two Powers? He presumed not. England had seized upon the property of her own West India planters, and ruined the planters and ruined the country, at the same time imposing new burdens upon an already overtaxed people at home. Whig and tory, however they disagreed on other matters, seemed, he said, to agree tolera. bly well on this; and the great master spirit of the movement party, O'Connell, (of whom it had been said that he sought mischief from the pure love of mischief,) was endeavoring to move heaven and earth against the southern planters. France, too, it seemed, overlooking the squalid poverty of her own starving millions, had all at once become wonderfully sensitive on this subject. And partly from her journals, and partly through channels of a more private nature, but more to be relied on, we learned that many of the most influential and leading men of that kingdom were striving to combine the moral power of the press of Europe in the cause of abolition. From this intermeddling fanaticism abroad, was it not likely we might have enemies enough, without these spirited efforts to make enemies at home? We could expect nothing, and we asked nothing, from other countries. We could protect ourselves; and, with the patriotism and fraternal feeling of our own countrymen, on which he hoped and believed we might always safely rely, we might set all Christendom at defiance, if disposed to intermeddle with us on this or any other subject. Our enemies he would defy every where; but would not, by such unprovoked defiances, insult and drive from us our countrymen and friends. [SENATE. them was involved, when the gentleman had seen they were bowed down, he hoped he would unite with them, so that they might show that they were not divided at home. For his part, he should persist in the course he was going to pursue, and to which he had expressed his preference, even at the risk of a division. The South ought to unite on the very strongest measures. No matter what was done, whether they rejected the prayer of the petition or refused to touch it as contaminating, the abolitionists would continue their schemes; they were animated by a religious enthusiasm; they had their movers, and they would continue their avocations to the end of their lives. He feared the good sense of the North would not be able to put them down. He had said before that he would move to reject this petition at once. Was there not a motion for that purpose now? Could not the honorable gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KING] see the object of it was to teach them that this was a subject about which they of the South could not be talked to? Sacred as that instrument, the constitution, was, when he saw their rights, their property, and their lives in jeopardy, the sacredness of its character was lost. He admitted the right of petition was sacred, and did not wish to abridge it. He saw no difference between rejecting the petition and rejecting the prayer of it. The right of petitioning did not imply the right of assenting to the petition. He felt a higher obligation than any other on earth to resist this attempt to interfere with southern rights. He warned those in the North whose affections were kind, and whose judgments were sound on this subject, that this temple was destined for purposes which those who built it never contemplated. If these societies were growing, as he believed they were, he could not shut his eyes to the threatened dangers. Gentlemen were mistaken if they thought he wished to discredit or weaken the exertions of his northern friends. He did not believe that those gentlemen from the South who acted with him were mistaken in their statements in relation to the feel sources than pamphlets or newspapers. He would ask the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. SWIFT] whether the number of these societies had not increased in his State of late? The Senator from South Carolina had remarked that the southern members were in a minority on that floor, and therefore ought not to divide. He felt that this was true, but the remark might be addressed to his friend with the same justice that it could be addressed to him. They happened to differ in the course best calculated to protect and secure the interests of the South; but he was happy to say that they differed only on collateral and comparatively unessential points. Upon the main sub-ings at the North. He had information from other ject they are united, and would stand together and sustain each other to a man. We might as well expect the right hand to be warring against the left, instead of warding a blow aimed by an enemy at the heart, as to expect the South to divide on any essential point connected with this subject, so vital to that section of the country. He was a native of a slaveholding State, and was a southern man in feelings, affections, and interests. His interests were there; his affections were there. What local prejudices he had were there; and if he had any ambition beyond the grave, it was that his bones might be buried in that section of the country where he had been nurtured, raised, cherished, and honored. Mr. PORTER said it was not his intention to have spoken on any subject to-day, and especially on the subject spoken upon by the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. KING.] Subsequent