Notices of New Books. [** It should be understood that the Notices of New Works forwarded to us for Review, and which appear in this part of the Magazine, do not preclude our recurring to them at greater length, and in a more elaborate form, in a subsequent Number, when their character and importance require it.] A Selection of Leading Cases on Real Property, Conveyancing, and the Construction of Wills and Deeds: with Notes. By Owen Davies Tudor, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. London: Butterworths. 1863. Pp. 1,014. Ir is now fourteen years since the example of Smith's Leading Cases induced Mr. Tudor (in conjunction with Mr. White) to do for equity practitioners what that great work had effected for the common lawyers. The attempt was successful, and the leading cases in equity not only found favour at home, but were transplanted to American soil, where the work was edited by learned and eminent hands. Encouraged by this success, Mr. Tudor, some seven years since, collected and edited a number of leading cases, the knowledge of which is of the greatest importance to the real property lawyer and conveyancer; and to these cases Notes were appended after the same method as that adopted in the Leading Cases in Equity. The second edition of this latter work is now before us, and we are able to say that the same extensive knowledge, and the same laborious industry, as have been exhibited by Mr. Tudor on former occasions, characterize this latter production of his legal authorship. We are informed in the advertisement to the edition that the Notes have been carefully revised, and much new matter added, the additions consisting of about 170 pages; and it is hardly necessary to say, that the number of cases cited has been largely increased, and brought down to the latest period. It should be noticed, that an entirely new case has been added to this edition, that of Lord Braybroke v. Inskip, in which the question is dealt with, when mortgage or trust estates will pass under a general devise. Seventeen pages of notes, careful and elaborate, are appended to the case, and constitute a valuable addition to the original work. It would not be possible, nor would it be consistent with this brief notice, to enter into the details of this volume, which can only be treated with justice in a lengthy article; it is enough, at this moment, to reiterate our opinion that Mr. Tudor has well maintained the high legal reputation which his standard works have achieved in all countries where the English language is spoken, and the decisions of our Courts are quoted. Jurisprudence. By Charles Spencer March Phillips. London: John Murray. 1863. THIS is a clever attempt to construct a system of jurisprudence on the antiquated principle of natural justice. Although we cannot say that the attempt is at all successful, still we have no hesitation in pronouncing the work of Mr. Phillips to be one of great interest. Any treatise upon jurisprudence by an Englishman must naturally excite attention, from the rarity of such a performance; and the present work is unquestionably distinguished by ability of no common character, by accurate and forcible modes of expression, and by considerable powers of systematic thinking and searching analysis. We do not, however, mean to assert that these qualities are entirely without alloy. There is a tendency to dogmatism and self-confidence which is neither pleasant, nor favourable to truth. On some occasions there is an amount of flippancy which strikes us as not quite suitable to the subject; and considerable portions of the work are distinguished by an aridity which certainly equals anything we have ever come across in law or in any other department. As Mr. Phillips does not appear to be connected with the profession, we have no scruple in saying that he is by no means sound in his law. What authority has he for laying it down "that every man who publicly professes to exercise any art or trade for hire or profit is compellable to give assistance in all cases where it is required, and will be responsible for the consequences if he refuses to do so?"* Or what does he mean by saying that "a body of associated individuals may appoint a corporation aggregate, and vest the supreme authority in a corporation sole, as in the case of a city whose inhabitants combine to elect a town-council, presided over by a mayor?" We have detected various instances of a similar nature throughout the work; and we deeply regret that such slips should occur, as they must inevitably shock the delicate susceptibilities of English lawyers, and prejudice them against a book which, we confess, we should like to see extensively read by the profession. It is, of course, impossible for us on the present occasion to give any adequate idea of the contents and method of the work. The author defines jurisprudence as "the science which teaches us to analyse and classify the rules of justice," and excludes the idea "that jurisprudence teaches us, or can possibly teach us, what the rules of justice are." After an elaborate introduction, in which Mr. Phillips fully states the principles upon which he proceeds, he treats the subject under two great divisions: First, Natural † Sec. 127. *Sec. 48. Jurisprudence, embracing personal rights and obligations, real rights and obligations, and statual rights and obligations; and secondly, Civil Jurisprudence, embracing municipal rights and obligations, territorial rights and obligations, and extra-territorial rights and obligations. The following quotation will show the leading object of the work:-"I intend to try by the present treatise the experiment of presenting the science of jurisprudence to the student in its natural shape and order. For this purpose I shall first inquire from what inevitable circumstances the necessity for such a science has arisen. These circumstances, whatever they may be, will constitute the natural elements of the science, and by the various combinations of which they may be capable, the science chiefly, in its simplest and most elementary form, will be composed. The natural and everlasting foundation being thus laid, it will become comparatively easy to comprehend the effect of the various artificial superstructions which the will of man has erected, or may erect upon it. To investigate the details, or even to sketch the outlines of human legislation, is of course no part of my plan, but I shall endeavour to indicate the general principles by which it is connected with, and through which it may be said to form a part of, the universal science of jurisprudence. I believe that the result of this conception, if adequately worked out, will be a clear and comprehensive view of that great system of problems whose solution is the object of law. Every question of right which can possibly arise between two human beings would be stated in its proper succession and connexion, and a method of analysis would thus be provided by which any conceivable system of law might at once be arrayed in precise and perfect logical order."