whole negotiation will be seen in its result, unless we accept two brief notes, which constitute all that passed between the negotiators. These have an interest general and special, and I conclude the history of this transaction by reading them: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, March 23, 1867. ŞIR: With reference to the proposed convention between our respective Governments for a cession by Russia of her American territory to the United States, I have the honor to acquaint you that I must insist upon that clause in the sixth article of the draft which declares the cession to be free and unin cumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate, Russian or any other, &c., and must regard it as an ultimatum. With the President's approval, however, I will add $200,000 to the consideration money on that account. I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you a renewed assurance of my most distinguished consideration. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. EDWARD DE STOECKL, &c.. &c., &c. [Translation.] Washington, March 17 | 29, 1867. Mr. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to inform you that by a telegram dated 16 | 28th of this month from St. Petersburg, Prince Gortchakow informs me that his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias gives his consent to the cession of the Russian possessions on the American continent to the United States for the stipulated sum of $7,200,000 in gold, and that his Majesty the Emperor invests me with full powers to negotiate and sign the treaty. Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my very high consideration. STOECKL. To Hon. WILLIAM H. SEward, Secretary of State of the United States. THE TREATY. The Treaty begins with the declaration that "the United States of America and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, being desirous of strengthening, if possible, the good understanding which exists between them," have appointed plenipotentiaries, who have proceeded to sign articles, wherein it is stipulated on behalf of Russia that "his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agrees to cede to the United States by this convention, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications thereof, all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands, the same being contained within the geographical limits herein set forth;" and it is stipulated on behalf of the United States that "in consideration of the cession aforesaid the United States agree to pay at the Treasury in Washington, within ten months after the ratification of this convention, to the diplomatic representative or other agent of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias duly authorized to receive the same, $7,200,000 in gold." The ratifications are to be exchanged within three months from the date of the Treaty, or sooner, if possible. Beyond the consideration founded on the desire of "strengthening the good understanding" between the two countries, there is the pecuniary consideration already mentioned, which underwent a change in the progress of the negotiation. The sum of seven millions Il was originally agreed upon; but when it was understood that there was a fur company and also an ice company enjoying monopolies under the existing government, it was thought best that these should be extinguished, in consideration of which our Government added $200,000 to the purchase money, and the Russian Government in formal terms declared "the cession of territory and dominion to be free and unincumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions, by any associated companies, whether corporate or incor porate, or by any parties, except merely private individual property-holders." Thus the Uni ted States receive this cession free of all incumbrances, so far at least as Russia is in a condition to make it. The Treaty proceeds to say, that "the cession hereby made conveys all the rights, franchises, and privileges now belonging to Russia in the said territory or dominion and appurtenances thereto." In other words, Russia conveys all that she has to convey. QUESTIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY. There are questions not unworthy of attention, which arise under the treaty between Russia and Great Britain, fixing the eastern limits of these possessions, and conceding certain privileges to the latter Power. By this treaty, signed at St. Petersburg 28th February, 1825, after fixing the boundaries between the Russian and British possessions, it is provided that "for the space of ten years the vessels of the two Powers, or those belonging to their respective subjects, shall mutually be at liberty to frequent, with out any hinderance whatever, all the inland seas, gulfs, havens, and creeks on the coast for the purpose of fishing and of trading with the natives;" and also that "for the space of ten years the port of Sitka or Novo Archangelsk shall be open to the commerce and vessels of British subjects." (Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, vol. 2, p 365.) In the same Treaty it is also provided that "the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, from whatever quarter they may arrive, whether from the ocean or from the interior of the continent, shall forever enjoy the right of navigating freely and without any hinderance whatever all the rivers and streams which in their course toward the Pacific ocean may cross the line of demarcation." (Ibid.) Afterwards a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Russia and Great Britain was signed at St. Petersburg 11th January, 1843, subject to be terminated on notice from either party at the expiration of ten years, in which it is provided that "in regard to commerce and navigation in the Russian possessions on the northwest coast of America the convention of 28th February, 1825, continues in force." (Ibid., vol. 6, p. 767.) Then ensued the Crimean war between Russia and Great Britain, effacing or suspending treaties. Afterwards another Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed at St. Petersburg 12th January, 1859, subject to be terminated on notice from either party at the 1 expiration of ten years, which repeats the last provision. (Ibid., vol. 10, p 1063.) Thus we have three different stipulations on the part of Russia; one opening seas, gulfs, and havens on the Russian coast to British subjects for fishing and trading with the natives; the second making Sitka a free port to British subjects; and the third making British rivers which flow through the Russian possessions forever free to British navigation. Do the United States succeed to these stipulations? Among these I make a distinction in favor of the last, which by its language is declared to be forever," and may have been in the|| nature of an equivalent at the settlement of the boundaries between the two Powers. But whatever may be its terms or its origin it is obvious that it is nothing but a declaration of public law as it has always been expounded by the United States and is now recognized on the continent of Europe. While pleading with Great Britain in 1826 for the free navigation of the St. Lawrence Mr. Clay, who was at the time Secretary of State, said that "the American Government did not mean to contend for any principle the benefit of which, in analogous circumstances, it would deny to Great Britain.' (Wheaton's Elements of International Law, part 2, cap. 4.) During the same year Mr. Gallatin, our minister in London, when negotiating with Great Britain for the adjustment of our boundaries on the Pacific, proposed that "if the line should cross any of the branches of the Columbia at points from which they are navigable by boats to the main stream the navigation of both branches and of the main stream should be perpetually free and common to the people of both nations." At an earlier day the United States made the same claim with regard to the Mississippi, and asserted as a general principle that "if the right of the upper inhabitants to descend the stream was in any case obstructed it was an act by a stronger society against a weaker, condemned by the judgment of mankind." (Ibid.) By these admissions our country is estopped, even if the public law of the European continent, first declared at. Vienna with regard to the Rhine, did not offer an example which we cannot afford to reject. I rejoice to believe that on this occasion we shall apply to Great Britain the generous rule which from the beginning we have claimed for ourselves. || The two other stipulations are different in character. They are not declared to be "forever "and do not stand on any principle of public law. Even if subsisting now they cannot be onerous. I doubt much if they are subsisting now. In succeeding to the Russian possessions it does not follow that the United States succeed to ancient obligations assumed by Russia, as if, according to a phrase of the common law, they are covenants running with the land." If these stipulations are in the nature of servitudes they depend for their || duration on the sovereignty of Russia, and are 66 personal or national rather than territorial. So at least I am inclined to believe. But it is hardly profitable to speculate on a point of so little practical value. Even if "running with the land" these servitudes can be terminated at the expiration of ten years from the last treaty by à notice, which equitably the United States may give, so as to take effect on the 12th January, 1869. Meanwhile, during this brief period, it will be easy by act of Congress in advance to limit importations at Sitka, so that this "free port" shall not be made the channel or doorway by which British goods may be introduced into the United States free of duty. general coNSIDERATIONS ON THE TREATY. From this survey of the Treaty, as seen in its origin and the questions under it, I might pass at once to a survey of the possessions which have been conveyed; but there are other matters of a more general character which present themselves at this stage and challenge the judgment. These concern nothing less than the unity, power, and grandeur of the Republic, with the extension of its dominion and its institutions.. Such considerations, where not entirely inapplicable, are apt to be controlling. I do not doubt that they will in a great measure determine the fate of this treaty with the American people. They are patent, and do not depend on research or statistics. To state them is enough. Advantages to the Pacific Coast. (1.) Foremost in order, if not in importance, I put the desires of our fellow-citizens on the Pacific coast, and the special advantages which they will derive from this enlargement of boundary. They were the first to ask for it, and will be the first to profit by it. While others knew the Russian possessions only on the map they knew them practically in their resources. While others were still indifferent they were planning how to appropriate Russian peltries and fisheries. This is attested by the resolutions of the Legislature of Washington Territory; also by the exertions at different times of two Senators from California, who, differing in political sentiments and in party relations, took the initial steps which ended in this Treaty. These well-known desires were founded, of course, on supposed advantages; and here experience and neighborhood were prompters. Since 1854 the people of California have received their ice from the fresh-water lakes in the island of Kodiak, not far westward from Mount St. Elias. Later still their fishermen have searched the waters about the Aleutians and the Shumagins, commencing a promising fishery. Others have proposed to substitute themselves to the Hudson Bay Company in their franchise on the coast. But all are looking to the Orient, as in the time of Columbus, although like him they sail to the West. To them China and Japan, those ancient realms Uor M of fabulous wealth, are the Indies. To draw this commerce to the Pacific coast is no new idea. It haunted the early navigators. Meares, the Englishman, whose voyage in the intervening seas was in 1789, closes his volumes with an essay, entitled "The trade between