tions, and we assign to each its intended amount of the whole sum. This is the usual course of Congress on such subjects; and why should it be departed from? Are we ready to say that the power of fixing the places for new fortifications, and the sum allotted to each; the power of ordering new ships to be built, and fixing the number of such new ships; the power of laying out money to raise men for the army; in short, every power, great and small, respecting the military and naval service, shall be vested in the President, without specification of object or purpose, to the entire exclusion of the exercise of all judgment on the part of Congress? For one, I am not prepared. The honorable member from Ohio, near me, has said that if the enemy had been on our shores he would not have agreed to this vote. And I say, if the proposition were now before us, and the guns of the enemy were battering against the walls of the Capitol, I would not agree to it. The people of this country have an interest, a property, an inheritance, in this instrument, against the value of which forty capitols do not weigh the twenti eth part of one poor scruple. There can never be any necessity for such proceedings but a feigned and false necessity, a mere idle and hollow pretence of necessity; least of all can it be said that any such necessity actually existed on the 3d of March. There was no enemy on our shores; there were no guns pointed against the Capitol; we were in no war, nor was there a reasonable probability that we should have war, unless we made it ourselves.

But whatever was the state of our foreign relations, is it not preposterous to say that it was necessary for Congress to adopt this measure, and yet not necessary for the President to recommend it? Why should we thus run in advance of all our own duties, and leave the President completely shielded from his own just responsibility? Why should there be nothing but grant, and trust, and confidence, on our side, and nothing but discretion and power on his?

I

Sir, if there be any philosophy in history, if human blood still runs in human veins, if man still conforms to the identity of his nature, the institutions which secure constitutional liberty can never stand long against this excessive personal confidence, against this devotion to men, in utter disregard both of principle and of expe rience, which seems to me to be strongly characteristic of our times. This vote came to us, sir, from the popular branch of the Legislature; and that such a vote should come from such a branch of the Legislature was among the circumstances which excited in me the greatest surprise and the deepest concern. Certainly, sir, certainly, I was not, on that account, the more inclined to concur. It was no argument with me that others seemed to be rushing, with such heedless, headlong trust, such impetuosity of confidence, into the arms of executive power. I held back the stronger, and would hold back the longer, for that very reason. see, or think I see, it is either a true vision of the future, revealed by the history of the past, or, if it be an illusion, it is an illusion which appears to me in all the brightness and sunlight of broad noor, that it is in this career of personal confidence, along this beaten track of man-worship, marked, every furlong, by the fragments of other free Governments, that our own system is making progress towards its end. A personal popu larity, honorably earned, at first, by military achievements, and sustained now by party, by patronage, and by an enthusiasm which looks for no ill, because it means no ill itself, seems to render men willing to gratify power, long before its demands are made, and to surfeit executive discretion, even in anticipation of its own appetite. Sir, if, on the 3d of March last, it had been the purpose of both Houses of Congress to create VOL. XII,-11

[SENATE.

a military dictator, what formula had been better suited to their purpose than this vote of the House? It is true we might have given more money if we had had it to give. We might have emptied the treasury; but as to the form of the gift we could not have bettered it. Rome has no better models. When we give our money for any military purpose whatever, what remains to be done? If we leave it with one man to decide not only whether the military means of the country shall be used at all, but how they shall be used, and to what extent they shall be employed, what remains either for Congress or the people but to sit still and see how this dictatorial power will be exercised? On the 3d of March, sir, I had not forgotten-it was impossible that I should have forgotten-the recommendation in the message at the opening of that session, that power should be vested in the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, at his discretion, in the recess of Congress. Happily this power was not granted. But suppose it had been, what would then have been the true condition of this Government? Why, sir, this condition is very shortly described. The whole war power would have been in the hands of the President; for no man can doubt a moment that reprisals would bring on immediate war; and the treasury, to the amount of this vote, in addition to all ordinary appropriations, would have been at his absolute disposal also. And all this in time of peace. I beseech sober men, sir, of all parties, I beseech all true lovers of constitutional liberty, to contemplate this state of things, and tell me whether such be a true republican administration of this Government. Whether particular consequences had ensued or not, is such an accumulation of power in the hands of the Executive according to the spirit of our system? Is it either wise or safe? Has it any warrant in the practice of former times? Or are gentlemen ready to establish the practice as an example for the benefit of those who are to come after us?

But, sir, if the power to make reprisals, and this money from the treasury, had both been granted, is there not great reason to believe that we should have been now up to our ears in a hot war? I think there is great reason to believe this. It will be said, I know, that if we had armed the President with this power of war, and supplied him with this grant of money, France would have taken this for such a proof of spirit on our part that she would have paid the indemnity without further delay. This is the old story, and the old plea. Every one who desires more power than the constitution or the laws give him, always says, that if he had more power, he could do more good. Power is always claimed for the good of the people; and dictators are always made, when made at all, for the good of the people. For my part, sir, I was content, and am content, to show to France that we are prepared to maintain our just rights against her, by the exertion of our power, when need be, according to the forms of our own constitution; that, if we make war, we will make it constitutionally; and if we vote money, we will appropriate it constitutionally; and that we will trust all our interests, both in peace and in war, to what the intelligence and strength of the country may do for them, without breaking down or endangering the fabric of free institutions.

