MARCH 18, 1836.] Expunging Resolution. [SENATE. their conduct then, gentlemen must now stick to the charge as then made, and maintain the President to have been guilty of a high crime. To defend themselves from the censure of having violated the constitution, subverted justice, and set a dreadful example, it is ne cessary for them to maintain that he committed no crime at all, not even the petty offence and venial misconduct which will constitute a misdemeanor in office. In this dilemma, it is not for me to anticipate what course gen. tlemen will take; whether they will retrace their steps, or advance further. It is not for me to decide whether it is a case in which the actors, far steeped in blood, may think it safer to go through than turn back; but, solely occupied with my own course, I proceed to establish my position, that the President was adjudged guilty of an impeachable offence, and that the Senate was unjustifiable for proceeding against him without the forms of an impeachment. The sentence against him is for violating the laws and the constitution. I have said that this offence was great in a private citizen, still greater in a common magistrate, and greatest of all in the Chief Magistrate of the country. Our own Chief Magistrate is laid under the most sacred and solemn responsibilities, to God and his country, to abstain from this crime. He takes an oath to do so; and here is a copy of that oath which President Jackson actually took, administered by the late Chief Justice Marshall, in the presence of assembled thousands, and on the steps of that Capitol, and at the base of that column at which he came so near to pay the dreadful forfeit of a supposed violation of his oath: "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend, the constitution of the United States." constitution, involving as it does perjury to his conscience, treachery to his trust, danger to the country, and evil example to all, becomes an offence of the great est magnitude, inferior only in turpitude and mischief to high treason itself. In republics the greatest jealousy is felt at assumptions of power beyond the law; and the more exalted the magistrate, the more eminent the citi. zen, who commits that offence, no matter how strong the necessity, or how slight the consequence, the voice of offended justice is sure to be heard. Why was Cicero banished from Rome? Not for putting Lentulus and Cethegus to death--for these parricides deserved to die a thousand deaths-but because, in ordering Roman citizens to be strangled, the Consul had assumed the exercise of a power not granted to him by the constitution and the laws of Rome. What was the cause of that immortal contest in Athens-that contest for the crown, not of royalty, but of honor and patriotism? Not that Demosthenes did not deserve to wear it, but that Ctesiphon had transcended the law in causing it to be conferred upon him. These were excusable, or venial violations of law; yet their commission agitated the great republics of antiquity, and their memory, at the end of two thousand years, and in a new hemisphere, is fresh in the recollection of every reader. But why quote examples? Why go to foreign countries? Why quit our own soil, this chamber, and this very case, to prove that the violation of law is the commission of a great crime? Did not every gentleman, in arguing this very case, treat it as a crime of the greatest enormity? Did they not denounce the President's conduct not merely as a violation of the laws and the constitution, but an actual overthrow of all Government? as the establishment of one man's will in place of all law and government? as being in itself a revolution? as an act pregnant with every calamity; filling the country with distress and Preserve, protect, and defend, the constitution! Such alarm, ruining the currency, sinking the price of prop- is the oath. The sentence is, that he violated that conerty, paralyzing industry, stopping factories, bankrupt- stitution, and, by consequence, that he violated that ing merchants and traders, destroying all confidence be- oath. Here, then, is the aggravated charge of perjury tween man and man, and striking the whole country upon his conscience, treachery to his trust, mischief to down from a state of unparalleled prosperity to a state the people, and destruction to that which he was bound of unparalleled misery? Did not every speaker against to preserve, protect, and defend. Can such things be, the President assert all this, and infinitely more, and and not imply crime? that high crime for which not only worse? And did not one hundred and twenty thousand impeachment lies under our constitution, but indictment petitioners back their assertions, reiterate their denun- and punishment also at common law? Surely, the point ciation, send it here for our information, and call upon is too plain for argument; and I must be permitted to us to undo what the President had done, as the only repeat that I cannot figure to my imagination any thing means of saving the country from utter ruin? And were so strange and wonderful as that gentlemen who pushed not these petitions received with all honor, and their the condemnation of President Jackson with such fury, contents made every speaker's own, by the manner in in 1834, should now deprive themselves of all justificawhich he adopted and commented upon them? Certainly tion for what they then did, by special pleading upon all these things were so; and during the six months that the