suscitated by that decision. It withdraws from Congress all right of interference with the right of petition in any form or in any shape whatever; and if it be true, as is stated by the honorable Senator from South Carolina, in a recent report submitted to this House, that the celebrated report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia Legislature in 1799, conclusively settled that Congress has no right, in any form or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of the press; and the violation of that principle, in the enactment of the sedition act, was the leading cause of the civil revolution of 1801. If this be so, sir, how can a distinction be drawn between the right of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press and the freedom of petition? They are alike protected by the same clause of the constitution, and by the same language placed within congressional action. If this be so, sir, the people themselves have settled the construc. tion of this clause irreversibly.

How, Mr. President, then, can we deny the right of petition without violating the constitution, without a gross usurpation of a power not only not granted to us, but withheld from us in clear, plain, and unequivocal language?

We cannot make any law, we cannot legislate at all, as to the right of petition; we cannot, calling to our aid all the powers of the House of Representatives and the Executive also, the whole powers of legislation, abridge, in any form or shape, the right of petition. Can we do it by rule? No, sir, surely not. We cannot do indirectly what we cannot do directly. But, sir, the Senate have done no such thing. Their rules have been drawn by sound constitutional lawyers. Page fortyeight, section twenty-four, rules of the Senate, declares: "Before any petition or memorial, addressed to the Senate, shall be received and read at the table, whether the same shall be introduced by the President or a member, a brief statement of the contents of the petition or memorial shall verbally be made by the introducer."

The rules, then, simply regulate the mode of the introduction of a petition. They go no further; they could not go further by the constitution, or without violating it. They make no question of the reception of petitions. The rejection of a petition for abuse or contempt is an anomaly, and must furnish its own rule.

Sir, how is the rejection of this petition attempted to be justified? It is by the lex parliamentaria, the law of Parliament. Now, it is clear that this rule respecting the reception of a petition, founded on the law of Parlia ment, has never been adopted, and could not be adopted, by the Senate. It is hostile to the principles of that constitution under which they hold their seats. It is adopted for another meridian; a meridian where the right of petition has been abridged by act of Parliament, by judicial decisions, usurping legislative powers; where it has been pared down to the size of parliamentary discretion. Here, sir, it is too mighty, too large, for senatorial power, much less for senatorial discretion, to grasp; and can it be seriously contended that it can be abridged by the parliamentary law of England, borrowed or not borrowed, adopted or not adopted, naturalized or not naturalized? No, sir, no. The position cannot be maintained. Such a doctrine assumes for its basis that the Senate may violate the constitution with impunity, under the shield of the rule of the British Parliament, wholly inconsistent with, and subversive of, the principles of that constitution.

But, sir, it has been said that the right of petition is limited to grievances which personally affect the petitioners. Sir, this doctrine sounds strangely to my ears. It is not the doctrine of the Revolution; and it is there that the people of the United States have learned their lessons of that right. It is not the doctrine of our anVOL. XII.-41

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cestors. It is not the doctrine of liberty. It is not the doctrine of our constitution. Sir, as respects the Union, the Government is a unit. That great mass of human liberty which reposes in safety under the protection of our constitution is composed of the rights and liberties, the prosperity and adversity, the weal and the wo, of each citizen and each section of our wide-extended empire. Sir, the sympathy between the members of the natural body is not more direct and immediate than that between all the members of this great republic. Touch the right, the interest, or the liberties, of the humblest citizen of this great republic, no matter where his lot may be cast, and the pulsation is felt in every part. Raise but the cry of oppression in the remotest prairie of Missouri, or the rudest dell of the Alleghanies, and the cry is echoed and re-echoed, ay, sir, and felt too, in every street and in every alley of every city and town, in every valley and upon every hill top and mountain of the extended limits of the Union. We are bonded together for common weal and common wo. It is this which breathes the Promethean fire of liberty into the cold and chiselled forms of republican government. Sir, the grievance of one is the grievance of all. So thought, so felt, so acted, the gallant sires of the constituents of the honorable Senator, in the darkest and most fearful period of the Revolution, before compact had added new obligations to the sacred ties of a common ancestry, kindred, and institutions. The cry of oppression raised in Faneuil Hall pealed over the whole South; and petition for redress of grievances, grievances which fell first upon the cradle of liberty only, beseiged the English Parliament from all quarters of the good old thirteen States. The true doctrine upon this subject is written in the history of the Revolution in characters of blood; of the blood of our sires in the East and West, the North and the South. The right of petition for the redress of grievances is as broad and expansive as the right of the citizen, and circumscribed only by the limits of the Union. It can be abridged only by those limits. The people must be, and are, the judges of what is or is not a grievance.

