demanded payment. There were two subsequent calls, of which notices were also sent to the respondents, and these were authorized by resolutions of the directors. Held, that there had been no allotment or appropriation of specific shares to the respondents; the entry of their names in the stock ledger was not conclusive; the resolutions authorizing the calls, dealing with stock which had been already allotted, could not be regarded as equivalent to an allotment; the fact that notices of calls were sent to the respondents amounted to nothing if the stock had not been already allotted to them by the directors; and they, therefore, never became shareholders, and were properly struck off the list of contributories in a winding-up. Quaere, per OSLER, J.A., whether notice of a call can be regarded as equivalent to notice of allotment. Semble, also, per OSLER, J.A., that on the evidence the respondents, as they had a right to do, withdrew their application, and that this came to the notice of the company on the day after the application was signed, which would be another answer to the liquidator's demand. Order of Falconbridge, C.J.K.B., affirmed. J. M. McEvoy, for appellant. Middleton, for respondents. From Denison, P.M.] REX v. SAUNDERS. [Nov. 3. Criminal law-Keeping common betting house-Betting booth on race course of incorporated association-Movable structure "House, office, room or other place"-Criminal Code, ss. 197, 198, 204. A wooden box or booth, moved about on castors from one part to another of the grounds of an incorporated racing association during the progress of a race meeting, and used by bookmakers for the purpose of making and recording bets with the public, is an "office" or "place" within the meaning of s. 197 of the Criminal Code. Shaw v. Morley (1868), L.R. 3 Ex. 137, followed. Held, also, GARROW and MEREDITH, JJ.A., dissenting, that the provisions of sub-s. 2 of s. 204 of the Criminal Code do not apply to the offence of keeping a common betting house contrary to ss. 197 and 198, and a conviction may properly be made under these latter sections for keeping a common betting house upon the race course of an incorporated racing association, even where the betting is confined to the races then in progress upon that race course. Rex v. Hanrahan (1902), 3 O.L.R. 659, followed. Conviction by the senior police magistrate for the city of Toronto affirmed. J. M. Godfrey, for defendants. Cartwright, K.C., for the Crown. Full Court.] [Nov. 3. GOODWIN v. CITY OF OTTAWA. Leave to appeal from order of Divisional Court-Special grounds -Assessment and taxes. Leave to appeal from the order of a Divisional Court, 12 O.L.R., was refused by the Court of Appeal, the amount in question being about $425 only, and the matter in dispute, viz., whether the plaintiff was liable to assessment and taxation in respect of income derived from dividends upon the stock of the Ottawa Electric Railway Company, not being one affecting the rights of the whole body of shareholders. H. S. Osler, K.C., for plaintiff. Middleton, for defendants. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Boyd, C., Trial.] MCINTOSH v. LECKIE. Lease of oil lands-Forfeiture clause-Contract license-Profit a prendre. [Oct. 29. Lease or The defendant by lease gave the plaintiff the exclusive right to drill for petroleum and natural gas on certain lands for five years from Dec. 16th, 1903. The lease contained the following clause: "This lease to be null and void and no longer binding upon either party if a well is not commenced on the premises within six months from this date, unless the lessee shall thereafter pay yearly to the lessor fifty dollars per year for delay." No well had been begun by June 16th, 1904, when the first six months expired. On July 8th, 1904, the plaintiff paid the defendant $50 by cheque which the defendant cashed on August 10th, 1904, and gave a receipt for it as "received on account of delay in beginning operations under the lease." In August, 1905, the plaintiff tendered the second yearly payment of $50 which the defendant refused, having made another lease of the premises to his co-defendant on July 28th, 1905. Held, that the second payment of $50 was in time, and might have been validly made at any time during the second year which did not terminate until Dec. 16th, 1905. The legal effect of the instrument in question was more than a license it conferred a profit a prendre, an incorporeal right to be exercised in the land comprised in it. J. Cowan, K.C., for the plaintiff. Hanna, for the defendant. Leckie. A. Weir, and Greenizen, for the other defendants. Boyd, C., Trial.] MCGREGOR v. TOWNSHIP OF WATFORD. [Oct. 29. Highway-Dedication-Plan-Registration before incorporation -R.S.O. (1897), c. 152, s. 62. A plan shewing the locus in quo as a street