Reduction of the Army. H. OF R. 400,000 But I suppose very little will be said about the usefulness of the present army, but we shall hear 1,052,000 more of the effects which a measure of this kind would have on the state of our negotiation in Eu500,000 rope. I suppose, therefore, that the question will turn on the propriety of dismissing this army 560,000 while our Commissioners are treating, and there93,000 fore this view of the subject may merit a few remarks. 133,000 120,000 The importance of this army in the negotiation seems to me to be entirely dependent on its importance in the kind of warfare we may expect to carry on with France. If it is not important in 1,026,000 that, I cannot conceive how it is to influence the 1,500,000 negotiation which is to end it. It would be an ex8,214,000 traordinary effect that our army should produce a termination of the war when it cannot affect it in 9,250,000 its progress. I have before stated my opinion on the danger of invasion, and I would say more, but that the public understanding has, I believe, decided in the same way; and, if not in repelling invasion, I should be glad to learn how the army can resist the views of France, so as to induce her to abandon them. $1,036,000 On this balance will be chargeable expenses of navy, fortifications, arms, foundries, treaties, &c., which will no doubt exhaust it. An instalment of the Dutch debt will become due next year, which is not taken into account, because as principal money it might not be properly considered as a necessary expense. On this view it would seem that you have no fund for borrowing in the present revenues of the United States, after the present year; and that if we confirm a system of expense which will require loans hereafter, we must accompany it with taxes, or submit to the disgraceful and ruinous system of borrowing money to pay the interest of our debts. The army which is comprehended in that resolution, non-commissioned officers and privates, amounts to 9,000 men: the army retained will then be 5,000 men, non-commissioned officers and privates. In the course of the last two years it will be observed that great additions were made to the permanent Army of the United States by a regiment of artillery and a number of men being annexed to each company, by which the number is made to amount to 5,000. It is desirable, I should imagine, that at entering on a negotiation our country should be so situated as to be able to make a firm and obstinate stand against unjust demands. If this is a desirable situation, I ask gentlemen to say whether this army does not lessen, instead of increasing our importance, with that country to which we go to negotiate, when it is apparent to the world that for its support we borrow money of more than one half the amount of the revenue, and pay interest on that loan at an enormous rate. This being known, will it not operate as a strong ground for suspicion that you are forced to the negotiation from pecuniary considerations; that your present state of exertion is greater than you can bear for any length of time, and thus lessen your respectability with that nation? While it may hurry you to submit to terms less advantageous than could be wished, it may make the terms proposed for your acceptance harder than they would otherwise have been. Sir, the finances of this country would be in an alarming state, if all the present expenses were How can this measure ever affect the negotianecessary, but my opinion is, that they are not tion? If such a consequence could be supposed, necessary, for that this additional army is in no I ask how it can ever be in the power of Governwise useful. I cannot conceive for what they are ment to give up any measure, let it be ever so wanted. The idea of invasion, the only ground mischievous, without running the same risk? If upon which their necessity could be founded, is this is to be held up as a bugbear, how is it posquite out of the question-an event of that sort in sible for a Government to change its measures? the present state of Europe, is absolutely impossi- Apprehensions of this sort, if they are not to be ble; whatever possible changes may take place, liable to the scrutiny of the mind, will put it out on considering the difficulties and inducements, it of your power to make any change, although it seems to me morally impossible. If there is not would add to your coercive power. In the preso great a certainty as I believe there is, the im- sent instance, you are to be deterred from reconprobability of the event is so great that we cannot sidering your arrangements for an army, by an be justified in keeping up so expensive a prepara-apprehension of an unfavorable effect on your ention for it. If that improbable contingency should ever be brought about, we have a competent defence in the patriotism of the people. The selfinterest of all the people of the United States, if no other principle should call them out, would be emy; although it must be confessed, that of all our preparations and measures this has been the least operative and promises to be so in future. If you have the power of further exertion, ought you not to make it in the war which will give you H. of R. Reduction of the Army. JANUARY, 1800. most power over France, and may she not count contemplated with respect to the troops to which that in retrenching useless expenses you acquire the resolution under consideration related. additional strength? It was also to be observed that the honorable I do not hesitate to say, if preference is due to gentleman had predicated all his arguments on the one, it is to our naval preparations of defence. Sir, idea, that the troops must be immediately disbandif you part with one which has never proved use-ed, or that the original law, unmodified, must have ful, will you not be better enabled to keep up the its full effect; that no middle ground might be taken. other, which is certainly more favorable to your He was of a very different