munities. Why should special knowledge be expected of the registrar on the subject of the Quaker and the Jewish ritual; or how can he, even if present, know anything of the practice of a society to which he does not belong? If, on the other hand, he is unable to "satisfy himself" on the point of conformity, why is the marriage to go unregistered, and the issue to lose the benefit of a lasting record of their legitimacy? The source of the mischief lies in the circumstance, that the State recognises one person as alone competent to celebrate the marriage, and another as alone competent to register it. The purely civil functionary, whose duty is to record the fact, ought not to be required to judge of the completeness of a ceremonial which, ex hypothesi, transcends the sphere of ordinary contract. Where the marriage is celebrated according to the rites of the Established Church, the officiating minister is also the person who registers the marriage. In the case of the great body of Nonconformists, the registering officer is himself the celebrant. These two functions can never be dissociated without producing the mischievous consequence of a conflict of jurisdictions. In the single instance of Jews and Quakers this severance is permitted to take place; and though the practical inconveniences which result are not flagrant, there is no reason why the anomaly should not be banished from the English marriage law. In the case of the established clergy, the minister is, for the purposes of registration, an officer of the State, and no other civil functionary need intervene; in all other cases, the civil and the religious forms should be kept perfectly distinct, the State first securing the contract, and fencing it round with all necessary precautions, and then withdrawing to allow the married parties to superadd any such religious ceremony as approves itself to their consciences. Apart, then, from the two exceptional cases which we have just noticed, the claims of the marriage law of England to become the standard marriage law of the United Kingdom, appear to rest on the following considerations: VOL. XIV.-NO. XXVIII. C C 1. The marriage law of England recognises only one kind of marriage, which cannot be annulled at the mere will of the parties, and is attended by ulterior civil consequences. 2. By the publication of banns, the law secures time for reflection before entering into the marriage state, by interposing a period of three weeks between the revocable agreement to marry and the final indissoluble contract. This second consideration does not, however, apply to marriages celebrated by licence. 3. It requires the marriage to be public, both for the sake of greater solemnity, and in order that, if any impediment exist, it may be disclosed. 4. Where the marriage is contracted bonâ fide, it allows no latent impediment, which is not founded on nature and common reason, to invalidate the contract. 5. So long as one of the prescribed modes of celebration is followed, it holds the marriage to be binding without reference to the religious faith of the contracting parties. Your committee, with this standard of a good marriage law in view, now pass to the consideration of the marriage law of Ireland. It should not be forgotten that from the year 1172 (the date of the assimilating ordinance of the Council of Cashel) down to the accession of William III., the marriage law of Ireland was identical with that of England; and that whereas the mischiefs which formerly beset the marriage law of England were owing to the non-interference and neglect of the Legislature, those that now beset the marriage law of Ireland are due to express statutory enactments. Ireland does not, like Scotland, claim validity for any mode of contracting marriages which is not equally recognised here. She does not, for instance, sanction the mere consensual contract simply because it is binding in foro conscientia. Previous contracts de præsenti, not followed by consummation, were declared insufficient to set aside a regular marriage so early as the year 1725; and both contracts de præsenti, and those de futuro copula subsequente, ceased to form a basis for compelling ecclesiastical celebration in the year 1818, sixty-five years after the passing of Lord Hardwicke's Act. Marriages of minors are no longer invalid for want of consent of parents or guardians; the Act. of 9 Geo. II., c. 11 (Irish), which made the consent essential in certain cases and under certain restrictions, having been repealed in the year 1844, by the 7 & 8 Vic., c. 80, sec. 50,. commonly known as the Irish Marriage Act. Protestants. of the Established Church, Jews, and Quakers, are married as in England; and the office of the registrar may, as here, be resorted to wherever it is desired to dispense with religious solemnities. In what, then, does the variance between the laws of the two countries consist? In one word, in the series of disabling statutes which have been passed since the accession of the House