with that of Kant, in declaring what we perceive to be nothing but appearances, undertook to furnish the information I have asked for; he attempted to show that things in themselves are motions which give rise to the appearances perceived. His words (to repeat a single sentence of a passage before quoted and criticised) are, "Whatever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they be not there but are seeming and appearances only: the things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused."*

This, however, is only removing the phenomena a step back, and would not be accepted by Kant as at all reaching the transcendental objects-the things in themselves, which, according to him, we can never know. The motions in Hobbes's theory, could we follow them with the greatest minuteness, would, as I before remarked, be in their turn nothing but appearances; nor was it possible for either him or Kant to form the faintest conception of any objects or events generically different as wholes, or in their constituent parts from such as we actually observe.

Here his argument is in effect that, because we can trace motions as concerned in producing the result called perceiving an object, we cannot perceive the object; while the truth is, as I have shown, that the perception of anything is not at all altered by our ignorance or knowledge of the material process through which it is effected.

LETTER XX.

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION CONTINUED.

KANT.

HAVING seen how, in what I have termed his negative doctrine, the German professor teaches that we know only appearances, not things in themselves, and that the real or transcendental objects behind these appearances lie hid under an impenetrable veil, and are not what we take them to be, it is natural for us to inquire into the positive part of the subject, to ask how these appearances arise ? How is it that they present themselves before us?

And here we come to the greatest marvel of the whole doctrine: it turns out, after all, that the objects conjectured to lie hid behind the appearances (for conjecture is the only thing possible) do not originate the said appearances, but, that we ourselves in some inexplicable way create the phenomena or confer the qualities we perceive.

It is scarcely possible to state such a doctrine except in self-contradictory language; and it will be best, therefore, to keep to the philosopher's own expressions.

In a passage quoted in my last Letter, he tells us that the sensible intuition attributes to the represented object its qualities, and that when the subjective quality or mind is withdrawn, the said object and its qualities vanish and are nowhere to be found; that is, in a word, we create all the appearances we perceive. For observe, by this passage it is really asserted that we attribute all the properties to the object; which is a sheer impossibility, and to speak of it is nothing less than logically absurd. Without stopping to examine whether any real fact is expressed by the word attribute thus used, I may venture to say that, before we can attribute any qualities to an object, we must know something about it; that is, in fact, we must know that it exists; which implies that we know some of its qualities as an indispensable condition to our attributing others. An object to be perceived at all must have some quality or qualities to begin with. It is in itself, indeed, a quality or a congeries of qualities. You may possibly attribute other qualities besides the first, or, at least, you may speak of doing it without absurdity; but you cannot possibly attribute all, for that would be making out the object to be originally nothing; it would be ascribing properties to a non-entity.

In the same passage we are told, as a varied expression of the doctrine, that the subjective quality determines the form of the object as phenomenon, or, in other words, the mind determines the forms

or appearances of objects perceived; or, again, that it determines what appearances shall come before it.

I have already shown that with the exception of directing the organs to these objects, the mind is passive in perception; and that what is perceived by it is the joint result of the material conditions in the object and in the medium on the one hand, and of the material affections of the nerves and brain on the other. Such, at least, are all the facts we can trace in the process. To prove this it is sufficient to adduce the organs of hearing and of sight. The nerve of the ear is impassive to everything but aerial vibrations; the nerve of the eye to everything but light. Here it is surely the respective constitutions of the two nerves, conjointly with the motions in inorganic matter acting upon them, that determine the forms of the objects; in other words, determine the effects on the mind, or the resulting states of consciousness; or, in still different language, determine what is perceived.

If aerial vibrations acting on one kind of nerve on which rays of light have no effect, cause the percipient being to hear, and rays of light acting on another kind of nerve on which aerial vibrations have no effect, cause him to see, how can the mind be said to determine or even modify the result? The kind of perception is obviously determined by the kind of nerve acted upon. The species under each kind are as obviously determined respectively

by the special aerial vibrations and the special rays of light impinging on the organs.

The result in each case is a definite state or modification of consciousness; in the one case called seeing, in the other hearing.

Kant's doctrine is, that what we see and what we hear are determined by our own minds; and it amounts to this, that these states of consciousness determine the form and manner of their own existence; a species of self-creation to which there is no analogy in nature, nor even any counterpart in fiction, unless we turn to the Kilkenny cats, so famed for eating each other up, and suppose they had previously performed the rival wonder of respectively giving birth to themselves.*

Another mode of stating the doctrine, which I must not pass over without notice, is that the mind is not only acted upon, but acts upon the objects. How the mind, however, can act upon anything

This is by no means without parallel in German philosophy. Schelling, speaking of "the ground of the divine existence," which "might also," he says, "become that of things" is represented as proceeding thus: "If, with reference to that ground with which we had become already acquainted under the name of absolute potence or of nature (naturans), we wish to bring it nearer to us men, we may say, that it is the longing which that which is eternally one, feels to give birth to itself!"-Chalybäus on Speculative Philosophy, Edersheim's Translation, p. 315. Hegel furnishes another instance according to the author last quoted, "The second point to which we have to attend is, how this subjective notion gives existence to itself.-Ibid. p. 386.