Another objection has been made to the reception of this petition, that it prays what the Congress cannot constitutionally grant. Admit it. What then? Is that a cause for rejecting the petition? Does the gentleman forget the principles which lie at the foundation of our institutions, of our Revolution: that government was instituted by the people and for their benefit, and that they may remodel it when they see proper? Does he forget the doctrines of the declaration of independence? Does he forget the provision of the constitution which expressly provides for amendments? But, sir, has the question as to the constitutional power of Congress over slavery and the treatment of slaves in the District of Columbia been settled? when? where? how? Is it not a question at least so open that a difference of opinion may be entertained? And if so, sir, (and I do not mean myself now to express any opinion on the subject,) is it a ground for rejecting a petition? It may be good ground for rejecting the prayer of a petition, that it asks what we have no power to grant. But we must receive it, understand it, examine it, to judge. We must receive it in order to enable us to discharge our duties. We must not forget that it is our duty to sustain the rights of the people; that in this hall the relation between us and the people is, on the side of the people, rights; and on our side, duties.

Sir, where will this doctrine carry the honorable Senator? The Legislatures of some States have instructed their Senators to vote in favor of what are called the expunging resolutions. I believe, sir, that some people have imagined that the resolutions are unconstitutional. Are they to be rejected? Is a sovereign State

I am, said Mr. B., clearly in favor of the first of these propositions, as the most direct and unequivocal expression of opinion against these petitioners the Senate can give; and, if that shall fail, I will vote for the other, as the second in point of strength. I would most strenuously insist on the first course being taken, but for the fact that several southern Senators [Messrs. KING of Alabama, and KING of Georgia] who have addressed the Senate, are averse to it, and several from the non-slaveholding States, whose opinions are altogether with us, have constitutional scruples. I consider this diversity of opinion at this time particularly unfortunate, more especially as respects the southern delegation; and if this were a matter of ordinary importance, or, important as it is, if, as heretofore, these petitions were presented by the Society of Friends, (a class for whose virtues all entertain the highest possible respect,) rather for the purpose of avowing their opinions than with a wish that any action of Congress should take place, I, for one, would concede a point, and yield my opinion to meet the views of others; but there are other coadjutors, more formidable in numbers, more dangerous in their views and intentions, and, I must add, showing little scruples as to the means they shall use; and it is also to be considered that while we are debating this question, there is in the South a heretofore unknown excitement. Influenced by these considerations, have found it impossible to yield a single point by way of concession in deference to the opinions of others; and, notwithstanding all I have heard about the danger of a false issue being made by involving the right of petition, being confounded in the minds of the people of the non-slaveholding States with the already too perplexing question of "abolition," I cannot be deterred from my course for fear of consequences which do not and ought not legitimately to follow. I have said (continued Mr. B.) already that I consider a refusal to receive these abolition petitions as the most direct way of meeting and negativing them. I will elucidate this idea by a reference to the ordinary proceeding on a bill. It is the undoubted right of every member of the Senate to propose by a bill such provisions as he may think promotive of the common weal. The ordinary course, we know, is to test the merits of a proposition of this sort on the question of engrossment for a third reading, when each member determines for himself the propriety of the act or the shape proposed. But if the Senate should think the enactment improper in any shape whatever, a motion may be made to reject the bill after the first reading. If the Senate should be averse to the proposition in the manner proposed, or in any shape which amendments could give to it, and should also think it improper to permit the question to be agitated, they would refuse leave to introduce it; in which case the Senate would not have possession of the bill, nor the member asking leave part with it. I consider the refusal to receive these petitions as comparing with a refusal to grant leave to bring in a bill, and the second proposition, made by the Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN,] to reject, immediately after receiving, the prayer which they contain, as comparing with a motion to reject a bill after the first reading.