was made and filed before but practically contemporaneously with the locality being set apart as an incorporated village, the former being on June 3rd, 1873, the latter on June 25th, 1873. The lots were first sold under the plan in 1876. Subsequent legislation which was retro-active declared that allowances for roads laid out in cities, towns, and villages, and fronting upon which lots had been sold, should be public highways. Held, that the road in question was a public highway and subject to the jurisdiction of the municipality. Meredith, for plaintiff. J. Cowan, K.C., for Township. Hanna, for defendants Kelly. Boyd, C., Trial.] CANADIAN OIL FIELDS v. OIL SPRINGS. [Oct. 29. Assessment and taxes-Mineral lands-Buildings on. The Assessment Act (1904), s. 36, sub-s. 3 enacts as to mineral lands that their value and that of the buildings thereon shall be estimated at the value of other lands in the neighbourhood for agricultural purposes. Held, that this does not mean that the value of the mineral lands and buildings is to be estimated as if there were no buildings thereon. Just as agricultural buildings are to be valued and assessed if the land is improved thereby, so are structures on mineral lands to be valued and assessed. The scheme of the Act is to put mineral lands and buildings on the footing of farming lands and buildings, but not to give mineral lands any further benefit. A. Weir, for plaintiff. Towers, for defendant. Boyd, C.] DRIFFIL V. OUGH. [Nov. 1. Creditors' suits-Settlement of plaintiff's debt-Addition of new creditor as co-plaintiff—Con. Rules 206, 313. A simple contract creditor who had brought this action on behalf of himself and all other simple contract creditors to avoid a transfer of property alleged to be in fraud of creditors, had been settled with as to his debt, but not as to his costs, and was willing that the action should proceed with another unpaid creditor added as co-plaintiff, and this motion was made accordingly. Motion dismissed, the proper course being for the present action to be settled as between the parties, and for the creditor now seeking to intervene, to begin an independent action. Con. Rules 206, 313, as to the substitution and addition of parties do not cover such an application as the present one. Middleton, for plaintiff. Scanlon, for defendant. Mulock, C.J. Ex.D., Anglin, J., Clute, J.] [Nov. 12. SOVEREEN MITT, GLOVE AND ROBE Co. v. WHITESIDE. Company-Directors-Filling vacancies in Board-Quorum— Special meeting of shareholders. Where the by-laws of a company provide that there shall be seven directors, and that four shall be a quorum, if, on account of four of them ceasing to be directors by reason of their selling and transferring their shares, only three are left, those three have not the power, under s. 43 (3) of the Ontario Companies Act, R.S.O. 1897, c. 191, to fill the vacancies, notwithstanding that by s. 40 the board might consist of only three; and the directors not having the power, and therefore failing, to fill the vacancies, the shareholders can do so at a special meeting called for the purpose. Decision of MACMAHON, J., affirmed. J. Bicknell, K.C., for plaintiffs. Kilmer, and Stephens, for defendants. Cartwright, Master.] [Nov. 20. GERMAN AMERICAN BANK v. KEYSTONE SUGAR COMPANY. Summary judgment-Motion for-Delay. The intention of Con. Rule 603 was that a motion for summary judgment should be made within a reasonable time after the appearance of the defendant: and a motion for such judgment in an action in which the writ was issued on June 20th, the appearance entered on July 10th, but the motion not launched until November 20th-the delay not being explainėd— was refused. McLardy v. Slateum (1890), 24 Q.B.D. 504, followed. DIVISION COURTS. FIRST DIVISION COURT, COUNTY OF LAMBTON. Taylor, J.J.] LUCAS v. SHAVER. [Oct. 29. Conditional sale-Manufactured goods other than household furniture-Exchange subject to lien. Held, 1. Following Coulthard v. Parr, 29 C.L.J. (1893), 269, that the Act respecting conditional sales applies only to manufactured goods other than household furniture and that other chattels, such as horses, etc., are not within these provisions. 2. Upon a conditional sale, when both vendor and purchaser agree to an exchange with a third party, of the articles sold, on the understanding that the article taken in exchange is to take the place of the chattel originally sold, and be subject to the terms of the conditional sale, the property in the article so got in exchange is in the original vendor of the first article, subject. to the terms of the conditional sale by him, and that the property in it does not pass to the purchaser until the terms of the original conditional sale have been fulfilled. The second point above decided is a new one in this Province. |