was an action by a member of a trade union against the union to recover a sum claimed to be due for sick benefits, in which two points were raised. (1) Whether there was any jurisdiction to entertain the action, and (2) Whether the plaintiff, who was a lunatic, was bound by an alteration made in the rules of society respecting sick benefits, whilst the plaintiff was insane. On the second point the Court held that the changes made in the rules of the union relating to sick benefits having been made in accordance with the rules authorizing and regulating the alteration of the rules of the union, were binding on the plaintiff, notwithstanding his insanity, and, this being sufficient to dispose of the case, the Court refrained from deciding the first point, but inclined to the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court was excluded by the Trade Union Act, 1871, s. 4(3), (R.S.C. c. 131, s. 4), notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal in Swaine v. Wilson (1889), 24 Q.B.D. 252, which they considered was distinguishable. LANDLORD AND TENANT-NOTICE ΤΟ QUIT-YEARLY RENT HABENDUM "UNTIL SUCH TENANCY SHALL BE DETERMINED Lewis v. Baker (1906) 2 K.B. 599 is an appeal from the judgment of Jelf, J. (1905) 2 K.B. 576 (noted, ante, vol. 41, p. 832), in which the question at issue was the sufficiency of a notice to quit. The action was for ejectment by landlord against tenant. The defendant was in possession under a lease dated June 1, 1901, at a yearly rent, the habendum being "until such tenancy shall be determined as hereinafter mentioned." The lease thereafter provided for the termination of the term by either party on giving three months' notice. On May 11, 1903, the landlord gave notice to quit on August 13, 1903; the notice was not complied with and subsequently the landlord assigned the reversion to the plaintiff. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the lease was for an indefinite term, terminable at any time on three months' notice, but Jelf, J., held that it was a yearly tenancy and that it was terminable only on three months, expiring with any year of the tenancy, and with this conclusion the Court of Appeal (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Barnes, P.P.D., and Farwell, L.J.), agreed. CONTRACT TO SUPPLY GOODS AS PURCHASER MAY REQUIRE FOR HIS BUSINESS AGREEMENT BY PURCHASER NOT TO BUY GOODS ELSEWHERE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT-ASSIGNEE OF CONTRACT. In Kemp v. Baerselman (1906) 2 K.B. 604 a question was raised somewhat similar to that in Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, 1903, A.C. 514, but which the Court of Appeal held was not governed by that case owing to the existence of a stipulation on the part of the purchaser in this case, which was not present in the Tolhurst case. The contract in question was one made by the defendant for the supply of all the eggs which one George Kemp should require for one year in his business of a baker, and Kemp bound himself to the defendant so long as the defendant was ready to supply him not to buy eggs elsewhere, and it was this stipulation which was held to differ the case from the Tolhurst case. Kemp assigned his business and the benefit of the contract to a joint stock company, which carried on business on a much more extensive scale than Kemp had done. The defendant then refused to supply any more eggs, and the action was brought by Kemp and the company to recover damages for breach of the contract. Channell, J., who tried the action held that the plaintiff's were entitled to damages for refusal to deliver eggs at the place of business formerly carried on by Kemp since the transfer of the business to the company, but not for refusal to deliver eggs at another place of business carried on by the company. With this judgment both parties were dissatisfied, and both appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeal (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Barnes, P.P.D., and Farwell, L.J.), the plaintiff relying on the Tolhurst case. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the action on the ground that the stipulation not to trade elsewhere rendered the contract of a personal character and as such not assignable, and that by the assignment of Kemp's business the defendant was discharged from his obligation under the contract. The Court moreover seemed to think that as the contract was to supply eggs for a particular business, that on that ground also it could not be assigned, notwithstanding what was said in the Tolhurst case to the contrary. HIGHWAY-DITCH ALONGSIDE OF HIGHWAY-DEDICATION. In Chorley v. Nightingale (1906) 2 K.B. 612 the Divisional Court (Kennedy and Lawrance, JJ.), affirmed a decision of a County Court to the effect that there is no rule of law which prevents the dedication of a ditch running alongside a highway between the travelled road and the fences on either side, as part of such highway merely because it cannot be used by the public as part of the roadway for the purpose of passage; and consequently where such a ditch was filled up and made part of the roadway, it was held not to be a widening