verbality of the accusation which they themselves they were going on, the act of President Jackson, in re- drew up, and, pointing to the careful omission of impumoving the deposites, was expressly treated as a crime ted bad motive, declare that his intentions were not of the direst import, and of the most calamitous conse- impugned; and defend themselves from the consequences quences. Having personally witnessed all these things, of pronouncing him a criminal then, by intrenching and too well remembering them, it is incomprehensible themselves behind his innocency now! Far from it. to me, and my mind will remain incredulous to the ap- The justification of gentlemen for what they did to agiparition until I shall behold it, that any one of the sup- tate the country rests upon the conscientiousness of their porters of the proceedings against President Jackson belief that the President was in reality the lawless and will now take a position in the rear of President Jack- dangerous criminal which they described him to be; son's innocency, and rest the success of their defence and the moment they give up that-the moment they now, upon the overthrow of their attack then. I say admit that innocency of motive, without which crime upon his innocency! for every denial of the criminality cannot exist-that moment they condemn themselves, of his conduct is an allegation of his innocence; and and admit that they were factious agitators, unjust judges, Instead every attempt to sink the charge against him below the and relentless persecutors of an innocent man. degree of a high crime is an admission of the injustice of this, they and I should now act together, both mainof those who then denounced and condemned him; fortaining that a high crime was charged upon the Presi nothing can excuse them for the course they then pursued, and for the alarm and agitation in which they involved the country, but the reality of their belief in the high crimes which they then imputed to the President. Here, then, lies a dilemma. To justify themselves for dent; but as I have not conferred with gentlemen, and do not know upon which horn of this dilemma they prefer to hang themselves, I must proceed in my own way, and make out my case upon its own strength, without reference to their weakness. The great position which I take is, that an impeachable offence has been charged upon the President, and that he has been adjudged guilty of that offence, without the forms of an impeachment, and without the benefits of a trial. Suppose gentlemen undertake to arrest me at the threshold, and say, we did not impugn his motives, we did not attribute bad intentions, we merely charged the fact. To this I answer: 1. If there was no allegation there was no denial of bad motive; and the charge of the crime implies the wicked intent. 2. That the speeches of gentlemen supplied what the form of their charge omitted; and that the imputation withheld from the record was proclaimed from the mouth, and incorporated into every speech. 3. That the criminal averment, "dangerous to the liberties of the people," was inserted in the first and retained in the second form of the charge, and only dropped from the third and last form after having been repeatedly pointed out, and fully relied on as showing the criminal and impeachable character of the accusation. 4. That no legislative use was made of the condemnatory resolve, after it was passed; that no such use could then or can now be made of it, because in its nature it is a criminal accusation, and presents a case, not for legislation, but for punishment. 5. That gentlemen in the opposition drew the charge themselves, and altered it themselves; and may have had a reason, not yet explained, for omitting those imputations of criminality in the record which were so profusely and conspicuously used in their speeches. 6. That even a regular and formal impeachment requires no allegation of corrupt motive. 7. That the offence being stated in the article of impeachment, the conviction will be valid; and the only sentence known under our constitution will be pronounced without reference to the quo animo. It 8. That this is not a case of regular impeachment, but of irregular condemnation without impeachment, and a charge on which the House of Representatives might frame an impeachment in form, and send it to us for trial. It is precisely the preliminary resolution, the general charge, without specification and technical averments, which is the incipient step and opening process to the preferment of an impeachment in form. is the initiative to impeachment. So say the books. Listen to Jefferson, in his Manual of parliamentary practice, drawn up by him for our especial guidance, and printed by ourselves for our convenient snd constant reference. He says: "The general course is to pass a resolution containing a criminal charge against the sup. posed delinquent, and then to direct some member to impeach him by oral accusation at the bar of the House of Lords." This is the way to begin an impeachment in the House of Representatives, and this is the precise manner in which we began it in the Senate. We passed the resolution as the book directs, and we passed it with the criminal charge in it. We began the impeachment regularly, but we began it in the wrong place, and our proceedings ended where those of the House of Representatives begin; we ended with the adoption of a general resolution, containing a criminal charge against the supposed delinquent. These