rungen seiner friedlichen Gesinnung den unbedingtesten Glauben beizumessen, warnte Sheridan in einer Rede, welche er sehr bald nach der Eröffnung des neuen Parliaments hielt, die Mitglieder vor der Französischen Regierung und deren Hinterlist, und so sehr er sonst Bonaparte und dessen Benehmen gegen Eng❤ land in Schutz zu nehmen gesucht hatte, so sehr bemühte er sich jetzt, das Parliament zu überzeugen, dass er von seinem Irrthum zurückgekommen sey und die Sachen nun aus ihrem wahren Gesichtspunkte betrachte. Von dieser Ansicht ausgehend, schilderte er mit hinreifsender Beredsamkeit und den stärksten Farben die eigentlichen Absichten Bonaparte's, wie er durch allgemein aufgestellte menschenfreundliche Grundsätze, an welche er selbst nicht glaube, die Klügeren zu berücken suche, und wie sein ganzes Treiben nur dahin gerichtet sey, auch England, gleich den übrigen schon unterworfenen Ländern, zu unterjochen. Mit Bedauern, fügte er hinzu, sähe er sich genöthigt, zu erklären, dafs seine Ansicht in diesem Falle von der seines Freundes Fox gänzlich abgehe; denn obgleich er, wie dieser, wünsche, dafs man den Krieg vermeiden möge, so sey er doch nicht mit ihm über die Mittel einig, 'durch welche dieses erreicht werden müsse, und der Meinung, dafs Bonaparte's Beispiel nur dazu da sey, um die Völker zur Einigkeit zu führen.“ Die Rede hatte nicht ganz den Erfolg, den sie ohne die zwar sehr witzigen aber schmerzenden Ausfälle auf die Minister gehabt haben würde. Der damalige Premier-Minister Addington, nachmaliger Lord Sidmouth, hatte im Aeussern einige Zügeøon denen, die man bei Aerzten wahrzunehmen pflegt. Dieser Umstand und die Zufälligkeit, dafs er der Sohn eines Arztes war, machten die auf ihn angewandte Benennung Sheridan's, The Doctor," zumal dies Wort von dem Redner in der Uebersetzung des Epigramms von Martinet: I do not like thee Doctor Fell mit aufserordentlichem Nachdruck gesprochen wurde, so haftend, dafs dieser Minister forthin immer der Doctor hiefs. Einige andere Minister kommen, wie der Leser sehen wird, nicht besser davon.

ARMY ESTIMAtes *) WAR WITH FRANCE.

December 8. 1802.

- With regard to the general question of a disposition to peace or war, I for one declare, that I am as strongly

*) Nämlich für das nächste Jahr 1803.

and as sincerely for the preservation of peace as any man, and that I do not consider war as any remedy for the evils complained of. If a war spirit be springing up in this country, if a chivalrous disposition be observable, if a sentiment of indignation be rising upon the subject of the treatment of Switzerland, I for one shall contend that the treatment of Switzerland is no cause of war. I would therefore say, preserve peace if possible: peace if possible, because the effects of war, always calamitous, may be calamitous indeed, buckling, as we should be forced to do, all our sinews and strength to that power in a contest with her upon such grounds. I repeat, therefore, peace if possible; but I add, resistance, prompt, resólute, determined resistance to the first aggression, be the consequences what they may. Influenced by these sentiments, I shall vote cordially and cheerfully for this large peace esta-blishment; and it is because I shall vote for it that I think myself bound to state my reasons. Sir, some gentlemen seem to consider what they advance as so many axioms too clear to need explanation or to require defence. But when I vote so large an establishment, I think myself not at liberty to bind such a burthen upon my constituents, *) without stating the grounds upon which I act, and the principles by which I am prompted. Sir, I have listened with all the attention I am master of to the different arguments that have been advanced in the present debate. One honorable gentleman who spoke second, appears to be a decided enemy to a great establishment, and the reasons he gave for his opposition, I confess, perfectly astonished me. Luckily he has no rapid flippancy in his manner; his sentiments are delivered too soberly and sedately to be mistaken. I am sure I mean nothing disrespectful to that gentleman, who amply repays the attention that is paid to him. But he says, if ministers had only said to him that danger existed, he would for one have voted for the force proposed. Does he doubt the danger? He complains that His Majesty's ministers do not state it precisely. But does he pretend that he does not see and feel it? Can any one look at the map of Europe and be blind to it? Can any one have a heartto resist apprehended injury, and say that we ought not to be prepared? But he asks, why raise only eleven hundred thousand men? You can never equal the military power of France, and as you cannot, why stop at eleven hundred thousand? Why not raise one hundred and twenty, one hundred and thirty, or one

