ford, Esq. in six Volumes, London. Im Jahre 1821 erschienen zu London: Memoirs of the life of the right honourable William Pitt, by George Tomline, Lord Bishop of Winchester, 3 Vols. (Der Verfasser hatte die Aufsicht über Pitt's Erziehung auf der Universität zu Cambridge.) Die vollständige Sammlung seiner Reden führt den Titel: The Speeches of the right honourable William Pitt in the House of the Commons, the second edition, 3 Vols. 8, London 1808 (mit dem Motto: Quanto magis admiraremini, si audissetis ipsum, Cicero.) In dieser Sammlung steht die hier abgedruckte Selle im 3ten Bande, Seite 135 und ff.

SPEECH RELATIVE TO A NEGOCIATION FOR PEACE WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

I will not pretend to inquire deeply into the nature and ef

fects of a constitution *), which can hardly be regarded but as a farce and a mockery. If, however, could be supposed that its provisions were to have any effect, it seems equally adapted to two purposes, that of giving to its founder **) for a time an absolute and uncontrolled authority, and that of laying the certain foundation of future disunion and discord which, if they once prevail, must render the exercise of all the authority under the constitution impossible, and leave no appeal but to the sword.

Is then military despotism that which we are accustomed to consider as a stable form of government? In all ages of the world, it has been attended with the least stability to the persons who exercised it, and with the most rapid succession of changes and revolutions. In the outset of the French revolution its advocates boasted that it furnished a security for ever, not to France only, but to all countries in the world, against military despotism; that the force of standing armies was vain and delusive; that no artificial power could resist public opinion; and that it was upon the foundation of public opinion alone that any government could stand. I believe, that in this instance, as in every other, the progress, of the French revolution has belied its professions; that so far from its being a proof of the prevalence of public opinion against military force, it is instead of the proof, the strongest excep,”

*) Die damalige neueste Französische Constitution. **) Bonaparte.

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tion from that doctrine which appears in the history of the world. Through all the stages of the revolution military force has governed; public opinion has scarcely been heard. But still I consider this as only an exception from a general truth; I still believe, that, in every civilized country (not enslaved by a jacobin faction), public opinion is the only sure support of any government; I believe this with the more satisfaction, from a conviction that if this contest is happily terminated, the established governments of Europe will stand upon that rock firmer than ever; and whatever may be the defects of any particular constitution, those who live under it will prefer its continuance to the experiment of changes which may plunge them in the unfathomable abyss of revolution, or extricate them from it, only to expose them to the terrors of military despotism. And to apply this to France, I see no reason to believe, that the present usurpation will be more permanent than any other military despotism, which has been established by the same means, and with the same defiance of public opinion.

What, then, is the inference I draw from all that I have now stated? Is it, that we will in no case treat with Bonaparte? I say no such thing. But I say, as has been said in the answer returned to the French note, that we ought to wait for experience, and the evidence of facts, before we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible. The circumstances I have stated would well justify us if we should be slow in being convinced; but on a question of peace and war, every thing depends upon degree, and upon comparison. If, on the one hand, there should be an appearance that the policy of France is at length guided by different maxims from those which have hitherto prevailed; if we should hereafter see signs of stability in the government, which are not now to be traced; if the progress of the allied army should not call forth such a spirit in France, as to make it probable that the act of the country itself will destroy the system now prevailing; if the danger, the difficulty, the risk of continuing the contest should increase, while the hope of complete ultimate success should be diminished; all these, in their due place, are considerations, which, with myself and (I can answer for it) with every one of my colleagues, will have their just weight. But at present these considerations all operate one way at present there is nothing from which we can presage

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so favourable a change of disposition in the French councils. There is the greatest reason to rely on powerful co-operation from our allies, there are the strongest marks of a disposition in the interior of France to active resistance against this new tyranny; and there is every ground to believe, on reviewing our situation, and that of the enemy, that if we are ultimately disappointed of that complete success which we are at present entitled to hope, the continuance of the contest, instead of making our situation comparatively worse, will have made it comparatively better.

If then I am asked how long are we to persevere in the war, I can only say, that no period can be accurately assigned beforehand. Considering the importance of obtaining complete security for the objects for which we contend, we ought not to be discouraged too soon; but on the other hand, considering the importance of not impairing and exhausting the radical strength of the country, there are limits beyond which we ought not to persist, and which we can determine only by estimating and comparing fairly, from time to time, the degree of security to be obtained by treaty, and the risk and. disadvantage of continuing the contest.