opinion; he thought middle ground might be taken, and that the law might be modified, so as to diminish the estimated expense, without dismissing the troops already in actual service. interest and local situation? The resolution proposed, he said, occupied such broad ground, as necessarily to unite against it a considerable variety of opinions respecting the future disposition of the army. Not only those who thought the original law ought to have its full course and effect, but those also who thought Another objection which will most likely be made, but which is in effect the same, is, that those measures having been established, taken to resist any attack that might be made from France, and no material change having happened since, it will be considered as a proof that the spirit which dictated them is gone. What I have said before I consider as a full answer to this. In retaining those measures which alene have had effect, we give the best proof of our determination to perse-it ought to receive certain modifications, and even vere; in dismissing those measures which have those who thought that in the event of the failure only been burdensome to ourselves, we certainly of the present negotiation, the army ought, under increase our ability to do so. Thinking as I do, certain circumstances, to be disbanded, but that about the usefulness of this army in a contest with this was not the time for disbanding it, must unite France, I conceive this the most proper time for against the motion now under consideration. It disbanding it. I would enter the negotiation with could only be supported by those who, like the an armor which would last more than a day; I mover of the resolution, thought that in the present would go to it so as to satisfy the country with moment, uninformed as we were concerning all whom we treat that we will not be obliged to those circumstances which should govern our deabandon the ground which justice has pointed out. cision, we ought to retrace the steps we had taken, If its usefulness is not such as it ought to be main- and very materially to change the ground on tained throughout the contest with France, in my which we found ourselves placed. This being the opinion this is the best time which can offer for dis-opinion on which alone it could be maintained, it banding the army. In case the negotiation is to became necessary to examine the arguments urged fail, the increase of passion and alarm would de- in support of this opinion. prive us of the power of acting up to the sound dictates of understanding, and we should certainly continue under the pressure, though useless. If there was a possibility of my proposition hindering the negotiation with France, or in the least retarding it, I am sure that I should be the last in the House to press it; there is nothing I wish more than a complete accommodation, and nothing for which I would bear more. I propose a correction of what I call a misdirected zeal; by correcting which, I conceive the country will acquire new energy, the power of Government be placed on a firmer and more substantial footing. Under the firm impression of these ideas, I have done what I considered my duty, and leave it to the consideration of the House whether the measure would or would not be prudent and practicable. It has been urged that the army ought to be disbanded because it was totally useless, because the United States were unable to bear the expense, and on some other suggestions, which should be considered in the course of the argument. Its inutility has been maintained on the impossibility of invading our country in the present state of things, on the difficulty of invading it at any time, and on the total indisposition to invasion, arising from the inadequacy of the object to the difficulty of attaining it. she may send across the Atlantic. By the opening of the next campaign we shall be informed on this subject, and shall be able to act with proper knowledge of it-at present we are uninformed and are urged to act without the requisite knowledge. But what assurance have gentlemen that invasion is now impracticable? The present state of Europe is totally unknown to us. The effects of the late decisive victories of France have not reached us. It is by no means certain that these victories may not have produced a negotiation Mr. MARSHALL said if it was true that America, with some of the continental Powers, which may commencing her negotiation with her present mil-liberate a considerable portion of her force, which itary force, would appear in the armor which she could only wear for a day, the situation of our country was lamentable indeed. If our debility was really such, that the troops sought to be disbanded could not be kept up but for a day, or for a very short period, our situation was truly desper- On this point it was necessary to inquire into ate. No cheaper mode of self-defence had been the relative situation of the two nations. All comor could be devised, and it amounted to a declara-mercial and friendly intercourse between us was ation that we were unable to defend ourselves. He thought differently from the honorable gentleman who moved the resolution. He thought America could maintain, if it should be necessary, a much larger force, for a much longer time, than was suspended. Whenever we met, the stronger party attacked and captured the weaker. The property of the captured was confiscated and their persons imprisoned. This was war in fact though not in form. We are, in fact, at war with France, though it is not declared in form. What security then is there that no disposition will exist to invade us? The unimportance of the object forms no such security. Neither is there any security that there exists no disposition to invade us. On this subject he differed essentially from the honorable gentlemen who supported the resolution. He thought America of vast importance to France. Whatever might be the views of France, whether they were merely to humble