brief answers I hold to be sufficient, Mr. President, to set aside any defence which could be bottomed on the omission, accidental or designed, of formal averments of bad motives in the sentence pronounced against the President. They show that the impeachable nature of the charge is not affected by that omission; on the contrary, the very circumstance of the omission may aggravate the conduct of the Senate by showing an [MARCH 18, 1836. extension of the non-committal policy to the high and sacred functions of Senators and judges, and exhibiting a subtle contrivance for condemning the victim without committing the judges. They show that this is not a case for common law averments, not a case for set. ting out with legal verbosity, that the aforesaid Andrew Jackson, yeoman, not having the fear of God before his eyes but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, he first dismissed Mr. Duane from the Treasury; and, after that, appointed Mr. Taney to the Treasury; and, after that, he took upon himself the responsibility of removing the deposites; and, finally, he perfomed a certain late proceeding in relation to the public revenue. All this, though eminently picturesque, and even quite dramatic in a common law indictment, happens to have no place in an impeachment; and I might safely rest my case where it now stands; but I choose to go further, to rise higher, and to place my cause upon loftier and nobler grounds. I take the true position, that the impeachment of a magistrate differs from the indictment of a citizen; and that a magistrate may be impeached under our constitution, tried, convicted, and subjected to every penalty known to an impeachment, not only without the allegation of bad motives, but without the fact of such intentions, or even the possibility of possessing intentions of any kind, either good or bad. And, first, I show what the judgment on impeachment is; and for that purpose refer to article 1, section 3, of the constitution: "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law." Upon this provision in the constitution I have to remark that impeachment lies against nobody but an officer; and, in its judgment, is official and not personal. It affects the officer, not the man. The object of the judgment is preventive, not penal justice. It is not punishment for past offences, but prevention of future misconduct, that is intended. Removal from office and disqualification to hold office is the ultimate penalty which can be inflicted under it. If the offence for which the impeachment was made should amount to a crime at common law, or by statute, then a criminal trial might ensue, and the punishment provided by law for that offence might be inflicted. The difference between indictment and impeachment lies in the difference between preventive and penal justice. The impeachment is to prevent the officer from doing further mischief; the indictment is to punish the man for the mischief he has done. A man can only be punished for crime, and wicked intention is necessary to constitute crime; but the officer may be deprived of his office for acts not amounting to crime, for want of the corrupt intention; for these acts may be detrimental to the community, and the welfare of the community may require that these acts should cease, whether they proceed from a wicked heart, or a weak head, or even a mistaken principle of action. Hence, impeachment lies for the act, without regard to the criminal intention; and indictment lies for the crime of which criminal intention is the essence and the touchstone. From this fair analysis of the impeachment process and judgment, in contradistinction to indictment, results the inference that criminality of intention is no way essential to the validity of impeachments under the constitution. So distinct is the trial by impeachment from that upon indictment for the same offence, that one cannot be plead in bar of the other, under the clause of the constitution which protects the citizen from two prosecutions for the same offence. MARCH 18, 1836.] Expunging Resolution. [SENATE. criminal intentions. Judge Chase was impeached upon eight articles; five of them charged corrupt and wicked In England, on the contrary, the sentence on conviction under impeachment extends to legal and actual punishment--to punishment in person and in property-intentions, three charged no intentions at all, being wholly silent on the question of motives, and merely alleging the commission of the acts and the violation of the law. The three articles thus silent on the question of motives were distinct and substantive charges in themselves, not variations of the same for the party may be both fined and imprisoned. On indictments both in England and our America, as every body knows, the direct object of the prosecution is punishment--punishment in life, limb, person, or property; and preventive justice is only an incident. Whenever, then, punishment would follow conviction, wheth-charge in other articles, but containing new and distinct er on indictment or impeachment--whenever the life or limb of the party was to be touched--whenever his body might be cast into prison, or his property taken by fine or forfeiture--in every such case, the quo animo, the state of mind, the criminal intent, was of the essence of the offence, and must be duly averred and fully proved, or clearly inferrible from the nature of the act done; but in the case of impeachment under the constitution of the United States, where