reflection had not struck him with any error advanced on that day. What he had seen had struck him with the necessity of observing silence. He felt as if the liberties of the country were involved in this discussion. Unless the people of the North used stronger measures than had yet been used, he despaired of suppressing the growth of abolitionism. He was proud to call the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KING] his friend. He believed him hon est. He believed if he [Mr. KING] thought he was pursuing a course which would weaken the cause of the South, he would instantly retrace it. The course pursued by that gentleman this day was, in his (Mr. P's) opinion, well calculated to thwart them, (the southern delegation.) They were presented here with a divided front; the maxim of "divide and conquer" was bearing upon them. When every thing dear to [Mr. SWIFT could only speak of a part of the State of Vermont, in which he had understood some five or six societies had been formed since he came here.] Mr. PORTER continued. The statement of the gentleman from Vermont corroborated what he had heard from other sources. He had no doubt that the accounts in those abolition papers were exaggerated. But he nevertheless believed, where there was so much smoke there must be some fire. He believed a large majority of the people of the North were virtuous, and it was to their virtue he looked for aid. He could, however, assure them that the only way to put down the abolitionists was by prompt and decisive measures. As to that wretch, Thompson, he did not regard any thing he said. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. NILES] had said all the mischief had been done by the clergy. Without coming to any decision, The Senate adjourned. TUESDAY, MARCH 1. FRENCH SPOLIATIONS. The following message was received from the PresiIdent of the United States: WASHINGTON, February 29, 1836. To the Senate of the United States: I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, correcting an error made in the report recently communicated to the Senate in answer to the resolution ENATE.] Ohio and Michigan Boundary-Slavery in the District of Columbia. of the 16th instant, respecting the number and amount of claims for spoliations presented to the commissioners under the French treaty of 1831, which were rejected. ANDREW JACKSON. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, To the President of the United States: The Secretary of State has the honor to state to the President that, in consequence of the error of one of the clerks in the Department, in mistaking vessels for claims, the report in answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 16th instant is incorrect in the number of claims in whole or in part allowed, and in the number of claims rejected. The Secretary respectfully requests that the President will transmit to the Senate the accompanying report, in which the error is corrected, to be substituted for the one heretofore communicated. It is not apprehended that any public injury can grow out of the mistake, but the Secretary considers it his duty to correct, as soon as it is discovered, any inaccuracy of a paper sent from the Department. All which is respectfully submitted. JOHN FORSYTH. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Feb. 24, 1836. To the President of the United States: The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 16th instant, requesting the President to "cause to be communicated to the Senate, so far as there may be information in the Department of State, the number and amount of claims for spoliations presented to the commissioners under the French treaty of 1831, which were rejected, and the reasons for such rejection," has the honor to report: That it appears from the "Register" of the commissioners, that the number of claims presented amounted Of which allowances have been made, in whole or in part, Leaving the number upon which no allowance has been made, 3,148 1,567 1,581 [MARCH 1, 1836. The report is very long, and occupied the greater part of the morning in the reading. Mr. EWING, of Ohio, moved that the report be laid on the table, and printed, and that 5,000 extra copies be printed. Mr. BUCHANAN rose to put himself right as to one single point. He concurred in the report of the bill, and he also concurred generally in the reasoning of the committee. There was, however, one point on which he dissented. He did not think that the provision in the constitution of Ohio imposed on the Government of the United States any obligation, express or implied, to demand from Michigan the disputed territory, as a matter of right. In reference to its expediency, he agreed with the committee. He thought the better course would be to give the territory to Ohio, and make it up to Michigan out of the Territory of Wisconsin. He thought that Ohio had no greater right to demand this territory of Michigan than Michigan had to claim it. Mr. CLAYTON said it was unnecessary at this time to debate the difference between the member from Pennsylvania and the rest of the committee. It was a fact, however, which, perhaps, it was well should be made known, that, in the results to which the committee had arrived, every member concurred. The gentleman from Pennsylvania differs from the rest