her great rival or were still more extensive, it was impossible to consider the effect which a control over American affairs must have in promoting those views, without being satisfied on this subject. Independent of the effective force which might be used, the great advantage which the monopoly of our commerce would give in time of peace for the formation of a naval power, was of importance to France or England. The result of the two last wars between those two nations, in one of which the force of America was added to that of Britain, and in the other to that of France, evinces the importance of America, even at that time, in either scale. Unquestionably that importance cannot be diminished. With respect to the difficulty of attaining the object, Mr. M. said that France could not be so much governed by the difficulty which might actually exist, as by the opinion she would previously entertain of that difficulty. Before the real difficulty could be ascertained, the invasion must take place. Of consequence, her opinion on this subject would regulate her conduct, and her opinion would depend on the measures which might be adopted, and the disposition which might be manifested by America. But it has been urged, not only that the army is useless, but that there is in the United States a positive inability to maintain it. To prove this our revenue and expenditure has been stated. Suppose this had been the language of '75? Suppose, at the commencement of our Revolution, a gentleman had risen on the floor of Congress, to compare our revenues with our expenses-what would have been the result of the calculation? Would not the same system of reasoning which the gentleman from Virginia has adopted, have proved that our resources were totally inadequate to the prosecution of the war? Yet it was prosecuted, and with success. If vast exertions were then made to acquire independence, will not the same exertions be now made to maintain it? The question now is, whether self-government and national liberty be worth the money which must be expended to preserve them. H. OF R. on correct calculation, whether the consequence of a present saving might not be a much more considerable future expenditure. The reduction of the army would certainly diminish the expense of the present year; but if it should have any operation on the existing negotiation with France, the present saving it would produce would bear no proportion to the immense waste of blood, as well as treasure, which it might occasion us. To determine in what manner this measure might, and probably would, bear on the existing negotiation, it became indispensable to take into our view what had preceded the actual state of things between the United States and France. In doing this it could not be necessary to enumerate the various injuries our country had sustained. They rested in the memory of every American, and need not be recited. It must, however, be particularly observed, that while prayers for peace were returned for indignities of every sort, while America was humbly supplicating for peace, and that her complaints might be heard, France spurned her contemptuously and refused to enter on a discussion of differences, unless that discussion was preceded by a substantial surrender of the essential attributes of independence. America was at length goaded into resistance, and resolved on the system of defence, of which the army now sought to be disbanded forms a part. Immediately the tone of France was changed, and she consented to treat us as an independent nation. Her depredations indeed did not cease; she continued still to bring war upon us; but, although peace was not granted, the door to peace was opened. What could have produced this change? Every member of the House is called upon to put this question to himself and to weigh it according to his best judgment. To supplicating America, even discussion was denied. America armed, and immediately a different language was used, and the rights of an independent nation were allowed her. What, he repeated, could have produced this change? Can any other motive be assigned, than the defensive system which America had adopted? If in the mind of any gentleman, any other motive did exist, he is called upon to assign that motive. If no other did exist, is it wise immediately to change the system which has alone been effectual? Is it not to be apprehended that this change may revive those sentiments which existed before that system was adopted? This subject, he said, was also to be considered in another point of view, which had been foreseen by the mover of the resolution and declared to be intimately connected with that which had been already stated. It was this: the policy of this measure depends entirely on the state of things when the negotiation shall be determined. The mover of the resolution, Mr. M. said, had urged, as his strongest reason for the measure, the saving of public money which it would produce. Any argument of which the object was economy, came home to the feelings of every member of the Will gentleman say, that, under any state of community, and came home to the feelings of every things, the army ought to be disbanded? Will member of the House. Such arguments would, they say that if peace should be made with the and ought to have great weight; but it should never continental Powers of Europe, and a French army be forgotten that true economy did not content should be crossing the Atlantic to invade our teritself with inquiring into the mere saving of the ritory, that yet our military force ought to be dipresent moment; a true and wise economy would minished? He believed no gentleman would say take an enlarged view of the subject, and determine, I so. He was certain the mover of the resolution H. OF R. Reduction of the Army. JANUARY, 1800. the army we wish should be disbanded, could have reached that nation. would not. Is it then wise to precipitate a measure, the policy of which depends entirely on an event