the sentence could extend no further than merely to prevent the party from using his power to do further mischief, leaving him subject to a future indictment, then the intent of the party, whether good or bad, innocent or wicked, became wholly immaterial, not necessary to be alleged, nor requiring to be proved or inferred, if the allegation should chance to be made. Every averment relative to the intention would be surplusage; for the mischief to the public was the same, whether a public functionary should violate the law from weakness or wickedness, from folly or from design. Mr. B. said that the cases of the Judges Chase and Pickering were evidences of the truth of his argument; for in one of these there could be no corrupt or wicked intention, for the party was insane, and therefore incapable, both in law and in fact, of being either corrupt or wicked; and in the other of which the mere naked violation of law was charged, without the slightest reference to the intentions, or quo animo, of the party. Mr. B. then went into a detailed statement of the impeachment of these two judges, to sustain the view he had been taking, and to apply historical facts and judicial decisions to the legal doctrines which he had laid down. Judge Pickering, a district judge of the United States for the State of New Hampshire, was impeached for acts of flagrant illegality, and which, in truth, implied great wickedness: the articles of impeachment charged wicked and corrupt intentions; yet it was proved that he was incapable, in law and in fact, of wickedness or corruption; for he was utterly insane, both at the time of committing the acts, and at the time he was tried for them, and could not, and did not, appear before the Senate to make any defence. His unfortunate condition was both proved and admitted, and the Senate was moved by counsel to stop the proceedings against him, and to remit or postpone the trial; but the Senate took the clear distinction between a proceeding which could only go to removal from office and a disqualification for holding office, and a prosecution which might involve a criminal punishment; and they proceeded with the trial, heard the evidence, found the illegal acts to have been committed, and pronounced the sentence which the good of the community required, and which the unfortunate judge was a proper subject to receive, that of removal from office. They did not add a sentence of disqualification for holding future offices, for he might recover his understanding, and again become a useful citizen. The Senate limited itself to a sentence which the good of the community demanded, and which was applicable to misfortune and not to criminality, which was suited to the acts of the judge, without regard to the absence of intentions. The case of Judge Chase was a case of a different kind to prove the same point. It was a case of various articles; some with, some without, the averment of charges; and, therefore, to stand or fall upon their own merits, without being helped out by a reference to the same charges in another form, in another part of the proceedings. They were the articles first, fourth, and fifth. Mr. B. would state them particularly; for if the least doubt remained on the mind of any one after seeing the case of Judge Pickering, the tenor of these three arti cles in the impeachment of Judge Chase would entirely remove and dispel that doubt. The first of these articles, which is number one in the impeachment, relates to the trial of Fries at Philadelphia, and charges the judge with three specific instances of misconduct in conducting that trial; and concluded them with the allegation, that they were dangerous to our liberties," and "in violation of law and justice;" but without the slightest reference to the quo animo of the judge, or the state of mind in which the acts were done. The article is wholly silent with respect to his intentions. The fourth article contains four specifications of misconduct, all charged to have occurred on the trial of Callender, in Richmond, Virginia, and alleged them to be "subversive of justice" and "disgraceful to the character of a judge;" but they were wholly silent as to the intentions of the judge, and left the quo animo with which he did the acts entirely out of the record. The fifth article charged a specific and single violation of law, in ordering the arrest of Callender upon a capias, instead of directing him to be called in upon a summons, but without imputing any motive or intention whatever, good or bad, to the judge, for preferring the capias to the summons. The only averment is, "that Callender was arrested and committed to close custody contrary to law in that case made and provided." Such were the three articles which charged violations of law upon Judge Chase, without imputing criminal intentions or corrupt motives to him; and upon which the judge was as fully tried, and made as ample a defence, both upon the law and the facts, as he did upon the five other articles which contained the ordinary averments of wicked and corrupt intentions. Neither the learned judge himself, nor any one of his numerous and eminent counsel, made the least distinction between the articles which charged, and the articles which did not charge, corrupt intentions. They went to trial upon the whole alike; put in no demurrers, made no motions to quash, reserved no points, but defended the whole upon the law and the facts of each separate charge. This, sir, should exterminate doubt and