of Orange. The list commences with the 9 Will. III., which not only prohibited the intermarriage of Catholic and Protestant, but rendered the celebrating priest liable to perpetual banishment. The 12 Geo. I., c. 3 (Irish), went further still, and raised the offence of celebrating such mixed marriages to the rank of a capital felony. But however terrible the penalties imposed on the celebrant, the marriage of the parties themselves had been hitherto left intact, and their issue was not bastardised. The 19 Geo. II., c. 13 (confirmed by the 32 Geo. III., c. 21), made void all marriages celebrated by popish priests where one or both of the parties professed the Protestant faith. This Act still remains in force, though many of the penalties enforced on the Roman Catholic clergy have since been swept away, and the Act of 1844 renders all celebrants of marriages not legalised thereby liable to an indictment for felony. In a spirit similar to that of the Act of Geo. II., the Acts which rendered valid marriages solemnized by dissenting ministers, do so only in the case where both parties are Dis senters. Thus the legal value of the contract is made to depend on a question of religious belief, a connexion which a late celebrated trial, the final issue of which is still pending, has shown to be attended with the most dangerous consequences. Next, how does the Irish marriage law stand in regard to publicity and registration? The Act of 1844 provided for the registration of all marriages celebrated by clergymen of the Established Church of England and Ireland, or by Presbyterian ministers, or according to the rites of the Jews and Quakers. But it made no provision for the registration of Roman Catholic marriages, as if in their case no protection was needed. Yet it has been ruled that the certificate of a Roman Catholic priest is admissible as legal evidence of the fact of marriage. Then, again, the ordinary precautions observed in England for ensuring publicity are neglected in Ireland where the parties are Roman Catholics, as these marriages may be solemnized at any hour of the day or night, and the publication of banns is not essential. Thirdly, the marriage law of Ireland bears traces of unequal concession. The privilege of issuing licences and publishing banns was granted to the Presbyterians in 1844, but it is denied to all other Nonconforming bodies. These last must apply to the registrar for a licence or certificate, and be married, as in England, either in his office or in a certified building within the district. These privileges should either be extended to all congregationalists whose organization furnishes them with the necessary machinery, or else (and this appears to be the preferable alternative) the licensing system should be abolished altogether. It is unnecessary to pursue the evils inherent in the present Irish marriage law into minuter detail, as the whole question has been the subject of recent public comment-they may be .briefly summed up as follows: 1. Uncertainty in the marriages of Roman Catholics and Protestant Dissenters, due to the difficulty of ascertaining the religious belief of the parties. 2. Want of publicity, by reason of the loose mode in which purely Roman Catholic marriages are permitted to be celebrated. 3. Want of security, owing to the imperfect provisions for registration. These inconveniences, so numerous and so extensive, have only recently attracted the notice of the Legislature, but, within the last few years, various attempts have been made in Parliament with a view to their removal. The guarantee of registration was endeavoured to be secured by the successive Government bills of Lord Naas and Mr. Whiteside in 1859, and of Mr. Cardwell in 1860. These measures sought to establish in Ireland a registration system for births and deaths, as well as marriages, and it was in consequence of the muti--lation which Mr. Cardwell's bill received at the hands of the select committee to which it was referred, that nothing has as yet been done towards effecting the desired objects. The bill introduced into the House of Lords by the late LordCampbell, was mainly levelled at the mischief arising from the invalidity of mixed marriages celebrated by Roman Catholic priests; and it proposed in substance, to repeal the 9 Geo. II., c. 13, so far as it rendered those marriages void. It provided further, as amended in committee, for the registration of purely Roman Catholic marriages, and it required that such marriages should be celebrated between eight A.M. and two P.M., in the presence of two or more credible witnesses. The measure introduced into the House of Commons by Sir Hugh Cairns last session was of a more comprehensive character than any of its predecessors. It adopted the main features of Lord Campbell's bill, by giving validity to intermarriages by Roman Catholic priests, and it proposed to confer on the Methodists the privilege of issuing licences, already conceded to the Presbyterians. But it left purely |