of us only in a single part of the reasoning which brought us to these results, and that is this: we consider it not only expedient, but due to our sense of justice, to confirm the Ohio line; the gentleman thinks it expedient only. We have not decided that Ohio has the line she claims as a matter of strict legal right. On the contrary, the report we have made negatives such a pretension. Had we decided that Ohio has, without our further legisla tion, a vested and indefeasible right to the boundary proposed in the bill, we should not have reported the bill, but have remitted the parties to the judicial tribunals of the country. The motion to print 5,000 extra copies was then agreed to. FLORIDA RAILROAD. On motion of Mr. KING, of Alabama, the previous orders were postponed, and the Senate took up the bill. to authorize the East Florida Railroad Company to make a road through the public lands. The bill baving been amended, a discussion arose between Mr. DAVIS, Mr. PORTER, Mr. KING of Ala The books of the commissioners do not, generally, give any information respecting the amount claimed in the rejected cases; nor do they, in any instance, furnish the reasons for rejection. In many of the cases in which allowances were made, these allowances were partial bama, and Mr. HENDRICKS, when it was for the present laid on the table, to allow time to Mr. DAVIS to preonly, portions of the claim having been rejected. It appears, therefore, that the records of the commissionpare an amendment. ers do not furnish the means of complying with the resolution of the Senate. An estimate of the amount of the rejected claims, and a conjectural statement of the reasons for the rejec tion, approximating to the truth, might probably be made upon a careful examination and comparison of all the papers on file in the Department, relative to the claims presented to the commissioners. But such an estimate and statement are not believed to be within the terms of the resolution, and would not repay the time and labor which, from the great number of the papers, would necessarily be employed in preparing them. All which is respectfully submitted. JOHN FORSYTHI. OHIO AND MICHIGAN BOUNDARY. Mr. CLAYTON, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which were referred the bill to establish the northern boundary line of the State of Ohio, and the joint resolution on the same subject, made a report, which was read. ABOLITION OF SLAVERY. The Senate proceeded to consider the petition of the Society of Friends, praying for the abolition of slavery. The question being on the motion of Mr. CALHOUN, that the petition be not received, Mr. PRENTISS rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President: I am unwilling that the vote which [ shall feel myself obliged to give upon this question should be liable, from silence on my part, to any misconception. In all my public acts, and on this occasion in particular, I am desirous that the grounds upon which I proceed should be distinctly known, so that no misapprehension may exist, with respect to my conduct or my motives, here or elsewhere. I cannot yield my assent to some of the doctrines which have been advanced in this debate; and I wish to say just enough to prevent the possibility of any inference that I acquiesce in them. Sir, (said Mr. P.,) the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia is a question, in all its aspects and re lations, of great interest and delicacy. It is a question which I have had no disposition to agitate, especially at this time; and at no time would I interfere, in the slightest manner, with slavery as it exists in some of the States. In my public character, I look upon slavery in the States only as the constitution of the United States looks upon it-as a State institution, existing under State laws, and subject only to State authority. I know it only as it is known to the constitution, and would not treat it otherwise than the constitution treats it. I would leave it where the constitution has left it, disclaiming all power in Congress over it; and I would neither do nor say any thing in my public capacity here to disturb the right in this species of property, or in any manner to endanger its security. While I say this, sir, in reference to slavery in the States, I am bound, in candor and frankness, to say that I regard slavery in this District in a very different light. The petitions which have been presented here do not ask any interference, or assert any power in Congress to interfere, with slavery in the States. They are con fined to slavery in this District. They complain of its existence here as a public evil, and ask the interposition of Congress to redress the grievance. The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] has moved that the petitions be not received. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] proposes that the prayer of the petitions be at once rejected. Sir, I cannot agree to either of these motions. They differ, to be sure, in point of form, but the effect of both, it appears to me, is substantially the same. The first in order, the one now before the Senate, denies, in terms, the right to petition at all on the subject. The other, it is true, does not, in form, deny the right; but while it professes to admit the right, it proposes to reject the prayer of the petitions immediately, without a hearing, and without consideration. They are both essentially preliminary motions, precluding alike the usual reference and examination into the merits of the petitions; and, in my judgment, they both, in effect, abridge the right secured by the constitution; or, more properly speaking, the right recognised by the constitution as a pre-existing right-a right original and inherent in the people. If we can make no law abridging the right to petition, we surely can neither rightfully refuse to receive a petition, nor reject it instanter, on its reception, without a hearing, without an inquiry into the subject-matter. The distinction between rejecting the petition, and rejecting the prayer of the petition, immediately on its being received, which is the motion proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, is too refined and abstract, in my apprehension, for a subject of such common and universal interest to the people, as the privilege and right to petition. The distinction, I must repeat, is, to my mind, unimportant, and exists rather in form than in substance. The character of the motion is not altered, or at all varied, by the circumstance that the motion admits of discussion. Discussion may be had on almost any and every preliminary motion. Discussion, free and liberal discussion, has been had on the motion not to receive. That motion is still pending; and if discussion is all that is to be looked to, every object has been attained, and gentlemen may as well vote for that motion at once. The disposition proposed to be given to the petition, after it shall be received, is equally summary, denying, as it does, investigation and consideration in the accustomed forms of proceeding; and though it may be a formal and technical compliance with the constitution, it is, after all, to every practical and essential purpose, equivalent to a rejection of the petition itself. To receive the petition with the express view and for no other purpose than immediately [SENATE. to proceed and reject the prayer of it, is treating the petition no better, except in mere matter of ceremony, tban to refuse to receive it at all. If we are bound to receive, we are bound to hear and consider; and an abrupt and premature rejection of the prayer of the petition, if not a denial of the right to petition, is a denial of every thing belonging to the right which is of any importance. When petitions are decorous in their language, and contain nothing which can be justly deemed intentionally offensive; when they come from persons competent to petition, and treat of subjects upon which it is competent for Congress to act, I hold that we are bound to receive them, and give them a respectful consideration. No petition, in my opinion, ought to be rejected, or can constitutionally be rejected and refused a hearing, on account of the nature of the subject of which it treats, unless the subject be obviously and unquestionably beyond the constitutional power of Congress. With this limitation of the right, it belongs, and must, from the very nature of the right, necessarily belong, exclusively to the petitioners themselves to judge of the subjectmatter. If Congress can discriminate between subjects, and say that upon some subjects petitions may be received, but upon others they shall not be received, what, I ask, becomes of the right to petition? What is the right worth? It will be in vain, sir, that we acknowledge the right, if we thus limit its extent, if we thus control its exercise. These preliminary motions, for I can call them nothing else, go directly, it appears to me, to impair, to narrow, and abridge the right. If we really mean that the right shall be enjoyed in its just, its legitimate extent, we shall forbear to embarrass it, to render it nugatory, by questions of this sort. We shall rather treat the petitions, as I think we are bound to treat them, and as they have always heretofore been treated, according to the ordinary rules and usages of parliamentary bodies in such cases. I regret exceedingly the harsh expressions which gentlemen have thought fit to apply to the petitioners. They have been denounced as incendiaries; they have been charged with criminal, with treasonable, intentions; with intentions to excite a servile war, and subject the whole southern country to pillage, havoc, and devastation. Sir, we are apt to fall into the very com mon error of supposing that all who differ from us, especially on subjects of an interesting and exciting nature, do so from unworthy motives, and not from honest conviction. With some of the persons who have signed petitions on this subject I am well acquainted. I know them to be intelligent, patriotic, highly respectable. Their propositions may be strongly stated; their argument may be bold; their illustrations may not be suited to the taste or the judgment of those whose opinions they oppose; but that all, the whole combined, proceeds from a consciousness, on their part, of doing and saying what is right, I neither have nor can entertain any doubt. With me, sir, it does not admit of a question that the petitioners believe, sincerely believe, what they profess to think, that the honor of the country, the prosperity of the country, the best and highest interests of liberty and humanity, are