CHAPTER XI

PARLIAMENTARY FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURE: THE CABINET SYSTEM

Formal and Theoretical Aspects. The entire political development of modern England centers around two great facts: the growth of the power of Parliament and the establishment of popular control in the predominant chamber, the House of Commons. Upon the vastness of the powers attained by the two houses something has already been said; it has been pointed out that Parliament has long since gained authority to alter or add to the national constitution at will, and that many, if not most, of the great constitutional changes of recent times have come about in this way. Closely following the power of constitutional amendment comes that of general legislation. It cannot be said that Parliament is the author of all English law. The great body of the common law has sprung from sources entirely outside legislative halls. But in so far as national laws are enacted to-day, it is Parliament, directly or indirectly, that enacts them. There is no subject upon which Parliament cannot legislate, no sort of law that it cannot put on the statute books, no existing law (written or unwritten) that it cannot modify or rescind. It goes without saying that the volume of legislation enacted by Parliament is enormous. The House of Commons, at all events, is always deluged with urgent business; and while procedure has been expedited by the more extensive use of committees, and by other devices to be described presently, matters of great importance often lie over for years awaiting a favorable opportunity for their consideration. Similarly, the revenues which come into the Treasury and which can be turned to use independently of Parliament would hardly carry on the business of government for a day, and Parliament (in effect, the House of Commons) not only makes possible, by its appropriation acts, the legal expenditure of practically all public moneys, but it provides, by its measures of taxation, the funds from which almost all appropriations are made.

Furthermore, Parliament (again, mainly the House of Commons) has full power to inquire into, criticize, and direct the

work of administration. An essential feature of the English system is that the ministers shall invariably be members of Parliament, that they shall retain office only so long as they command the support of a majority in the House of Commons, and that the cabinet- the inner circle composed of the principal ministers shall serve practically as an executive committee of Parliament for the general management of the administrative machinery which Parliament sets up and maintains. "Parliament," once declared a leading member of the House of Lords, "makes and unmakes our ministries, it revises their action. Ministries may make peace and war, but they do so at pain of instant dismissal by Parliament from office; and in affairs of internal administration the power of Parliament is equally direct. It can dismiss a ministry if it is too extravagant or too economical; it can dismiss a ministry because its government is too stringent or too lax. It does actually and practically in every way directly govern England, Scotland, and Ireland." 1

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Loss of Power to the Cabinet and to the Electorate. of the great powers thus attributed to Parliament unquestionably belong to it. However, they are actually exercised by the two houses with not quite so much initiative, continuity, and force as these broad statements would imply; and it becomes necessary to look somewhat beneath the surface to discover the true situation. Such scrutiny reveals the fact that, so far as the actual exercise of its powers is concerned, Parliament has lost, and is losing, on the one side to the cabinet, and on the other to the electorate. For the moment there is something shocking in this discovery; we had been accustomed to think of Parliament as the great organ of popular government, and a diminution of the powers which it wields suggests a recession of democracy. But reassurance comes when we reflect that loss of power to the cabinet is not necessarily inconsistent with popular government, since the cabinet is made up largely of elected members of Parliament, and is responsible to the House of Commons; while, of course, a loss to the electorate means throwing power back directly into the hands of the people.

To this last-mentioned development three things have chiefly contributed. The first is the great increase of popular information and the sharpening of public opinion upon political affairs, made possible by the printing press, the telegraph, and other aids to quick and cheap dissemination of news and ideas. "A 1 The Duke of Devonshire, quoted in Low, Governance of England (new ed.), 57-58.

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debate, a vote, or a scene, says Lowell," that occurs in Parliament late at night is brought home to the whole country at breakfast the next morning, and prominent constituents, clubs, committees, and the like, can praise or censure, encourage or admonish, their member for his vote before the next sitting of the House." 1 Under the constant gaze of his constituents, the member is less free to act and speak and vote as he likes than was his predecessor of a hundred years ago. A second factor in the situation is the growth of the idea of the referendum, or the popular mandate. Legally, Parliament is still free to make constitutional changes and to enact ordinary legislation at will. But in the past quarter-century, and especially since the sharp political struggles of 1909-11, the view has come to be widely held that before taking final action on matters of great importance the houses, through their leaders, ought to consult the nation (ordinarily by means of a dissolution, followed by a national election), so that definitive legislation may be based on a fresh and unmistakable mandate from the people. A third, and more important, factor is the remarkable growth of the power of the cabinet, and the actual supplanting, in a considerable measure, of cabinet responsibility to the House of Commons by cabinet responsibility directly to the electorate. This matter of the cabinet's increased power, as it affects Parliament, calls for some comment.