-P. 23. It will be seen at once from the above extract that Mr. Phillips is opposed alike to the utilitarian and to the historical theory of jurisprudence. We cannot, however, say that in formally discussing the question, he has thrown any real doubt on either of the two views, which with certain limitations may very well stand together. His own theory, we venture to think, he leaves very much where he found it. With respect to English law, we may observe that Mr. Phillips considers it capable, by the application of general principle, of becoming "the most perfect system of law whose existence the imperfections of the human intellect will permit." "Such a system," he says, "would consist in a code of fixed rules, founded upon rational calculations of general expediency; and combined with a collection of judicial precedents constantly improved by the additions and alterations of a succession of accomplished jurists."-P. 72. A New Pantomime. By Edward Vaughan Kenealy, LL.D. London: Reeves & Turner. 1863. Ir is so rare to find a barrister in successful practice who is also gifted with poetical genius, that such an event should not be passed over in a hurried notice. We had fully intended to do Dr. Kenealy justice in an article, but an unusual pressure on our space prevents our fulfilling the intention. We should be unwilling, however, to allow this number to pass into print without expressing our conviction of the real genius which is embodied in the "New Pantomime." The Institutions of the English Government. Being an Account of the Constitution, Powers, and Procedure of its Legislative, Judicial, and Administrative Departments. By Homersham Cox, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. London: H. Sweet. 1863. Pp. 757. The English Constitution. By Dr. Edward Fischel. Translated from the Second German Edition. By Richard Jenery Shee, of the Inner Temple. London: Bosworth & Harrison. 1863. Pp. 592. As we hope to treat of these two works at some length in a future number, we shall confine ourselves at the present moment to a short statement of the nature and objects of each. Mr. Homersham Cox has collected from ancient and modern authorities a general account of the British Government, of the powers and practice of its several departments, and of the constitutional principles affecting them, in a compendious form. The work supplies a great want in describing the modern functions of British institutions. Copious and authentic authorities are cited in the notes, and the volume opens with an excellent and most useful analysis. Dr. Fischel's work is perhaps still more valuable as being the independent opinion of a foreigner on the British Constitution, and the institutions which have grown up and flourish under it. It is wonderful that a foreigner should have obtained a knowledge of these at once so extensive and minute as that which this work exhibits. The translation is made from the second edition of the work, and is substantially literal, though some errors have been corrected by the translator, Mr. R. T. Shee. Questions for Law Students on the Fifth Edition of Mr. Serjeant Stephen's New Commentaries on the Law of England. By James Stephen, Esq., LL.D., &c. London: Butterworths. 1863. We have recently noticed the new edition of Stephen's Commentaries with that approval which is unanimously accorded by the voice of the profession. The work now before us contains a series of questions on the Commentaries, for the use of Law Students. It is, in our judgment, carefully and ably done. The Transfer of Land and Declaration of Title Acts, 1862: with Notes, General Orders, Forms, &c.; and a full Index. By R. Denny Urlin and Thomas Key, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. London: William Maxwell. 1863. Shall we Register Title? or the Objections to Land and Title Registry Stated and Answered. By Tenison Edwards, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Chapman & Hall. 1863. IT appears from a Parliamentary Paper, ordered in June last, that the number of applications as yet made to the Office of Land Registry is thirty-four, comprising property estimated to exceed £500,000 in value; but only three land certificates have been granted. Nothing has yet been done under the Declaration of Title Act. It is, therefore, still open to theoretical conjecture, how far the recent measures on land transfer are likely to succeed, and the little works of Messrs. Urlin and Key, and Mr. Edwards, may be consulted with advantage on the probable solution of the question. The former, we may say, contains a very good account of the Irish and the South Australian systems, which is a valuable contribution to (if we may use the term) the comparative jurisprudence of the subject. Mr. Edwards gives in a popular way a very clear statement of the objections which have been urged to the registration of title, and the answers that may be made to such objections. Both the books are worth reading. A Concise Treatise on the Construction of Wills. THIS is a synopsis of those judicial decisions which are now the canons of interpretation applicable to wills. Lawyers are much indebted to parish clerks, schoolmasters, and other self-instituted will-makers, for the subtleties of this department of our jurisprudence. Some of the most ingenious arguments and memorable judgments reported in the books are those which settle the legal construction to be put on testamentary words and phrases. Thus, such expressions as "issue," "heirs male of the body," "money," "effects," "lands," "rents and profits," "estate," &c., which constantly occur in wills, have a precise legal meaning, according to which the document will be construed, unless the testator expressly prescribes a different interpretation. The author confines himself to the Rules of Construction; and, in this respect, his treatise differs from the larger work of Jarman, which embraces, in addition, the Rules of Law. The distinction is clear, and deserves attention. "A rule of construction always contains the |