Mr. President, it is the misfortune of the Senate to have differed with the President on many great ques tions during the last four or five years. I have regretted this state of things deeply, both on personal and on public account; but it has been unavoidable. It is no pleasant employment, it is no holiday business, to maintain opposition against power and against majorities, and to contend for stern and sturdy principle, against personal popularity, against a rushing and overwhelm

ing confidence, that, by wave upon wave, and cataract after cataract, seems to be bearing away and destroying whatsoever would withstand it. How much longer we may be able to support this opposition in any degree, or whether we can possibly hold out till the public intelligence and the public patriotism shall be awakened to a due sense of the public danger, it is not for me to foresee or to foretell. I shall not despair to the last, if, in the mean time, we be true to our own principles. If there be a steadfast adherence to those principles, both here and elsewhere, if, one and all, they continue the rule of our conduct in the Senate, and the rallying point of those who think with us and support us out of the Senate, I am content to hope on, and to struggle While it remains a contest for the preservation of the constitution, for the security of the public liberty, for the ascendency of principle over men, I am willing to bear my part in it. If we can maintain the constitution, if we can preserve this security for liberty, if we can thus give to true principle its just superiority over party, over persons, over names, our labors will be richly rewarded. If we fail in all this, they are already among the living, who will write the history of this Government, from its commencement to its close.

on.

When Mr. WEBSTER had concluded,

Mr. CUTHBERT observed that, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, the kingly power was abolished at Rome. The great dread at Rome was the dread of the kingly name, from which the Romans thought the greatest danger to the republic was to be apprehended. The danger to Rome, however, was not in the kingly name; for, so odious had the name become, that, in the very worst days of the republic, it could never have been revived. Here was the error committed by the gentleman from Massachusetts-the dread of the kingly power, from which no danger could be apprehended in this Government. It was the patrician class-a moneyed aristocracy a combination of their political leaders, seeking to establish an aristocratic Government, regardless of the welfare of the people, that was more to be dreaded than the power of any single man. There was the situation under which they were placed in that House. The administration was daily subject to the most violent. attacks from these political leaders, who were men of established character, of intellectual acquirements, and acknowledged standing in society; yet the course of these leaders was not to be impugned, lest (said Mr. C.) we infringe the rules of order.

Here Mr. C. yielded the floor to a motion for adjourn

ment.

And the Senate adjourned to Monday.

MONDAY, JANUARY 18.

UNITED STATES AND FRANCE.

The following message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. DoNELSON, his secretary.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

[JAN. 18, 1836.

precedent to the execution of a treaty unconditionally ratified, and to the payment of a debt acknowledged by all the branches of her Government to be due, that certain explanations shall be made, of which she dictates the terms. These terms are such as that Government has already been officially informed cannot be complied with; and, if persisted in, they must be considered as a deliberate refusal on the part of France to fulfil engagements binding by the laws of nations, and held sacred by the whole civilized world. The nature of the act which France requires from this Government is clearly set forth in the letter of the French minister, marked No. 4. "We will pay the money," says he, "when the Government of the United States is ready, on its part, to declare to us, by addressing its claim to us officially, in writing, that it regrets the misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries; that this misunderstanding is founded on a mistake; that it never entered into its intention to call in question the good faith of the French Government, nor to take a menacing attitude towards France;" and he adds, "if the Government of the United States does not give this assurance, we shall be obliged to think that this misunderstanding is not the result of an error." In the letter marked No. 6, the French minister also remarks, "that the Government of the United States knows that upon itself depends henceforward the execution of the treaty of July 4, 1831."

Obliged, by the precise language thus used by the French minister, to view it as a peremptory refusal to execute the treaty, except on terms incompatible with the honor and independence of the United States, and persuaded that, on considering the correspondence now submitted to you, you can regard it in no other light, it becomes my duty to call your attention to such measures as the exigency of the case demands, if the claim of interfering in the communications between the different branches of our Government shall be persisted in. This pretension is rendered the more unreasonable by the fact that the substance of the required explanation has been repeatedly and voluntarily given, before it was insisted on as a condition-a condition the more humiliating, because it is demanded as the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration. Does France desire only a declaration that we had no intention to obtain our rights by an address to her fears rather than to her justice? She has already had it, frankly and explicitly given by our minister accredited to her Government, his act ratified by me, and my confirmation of it officially communicated by him, in his letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 25th of April, 1835, and repeated by my published approval of that letter after the passage of the Dill of indemnification. Does France want a degrading, servile repetition of this act, in terms which she shall dictate, and which will involve an acknowledgment of her assumed right to interfere in our domestic councils? She will never obtain it. The spirit of the American people, the dignity of the Legislature, and the firm resolve of their executive Government, forbid it.

