ation of the first bill. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling and Moulton, L.JJ.) held that the plaintiff was not bound by the first bill delivered, and that although the defendants might, notwithstanding its delivery, have under the statute obtained an order for the taxation of the paid bill, which would have involved an admission of liability for the amount found due on the taxation, they were now, after verdict, under section 37 of the Solicitors' Act, 1843 (R.S.O. c. 174, s. 37), precluded from getting a reference under the statute, except on shewing special circumstances, which they had not done. Nevertheless, the Court, under its inherent jurisdiction, had power to refer the bill to the Master, and they considered that the proper judgment in such a case was one for the amount which should be found due by a Master on taxation, and that in ascertaining the amount for which judgment should be entered the Master would be entitled to take both bills into consideration. BILL OF LADING INCORPORATION OF CONDITIONS OF CHARTERPARTY BY REFERENCE. unsea The Northumbria (1906) P. 292 was an action in the Admiralty Court by the plaintiff under a bill of lading to recover for damages to cargo. The bill of lading incorporated all the conditions of the charter-party, including negligence, as conditions on which the goods in question were carried. The charterparty provided that "the steamer is in no way liable for the consequences of perils of the sea worthiness, or latent defect in hull, machinery or appurtenances, whether existing or not before or after the commencement of the voyage, not resulting from the want of due diligence by the owners of the steamer or by the ship's husband or manager,' and by a further clause in the charter-party, the above clause was to be embodied in the bill of lading. It appeared by the evidence that rough weather was met with during the voyage sufficient to cause a crack in one of the deck plates; and that by reason of such crack the water entered and damaged the plaintiff's goods. The Divisional Court (Barnes, P.P.D., and Deane, J.) held, reversing the Court below, that in these circumstances a prima facie case of perils of the sea had been made out by defendants, and not rebutted by the plaintiff, and, moreover, that the bill of lading incorporated the clause in the charter-party as to exemption from liability for unseaworthiness, and therefore > on both grounds the plaintiff's action failed, there being no evidence of negligence on the defendants' part. EXPROPRIATION OF LAND-STATUTORY POWER-DIVERSION OF EXPROPRIATED LAND TO OTHER THAN AUTHORIZED PURPOSES. In Attorney-General v. Pontypridd (1906) 2 Ch. 257 the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) have affirmed the judgment of Farewell, J. (1905) 2 Ch. 441, noted ante, p. 102. ADMINISTRATION PERSONAL ESTATE INTESTACY-ADVANCES OUT OF LUNATIC'S ESTATE ON CONDITION OF THEIR BEING BROUGHT INTO HOTCHPOT-STATUTE OF DISTRIBUTIONS (22 & 23 CAR. II. c. 10) ss. 6, 7—(R.S.O. c. 335, s. 2). In Re Gist, Gist v. Timbrill (1906) 2 Ch. 280 the Court of Appeal (Williams, Romer and Moulton, L.JJ.) have affirmed the decision of Eady, J. (1906) 1 Ch. 58 (noted ante, p. 226). BUILDING SCHEME PLAN IMPLIED REPRESENTATION-POWER TO PERMIT VARIATION-BLOCKING UP ROAD-CUL-DE-SACDEDICATION-USER. In Whitehouse v. Hugh (1906) 2 Ch. 283 the Court of Appeal (Williams, Romer and Moulton, L.JJ.) have affirmed the decision of Kekewich, J. (1906) 1 Ch. 253 (noted ante, p. 337). In re Wright, Whitworth v. Wright (1906) 1 Ch. 288. The rule against perpetuities was here successfully invoked. By a settlement made in 1871, and another made in 1882, Mary Whitworth was given power of testamentary appointment over certain property amongst her children, her children taking in default of appointment. She had also unsettled separate property of her own. By her will she gave both the settled and unsettled properties to trustees upon trust for her son and three daughters; the son's share to be payable on his attaining 25, and the share of each daughter being given in trust for her life, with remainder to her children. All the children were born after 1871 and before 1882. Buckley, J., held that so far as the property included in the settlement of 1871 was concerned, the ap pointment to the son at 25, and to the grandchildren in remainder, were void as infringing the rule against perpetuity, and that the children of the testatrix were not bound to elect between what was invalidly appointed, and the interests validly given them by the will. LUNACY ORDERS IN LUNACY DEATH OF LUNATIC ADMINISTRATION CREDITORS OF LUNATIC PRIORITY. In re Hunt, Silicate Paint Co. v. Hunt (1906) 2 Ch. 295 was an administration suit. The deceased had been a lunatic, and during his lunacy orders had been made directing his committee to pay his creditors a dividend of 6s. in the pound on their debts. This dividend was paid before a firm of Brown, Janson & Co. had sent in their claim; they subsequently applied in lunacy for leave to prove their claim, which