involved in this question. If they are wrong in their opinions, or express them with too much boldness and independence, the fault, if it be one, is to be found in the institutions of the country; in the civil and political principles of the country; in the edu cation of the country. It is from these sources that the petitioners have imbibed their opinions, as well as the spirit which prompts the expression of them with manly freedom; and, sir, you cannot, by any law you can make, or by any vote which may be here given, repress or restrain the free expression of their opinions, any more than you can stop or check, by legal enactment, or legal coercion, the course and currrent of their thoughts. It would be unwise to attempt to do so. We should rather treat them as they have heretofore been treated. We should resort to no extraordinary measures. We should observe the ordinary rules and usages of this body, and permit the petitions, as usual, to go to a committee. This is not only the just, constitutional course, but the course, in my opinion, enjoined upon us by every consideration of policy as well as of duty. Sir, upon the constitutional question, whether Congress has the power to abolish slavery in this District, we had, some days ago, a very compact, luminous, and intelligible argument from the Senator from Virginia; and from the known ability, and habits of close and thorough research of the Senator, we have a right to presume, and, indeed, must presume, that every consideration was presented, in support of his doctrine, of which the subject is susceptible. Although the lucid simplicity, the exact and eloquent brevity of his style and reasoning, interested and charmed me much, the Senator must pardon me if I say that his argument failed to convince me. Two propositions were relied upon as the principal basis of the argument. It was insisted, first, that the act of cession of Virginia expressly interdicted the exercise of the power by Congress. The act, after ceding the territory, and relinquishing to the United States "absolute right and exclusive jurisdiction over it," provides that nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than as the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States." This clause, which was evidently inserted in the act from abundant caution, was intended to define and ascertain, with more exact precision, the subject-matter of the grant, and to preclude, by express negative words, the possibility of its being construed to transfer any right or interest in the soil itself. This is not only the grammatical reading, but the natural and plain sense of the clause; and, giving to it its utmost import and extent, it is manifest that it imposes no limitation or restriction whatever upon the legislation of Congress. It was further insisted that, independent of the proviso in the act of cession, Congress did not possess, and could not exercise, the power in question. It was said that neither the Legislature of Virginia nor that of Maryland had any power to abolish the right of property, and that they could not grant or transfer to Congress a power they did not themselves possess. Sir, the competency of the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland to cede the territory, and relinquish to the United States full and absolute jurisdiction over it, is not, and, I presume will not be, denied; and it appears from the act of Virginia that jurisdiction was surrendered to the United States, to be held and exercised, "pursuant," as the act expresses it, "to the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of the United States." That section, it will be seen, confers upon Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the territory. When the jurisdiction of Virginia and Maryland ceased, the jurisdiction of the United States commenced; and the question whether Congress can abolish slavery in this District depends, not upon any powers granted to it by the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, for they could grant none, but upon the powers given it by the constitution of the United States. | [MARCH 1, 1836. ever" over the District; powers as large and extensive as could well be conferred, and probably as full and absolute as belong to the Legislatures of any of the States. Congress, then, in its local legislation for this District, must have, at least, as ample power over slavery within its limits, as any State Legislature possesses, or can exercise, over slavery in any of the States. Sir, I hold, and I suppose it will not be denied, that the law of the land is the foundation of all rights of property. They exist only by and under the law, and cannot exist independent of it. They may be said to owe their origin and existence to the Legislature. This is literally and peculiarly the case with respect to the right of property in slaves. No such right, it is well known, is recognised, or even tolerated, by the common law. It is true that a century and a half ago, the court of common pleas in England adjudged that trover would lie for a negro boy, "because," said the court, negroes are heathens, and therefore a man may have property in them." But, in a subsequent case, a few years afterwards, in the King's Bench, it was determined by the whole court, that trover would not lie for a negro