A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good SocietyStephen L. Elkin, Karol Edward Soltan University of Chicago Press, 1993 M06 15 - 240 páginas In The New Constitutionalism, seven distinguished scholars develop an innovative perspective on the power of institutions to shape politics and political life. Believing that constitutionalism needs to go beyond the classical goal of limiting the arbitrary exercise of political power, the contributors argue that it should—and can—be designed to achieve economic efficiency, informed democratic control, and other valued political ends. More broadly, they believe that political and social theory needs to turn away from the negativism of critical theory to consider how a good society should be "constituted" and to direct the work of designing institutions that can constitute a "good polity," in both the economic and civic senses. Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan begin with an overview of constitutionalist theory and a discussion of the new constitutionalism within the broader intellectual and historical context of political and social thought. Charles Anderson, James Ceaser, and the editors then offer different interpretations of the central issues regarding institutional design in a constitutionalist social science, consider various ways of performing the task, and discuss the inadequacy of recent political science to the job it ought to be doing. The book concludes with essays by Ted Lowi, Cass Sunstein and Edwin Haefele which apply these themes to the American regime. |
Contenido
PART ONE Introduction to a New Constitutionalism | 1 |
PART TWO Varieties of Constitutionalist Theory | 39 |
PART THREE The American Regime | 145 |
Contributors | 233 |
| 235 | |
Términos y frases comunes
action administrative agencies aggregators American republic analysis Anti-Federalists arbitrary argued arguments authority basic behavior Cambridge central citizens civic virtue classic classic liberalism community of inquiry competence conception concern Congress conservatism constitutional regime constitutional theory constitutionalism constitutionalist contemporary corporations courts Dahl decision delegation deliberation deliberative democratic designer's perspective economic efficiency Elkin Federalist goals Hayek human idea ideal important individual inquiry institutional design interest group issue justice lawmaking legislative liberal democracy limits Lindblom Lowi Madison Madisonian means ment moral normative normativism participatory democracy pluralist political economy political institutions political power practice pragmatic liberalism preferences principles procedural question rational choice rational choice theory rational reconstruction reason regulatory republican revolution Robert Dahl role rule of law scientific self-interest self-limiting social choice theory social science society Sołtan standards substantive theorists tion tional tive traditional political science understanding University Press values welfare York