hundred and forty thousand? If this argument be worth any thing, it applies equally to our raising only one thousand. Why, if we can never be equal to France, raise a man? The next excellent reasoning of the honorable gentleman who spoke second against the proposed vote is, that the first year of war there will be an immense army drawn upon the opposite coast, and therefore, now it is not necessary to be prepared. When the army is upon your shores, when the trumpet of the enemy sounds at your gates,, then it is time to be prepared. Appearance of security, he contends, gives, often, the effect of security. If we have large armies, France will think we raise them through fear; if we do not have them, she will think that we feel ourselves perfectly secure. I have heard instances, Sir; where mounting wooden guns upon a fort has produced the same security as if there had been real ones. But unluckily in this instance for us, by our constitutional form of proceeding, our whole force must be known: we cannot pass upon an enemy wooden guns and an army at Brentford *). If we vote no force, an enemy will know we have none. But have no arms, throw away your guns, is the advice of the honorable gentleman. Sir, when every house in my neigbourhood has been attacked and robbed by a gang of ruffians, how my having no arms is to save me from a visit from them, I must leave the honorable gentleman to explain. His next argument is, that it is unreasonable in us to believe that Buonaparte wishes to be at war with us; for he thinks the French have nothing to gain by invasion. Nothing to gain? What else have they to lose but that of which it has been said they have so much to spare, and what have they not to gain? Sir, I cannot but think this as unbecoming a sentiment as ever was uttered. But it is unreasonable to think that the French wish to meddle with us. Why, I protest I cannot explain. If, as has been said, they have felt our arms, they who have been every where else successful, cannot but view the only power whose arms they have felt with feelings of warm resentment, and with sentiments of mortified pride. But look at the map of Europe;

*) Flecken in Middlesex, am Flusse Brent. Der Sinn der obigen Stelle kann wol nur seyn: wir können so wenig hölzerne Kanonen auf einen Feind richten, als vorgeben, dafs wir eine Armee bei Brentford hätten, ohne dafs die Franzosen sogleich erführen, ob dem also sey oder nicht.

there, where a great man (who, however, was always wrong on this subject) said he looked for France, and found nothing but a chasm. Look at that map now, and see nothing but France. It is in our power to measure her territory, to reckon her population, but it is scarcely within the grasp of any man's mind to measure the ambition of Buonaparte. Why, when all Europe bows down before him why, when he has subdued the whole continent, he should feel such great respect for us, I am at a loss to discover. If then it be true, as I have stated, that his ambition is of that immeasureable nature, there are abundant and obvious reasons why it must be progressive reasons much stronger than any that could have been used under the power of the Bourbons. They were ambitious, but it was not so necessary for them to feed their subjects with the spoils and plunder of war; they had the attachment of a long established family applied to them; they had the effect and advantage of hereditary succession. But I see in the very situation and composition of the power of Buonaparte a physical necessity for him to go on in this barter with his subjects, and to promise to make them the masters of the world if they will consent to be his slaves. I see then, I repeat, this strong reason for his pursuing this system of policy. If that be the case, must not his most anxious looks be directed to Great Britain? Every thing else is petty and contemptible compared with it. in his power, is at least in his influence back

Italy is his vassal

Russia, if not Prussia is at his

Holland is in his grasp

Spain

at his nod Turkey in his toils Portugal at his foot: when I see this, can I hesitate in stating my feelings, still less can I hesitate in giving a vote that shall put upon our guard against the machinations and workings of such an ambition? But is has been said, that it is possible he may mean nothing more than rivalry of commerce. Happy, Sir, shall I be if such an idea enter into his head at all, much more if it form part of his plans. But I confess that I cannot see that it does. I mark him taking positions calculated to destroy our commerce, but I do not find him doing any thing for the mutual benefit of the trade of the two countries. I see him anxious to take possession of Louisiana, and to use the ports of St. Domingo to carry out West India and Jamaica trade. I can conceive a possible case, in which such positions might be taken as to force us to surrender our commerce without a stroke.

An ignorant observer may see two armies, and may say there is no war, because there is no battle; yet one of them may make such movements as to compel the other to surrender without striking a blow.

Of the commercial talents of Buonaparte, I can be supposed to know but little; but bred in camps, it cannot be imagined that his commercial knowledge can be very great; and, indeed, if I am rightly informed, he is proceeding in the old plan of heavy duties and prohibitions. But he would go a shorter way to work with us. The old country has credit and capital, and commercial enterprise; and he may think, if he can subjugate us, that he can carry them off to France like so many busts and marbles. But he would find himself mistaken; that credit would wither under the gripe of power; that capital would sink into the earth, if trodden upon by, the foot of a despot. That commercial enterprise would, I believe lose all its vigour in the presence of an arbitrary government. No, Sir, instead of putting his nation apprentice to commerce, he has other ideas in his head. My humble apprehension is, that, though in the tablet and volume of his mind there may be some marginal note about cashiering the King of Etruria; yet, that the whole text is occupied with the destruction of this country. This is the first vision that breaks upon him through the gleam of the morning; this is his last prayer at night, tó whatever Deity he addresses it, whether to Jupiter or Mahomet; to the Goddess of Battles, or the Goddess of Reason. But, Sir, the only consolation is, that he is a great philosopher and philanthropist. I believe this hyper - philanthropy has done more harm than ever it did good. He has discovered that we all belong to the Western family *). Sir, I confess I feel a sentiment of deep indignation, when I hear (I take it from report) that this scrap of nonsense was uttered to one of the most enlightened of the human race. To this family party I do not wish to belong. He may invite persons, if he please, to dinner, and, like Lord Peter **), say, that this tough crust is excellent mutton. He may toss a sceptre to the King of Etruria to play with; and

*) Der Leser wolle sich erinnern, dafs Napoleon cinst den als ́ grandios bewunderten Gedanken äufserte, dafs alle Völker Europens nur in zwei Familien, die westliche und östliche, zerfielen. Sheridan bezeigt keine Lust, zu der ersten grofsen Familie zu gehören. **) S. dies Handbuch Seite 119.