any more than for any other man; " for by the common law," said Lord Holt, "no man can have a property in another." Slavery, in its most mitigated form, imports an obligation of perpetual service, or service for life, without wages, with an unrestrained right of alienation in the master, coupled with an arbitrary power of administering any sort of correction, not immediately affecting life or limb. The servitude runs from generation to generation; the children of slaves being, by birth, slaves also. In every form of it, it takes away the most essential rights that attend the existence of men, and being equally inconsistent with the free spirit and principles of the common law, it is neither known to nor acknowledged by it. In all the States where slavery exists, the right of property in slaves must be derived from positive enactments of the Legislature; and in this District, I take it that, independent of legislation, either original on the part of Congress or adopted by it, the right does not, and would not, exist at all. But it is probably not very material, as to the power of the Legislature over it, whether the right is derived from acts of positive legislation, or from the common law. The I have said, sir, that all rights of property owe their origin and existence either to statute or common law; and I say further, that it cannot be maintained that the Legislature, as the law-maker, has no power whatever over the rights of property. The proposition certainly is not true in a general and unqualified sense. clause in the constitutions of the States and of the United States, which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation, certainly implies the existence of a power in the Legislature over If a law is made by which a person is deprived of the right to certain property, taken for public use, it is by virtue of such law that the property ceases to be his; and though the law provides a compensation, the right of property is not the less taken away against the will of the proprietor. it. The truth is, the rights of property are subject to legislative action and interference, except where such action or interference is prohibited or restrained by constitutional provisions. So far as restrictions are imposed upon it by the constitution, the power of the Legislature is qualified and limited. It is admitted that a right or interest in property, once actually vested by law, cannot be taken away by the Legislature, except when taken for public use, and then only on making compensation. The constitution, as we have already seen, gives to This is made a fundamental principle in the organic Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatso-systems of this country; and without it, law, to use the language of another, would be tyranny, and government would be oppression. The constitution, regarding the right of property as one of the most important of rights, and the protection and security of it as one of the chief objects of government, declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. This process is a judicial process, and of course can emanate only from the Judiciary. Besides, no person can be deprived of a legal right, unless he has forfeited such right. The forfeiture can be ascertained and declared only by a judicial tribunal. The adjudication is in its nature a judicial act, which cannot be performed, any more than the process already mentioned can be issued, by the Legislature; because, according to the theory and provisions of the constitution, one branch of the Government cannot exercise powers properly belonging to another. [SENATE. itance, by purchase, or by birth, may be prohibited. By thus preventing the formation of any new relation of master and slave, the entire abolition of such relation may in time be accomplished, without dissolving any subsisting obligation. It may be added that, though a repeal of the existing laws on the subject of slavery in this District might not affect any actual subsisting right, it is obvious that no property could be thereafter acquired in any person, not living, or held in service in the District, at the time of such repeal. But I go further, sir. If Congress, under the clause giving it "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District, has authority to impose taxes, and provide how they shall be raised, for local and municipal purposes, I do not see why it has not the power, by means of taxation, to effect the abolition of slavery here. I say nothing of the right or justice of exerting the pow er for such a purpose. I speak only of the power, and of its capacity to be used to accomplish such an end. But, however this may be, I hold that Congress, if the public interest and welfare require it, may directly, and at once, emancipate the slaves, on making a just compensation to the owners. The clause in the constitution which regulates the taking of private property for public use is not, in my opinion, restricted to such property merely as may be converted and applied to the use and emolument of the public. I think the word use, in the constitution, is to be understood in a liberal sense, as equivalent to purpose or benefit; and that whatever is taken for public purposes, or for the public benefit, is taken for public use, within the meaning of the constitution. Neither