of the highway. DEFAMATION-LIBEL-FAIR COMMENT-MALICE-REVIEW OF BOOK -PRIVILEGED OCCASION. Thomas v. Bradbury (1906) 2 K.B. 627 was an action for libel against the publishers of Punch. The libel complained of was contained in a review of a book written by the plaintiffi, The review was entitled "Mangled Remains," and was a severe criticism of the work charging the writer with incompetence and conceit, etc. The defendants pleaded fair comment on a privileged occasion. At the trial it was proved that the writer of the review and the plaintiff were not on friendly terms, and it was held by the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., Cozens-Hardy, L.J., and Barnes, P.P.D.), that such evidence was properly admitted to shew malice, and that the jury might properly find as they did that comment, which is actuated by malice, cannot be termed fair, and a verdict in favour of the plaintiff for £300 was upheld. BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE TRUSTEE'S POWER ΤΟ COMPROMISE CLAIMS SANCTION OF COURT-OPPOSITION TO COMPROMISE -(R.S.C. c. 126, s. 33). In re Pilling (1906) 2 K.B. 644, although a bankruptcy case, is deserving of notice as bearing on the effect of the Winding-up Act (R.S.C. c. 129) c. 33. Under the English Bankruptcy Act the trustee has ample power, with the consent of committee of inspection, to compromise all claims. In this case the trustee and committee were in favour of accepting a proposed compromise, but the bankrupt objected, and for his own protection the trustee applied to the Court for directions and authority fo accept the compromise. The application was opposed by the bankrupt. Bingham, J., to whom the application was made, refused to express any opinion, holding that it was a matter for the discretion of the trustee and committee with which the Court would not interfere unless it were shewn by the party objecting that the compromise was one which ought not to be accepted, which he held had not been done. COMPANY-WINDING-UP-ASSETS COVERED BY DEBENTURES—UNSECURED CREDITOR (R.S.C. c. 129, s. 8). Re Crigglestone Coal Co. (1906) 2 Ch. 327 was an application by an unsecured creditor of an insolvent joint stock company for a winding-up order. The application was opposed by debenture holders whose debentures covered all the assets of the company, and who had obtained the appointment of a receiver to enforce their security, and also by the company which was under the control of the debenture holders, on the ground that there were no assets available for unsecured creditors. Buckley, J., granted the order and the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer, and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.), affirmed his decision on the ground that those who opposed the application had failed to shew that no possible benefit could accrue to the unsecured creditor by granting the order. ADMINISTRATION—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—“PRESENT RIGHT TO RECEIVE THE SAME"-RIGHT OF ACTION AT LAW-INCAPA- In re Pardoe McLaughlin v. Penny (1906) 2 Ch. 340 the Court of Appeal have reversed the judgment of Kekewich, J. (1906), 1 Ch. 265 (noted, ante, p. 337). WILL CONSTRUCTION-GIFT TO CHILDREN AS A CLASS SUBSTITUTIONAL GIFT TO ISSUE-SHALL PREDECEASE ME"-ISSUE OF PARENT DEAD AT DATE OF WILL. In re Gorringe, Gorringe v. Gorringe (1906) 2 Ch. 341. The Court of Appeal (Williams, Romer and Moulton, L.JJ.), have reversed the decision of Joyce, J. (1906) 1 Ch. 319 (noted, ante, p. 338), and hold that the issue of the son who was dead at the date of the will were entitled to participate in the residuary gift in favour of the issue of the testator's children "who shall predecease me." The Court, however, was not unanimous, Romer, L.J., dissenting. An order fixing the time for the trial of an election petition at a date beyond the time prescribed under the Act operates as an enlargement of the time. St. James Election Case, 33 S.C.R. 137; Beauharnois Election Case, 32 S.C.R. 111, followed. Lovett, for appellant. Lafleur, K.C., and Drysdale, K.C., for respondent. N.S.] QUEEN'S v. SHELBURNE ELECTION CASE. [Oct. 8. Controverted election-Trial of petition-Evidence-Corrupt· acts at former election-Agency-System of corruption. A petition against the return of a member for the House of Commons at a general election in 1904, contained allegations. of corrupt acts by respondent at the election in 1900, which were struck out on preliminary objections. On the trial of the petition evidence of payments by respondent of accounts in connection with the former election was offered to prove agency and a system, and was admitted on the first ground. A question as to the amount of one account so paid was objected to and rejected. Held, that such rejection was proper; that the question was not admissible to prove agency, for agency was admitted or proved otherwise; nor as proof of a system which could not be established by evidence of an isolated corrupt act. Held, also, that where evidence is tendered on one ground other grounds cannot be set up in a Court of Appeal. Lovett, for appellant. Lafleur, K.C., and Drysdale, K.C., for respondent. |