If a member of the Senate should rise here now, and ask leave to introduce a bill to meet the views of these petitioners, what course ought to be taken? I am fully persuaded that the Senate would refuse. Suppose the matter had proceeded to the "authoritative command,' to which the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WALL] alluded, and the Senator was even instructed by a Legislature of a State to offer it, would the Senate be bound to grant leave? I think we ought not, and would not. If the Senate would not entertain this proposition when offered in pursuance of instructions from a State Legislature, it is something singular if they shall be bound to

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do so when presented by a few individuals of a State, because they choose to adopt the form of a petition. It is upon this consideration that I am not in favor of receiving these petitions, and not that I entertain the opinion intimated by the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN,] that reception gives jurisdiction over the subject.

To ascertain the subject-matters upon which we may act, we must look to the constitution of the United States. I know that precedents are sometimes resorted to to ascertain the opinions of former Congresses as to the proper construction of the constitution. These, I do not hesitate to say, do carry us, in some instances, beyond our proper and legitimate sphere. These are bad enough, and ought not to be implicitly relied on; but to resort to petitions on file would be still worse. If that were done, even in this case, we should find ourselves already entertaining jurisdiction; for there are many such petitions on our files, from the establishment of the Government.

Mr. President, it is thought by some we are precluded from taking this strong ground, and meeting these petitions in limine, by a provision of the constitution of the United States, found among the amendments, article 1st, in these words: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

There appears to be some difference of opinion, among Senators who have preceded me, as to the proper limit of the right of petition. While the Senator from New Jersey on my right [Mr. WALL] admits that the petition should be respectful in language to the body to whom it is addressed, in defining its objects, he says, "it should be as broad as the constitution itself." The Senator from Georgia [Mr. KING] is willing to admit no exception whatever, either as to language or object. I say none; for, after disclosing that he would vote to receive a petition requesting Congress to abolish slavery in the State of Georgia, I know of no stronger case which could be put. The opinion of the Senate is man. ifested in the rejection of petitions for disrespectful language, appears to be in accordance with that expressed by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. WALL,] that it is not their duty to receive petitions containing abuse of themselves, when it appears that the form of petition has been assumed for the purpose of slandering and abusing them as a body, or individuals composing it. Upon the second branch, no case has happened in which the reception of a petition has been resisted, requesting Congress to do an unconstitutional act. That such petitions may be presented, is easy to imagine; and that these now presented are so, I, for one, have no doubt. Am I, and those who think with me on this point, bound by this provision of the constitution to receive these pe titions, by the force of this provision? On a careful examination of it, I think not. The citizens of the United States have a right peaceably to assemble and petition the Government-for what? For a redress of grievances. But are the two Houses of Congress bound to receive and consider complaints on subjects wholly beyond their control, and palpably not within their del egated powers, by whatever exciting circumstances they may be attended, and however much they may endanger the peace and repose and safety of another portion of this widely extended community? Suppose petitioners, choosing to consider themselves aggrieved for the want of an established religion, should request Congress to make a law "respecting an establishment of religion," which Congress prohibited to do in the first clause of this very amendment, would that be a grievance which

Congress could redress? Or suppose they should petition Congress to change the form of the Government itself from a republic to an elective or hereditary monarchy, could you grant redress? Would the subject of complaint be a grievance? Why, would we entertain them, consider of them? No, I say, reject instantly.

These grievances must be their own, not those of others. In what way conceivable are these petitioners, inhabitants of Pennsylvania, interested in the question what property the inhabitants of other States or Districts or Territories shall hold, or in the conditions and restrictions upon which they shall hold it? About as much as they are in the affairs of the people of India; and if they should take it into their heads to think their barbarity and ignorance of Christianity a grievance, they could, with as much propriety, send us a petition to fit up, with the funds of the Government, a missionary establishment, as they can interfere in the matters to which these petitions relate. Sir, I say, then, that the holding of slaves by the inhabitants of the District of Columbia is a matter of no grievance to the citizens of non-slaveholding States, in the legal sense of that word; and if it could, by construction, be so considered, it is one which Congress cannot, by any possibility, redress. I am willing to adopt the definition of the right of petition advanced by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. WALL,]" that it is as broad as the constitution," if it is not to be made broader. The Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. WALL,] in searching to find some ground upon which to rest this complaint of grievance, has said that "the grievance of one American citizen is a grievance to all, and that all may complain of it," but then presupposes that this one citizen considers the matter complained of as a grievance. If this petition came in aid of one presented by those owning slaves here, this argument would be fair; but, so far from that being the case, the reverse is known to be true. Sir, suppose certain citizens, having no property at all, should represent that other citizens had large fortunes, and request an agrarian law by which all would be made equal-would the gentleman tell us that the "grievance of one citizen is that of another," and therefore it would not be a groundless complaint? Wait, sir, until those who have property think fit to consider its possession a grievance, and request to be relieved from it. The two cases are similar in every respect, except that these petitioners do not desire to be benefited by the dispossessing of the inhabitants of this District of their property..

