and even condemn its policy; but they are powerless to overthrow a ministry supported by the Commons, or to uphold a ministry which the Commons have condemned. Instead of many masters, a government has only one. Nor can it be justly said, that this master has been severe, exacting, or capricious. It can neither be affirmed that strong governments were characteristic of the parliamentary system, subverted by the reform act; nor that weak governments have been characteristic of the new system, and the result of it. In both periods, the stability of administrations has been due to other causes. If in the latter period, ministers have been overthrown, who, at another time might have been upheld by the influence of the Crown; there have yet been governments supported by a parliamentary majority and public approbation, stronger in moral force, and more capable of overpowering interests adverse to the national welfare,than any ministries deriving their power from less popular sources. After the reform act, Lord Grey's ministry was all-powerful, until it was dissolved by disunion in the cabinet. No government was ever stronger than that of Sir Robert Peel, until it was broken up by the repeal of the corn-laws. Lord Aberdeen's cabinet was scarcely less strong, until it fell by disunion and military failures. What government was more powerful than Lord Palmerston's first administration, until it split upon the sunken rock of the Orsini conspiracy? On the other hand, the ministry of Lord Melbourne was enfeebled by the disunion of the Liberal party. The first ministry of Sir Robert Peel, and both the ministries of Lord Derby were inevitably weak, being formed upon a hopeless minority in the House of Commons. Such causes would have produced weakness at any time; and are not chargeable upon the caprices, or ungovernable' temper, of a reformed Parliament. And throughout this period, all ad - ministrations, whether strong or weak, and of whatever political party, relying mainly upon public confidence, have labored successfully in the cause of good government; and have secured to the people more sound laws, prosperity, and contentment, than have been enjoyed at any previous epoch, in the history of this country. over supplies and taxes. One of the most ancient and valued rights of the ComControl of the mons, is that of voting money and granting taxes Commons to the Crown, for the public service. From the earliest times, they have made this right the means of extorting concessions from the Crown, and advancing the liberties of the people. They upheld it with a bold spirit against the most arbitrary kings; and the Bill of Rights crowned their final triumph over prerogative. They upheld it with equal firmness against the Lords. For centuries they had resented any "meddling" of the other House "with matter of supply; " and in the reign of Charles II., they successfully maintained their exclusive right to determine "as to the matter, the measure, and the time" of every tax imposed upon the people. In the same reign, they began to scrutinize the public expenditure; and introduced the salutary practice of appropriating their grants to particular purposes. But they had not yet learned the value of a constant control over the revenue and expenditure of the Crown; and their liberality to Charles, and afterwards to James II., enabled those monarchs to violate the public liberties. Their liberality to the Crown. The experience of these reigns prevented a repetition of the error; and since the Revolution, the grants of the Commons have been founded on annual estimates, laid before them on the responsibility of ministers of the Crown, and strictly appropriated to the service of the year. This constant control over the public expenditure has, more than any other cause, vested in the Commons the supreme power of the state; yet the results have been favorable to the Crown. When the Commons had neither information as to the necessities of the state, nor securities for the proper application of their grants, they had often failed to respond to the solicitation of the king for subsidies, or their liberality had fallen short of his demands. But not once since the Revolution, have the demands of the Crown for the public service, been refused. Whatever sums ministers have stated to be necessary, for all the essential services of the state, the Commons have freely granted. Not a soldier has been struck from the rank and file of the army; not a tailor or a ship from the fleet, by any vote of the Commons. So far from opposing the demands of the Crown, they have rather laid themselves open to the charge of too facile an acquiescence in a constantly increasing expenditure. Since they have assumed the control of the finances, the expenditure has increased about fifty-fold; and a stupendous national debt has been created. Doubtless their control has been a check upon ministers. The fear of their remonstrances, has restrained the prodigality of the executive; but parsimony cannot be justly laid to their charge. The people may have some grounds for complaining of their stewardship; but assuredly the Crown and its ministers have none. While voting the estimates, however, the Commons have sometimes dissented from the financial arrange- Ministers dements proposed by ministers. Responding to the feated on pecuniary demands of the Crown, they have measures. financial 1 In 1625, the Commons postponed the supplies demanded by Charles I. for carrying on the war with Spain. - Parl. Hist. ii. 35. In 1675, they refused a supply to Charles II., to take off the anticipations upon his revIbid. iv. 757. In 1677, they declined a further supply till his Majesty's alliances were made known. — Ibid. 879. And in the next year they refused him an additional revenue. Ibid. 1000. In 1685, James II. re enue. quired 1,400,000l.; the Commons granted one half only. - Ibid. 1379. 