which is not yet, but will soon be, ascertained? I could not understand one of the gentleman's In a few months the fate of the present negoti- arguments, when he spoke of the motive for invadation will be decided. Should it terminate favor- ing this country by the different weight it would ably, the army expires by the law which gave it be- have in the scale of either of the contending Powing, and the additional expense to be incurred will ers. Instead of this being a reason why she should be very inconsiderable. Should it fail, we shall make war upon us, it is a good reason, in my opinthen know the disposition of France and the sit-ion, why she should wish for peace with us, to uation of Europe. We shall be able to form a keep us out of the scale of her enemy. He surely just estimate of the danger of invasion, and con- could not think it an easy acquisition to France, sequently to decide, with much better information from any attachment formed for that nation among than we now possess, on the question under discus- the people of this country, so as to make it an easy sion. If such a state of things should then exist conquest. I am sure he would not form such a as would justify disbanding the army, the loss degrading opinion of his countrymen. The genproduced by the delay of that measure would be eral suggestion that we may be invaded will not very inconsiderable. If the then state of things operate the least in favor of retaining the troops, should require even an augmentation of the exist- for to that we are always exposed. No time can ing force, the injury occasioned by our preci- be pointed out in which it would not be as practipitation might be very considerable. We should cable as at present, but many periods and circumcertainly throw away all the expense incurred in stances in which it would be more so. If a conrecruiting men, all the discipline the present army quest can be made of this country, and the difficulhad acquired, and be in a state as unprepared as ties of achieving it are not sufficient to prevent the if the expense for those objects had never been attempt, I ask whether a time of peace would not sustained. He concluded with observing that this comport more with the interests of the nation was not the time for diminishing the force of the expected to attempt it? Their supply of arms and nation, and therefore he was opposed to the resomen, and having no enemy to encounter, would lution. certainly render that the most proper time. The consequence, then, of those arguments would be that we must keep this army up and go on arming in all times, because we may be invaded. This continual alarm will be found so fatal to public happiness, that we shall at last be willing to yield ourselves up to any master who can promise us security. is a middle ground upon which we can go, and But the gentleman seems to suppose that there the army, by which expense can be saved. How that we might do something short of disbanding does this proposition comport with the influence he conceives any change in our system will have on France, or with his fears of invasion? Is your army so numerous that you can bid defiance to France with half of it-for, in the idea of the gentleman, in case of a want of agreement, your negotiators are to return with an army at their heels! Mr. NICHOLAS.-As usual, I fear that this, as I consider it, wrong step, will never be got over. How can it, if there is strength in the gentleman's arguments? Where is the end of it? In vain do we seek for it! He supposes the necessity for that army will continue while depredations continue on our commerce; thus, France may continue her depredations, which are directed only towards a part where this army can have no effect, and consequently, though there will be no power to use it, the armament is never to have an end.. He says on the moment of failure in the negotiation, an army may be crossing the ocean, and then we shall want these troops. Sir, this might occur at any period, and if we are never to disband our army, under apprehensions of that event, it will never be done, and our expense will be perpetual; but of all times the one fixed on by the gentleman is the most improbable, and if you are to be in perpetual alarm on this account, where will the argument lead? The expense is stated to be small, as the In my opinion, the same arguments that go to the event will be soon known. We know not how least retrenchment at the present time, go to the short is the time or how long; we cannot limit it. whole principle of the resolution, for, if we were to France may continue, and might continue to plun-be invaded, it would not all be enough; we must der us on the ocean, and therefore to fix on her for- have recourse to other means. If from motives of bearance as the time, is but in other terms to be economy we ought to save part of the expense, and satisfied to bear the burden for years, without a the saving of that part would leave us in nearly the prospect of its being useful. same danger which saving the whole would, who The gentleman considers this armament to be can hesitate to decide which is the most expedithe measure which extorted the overtures from ent? I confess I have heard none of the arguFrance. But this is not so. It is a little extraor-ments used by the gentleman that have convinced dinary that he should have ascribed an effect to a me of the impropriety of the resolution, but rather measure that existed previous to the knowledge of they have confirmed me in a sense of the necesthat measure; for the propositions, and the avowed sity of it. willingness on the part of the Directory to meet our complaints by an honorable adjustment, were made known to our Ministers in August, which was before the law of July, 1798, which created Considerable argument then took place on a motion of Mr. JONES to refer the resolution to a Committee of the whole House, which at last was agreed to; and the House adjourned. JANUARY, 1800. WEDNESDAY, January 