silence cavil. It should put an end to all idea of getting out of the dilemma in which the Senate is placed by intrenching themselves now behind the innocency of President Jackson's intentions. Mr. B. continued. Thus far, Mr. President, I have argued this point upon principles of law and reason, supported by precedents drawn from our own history, and I trust have fully established my first proposition, namely, that the offence charged upon President Jackson was an impeachable offence, and that as a high crime, though it would be sufficient for my argument that it charged conduct amounting to misdemeanor only; and, consequently, that the conduct of the Senate, in proceeding against him without the forms of an impeachment, was illegal, irregular, unconstitutional, and subversive of the fundamental principles of law and justice. But although my case may be made out, and my propo sition established, yet my magazine of argument is not exhausted, and I still have in reserve a most potential argument to be used in this case. It is the argument of authority, and is drawn from the legislative history of one of the States of this Union-the State of Kentucky; and a brief introductory narrative may be necessary to develop its origin and to elucidate its application. It is a matter of history, Mr. President, that some forty years ago, a judge of the court of appeals in Kentucky had the misfortune to be a pensioner on the Spanish Crown, and held a secret correspondence with the Governors General of Louisiana for the separation of the Western from the Atlantic States. A legislative inquiry established these facts, and the unhappy judge avoided the stroke of justice by retiring from the judgment seat. The same inquiry implicated another judge in Kentucky, not of the State courts, but of the federal Judiciary; and at a succeeding session of the General Assembly, a member of that body, Humphrey Marshall, Esq., introduced a resolution condemning the conduct of that federal judge, and recommending an inquiry to be instituted into it by the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States. This proceeding was resisted by distinguished members of the Kentucky Legislature; and another resolution was brought in, utterly reprobating the motion of Mr. Marshall, and severely condemning the attempt to procure from a legisla tive body the expression of an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of an officer who was subject to impeachment before the Senate of the United States. After several day's discussion, says the historian, the following resolution was offered by Mr. Clay. "Whereas the General Assembly did, at their last session, order transcripts of the evidence taken before the committee appointed to examine into the conduct of Benjamin Sebastian to be transmitted to the President of the United States and to the Senators and Representatives from the State in Congress; and as the present Assembly has entire confidence in the general administration, and in the Congress of the United States, among whose duties is that of arraigning the public officer, or private citizen, who may have violated the constitution or the laws of the Union; and whereas the legitimate objects which call for the attention of the Legislature are themselves sufficiently important to require the exercise of all their wisdom and time, without engaging in pursuit of others, thereby consuming the public treasure, and the time of the representatives of the people, in investigating subjects not strictly within the sphere of their duty; and inasmuch as the expression of an opinion by the General Assembly upon the guilt or innocence of Harry Innis, Esq., in relation to certain charges made against him, would be a prejudication of his case-if in one way, would fix an indelible stigma upon the character of the judge, without the forms of trial or judicial proceeding, and if the other, might embarrass and prevent a free and full investigation into those charges; wherefore, "Resolved by the General Assembly, That it is improper in them to prescribe to Congress any course to be taken by that body in relation to the said charges, or to indicate any opinion upon their truth or falsehood. "Resolved, That the constitution and laws of the land, securing to every citizen, whether in or out of office, a fair and impartial trial, whether by impeachment or at common law, the example of a legislative body, before the commencement of any prosecution, expressing an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of an implicated individual, would tend to subvert the fundamental principles of justice." Mr. President, I seize, with confidence, and appropriate without abatement to the present occasion, every word that is contained in this resolution, with the re [MARCH 18, 1836. mark, that the severe reprobation which it expresses is many ten thousand times more applicable to the Senate of the United States, for its conduct towards President Jackson, than to the Kentucky Legislature for its proposed conduct towards Judge Innis. In that case the Kentucky General Assembly was not the tribunal for the trial of the federal judge in the event of his impeachment, and their prejudication of his case did not affect the bosom of his constitutional triers. In President Jackson's case his prejudgers were his constitutional judges, and judges who would have a legal right to sit in judg ment upon him, notwithstanding their moral disqualification for that duty by their prejudication of his