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CHAPTER IV.

ANCIENT AND MODERN LIBERTY.-ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN STATES.

THAT which the ancients understood by liberty differed essentially from what we moderns call civil liberty. Man appeared to the ancients in his highest and noblest character, when they considered him as a member of the state or as a political being. Man could rise no higher in their view. Citizenship was in their eyes the highest phase of humanity. Aristotle says in this sense, the state is before the individual. With us the state, and consequently the citizenship, remain means, all-important ones, indeed, but still means to obtain still higher objects, the fullest possible development of humanity in this world and for the world to come. There was no sacrifice of individuality to the state, too great for the ancients. The greatest political philosophers of antiquity unite in holding up Sparta as the best regulated commonwealth-a communism in which the individual was sacrificed in such a degree, that to the most brilliant pages of all history she has contributed little more than deeds of bravery and saliant anecdotes of stoic heroism. Greece has re

kindled modern civilization, in the restoration of letters. The degenerate keepers of Greek literature and art, who fled from Constantinople when it was conquered by the Turks, and settled in Western Europe, were nevertheless the harbingers of a new So great was Grecian knowledge and civilization even in this weakened and crippled state! Yet in all that intellectuality of Greece which lighted our torch in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there is not a single Lacedæmonian element.

era.

Plato, when he endeavors to depict a model republic, ends with giving us a communism, in which even individual marriage is destroyed for his higher classes.1

2

We, on the other hand, acknowledge individual and primordial rights, and seek one of the highest aims of civil liberty in the most efficient protection of individual action, endeavor, and rights. I have dwelled upon this striking and instructive difference at length in my work on Political Ethics, where I have endeavored to support the opinion here stated by historical facts and passages of the ancients. I must refer the reader, therefore, to that part of the work; but there is a passage which seems to me so important for the present inquiry, as well as for

1 It is a striking fact that nearly all political writers who have indulged in creating Utopias-I believe all without exception-have followed so closely the ancient writers, that they rose no higher than to communism. It may be owing in part to the fact, that these writers. composed their works soon after the restoration of letters, when the ancients naturally ruled the minds of men. 2 Chapter XIII. of the second book.

another which will soon occupy our attention, that, unable to express myself better than I have done in the mentioned work, I must beg leave to insert it here. It is this:

"We consider the protection of the individual as one of the chief subjects of the whole science of polities. The πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, or political science of the ancients, does not occupy itself with the rights of the individual. The ancient science of politics is what we would term the art of government, that is, "the art of regulating the state, and the means of preserving and directing it." The ancients set out from the idea of the state, and deduce every relation of the individual to it from this first position. The moderns acknowledge that the state, however important and indispensable to mankind, however natural, and though of absolute necessity, still is but a means to obtain certain objects, both for the individual and for society collectively, in which the individual is bound to live by his nature. The ancients had not that which the moderns understand by jus naturale, or the law which flows from the individual rights of man as man, and serves to ascertain how, by means of the state, those objects are obtained which justice demands for every one. On what supreme power rests, what the extent and limitation of supreme power ought to be, according to the fundamental idea of the state, these questions have never occupied the ancient votaries of political science.

"Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, do not begin with this question. Their works are mainly occupied with the discussion of the question, Who shall govern? The

safety of the state is their principal problem; the safety of the individual is one of our greatest. No ancient, therefore, doubted the extent of supreme power. If the people possessed it, no one ever hesitated in allowing to them absolute power over every one and everything. If it passed from the people to a few, or was usurped by one, they considered, in many cases, the acquisition of power unlawful, but never doubted its unlimited extent. Hence, in Greece and Rome the apparently inconsistent, yet, in reality, natural sudden transitions from entirely or partially popular governments to absolute monarchies; while, in modern states, even in the absolute monarchies, there exists a certain acknowledgment of a public law of individual rights, of the idea that the state, after all, is for the protection of the individual, however ill-conceived the means to obtain this object may be.

"The idea that the Roman people gave to themselves, or had a right to give to themselves, their emperors, was never entirely abandoned, though the soldiery arrogated to themselves the power of electing the masters. . . . Yet the moment that the emperor was established on his throne, no one doubted his right to the absolute supreme power, with whatever violence it was used.3

3 This was written in the year 1837. Since then, events have occurred in France which may well cause the reader to reflect whether, after all, the author was entirely correct in drawing this peculiar line between antiquity and modern times. All I can say in this place is, that the political movements in France resemble the

VOL. I.-6

"Liberty, with the ancients, consisted materially in the degree of participation in government, 'where all are in turn the ruled and the rulers.' Liberty, with the moderns, consists less in the forms of authority, which are with them but means to obtain the protection of the individual, and the undisturbed action of society in its minor and larger circles. 'ExevSepia, indeed, frequently signifies with the Greek political writers, equality; that is absolute equality, and ισότης, equality as well as ελευθερία, are terms actually used for democracy, by which was understood what we term democratic absolutism, or unlimited, despotic power in the demos, which, practically, can only mean the majority, without any guarantee of any rights. It was, therefore, perfectly consistent that the Greeks aimed at perfect liberty in perfect equality, as Aristotle states, not even allowing a difference on account of talent and virtue; so that they give the rános the lot, as the true characteristic of democracy. They were consistently led to the lot; in seeking for liberty, that is the highest enjoyment and manifestation of reason and will, or self-determination-they were led to its very negation and annihilation-to the lot, that is to chance.

dire imperial times of Rome just so far as the French, or rather the Napoleonists among them, step out of the broad path of modern political civilization, actually courting a comparison with imperial Rome, and that this renewed imperial period will be nothing but a phase in the long chain of political revulsions and ruptures of France. The phase will not be of long duration; and, after it will have passed, it will serve as an additional proof of our position. 4 Plato, Gorg. 39.

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