the northwest coast of America and China," in the || course of which he dwells on the "great and very valuable source of commerce" afforded by China as "forming a chain of trade between Hudson bay, Canada, and the northwest coast,' and then he exhibits on the American side the || costly furs of the sea otter, which are still so much prized in China; "mines which are known to lie between the latitudes 40° and 60° north;" and also an "inexhaustible supply" of ginseng, for which there is still such a demand in China that even Minnesota, at the headwaters of the Mississippi, supplies her contribution. His catalogue might be extended || now. when the English navigator recorded his voyage. Of course whatever helps this result is an advantage. The Pacific railroad is such an advantage, for, though running westward, it will be, when completed, a new highway to the East. This Treaty is another advantage, for nothing can be clearer than that the western coast must exercise an attraction which will be felt in China and Japan just in proportion as it is occupied by a commercial people communicating readily with the Atlantic and with Europe. This cannot be done without consequences not less important politically than commercially.. Owing so much to the Union, the people there will be bound to it anew, and the national unity will receive another confirmation. Thus the whole country will be a gainer. So are we knit together that the advantages to the Pacific coast will contribute to the general welfare. Extension of Dominion. (2.) The extension of dominion is another consideration, calculated to captivate the public mind. Few are so cold or philosophical as to regard with insensibility a widening of the bounds of country. Wars have been regarded as successful when they have given a new ter As a practical illustration of this idea, it may be mentioned that for a long time most if not all the sea otter skins of this coast found their way to China, excluding even Russia herself. China was the best customer, and therefore Englishmen and Americans followed the Russian company in carrying these furs to her market, so that Pennant, the English natural-ritory. The discoverer who had planted the ist, impressed by the peculiar advantages of this coast, exclaimed, "What a profitable trade with China might not a colony carry on were it possible to penetrate to that part of the country by means of rivers and lakes!" But under the present Treaty this coast is ours. land, each followed the example of Spain and rejoiced in extended empire. flag of his sovereign on a distant coast has been received as a conqueror. The ingratitude which was shown to Columbus during his later days was compensated by the epitaph that he had given a new world to Castile and Leon. His discoveries were continued by other navigators, and Spain girdled the earth with her The absence of harbors at present belong-possessions. Portugal, France, Holland, Enging to the United States on the Pacific limits the outlets of the country. On that whole extent, from Panama to Puget's sound, the only harbor of any considerable value is San Francisco. Further north the harbors are abundant, and they are all nearer to the great marts of Japan and China. But San Francisco itself will be nearer by the way of the Aleutians than by Honolulu. The projection of maps is not always calculated to present an accurate idea of distances. From measurement on a globe it appears that a voyage from San Francisco to Hong Kong by the common way of the Sandwich islands is 7,140 miles, but by way of the Aleutian islands it is only 6,060 miles, being a saving of more than one thousand miles, with the enormous additional advantage of being obliged to carry much less coal. Of course a voyage from Sitka, or from Puget sound, the terminus of the Northern Pacific railroad, would be shorter still. The advantages to the Pacific coast have two aspects, one domestic and the other foreign. || Not only does the Treaty extend the coasting trade of California, Oregon, and Washington Territory northward, but it also extends the base of commerce with China and Japan. To unite the east of Asia with the west of America is the aspiration of commerce now as Our territorial acquisitions are among the landmarks of our history. In 1803 Louisiana, embracing the valley of the Mississippi, was acquired from France for fifteen million dollars. In 1819 Florida was acquired from Spain for three million dollars. In 1845 Texas was annexed without any purchase, but subsequently her debt was assumed to the amount of seven and a half million dollars. In 1848 California, New Mexico, and Utah were acquired from Mexico after war, and on payment of fifteen million dollars. In 1854 Arizona was acquired from Mexico for ten million dollars. And now it is proposed to acquire Rus|| sian America. The passion for acquisition, which is so strong in the individual, is not less strong in the community. A nation seeks an outlying territory, as an individual seeks an outlying farm. The passion shows itself constantly. France, passing into Africa, has annexed Algeria. Spain set her face in the same direction, but without the same success. There are two great Powers with which annexation has become a habit. One is Russia, which from the time of Peter the Great has been moving her flag forward in every direction, so that on every side her limits have been extended. Even now destiny of the Republic manifest. It was to the report comes that she is lifting her south-spread over the northern part of the Amerern landmarks in Asia, so as to carry her ican quarter of the globe; and it was to be a boundary to India.. The other annexationist support to the rights of mankind. is Great Britain, which from time to time adds another province to her Indian dominion. If the United States have from time to time added to their dominion they have only yielded to the nniversal passion, although I do not forget that the late Theodore Parker was accustomed to say that among all people the Anglo-Saxons were remarkable for "agreed of land." It was land, not gold, that aroused the