[FEB. 29, 1836.

the States, by which persons are held to service for a limited time; or when liberty is taken away for acts committed, as under the vagrant laws of some of the States, can Congress contravene these laws? But it is not necessary to advert to these general principles, for the question is settled and fixed by the constitution. The third clause of the second section, article fourth, expressly provides that "no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered, upon claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." There it is expressly reserved to the State Legislatures to say where service may be due. If this provision had not been inserted, so far as respects the powers of the general Government, the same conclusions would have resulted from the construction of the first clause of section ninth, article first, made irrevocable by article fifth, in which power is given to Congress to prohibit the introduction of such persons as the States then existing thought proper to admit in the year 1808; which power Congress has exercised, by prohibiting the further introduction of slaves in the United States, under the severest penalty. The general Government being one of limited powers, whenever a power of a particular subject is granted to a certain extent, it cannot be exercised beyond the limit prescribed, and the idea of its being general is precluded. Congress had, by this provision, power to prohibit the further introduction of slaves in 1808, and, by consequence, no other power over the subject.

The idea of any other power is also negatived by representation being, to a certain extent, based upon this description of people; we look in vain for any other power than the one alluded to in the constitution of the United States; we are obliged to look for it in the acts of cession of Virginia and Maryland. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. LEIGH] has shown, in a very able argument, which I should only weaken by repetition, that the Legislature of Virginia had not themselves, by the constitution of that State, the power of abolishing slavery. Their powers are also limited by constitutional law. No such power was delegated to them by the people; the Legislature being restrained from interfering with property in the same manner that Congress is. How is it, then, possible for the Legislature of that State, by any act of cession, or any other act, to clothe Congress with more power than they possessed themselves? The people of the District of Columbia, being parts of two States, did not, by the constitution of the United States, empower Congress to abolish slavery within the States of which they formed part, nor did they empower the State Legislatures to do it. How is it, then, that they have not this portion of power, never given up; and how is it Congress has got it? Mr. President, (said Mr. B.,) if it were even admitted that Congress has any general power over the subject, (which has not been ever contended for upon this floor,) I think we would find, on an examination of the acts of cession, particularly that of Virginia, that, so far from authorizing Congress to abolish slavery in this District, they are expressrestrained. They are expressly required to protect all the rights of the citizens therein"-rights, as I presume they then were, and this right of property was one. It would be a flagrant breach of this act of cession, as well as of trust, should Congress ever consent to adopt the measure which these petitioners ask. Can. slaves be taken, as suggested, for "public use?" No; the public, as such, have no use for them; and the general funds of the Government, intrusted by the people to our care, cannot be used for the purpose of purcha sing them for liberation. For these reasons, and many more which might be urged, (said Mr. B.,) I am of