8. Reduction of the Army. An engrossed bill for the relief of John Vaughan was read the third time, and passed. Sundry petitions and remonstrances from a number of the inhabitants of Morris county, in the State of New Jersey, were presented to the House and read, praying a repeal of the alien and sedition laws passed at former sessions of Congress; and, also, of the law which authorizes the President to augment the Army; for certain reasons therein expressed. Ordered, That so much of the said petitions as relates to a repeal of the laws authorizing the augmentation of the Army be referred to the Committee of the whole House to whom is committed the motion for a repeal of certain parts of the acts relative to the Army, passed the sixteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, and the third of March, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine. Mr. GRISWOLD, from the Committee of Revisal and Unfinished Business, reported a bill to repeal part of an act, entitled "An act to provide for mitigating or remitting the forfeitures, penalties, and disabilities, accruing in certain cases therein mentioned;" which was read twice, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the Whole House to-morrow. A Message was received from the President of the United States, transmitting a report of the Director of the Mint. The Message and report were read, and ordered to lie on the table. REDUCTION OF THE ARMY. The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the motion depending yesterday, for a repeal of certain parts of the acts relative to the Army, passed the sixteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, and the third of March, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine-Mr. MORRIS in the Chair. Mr. BAYARD rose and said, he felt much embarrassment in rising to speak in support of positions which had already been so ably and so eloquently maintained by the honorable gentleman from Virginia. He could not flatter himself with the expectation of throwing much light on a subject which had been illustrated by him. But the subject was of such magnitude and interest, that it was important to contemplate it in every point of view. He was not surprised that such a resolution as the one under consideration, even at the present crisis, should have been brought forward by the honorable gentleman who moved it. He could perceive in it a connexion with a system which had long been pursued by a party in the United States a system which had for its object the debilitation and degradation of the General Government. A knowledge of the party and a knowledge of their views prevented any astonishment at the present measure they proposed. This measure he did not regard as a single operation. It was part of a general plan, which, if it were successful, would soon be unfolded. H. OF R. try, had compelled the United States to adopt a system of defence. The nation had found that no reliance could be placed on the moderation or justice of the French Government. Their own energies were the only ground on which their independence could be maintained. They did not hesitate as to the alternative of defence or submission. Having resolved to resist the aggressions and pretensions of the French Government they found themselves forced into a state of hostility. The commercial intercourse with France was suspended, the treaty of alliance was abolished, a navy was created for the protection of trade, and an army ordered to be raised. Our ships of war were instructed to seize and destroy the armed ships of the French Republic, and a war, though deprecated, was expected without dread. The national sentiment coincided with the temper of the Government, and its measures were approved and applauded. The system which was adopted was connected in its parts, and the objection which went to one part applied with equal force to the whole. The naval hostilities authorized against France rendered an army necessary against invasion from Europe or the islands, which might reasonably be expected. If gentlemen now said an army was not necessary, it must be because they thought the French Government was not hostile but friendly. If they thought that Government friendly, surely there could be no occasion for the navy. The same reason would induce us to revive the treaty with France and open the commercial intercourse. Sir, said Mr. B. before we undertake to change the entire plan which we have pursued, and which certainly has been productive of salutary effects, gentlemen should well consider what condition of the country induced that plan, and whether that condition is altered; they should reflect upon the operation which the change might have upon our affairs abroad and on its probable effects at home. He should not enter into a recapitulation of the various complaints and recriminations which had occurred between the two countries. It was sufficient to observe that the Government of the United States, actuated by a love of peace and a motive of amity, early sent a Minister to France, to conciliate the differences which had arisen. This Minister was not simply rejected, but repelled with circumstances of marked disdain and contumely, designed, not as a personal, but as a national affront. The moderation of the Government and the forbearance of the people passed over in silence this gross violation of the respect and justice done to them. Still, willing for peace and anxiously desirous to avoid engaging in the contentions of Europe, a new embassy was sent to France, composed of citizens the most illustrious for their talents and probity. We all know the fate of this embassy. The olive branch which was presented was disdainfully trampled under foot. Our Ministers were not received. A miserable pecuniary intrigue was set on foot, which unveiled the corruption and hypocrisy of the French administration, and reThe conduct of France in relation to this coun-mained a lasting monument of the disgraceful 6th CoN.-9 |