tions. There can be no doubt, that the people had a right to invest the general government with such powers, as they might deem proper, and to restrain the States from the exercise of any, which they might consider incompatible with the objects of the general compact; to make the powers of the State governments, in certain cases, subordinate to those of the nation, or to reserve to themselves those portions of sovereignty, which they might not choose to delegate to either. The Constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of the existing State sovereignties; nor formed by a surrender of powers already existing in State institutions; for the powers of the States depend upon their own constitutions, and the people of every State had the right to modify and restrain them, according to their own views of policy or principle. It is also clear that the powers of the State governments remain unaltered, except so far as they are controlled or modified by the constitution of the United States.

ernment

The government of the United States, The govthus formed by the people, can claim no can exercise powers which are not granted to it by the no powers Constitution, either in express terms, or by the Constinot given by necessary implication. But this instrument, tution. like every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms; and when a power is expressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular cases, unless that construction be rendered proper by the context, or by necessary implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense;

as they would be understood by a candid and unbiassed reader; and not in a sense unreasonably restricted, or enlarged. The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It could not have been otherwise, without entering into details, altogether inconsistent with its character and objects. It was intended to endure for ages, and direct the government of a great nation in times and circumstances which could not be foreseen

by its makers. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means in the attainment of legitimate objects, and to mould the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom and the public interests may require.

With this general view of the origin and intention of the Constitution, we proceed to the examination of its several parts.

ments of government.

CHAPTER II.

THE LEGISLATURE.

THE government is distributed by the Depart Constitution into three great departments; the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; all co-ordinate, and of equal authority, in their proper sphere; though mutually interwoven, and, in some measure, dependent upon each other.

The first article establishes the legislative department, and declares that "all legislative powers hereby granted, shall be vested in a

*

Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Represen-
tatives." The very words of this section
remind the Legislature that it is limited in
its powers.
It can exercise none but such
as are "hereby granted ;" and every attempt
to exceed these prescribed limits, is fruitless,
for the act would be without foundation, and
therefore void.

Powers of government limit

De Lolme mentions it as a remarkable circumstance in the English system, that, while in other nations, the government is suppos- ed. ed to possess originally, and by itself, all manner of lawful authority, and its rightful powers are supposed to be unlimited, so far as there are no visible barriers set up against it, in England the reverse obtains; and the liberty of the subject, not the authority of the government, is unbounded, except by express law. With whatever justice this remark can be made of a State, whose parliament is held to be "omnipotent," and can confessedly, pass any laws, not in themselves contradictory and impossible; the people of this country enjoy the full benefit of living under a government of their own forming, and retaining all the liberty which they have not delegated to that government for their own advantage. Instead of having the undefined, and undefinable powers of the British Parliament, the Congress of the United States possesses no power not granted by the Constitution; and with the people resides the right to enlarge or diminish

* Rawle on the Constitution, p. 29.

Division

of Legisla two bodies.

ture into

the sphere of authority which they have prescribed.

The Legislature is divided into two separate bodies, independent of each other; whose joint assent is necessary to the enactment of any law; and whose legislative powers, with one exception, which we shall notice hereafter, are the same. Experience teaches that it is not safe to intrust the legislative power to a single assembly; particularly if it consist of many members. Such assemblies are peculiarly liable to act under the influence of sudden excitement. Passion, prejudice, personal influence, party intrigue, and even caprice, have often governed their decisions; and the history of all nations, ruled by such an assembly, whether of the whole people, as at Athens, or of a select few, as in Venice, affords abundant proof that neither the liberty, nor the happiness of the community, can be safely intrusted to such hands.

In the early experiments of self government in this country, the attempt was made by the States of Georgia and Pennsylvania, whose first legislatures consisted of a single house; but the instability and improvidence which marked their proceedings, soon convinced the people of those States of the inexpediency of the arrangement; and in the constitutions subsequently adopted, they imitated the example of the other States, and of the general government, by dividing the legislature into two branches.

The principal object of this separation is to prevent the effects of strong temporary

excitement. It is not so probable, that a law will be adopted hastily, or without good reason, when it is subjected to the deliberate examination and discussion of two separate houses, sitting in different places, selected in different modes, and, in some measure, jealous of each other's proceedings. The two principal requisites of good legislation are, wisdom in adopting, and stability in maintaining laws; and these are best attained by a separation of the legislative department. There was, moreover, another reason for the separation, peculiar to this country. The several States claimed to be considered as independent sovereignties, and as such, to have a share in the general government. This is effected by the composition of the Senate, as will be seen hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

THE second section of this article treats How comof the House of Representatives, which posed. "consists of members chosen every second year, by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legisla- ture." This is generally called the popular branch of the legislature; not that all our institutions are not essentially popular, but by way of distinction from the Senate, which more immediately emanates from the States.