the north bank of the James. He therefore crossed the Chickahominy, and fell back to the strong intrenchments in front of Richmond. His army there, including those which Beauregard had brought from North Carolina, numbered 70,000. Grant's force, including Butler's Army of the James, numbered 150,000. The Federal columns moved rapidly, and on the evening of the 13th came in sight of the James, across which a pontoon bridge, two thirds of a mile long, had been laid, over which, and by means of boats, the army crossed; the passage occupied three days. It was soon in the position from which Grant proposed to conduct the investment of Richmond, although it took the form of the siege of Petersburg, eighteen miles distant, and on the opposite side of the James River. This change of base was one of the great movements of the war. Within a few days, an army of more than 100,000 men had been marched fifty miles and transported with all its impedimenta across two rivers and set down before the enemy's capital.

Between the battle of the Wilderness and the close of the fighting on the Chickahominy was a period of thirty-seven days, during which Grant lost 54,551 men, of whom 9,856 were reported as "missing." Lee lost not far from 42,000, of whom about 8,500 were prisoners. Besides these were considerable losses in the engagements between Butler and Beauregard near Bermuda Hundreds, and in minor operations in various portions of Virginia. Probably not fewer than 100,000 men, on both sides, were killed, wounded, or captured within a little more than five weeks.

The situation in June.

In a despatch to Halleck, dated June 5th, Grant thus described the existing situation: "My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after having destroyed his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south should he retreat. I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breast works, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city." Summing up, he said: "The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection." These pregnant sentences not

1864.]

A FRIGHTFUL SLAUGHTER OF MEN.

211

only give a correct view of the situation, as subsequent events proved it to be, but they furnish a key to all that came afterwards in that long campaign. It had not been common for the Washington authorities, before this time, to hear from the commander of the Army of the Potomac that the enemy was in a condition feebler than its antagonist; the day of overrating the enemy and "falling back" had apparently gone.

While the Federal armies were moving around Richmond, the spirit

of the people in the loyal States rose and fell with the report of each day's doings. During the awful fighting in the Wilderness, although men were moved to admiration of Grant's dogged persistence and pertinacity of hold, the heart of the Nation was deeply stirred by the vastness of the sacrifice of human life which was required to hold Lee to the work. Congress

adjourned

on July 4th, and the

popular feeling of de

pression over the

General Grant and his Family at City Point.

Drawn by Lawrence Hague from a photograph.

frightful losses was expressed in a joint. resolution requesting the President to appoint a day of public fasting, humiliation, and prayer," that the effusion of blood may be stayed, and that unity and fraternity may be restored, and

peace established throughout all our borders." The proclamation was issued on the 7th of July, and the day of fasting was appointed for the first Thursday of the following month. Earlier in the Wil

Review of the 17th New York Regiment at Miner's Hill, Va.
Drawn by Otto H. Bacher from a photograph.

derness campaign, a very different spirit had prevailed; and when the army finally got out of the Wilderness and had confronted the foe at Spottsylvania, the President issued an address to "The Friends of Union and Liberty," informing them that enough was known of the military operations before to warrant a feeling "of special gratitude to God;" and he recommended that all the people should unite in thanksgiving and prayer to Almighty God.

Several of the Northwestern States volunteered to furnish the Government with militia to serve one hundred days, owing to a A new call for troops. call for more men which became most urgent during the latter part of April, 1864. Of these men there were mustered into service, between April 23d and July 18th, 83,612, of which Ohio furnished 36,254, the quota of that State being 30,000. July 18th, 1864, the President issued his call for 500,000 men. This produced a profound sensation throughout the country. It was felt that it was expressive of a determination that the war should be prosecuted to its end, provided the people were willing and able to sustain the army by furnishing recruits, moral aid and comfort, and the material assistance which was necessary. Under that call, after deducting all allowances for commutations and excess of credits on previous calls, the total number furnished was nearly 400,000. The one-hundred days men were utilized for the time being by manning the forts at all points where garrisons were necessary, and the veterans thus released were sent to the armies in the field.

CHAPTER IX.

SHERMAN IN GEORGIA.

BICKERINGS AMONG THE CONFEDERATE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

SHERMAN'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS. FIGHTING ALL THE WAY From Dalton tTO THE CHATTahoochee. -JOHNSTON'S MASTERLY RETREATS. HE IS RELIEVED BY HOOD. THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA. DEATH OF GENERAL MCPHERSON. HOOD'S INEFFECTUAL ATTACKS ON THE FEDERAL LINES. FALL OF ATLANTA. THOMAS LEFT IN COMMAND OF TENNES SEE. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND FINAL ROUT OF HOOD'S ARMY.

-

AFTER their defeat in the latter part of November, 1863, the Confederate Army of Tennessee retreated to Dalton, thirty Bragg supermiles to the southeastward, just below the northern boun- seded. dary of Georgia. This place was not chosen for its strategic advantages, but because it was the most convenient point at which the shattered army could sit down and rest. On the 18th of December, Bragg was recalled from the command of the army and was succeeded by Joseph E. Johnston. In his instructions to Johnston, Jefferson Davis expressed a desire that the Army of Tennessee should begin aggressive operations as soon as possible, driving the Federals out of Tennessee. Johnston's reply to this unreasonable suggestion doubtless angered Davis, who had his favorites, one of whom Johnston was not; to Bragg, however, Davis clung through evil report and good report. There is an irreconcilable difference among the Confederate authorities relative to the strength of Johnston's army at that time. But, according to the most accurate and careful1 estimate, his army numbered 84,328 available men, between April 30th and June 10th, 1864.

Sherman's

armies.

Sherman, for the great campaign now laid out before him with Atlanta for an objective point, was in command of three military organizations comprising a total force of 98,797 three men and 254 guns. This formidable battle array was divided as follows: the Army of the Cumberland, under General G. H. Thomas, 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, under General J. B.

1 See Battles and Leaders, vol. iv. p. 281. But Jefferson Davis, in his Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, says that Johnston had 68,620 men at his disposal at Dalton and within easy reach of the town.

McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, under General J. M. Schofield, 13,559. During the next month some cavalry and two divisions of infantry joined Sherman, so that on June 1st his total effective force numbered 112,819 men; this was far short of the number which Sherman, earlier in the war, had declared necessary for the campaign in this region, thereby giving occasion for the remark that the extravagance of his figures (200,000 men) showed that he was not of sound mind.

Grant: "The
But in that I

In explaining his plan of operations, he wrote to most difficult part of my problem is that of provision. must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve." He estimated that his army would require 130 carloads of ten tons each to reach Chattanooga, daily, to supply food and forage for the march. In response to the clamor of the railway managers whose rolling stock he had seized, and of the people of Tennessee, who were thus deprived of the means of procuring food, Sherman replied that the railroad could not supply the people and the army too; and he added: "One or the other must quit, and the army don't intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us." He ordered that the soldiers should divide their rations with the suffering people; and he suggested that the inhabitants, whose homes and farms he was endeavoring to save and defend, should resort to wagoning, as they had done before the railroad was built. Stripped