case. In Judge Innis's case there was no great national event connected with his fate; no change in the ascendancy of political parties to be effected; no political prophecies to be accomplished by the prophets themselves; no great moneyed power to be gratified; no barrier to be struck down from between the people and their eternal foe; no obstacle to be removed from before the onward march of a political and moneyed confederacy which was advancing to the conquest of the Government, and only stopped in its course by the invincible courage and incorruptible integrity of one man. Judge Innis's case was different from all this. It affected no one but himself. It was individual and personal; his prejudgers were not his triers; and, whatever wrong might be done him, his country at least was safe, and her free institutions might survive and flourish; yet, even in this case of mitigated wrong and contingent injustice, how keen was the scent that snuffed the approach of danger in the tainted breeze! How sharp was the eye that detected the lurking mischief in the remote contingency of a bare possibility! How pointed, how cutting, how strong, and how just, the rebuke that was lavished upon a legislative body for setting the example of pronouncing an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of an officer subject to impeachment before the Senate of the United States! Every word of it is a two-edged sword cutting into the vitals of the Senate, and leaving that deadly wound for which there is no healing in the art of surgery. To comment upon such a case is impossible; to amplify, is to weaken it; to repeat, is to destroy; yet at how many points must the minds of Senators instinctively halt, catch up the cutting phrase, apply it to their own case, while the small, still voice of conscience whispers, ten thousand times more applicable to us than to them! Mark a few of these phrases: "The constitutional right of Congress to arraign the public officer who may have violated the constitution;""the waste of time and public money in pursuing subjects not within the sphere of their duty;""the injustice of prejudging an impeachable officer;" "the stigma upon an innocent man, if unjustly condemned;" "the impediment to justice, if the guilty should be absolved;"the flagrant enormity of pronouncing an opinion upon impeachable charges without the forms of trial or judicial proceeding;" "the total impropriety of even indicating an opinion upon the truth or falsehood of the accusation;" "the constitutional and legal security of each citizen to have a fair and impartial trial, both by impeachment and at common law;""the subversion of the fundamental principles of justice, and the dangerous example of a legislative body, before the commencement of any prosecution, expressing an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of an impli cated individual." All these expressions apply directly and with infinitely more force to the case of President Jackson than to that of Judge Innis. The Bank of the United States, through all its organs, had appeared as the accuser of President Jackson. It had sat in judg ment upon him for a violation of the laws and the constitution in dismissing Mr. Duane and appointing Mr. Taney; for taking upon himself the responsibility of re moving the deposites, and for his proceedings in relation to the revenue. It had demanded his impeachment, foretold it, and named the member of the House of Rep. resentatives whom it presumed to say would bring it forward. The public press in the service of the bank had been for many months preparing the public mind for the event; and, just at the commencement of the session, the bank itself, in its own person, and in the most imposing form, stepped from behind the curtain, and appeared upon the stage as the responsible accuser. It caused a manifesto of some fifty pages to be drawn up by a committee of its directors; adopted by a vote of the board; ordered 5,000 copies to be printed; a copy to be laid upon the table of every member of Congress, and the rest distributed all over the Union. It was that famous manifesto, from which I have read some passages, in which the President of the United States was compared to counterfeiters, and the first place in the comparison assigned to him. The Senate and the country would remember that manifesto. It was the authentic act of the bank, and contained the identical charge against the President which was immediately afterwards brought into the Senate-and, what is more, it contained every argument which was used in the Senate in support of the condemnatory resolution. The President, then, was an implicated and accused individual at the commencement of the session of 1833-'34. He was accused by the bank; and, being thus accused, the Senate took cognizance of the charge without the intervention of the House of Representatives, debated it for a hundred days, and adopted it. The resolution brought into the General Assembly of Kentucky, in the case of Mr. Innis, strong as they are, are yet described by the historian,* from whom I have read them, as being "temperate and just, and respectful to the sacred rights of every private citizen to enjoy an impartial trial without the denunciation of influential men in office." I concur in this sentiment, Mr. President, and so did the General Assembly of Kentucky concur with the mover of the resolution which I have read; for, although that resolution was not adopted, yet it had the effect of changing the