Anglo-Saxon phlegm. I doubt, however, if this passion be stronger with us than with others, except, perhaps, that in a community where all participate in government the national sentiments are more active. It is common to the human family. There are few anywhere who could hear of a considerable accession of territory, obtained peacefully and honestly, without a pride of country, even if at certain moments the judgment hesitated. With an increased size on the map there is an increased consciousness of strength, and the citizen throbs anew as he traces the extending line. By the text of our Constitution the United States are bound to guaranty a republican form of government' to every State in this Union; but this obligation, which is only ap plicable at home, is an unquestionable indication of the national aspiration everywhere. The Republic is something more than a local policy; it is a general principle, not to be forgotten at any time, especially when the oppor| tunity is presented of bringing an immense region within its influence. Elsewhere it has for the present failed; but on this account our example is more important. Who can forget the generous lament of Lord Byron, whose passion for freedom was not mitigated by his rank as an hereditary legislator of England, when he exclaims in memorable verse: Extension of Republican Institutions. (3.) More than the extension of dominion is the extension of republican institutions, which is a traditional aspiration. It was in this spirit that Independence was achieved. In the name of Human Rights our fathers overthrew the kingly power, whose representative was George the Third. They set themselves openly against this form of government. They were against it for themselves, and offered their example to mankind. They were Roman in character, and turned to Roman lessons. With a cynical austerity the early Cato said that kings were "carnivorous animals," and at his instance the Roman Senate decreed that no king should be allowed within the gates of the city. A kindred sentiment, with less austerity of form. has been received from our fathers; but our city can be nothing less than the North American continent with its gates on all the surrounding seas. John Adams, in the preface to his Defense of the American Constitution, written in London, where he resided at the time as minister, and dated January 1,1787, at Grosvenor Square, the central seat of aristocrati fashion, after exposing the fabulous origin of the kingly power in contrast with the simple origin of our republican constitutions, thus for a moment lifts the curtain of the future: "Thirteen governments," he says plainly, "thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, and without any pretense of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, is a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind." (John Adams's Works, vol. 4, p. 293.) Thus, according to this prophetic minister, even at that early day was the || "The name of commonwealth is past and gone O'er the three fractions of the groaning globe!" Who can forget the salutation which the poet sends to the "one great clime," which, nursed in freedom, enjoys what he calls "the proud distinction" of not being confounded with other lands, Whose sons must bow them at a monarch's,motion, The present Treaty is a visible step in the occupation of the whole North American continent. As such it will be recognized by the world and accepted by the American people. But the Treaty involves something more. By it we dismiss one more monarch from this continent. One by one they have retired; first France; then Spain; then France again and now Russia; all giving way to that absorbing Unity which is declared in the national motto, E pluribus unum. Anticipation of Great Britain. (4.) Another motive to this acquisition may be found in a desire to anticipate the imagined schemes or necessities of Great Britain. With regard to all these I confess my doubts, and yet, if we may credit report, it would seem as if there was already a British movement in this direction. Sometimes it is said that Great Britain desires to buy if Russia will sell. Sir George Simpson, governor-in-chief of the Hudson Bay Company, declared that without the strip on the coast underlet to the former by the Russian Company the interior would be "comparatively useless to England." Here, then, is a provocation to buy. Sometimes report assumes a graver character. A German scientific journal, in an elaborate paper entitled "The Russian Colonies on the Northwest Coast of America," after referring to the constant "pressure" upon Russia, proceeds to say that there are already crowds of adventurers from British Columbia and California now at the gold mines on the Stikine, which flows from British territory through the Russian possessions, who openly declare their purpose of driving the Russians out of this region. I refer to the Archiv für Wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland, edited at Berlin as late as 1863, by A. Erman, vol. 22, pp. 47-70, and unquestionably the leading authority on Russian questions. At the same time it presents a curious passage bearing directly on British policy from the British Colonist, a newspaper of Victoria, on Vancouver's island. As this was regarded of sufficient im portance to be translated into German for the instruction of the readers of a scientific journal, I shall be justified in laying it before you restored from the German to English. It is as follows: The information which we daily publish from the Stikine river very naturally excites public attention to a great extent. Whether the territory through which the river flows be considered in a political, commercial, or industrial light there is a probability that in a short time there will be a still more general interest in the claim. Not only will the intervention of the royal jurisdietion be demanded in order to give to it a complete form of government, but if the land proves to be as rich as there is now reason to believe it to be it is not improbable that it will result in negotiations between England