2 With a few exceptions, so trifling as to be almost ridiculous, it will be found that the annual estimates have been voted without deduction; e. g. in 1858, the only result of the vigilance of Parliament was a disallowance of 300l. as the salary of the travelling agent of the National Gallery! In 1859, the salary of the Register of Sasines was refused; but on the recommitment of the resolution, was restored! disapproved the policy, by which it was sought to meet them. In 1767 Mr. Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to continue for one year, the land tax of four shillings in the pound; but on the motion of Mr. Grenville, the tax was reduced to three shillings, by which the budget sustained a loss of half a million. This was the first occasion, since the Revolution, on which a minister had been defeated upon any financial measure.1 Throughout the French war, the Commons agreed to every grant of money, and to every new tax and loan, proposed by successive administrations. But on the termination of the war, when the ministers desired to continue one half of the war property tax, amounting to about seven millions and a half,—such was the national repugnance to that tax, that they sustained a signal defeat. Again in 1852, Lord Derby's ministry were out-voted on their proposal for doubling the house tax. But when the Commons have thus differed from the ministry, the questions at issue have involved the form and incidence of taxation, and not the necessities of the state; and their votes have neither diminished the public expenditure, nor reduced the ultimate burdens upon the people. 8 Nor have the Commons, by postponing grants, or in other Stopping the words, by "stopping the supplies," endeavored to supplies. coerce the other powers in the state. No more formidable instrument could have been placed in the hands of a popular assembly, for bending the executive to its will. It had been wielded with effect, when the prerogative of kings was high, and the influence of the Commons low; bu now the weapon lies rusty in the armory of constitutional warfare. In 1781, Mr. Thomas Pitt proposed to delay the granting of the supplies for a few days, in order to extort 1 Parl. Hist. xvi. 362. 2 Ayes 201, Noes 238; Hansard's Deb., 1st Ser., xxxiii. 451; Lord Brougham's Speeches, i. 495; Lord Dudley's Letters, 136; Horner's Mem ii. 318. 8 Hansard's Deb., 3d Ser., cxxiii. 1693. from Lord North a pledge regarding the war in America. It was then admitted that no such proposal had been made since the Revolution; and the House resolved to proceed with the committee of supply, by a large majority. In the same session Lord Rockingham moved, in the House of Lords, to postpone the third reading of a land tax bill, until explanations had been given regarding the causes of Admiral Kempenfeldt's retreat; but did not press it to a division.2 The precedent of 1784, is the solitary instance in which the Commons have exercised their power of delaying the supplies. They were provoked to use it, by the unconstitutional exercise of the influence of the Crown; but it failed them at their utmost need,3 — and the experiment has not been repeated. Their responsibility, indeed, has become too great for so perilous a proceeding. The establishments and public credit of the country are dependent on their votes; and are not to be lightly thrown into disorder. Nor are they driven to this expedient for coercing the executive; as they have other means, not less effectual, for directing the policy of the state. erality of tue While the Commons have promptly responded to the demands of the Crown, they have endeavored to Restraints guard themselves against importunities from other upon the lihquarters, and from the unwise liberality of their Commons. own members. They will not listen to any petition or motion which involves a grant of public money, until it has received the recommendation of the Crown; and they have further protected the public purse, by delays and other forms, against hasty and inconsiderate resolutions. Such precautions have been the more necessary, as there are no checks upon the liberality of the Commons, but such as they impose 1 Nov. 3), 1781; Parl. Hist. xxii. 751; Ayes 172, Noes 77. Mr. T. Pitt had merely opposed the motion for the Speaker to leave the Chair. 2 Nov. 19; Parl. Hist. xxii. 865. 8 See supra, p. 72. 4 Standing Order, Dec. 11th, 1706. See May's Law and Usage of Parliament, 4th ed. 512. |