resolutions of Mr. Marshall, and to deprive them entirely of their criminating character. Such were the sentiments entertained in Kentucky, such the jealous and sensitive delicacy of the feeling against the prejudication of an impeachable officer; and all this generous feeling, watchful jealousy, and cutting rebuke, was called forth in a case of most remote and contingent mischief, where the prejudgers were not the triers, and where the prejudication could have but a most indirect operation upon the minds of the actual judges. If just there and then, how much more so now and here! When the Senate of the United States, upon charges put forth by the Bank of the United States, sits in judgment upon the President of the United States, condemns him unheard, fixes a stigma on his name, rouses one hundred and twenty thousand people to petition against him-more than ever appeared at the bar of the national convention against Louis the XVIgives an audacious institution a triumph over him, and subjects his life to imminent deadly peril. Yes, sir, puts life itself in danger; for it is incontestable that the denunciations of the Senate had the effect of putting the pistol in the hands of the assassin. Yes, sir, these denunciations! for while rational, intelligent, and informed people saw the injustice of the charge against the President, and the folly of believing that the remo val of the deposites had made the distress; yet, with the ignorant, the uninformed, and the insane, it was quite different. They believed it all, and acted according to their belief. The ignorant went to the polls to put an Mann Butler, Esq.-Note by Mr. B. [SENATE. end, by their votes, to the administration of the "tyrant" that was destroying their country; the "insane" went to the portico of the Capitol to put an end, with his pistol, to the life of the same "tyrant." But thanks to God and to the people! his providence held back the bullets; their confidence sustained him at the polls, and their justice will find the means of expunging from our journals that unjustifiable sentence which should never have been put upon it. Sooner or later, expunged it will be. At this session, if the voice of the people is obeyed; after the next general election, if it is not done now. There is no room for mistake. Two years' past history, and the issue of the elections, had developed the will of the people. Far from believing in the truth and justice of the sen. tence pronounced by the Senate, and returning a House of Representatives to impeach the President in form, they have gone on increasing in their confidence and affection, returning larger and larger majorities in his favor; and in primary meetings, legislative resolves, and a thousand different modes, have testified their will that this unjust sentence should be expunged from the journal. The will of the great majority of the people of these States is known; it is in favor of expurgation. The famous Mr. Fox voted in favor of expunging the record of Wilkes's expulsion from the journals of the House of Commons, against his own opinion, and against his previous votes, and in professed obedience to the will of the people. His example is worthy of imitation; and I trust (said Mr. B.) that the expressed will of the people will be obeyed in this case. For or against the expunging, I trust it will be obeyed; and that the voices of the State Legislatures will be equally respected, work which way they may. Mr. B. concluded what he had to say upon this part of the case with expressing his deep regret that the General Assembly of Kentucky, in 1834, should have so sadly and lamentably forgotten their own example of 1807. In 1807, as has been shown, they deprived the resolutions of Mr. Marshall of their criminating charac ter before they would adopt them; in 1834, and in the month of February of that year, while the proceeding against President Jackson was in full blast, it adopted resolutions against him of the most violent character, upon the very points in discussion, and ordered them to be transmitted to their whole delegation in Congress. The following is a copy of these resolutions: "Resolved, That the President of the United States, by causing to be withdrawn the public money from the place of safe deposite, where it had been made by law, and placing it in local banks under his control, of the solvency of which the people at large know nothing, and into whose affairs their representatives have no right to examine, has violated the laws and constitution of the United States; that he has 'assumed a responsibility' dangerous to liberty, and which tends to the concentration of all power in the hands of the Chief Magistrate of the United States." "Resolved, That, by the frequent exercise of the veto power, and that still more arbitrary and dangerous one of withholding bills passed by both Houses of Congress, thereby preventing the opportunity of a reconsideration by that body in the mode prescribed in the constitution, the President has, to a great extent, crippled and paralyzed the legislative department of our Government, and, in some instances, has prevented the exercise by Congress of their essential constitutional rights." "Resolved, That the Clerk of this House transmit to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, copies of the foregoing resolutions." II. Having shown, Mr. President, that the proceeding against President Jackson was illegal and unconstitutional, I take up my second proposition, which affirms |