Cabinet and Parliament in Legislation. A hundred years ago, and less, the members of the cabinet had comparatively little to do with law-making. They were already, with only an occasional exception, members of Parliament. But their duties were mainly executive, and they bore little general responsibility for the legislation that was enacted. The public demand, however, that came upon them as administrators for remedial legislation, the growing complexity of the relations between legislation and administration, and the increasing compactness and morale of the inner ministerial group-in short, the ripening of the cabinet system brought, during the nineteenth century, a totally changed situation. The cabinet of to-day not only actively participates in law-making; it decides what important measures are to be brought before the houses, puts these measures into form, introduces them, explains them, defends them, presses for their passage, takes full responsibility for them after they are passed, and gives up the attempt to govern if they, or any of them, are definitely rejected 1 Government of England, I, 425.

by the popular chamber. Every cabinet member has, of course, a seat in one house or the other; and in the house of which he is not a member he or, more accurately, the executive department or office over which he presides — has as a rule a spokesman in the person of a parliamentary under-secretary. Measures which are brought forward by the cabinet are known as "Government bills." They are almost certain to be passed. What happens in case one of them is defeated depends on the circumstances; but the fall of the cabinet is not unlikely to be the result. Bills may be introduced by members of the two houses who do not belong to the cabinet. But little time is allowed for the consideration of these “private members' bills,” and few are ever passed — none that are of a far-reaching and controversial nature. 1

Indeed, the ordinary member plays a distinctly passive rôle. He listens to the speeches of the Government leaders in favor of their bills, and to the rejoinders by the leaders of the Opposition; he may, if he is adroit, manage to take some small part in the discussion himself; and he finally gives his vote one way or the other. How he will vote can usually be told in advance; for his vote helps to decide the fate not only of the bill under consideration, but of the ministry, and therefore the fortunes of his party. Liberal members must vote for the bills introduced by a Liberal ministry or ruin that ministry and drive their own party from power. Only by voting consistently and solidly against the Government's bills can the Opposition hope to make a showing that will attract strength and eventually build up the majority that is necessary to a cabinet overturn in its favor. Nowhere are party lines more sharply drawn than in the House of Commons (conditions in war time are, of course, exceptional); in few legislative bodies does the ordinary member exercise less personal initiative. "To say," concludes the American writer who has made the closest study of this subject," that at present the cabinet legislates with the advice and consent of Parliament would hardly be an exaggeration; and it is only the right of private members to bring in a few motions and bills of their own, and to criticize Government measures, or propose amendments to them, freely, that prevents legislation from being the

1 Under standing orders long in effect before the Great War, Government business had precedence at every sitting except after 8.15 on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings and at the sitting on Friday; and under motions for adjournment urgent matters of public importance might displace private members' motions even at these times. During the war the Government claimed all of the time, to the entire exclusion of private members' bills.

work of a mere automatic majority. It does not follow that the action of the cabinet is arbitrary. . . . The cabinet has its finger always on the pulse of the House of Commons, and especially of its own majority there; and it is ever on the watch for expressions of public feeling outside. Its function is in large part to sum up and formulate the desires of its supporters, but the majority must accept its conclusions, and in carrying them out becomes well-nigh automatic." 1

Cabinet and Parliament in Administration. A similar situation exists in the domain of executive and administrative work. Most of the members of the cabinet stand at the head of great executive offices or departments. As ministers, their primary business is to supervise the work carried on in and through these agencies; and ever since the cabinet system came into existence their direct and full responsibility to Parliament (actually, the House of Commons) for all of their executive actions has been accepted as axiomatic. The theory is that the ministers are answerable to the elected chamber for all that they do, singly in small or isolated matters, collectively in important ones; that their acts can be examined, criticized, revised, or annulled; and 'that the great powers which they wield can be stripped from them whenever the House of Commons chooses to withhold from them its support. Any member of the House of Commons may address a question (subject to the Speaker's judgment as to its propriety) to any minister of the crown who is also a member, with a view to obtaining information. Except in special cases, notice of questions must be given at least one day in advance, and half an hour or more is allowed at four sittings every week for the asking and answering of such questions. A minister may answer or decline to answer, but unless a refusal can be shown to arise from legitimate considerations of public interest its political effect may be embarrassing. Ordinarily there is no debate. But if the matter is an important one, and the House is not satisfied with the minister's reply, the questioner may ask leave to "move the adjournment of the House"; and if forty members support his request, a debate (nominally on that motion, but really on the substance of the question) takes place; and the Government, which formally opposes the motion, if defeated, must resign, or at least the

1 Lowell, Government of England, I, 326. For criticism of the alleged autocracy of the cabinet in legislation see Jenks, Government of the British Empire, 112-113, and especially E. Clark, "Woman Suffrage in Parliament; a Test for Cabinet Autocracy," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., May, 1917.