But, Sir, there are some gentlemen in the House, who seem to consider it already certain, that the ultimate success to which I am looking is unattainable: they suppose us contending only for the restoration of the French monarchy, which they believe to be impracticable, and deny to be desirable for this country. We have been asked in the course of this debate, do you think you can impose monarchy upon France, against the will of the nation? I never thought it, I never hoped it, I never wished it: I have thought, I have hoped, I have wished, that the time might come when the effect of the arms of the allies might so far overpower the military force which keeps France in bondage, as to give vent and scope to the thoughts and actions of its inhabitants. We have, indeed, already seen abundant proof of the disposition of a large part of the country; we have seen almost through the whole of the revolution the western provinces of France *) deluged with the blood of its inhabitants, obstinately, contending for their ancient laws and religion. We have recently seen in the revival of that war, a fresh instance of the zeal

*) Anspielung auf die innerlichen Unruhen in der Vendée.

which still animates those countries in the same cause. The se efforts (I state it distinctly, and there are those near mey who can bear witness, to the truth of the assertion) were not produced by any instigation from hence; they were the effects of a rooted sentiment prevailing through all those provinces, s forced into action by the law of the hostages and the other tyrannical measures of the Directory, at the moment when we were endeavouring to discourage so hazardous an enterprise. If, under such circumstances, we find them giving proofs of their unalterable perseverance in their principles; if there is every reason to believe that the same disposition prevails in many other extensive provinces of France; if every party appears at length equally wearied and disappointed with all the successive changes which the revolution has produced; if the question is no longer between monarchy, and even the pretence and name of liberty, but between the abcient line of hereditary princes on the one hand, and a military tyrant, a foreign usurper, on the other; if the armies of that usurper are likely to find sufficient occupation on the frontiers, and to be forced at length to leave the interior of the country at liberty to manifest its real feeling and disposition; what reason have we to anticipate, that the restoration of monarchy under such circumstances is impracticable?—

On the question, Sir, how far the restoration of the French monarchy, 'if practicable, is desirable, I shall not think it necessary to say much. Can it be supposed to be indifferent to us, or to the world, whether the throne of France is to be filled by a prince of the house of Bourbon, or by him *) whose principles and conduct I have endeavoured to develope? Is it nothing with a view to influence and example, whether the fortune of this last adventurer in the lottery of revolutions, shall appear to be permanent? Is it nothing, whether a system shall be sanctioned which confirms, by one of its fundamental articles, that general transfer of property from its ancient and lawful possessors, which holds out one of the most terrible examples of national injustice, and which has furnished the great source of revolutionary finance, and revolutionary strength, against all the powers of Europe?

In the exhausted and impoverished state of France, it

*). Bonaparte.

It is

seems for a time impossible that any system but that of robbery and confiscation, any thing but the continued torture, which can be applied only by the engines of the Revolution, can extort from its ruined inhabitants more than the means of supporting, in peace, the yearly expenditure of its Govern ment. Suppose, then, the Heir of the House of Bourbon reinstated on the throne, he will have sufficient occupation in endeavouring, if possible, to heal the wounds, and gradually to repair the losses of ten years of civil convulsion; to reanimate the drooping commerce, to rekindle the industry, to replace the capital, and to revive the manufactures of the country. Under such circumstances, there must probably be a considerable interval before such a monarch, whatever may be his views, can possess the power which can make him formidable to Europe; but while the system of the revolution continues, the case is quite different. true, indeed, that even the gigantic and unnatural means by which that revolution has been supported, are so far impaired; the influence of its principles, and the terror of its arms, so far weakened; and its power of action so much contracted and circumscribed; that against the embodied force of Europe, prosecuting a vigorous war, we may justly hope that the remnant and wreck of this system cannot long oppose an effectual resistance. But, supposing the confederacy of Europe prematurely dissolved; supposing our armies disbanded, our fleets laid up in our harbours, our exertions relaxed, and our means of precaution and defence relinquished; do we believe that the revolutionary power, with this rest and breathing-time given it to recover from the pressure under which it is now sinking, possessing still the means of calling suddenly and violently into action whatever is the remaining physical force of France, under the guidance of military despotism; do we believe that this power, the terror of which is now beginning to vanish, will not again prove formidable to Europe? Can we forget, that in the ten years in which that power has subsisted, it has brought more misery on surrounding nations, and produced more acts of aggression, cruelty, perfidy, and enormous ambition, than can be traced in the history of France for the centuries which have elapsed since the foundation of its monarchy, including all the wars which in the course of that period have been waged by any of those Sovereigns, whose projects of aggran