIII. it is said that the saving of the statute of 1 R. III. which saveth any right or interest of intails, must be understood of intails of the possession, and not of the part of the use, because a use is no right nor interest. So again, you see Littleton's conceit, that an use should amount to a tenancy at will, whereupon a release might well inure, because of privity, is controled by 4 and 5 H. VII. and divers other books, which say that cestuy que use is punishable in an action of trespass towards the feoffees; only 5 H. V. seemeth to be at some discord with other books, where it is admitted for law, that if there be cestuy que use of an advowson, and he be outlawed in a personal action, the King should have the present