and Russia for the transfer of the sea-coast to the British Crown. It certainly is not acceptable that a stream like the Stikine, which for one hundred and seventy to one hundred and ninety miles is navigable for steamers, which waters a territory so rich in gold that it will allure thousands of men-certainly it is not desirable that the business of such a highway should reach the interior through a Russian door of thirty miles ofcoast. The English population which occupies the interior cannot be so easily managed by the Russians as the Stikine Indians of the coast manage the Indians of the interior. Our business must be in British hands. Our resources, our energies, our undertakings cannot be fully developed in building up a Russian emporium at the mouth of the Stikine. We must have for our productions a depot over which the British flag waves. By the treaty of 1825 the navigation of the river is secured to us. The navigation of the Mississippi was also open to the United States before the Louisiana purchase, but the growing strength of the North made the attainment of that territory either by purchase or by might an evident necessity. We look upon the sea-coast of Stikine land in the same light. The strip of land which stretches along from Portland canal to Mount St. Elias with a breadth of thirty miles, and which according to the treaty of 1825 forms a part of Russian America, must eventually become the property of Great Britain, either as the direct result of the development of gold, or for reasons which are now yet in the beginning, but whose results are certain. Foritis clearly undesirable that the strip three hundred miles long and thirty miles wide which is only used by the Russians for the collection of furs and walrus teeth shall forever control the entrance to our very extensive northern territory. It is a principle of England to acquire territory only as a point of defense. Canada, Ñova Scotia, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, and the great part of our Indian possessions were all acquired as defensive points. In Africa, India, and China the same rule is to-day followed by the Government. With a Power like Russia it would perhaps be more difficult to get ready, but if we need the sea-coast to help us in our business in the precious metals with the interior and for defense then we must have it. The United States needed Florida and Louisiana, and they took them. We need the shore of New Norfolk and New Cornwall. "It is just as much the destiny of our Anglo-Norman race to possess the whole of Russian America, however wild and inhospitable it may be, as it has been the destiny of the Russian Northmen to prevail over northern Europe and Asia. As the wandering Jew and his phantom in the tale of Eugene Sue, so will the Anglo-Norman and the Russian yet look upon each other from the opposite side of Behring straits. Between the two races the northern half of the Old and New World must be divided. America must be ours. "The present development of the precious metals in our hyperborean Eldorado will most probably hasten the annexation of the territory in question. It can hardly be doubted that the gold region of the Stikine extends away to the western source of the Mackenzie. . In this case the increase of the business and of the population will exceed our most sanguine expectations. Who shall reap the profit of this? The mouths of rivers have as well before as since the time of railroads controlled the business of the interior. For our national pride the thought, however, is unbearable that the Russian eagle should possess a point which owes its importance to the British lion. The mouth of the Stikine must be ours, or at least an outer harbor must be established on British soil from which our steamers can pass the Russian girdle. Fort Simpson, Dundas Land, Portland canal, orsome other convenient point, must be selected for this purpose. The necessity of speedy action in order to secure the control of the Stikine is apparent. If we let slip the opportunity, so shall we permit a Russian State to arrive at the door of a British colony.' The Thus if we may credit this colonial ejaculation, caught up and preserved by German science, the Russian possessions were destined to round and complete the domain of Great Britain on this continent. The Russian "eagle" was to give way to the British "lion." Anglo-Norman was to be master as far as Behring straits, across which he might survey his Russian neighbor. How this was to be accomplished is not precisely explained. The promises of gold on the Stikine failed, and it is not improbable that this colonial plan was as unsubstantial. Colonists become excited easily. This is not the first time in which Russian America has been menaced in a similar way. During the Crimean war there seemed to be in Canada a spirit not unlike that of the Vancouver journalist, unless we are misled by the able pamphlet of Mr. A. K. Roche, of Quebec, where, after describing "richer in resources and Russian America as capabilities than it has hitherto been allowed to be either by the English who shamefully gave it up, or by the Russians who cunningly obtained it," the author urges an expedition for its conquest and annexation. His proposition fell on the happy termination of the war, but it exists as a warning, with a notice also of a former English title, "shamefully" abandoned. This region is distant enough from Great Britain; but there is an incident of past history which shows that distance from the metropolitan Government has not excluded the idea of war. Great Britain could hardly be more jealous of Russia on these coasts than was Spain in a former day, if we may credit the report of Humboldt. I quote again his authoritative work, Essai Politique sur la Nouvelle Espagne, (Tom. 1, page 345,) where it is recorded that as early as 1788, even while peace was still unbroken, the Spaniards could not bear the idea of Russians in this region, and when in 1790 the Emperor Paul declared war on Spain the hardy project was formed of an expedition from the Mexican ports of Monterey and San |