In execution of this design, I now transmit to you the papers numbered from one to thirteen, inclusive, containing, among other things, the correspondence on this subject between our chargé d'affaires and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from which it will be seen that France requires, as a condition

respondence had between that functionary and the Secretary of State, relative to that letter, and to accompany the same with such explanations as will enable you to understand the course of the Executive in regard to it. Recurring to the historical statement made at the commencement of your session, of the origin and progress of our difficulties with France, it will be recollected that, on the return of our minister to the United States, I caused my official approval of the explanations he had given to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to be

France, destined for our seas. Of the cause and intent of these armaments I have no authentic information, nor any other means of judging, except such as are common to yourselves and to the public; but whatever may be their object, we are not at liberty to regard them as unconnected with the measures which hostile movements on the part of France may compel us to pursue. They at least deserve to be met by adequate preparations on our part, and I therefore strongly urge large and speedy appropriations for the increase of the navy, and the completion of our coast defences.

If this array of military force be really designed to affect the action of the Government and people of the United States on the questions now pending between the two nations, then indeed would it be dishonorable to pause a moment on the alternative which such a state of things would present to us. Come what may, the explanation which France demands can never be accorded; and no armament, however powerful and imposing, at a distance, or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from discharging the high duties which we owe to our constituents, to our national character, and to the world.

The House of Representatives, at the close of the last session of Congress, unanimously resolved that the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on by the United States. It is due to the welfare of the human race, not less than to our own interests and honor, that this resolution should, at all hazards, be adhered to. If, after so signal an example as that given by the American people during their long-protracted difficulties with France, of forbearance under accumulated wrongs, and of generous confidence in her ultimate return to justice, she shall now be permitted to withhold from us the tardy and imperfect indemnification which, after years of remon strance and discussion, had at length been solemnly agreed on by the treaty of 1831, and to set at nought the obligation it imposes, the United States will not be the only sufferers. The efforts of humanity and religion to substitute the appeals of justice and the arbitrament of reason for the coercive measures usually resorted to by injured nations will receive little encouragement from such an issue. By the selection and enforcement of such lawful and expedient measures as may be necessary to prevent a result so injurious to ourselves, and so fatal to the hopes of the philanthropist, we shall therefore not only preserve the pecuniary interests of our citizens, the independence of our Government, and the honor of our country, but do much, it may be hoped, to vindicate the faith of treaties, and to promote the general interests of peace, civilization, and improveANDREW JACKSON.

ment.

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1836.

[JAN. 18, 1836.

last, and of a letter addressed to this Department by the late minister of the Government of France, with the correspondence connected with that communication, which, together with a late correspondence between the Secretary of State and the French chargé d'affaires, and a recent correspondence between the chargé d'affaires of the United States at Paris and the Duke de Broglie, already transmitted to the President to be communicated to Congress with his special message relative thereto, are the only papers in the Department of State supposed to be called for by the resolutions of the Senate of the 12th instant.

It will be seen by the correspondence with the chargé d'affaires of France, that a despatch to him from the Duke de Broglie was read to the Secretary, at the Department, in September last. It concluded with an authority to permit a copy to be taken if it was desired. That despatch being an argumentative answer to the last letter of Mr. Livingston to the French Government, and in affirmance of the right of France to expect explanations of the message of the President, which France had been distinctly and timely informed could not be given without a disregard by the Chief Magistrate of his constitutional obligations, no desire was expressed to obtain a copy: it being obviously improper to receive an argument in a form which admitted of no reply, and necessarily unavailing to inquire how much or how little would satisfy France, when her right to any such explanation had been, beforehand, so distinctly and formally denied.

All which is respectfully submitted.

JOHN FORSYTH.

The above messages and documents having been read, Mr. CLAY moved that the message, with the accompanying documents, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Whereupon,

Mr. BUCHANAN said that he had been so much gratified with the message which had just been read that he could not, and he thought he ought not, at this the very first moment, to refrain from expressing his entire approbation of its general tone and spirit. He had watched with intense anxiety the progress of our unfortunate controversy with France. He had hoped, sincerely hoped, that the explanations which had been made by Mr. Livingston, and officially approved by the President of the United States, would have proved satisfactory to the French Government. In this he had found his hopes to be vain. After this effort had failed, he felt a degree of confidence, almost amounting to moral assurance, that the last message to Congress would have been hailed by France, as it was by the American people, as the olive branch which would have restored

cient ally. Even in this, he feared he was again doomed to be disappointed. The Government of France, unless they change their determination, will not consider this message as sufficient. We have the terms clearly prescribed by the Duke de Broglie, upon which, and upon which alone, the French Government will consent to comply with the treaty, and to pay the five millions of dollars to our injured fellow-citizens. Speculation is now at an end. The clouds and darkness which have hung over this question have vanished. It is now made clear as a sunbeam. The money will not be paid, says the organ of the French Government, unless the Government of the United States shall address its claim officially in writing to France, accompanied by what appeared to him, and he believed would appear to the whole American people, without distinction of party, to be a degrading apology. The striking peculiarity of the case, the one which he would undertake to say distinguished it from any other case which had arisen in