The Mind and the BrainK. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company Limited, 1907 - 280 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
act of cognition act of consciousness action admit analysis appears argument Aristotle Bergson body brain cause ceive centres cerebral colour conceive conception consequently consists constitute definition Descartes distinction doctrine Edition elements emotion error excitant exist explain external object extrospection false feeling give heterogeneity hypothesis idea imagine impression intermediary LL.D logical material materialist mechanical ment mental metaphysics mind molecular monism motion movement muscular naïve realism nature nervous system ness objects of cognition observation opinion optic nerve organs ourselves outer world panpsychism parallelist perceive perception pheno phenomena phenomenon philosophers physicists physiologists possible preadaptation principle produced properties psychical psychology reality reason recognise relation represent representation resemblance retina rôle sciousness sensations of sight sense sensory nerves separate simply soul sound spiritualists substance suppose tertium quid theory things Thomas Reid thought tion tuning-fork unconscious vibration visual perception visual sensation
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Página 219 - In the second place, we have every reason for believing that there is, in company with all our mental processes, an unbroken material succession. From the ingress of a sensation, to the outgoing responses in action, the mental succession is not for an instant dissevered from a physical succession.
Página 219 - A new prospect bursts upon the view ; there is a mental result of sensations, emotion, thought, terminating in outward displays of speech or gesture. Parallel to this mental series is the physical series of facts, the successive agitation of the physical organs, called the eye, the retina, the optic nerve, optic centres, cerebral hemispheres, outgoing nerves, muscles, etc.
Página 219 - It would be incompatible with everything we know of the cerebral action, to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance; which immaterial substance, after working alone, imparts its results to the other edge of the physical break, and determines the active response — two shores of the material with an intervening ocean of the immaterial.