justice, nor the security of private rights, would seem to demand any other or different construction. No principle of justice can be violated, nor can private property be exposed to wrongful and unjust invasions of power, when an equivalent is required to be rendered. A more strict, narrow, and limited interpretation, would be obviously less beneficial, and does not appear to be called for either by the words or the intent of the constitution. Such an interpretation would not only be an unnecessary and inconvenient restraint upon the power of the Legislature, but might prevent, in many instances, the accomplishment of objects of the greatest importance; objects of the highest interest and utility to the community. The equivalent prescribed and guarantied by the constitution is a sure and sufficient security against any abuse of the power; and it certainly is not unreasonable that private rights But, although a present vested right cannot be taken away by a direct act of legislation, except for the purpose and on the terms which have been stated, the Legislature may, and constantly does, exercise a power over property, in many ways, without being supposed at all to interfere with or disturb the principle of vested interests. Not to mention statutes of limitations and various other legislative acts which operate upon the rights of property, it regulates and controls the alienation of property, the transmission of it by descent, and the disposition of it by will. It can alter, modify, and change the law in these particulars as it pleases. It can say who shall be admitted as heirs, and what shall be the rule of distribution and division among them; or it can declare that property shall not pass at all by descent, but shall, in all cases, escheat to the State. This may seem a strong, and, perhaps, a bold proposition. Such a law would, indeed, be very impolitic and unjust, in reference to most species of property; but, if general and prospective in its operation, it would be difficult to raise any valid objection to it on the ground of constitutional power. The question of policy, of right and justice, is one thing; the question of constitutional power is another. Who, I ask, would be deprived of any actual vested interest, by a law providing that no one shall take, by inheritance, any right of property in slaves? Or by a law, that all children, born of slaves after a certain period, shall be free? Such enactments would touch no rights actual and vested, but rights, if they can be called such, resting in expectancy merely; rights purely potential in their nature and character. It has been said in another place, and with much sig-should yield, on terms of just compensation, to the parnificancy and propriety, that slaves, if property, are also persons. The right of property in the persons of slaves is not the same, either in nature or extent, as the right of property acquired in things having a natural existence, over which the owner has a power of absolute and unlimited dominion and disposal. The right originates in and springs out of a relation entirely ex instituti; and though the relation differs, in every thing that is essential to human rights, from the relation of master and apprentice, yet, like that, it is a relation which the law creates or permits, and which it may put I have not been able to persuade myself that it would and end to, as it may put an end to that or any other in- subserve the cause of truth and justice, contribute at all stituted relation. Although, as I have not only admitted, to the peace of the country, or serve in any degree to but asserted, the Legislature has not the power, by a re- strengthen the union of these States, to withhold the trospective law, directly to take away or annihilate expression of our real opinions upon this question. The property already vested under the sanction of existing people should not be blinded upon this subject, any laws, and therefore legal property, it certainly may, more than upon any other. Since it is agitated, it is due without violating any constitutional principle, and with- to the country, it is due both to the North and to the out any injustice too, restrain future acquisitions. No South, to state explicitly the views we entertain upon one can doubt that any trade or traffic may be suppress- this most important matter. To know that Congress ed, which is either injurious to the public health or mor- has the power to abolish slavery in this District, need als, or is incompatible with public policy; and that the not, and will not, produce alarm or apprehension in any further introduction of slaves into this District, or the quarter of the Union. The people every where must future acquisition of them in any way, whether by inher-feel assured, and ought to rest satisfied, that this power, amount rights of the public, so far, and to such extent, as the interest and welfare of the public may require, or as may be necessary to effectuate great and useful public purposes. These, sir, are my doctrines upon this very interesting and important subject. I have stated them briefly but frankly; giving a glimpse, rather than a view, of the reasons by which they may be sustained. I have felt it incumbent upon me to say something, and I could not, in the proper discharge of my duty here, well say less. |