opinion we have no power over this subject, and that we cannot redress these, which the petitioners choose to call grievances. Disposed as I am at all times to treat those who come bere to petition with the utmost respect and kindness, I might, although it cannot be considered as a matter of strict right, be willing to receive these petitions; but, sir, the excitement which prevails on this subject in the State from which I come, in common with all the South, whose peace and security are threatened by these proceedings, compels me to resist them at every step and in every stage. Are these petitioners such as are entitled to peculiar grace and favor in the eyes of the Senate? Who are they? They are those who, overlooking the ameliorations which might be made in the condition of those immediately around them, give wings to their charity, and seek to interfere in the affairs of others. Sir, I do not allude particularly to the Society of Friends, who have annually, from the formation of the Government, sent to Congress such a document rather in the nature of a continual claim, and to declare their opinion upon the subject, than with any wish or expectation that their views will be adopted; but it is to the abolitionists, who came in as auxiliaries, with respect to some of whom I do not entertain the same favorable opinion. Sir, I do not intend to follow the course some have taken, of denouncing, en masse, this class of people at the North as fanatical, or hypocritical, or diabolical. Some there are among them, I have no doubt, who are agitators for the love of mischief, and who would be willing to involve the whole South in one scene of civil commotion, rather than desist from these schemes, which alone gives them importance. This class, actuated by a depraved ambition, without regard to consequences, however awful, prefer to be distinguished by being the instigators of crime, rather than remain in that obscurity to which nature has destined them. To these I have not one word to say; they are joined to their iniquities, let them go; but to those who are willing to reflect for themselves, and who have been misled in associating with others unworthy, by mistaken ideas of philanthropy, (and I hope this class is numerous,) I would suggest a few considerations. They all admit that they have legally no right to act upon the subject of slavery in other States; neither Congress nor the State Governments can touch this subject. Is there not an impropriety in your interfering in the affairs of others, by numerous voluntary associations, by raising large sums of money, with which you have legally no right to intermeddle? Do you suppose yourselves capable of suggesting considerations upon the subject which have not occurred to the minds of those who bave been accustomed to slavery all their lives, and have made it the constant theme of reflection and study? Do you suppose that, among the countrymen of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Henry, Marshall, and of Lowndes, there are not men who have equal sagacity with yourselves, and who are ready to do every thing, even to the sacrifice of their lives, to effect any object which would promote their country's prosperity and happiness? Is there not a manifest indelicacy in doing so? Do you think that you could be induced to alter the legislative and constitutional institutions of your own States on the dictation of others, who are not residents of your States, whose interests are in no way affected by such change? If arguments to show you the impolicy or impropriety of the political institutions of your own States should fail to induce you to change them, do you suppose they would become more convincing if to argunient they should add the grossest abuse? If you should discover those interfering with your affairs, heaping the most degrading epithets upon you which the language furnishes, forming associations to force you to do unwillingly what you would not assent to willingly,

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would it not have a tendency to steel the mind against the force even of truth itself? Do you suppose the publication of pictorial representations and pamphlets, fabricating the grossest misrepresentations, libelling the whole South, calculated to produce any other feeling than exasperation? It is for such trash as this that they levy contributions on you, which you are induced to furnish from feelings of (I must say) mistaken philanthropy. Acknowledging there is no legal right to interfere with the subject of slavery in the South, societies are formed, presess are established, papers and pamphlets are issued, pictorial representations are struck and circulated, almost entirely at the North, where slavery does not exist, under the pretext of elightening the South upon the subject. These papers do not circulate in the South. It is easy to foresee, if your pursue this plan, while the minds of the people of the North may be well affected towards the object you desire; that those of the South must become more and more against it. It has already had that effect. Slavery was fast disappearing from the most northern of the southern States. There was, in each of these States, a strong party inclined to hasten the period when it should become entirely extinct. They were using efforts to bring about that consummation. The effect of the abolition movement in the North has entirely silenced all these; no inducement could make them move in the matter. Another effect of these publications must be to estrange those feelings of kindness, and affection, and sympathy, which all portions of this republic should feel for each other. The main strength of the Government consists in this; destroy these feelings, and it will be worthless; indeed, it cannot long survive. The inevitable tendency of this course must be, whether you design it or not, to the formation of a political party, if any considerable number of the people of the northern States unite together upon these principles of anti-slavery. It is already assuming that aspect. The leaders are already beginning to throw off the mask. I see that a certain document, which is in a paper before me, issued by the head of the executive committee of the Abolition Society of New York, contains strictures on the late message of the Governor of the State, and on the constitution of the United States itself. The course which the Governor of that State has thought it his duty to pursue on this subject has called down upon him the particular displeasure of this person, and, I suppose, of the society he represents.

For his enlightened and liberal views upon the subject, he is threatened with political martyrdom, in the following language: "The time may not be far distant when the ghost of this message will haunt your dreams of popularity by day and by night, and show its spectral form astride every path of your future advancement." No avowal could be more distinct than this. The object of those who lead in this agitation is to drive from political stations all those who oppose their views, and, by consequence, to get those in who will favor them; that being achieved, they will be prepared to give law to their own party to act efficiently, by the enactment of laws to suit their views. What must be the result of this? Will the South submit? I say they will not. Their opinions are fully made up, and they have as one man taken their stand. I say, knowing fully the feelings of that part of the South from which I come, that the subject never can be touched except with the point of the sword. I state this, not as a threat, but as a true statement of public feeling. If any general move upon this subject should ever be made, my constituents are among those who will oppose to it all the physical pow. er of the State, if it be attempted through the invidious efforts of emissaries; if they should be detected, there is no power upon earth that can rescue them from punishment. Mercy to him who shows it, is the rule; and