was granted, and the order provided that they should be paid in priority to the other creditors until they also had received 6s. in the pound on their claim. Before they were paid this dividend the lunatic died, and his estate was ordered to be administered, and the question then arose whether the order in lunacy gave Brown, Janson & Co. any priority in the administration proceedings, and Buckley, J., held that it did not, and that its operative force ceased with the death of the lunatic, and that on his death the then existing debts must be paid in the ordinary course of administration without reference to the order in lunacy. WILL CONSTRUCTION TAIN AMOUNT LEGACY EXPRESSED TO MAKE UP CERMISCALCULATION LEGATEE. In re Segelcke, Ziegler v. Nicol (1906) 2 Ch. 301. A testator gave a legacy of £1,000 to be equally divided between certain of his god-children therein described. By a codicil he gave £50 additional to each of his god-children as named in his will, "so that each receives £100 each." At his death there were only nine god-children entitled, and the question was whether, as the £1,000 was more than sufficient to give them £100 each, they were nevertheless also entitled to the £50 additional bequeathed by the codicil, and Joyce, J., held that the bequest in the codicil was a clear gift of £50 additional to each of the god-children; and that the subsequent words were of doubtful import and could not be construed as cutting it down, and consequently that each god-child was also entitled to the £50 additional. WILL CONSTRUCTION DEVISE OF REAL ESTATE TESTATOR NOT ENTITLED TO REALTY, BUT ENTITLED TO PROCEEDS OF SALE SIBILITY. In re Glassington, Glassington v. Follett (1906) 2 Ch. 305. A testator devised all her real estate to trustees upon certain trusts. The testatrix was not beneficially entitled to any real estate at the date of the will, or at her death, but she was beneficially entitled to a share of the proceeds of certain freehold property which was subject to a trust for sale. There had been no election by the testatrix to take the freehold property unconverted. In these circumstances, Joyce, J., held that the devise passed all the testatrix's interest in the proceeds of the real estate to which she was entitled, and that this was a case in which extrinsic evidence was admissible for the purpose of construing the will. WILL CONSTRUCTION TESTATOR ILLEGITIMATE-BEQUEST BY ILLEGITIMATE TESTATOR TO "ALL MY NEPHEWS AND NIECES.' In re Corsellis, Freeborn v. Napper (1906) 2 Ch. 316. The testator whose will was in question in this case was illegitimate. He had lived with his parents and natural brothers and sisters as one family, and treated them as his lawful relatives. By his will he referred by name to all of his living natural brothers and sisters as his brothers and sisters, and to some of their children as his nephews and nieces, but he did not mention a deceased natural sister or her children, and there was no evidence that he knew of their existence. He made a bequest in favour of "all my nephews and nieces living" at a certain specified period, and the question at issue was whether the children of the deceased natural sister were entitled to participate. Eady, J., held that they were, and that the bequest was not confined to the children of the brothers and sisters actually named in the will. In re Booth, Booth v. Robinson (1906) 2 Ch. 321. A testator by his will purported to dispose of property comprised in a settlement under which he took a life interest only, without any power of disposition. He also disposed of his own property. Some of the persons entitled under the settlement took other benefits under the will. They all elected to take against the will, which had the effect of depriving some of them of shares of the settled property purported to be given them by the will, and the question Eady, J., had to consider was whether or not the persons electing to take against the will were bound to make compensation to other persons so electing, as well as those who took under the will only, for any disappointment occasioned by the election, to the extent of the benefits received under the will by the persons electing to take against it; and he held that they were, and that in estimating such benefits, any compensation which the electing persons themselves receive by way of compensation must be taken to be part of the benefits received by them under the will. Correspondence. JUDGES AND REPORTERS. Editor of THE CANADA LAW JOURNAL, Sir,-There are some decisions that a wise reporter will allow to be forgotten. I have known one case at least where the Court evidently suggested to the reporter that the decision was made to fit the particular case, and was not intended to be an exposition of the law bearing upon the facts involved. That case was not reported. There are other cases where the Court apparently is not aware of the difference between the decisions of the Court and the law of the land. In such cases the reporter should, if he is competent for his important duties, exercise his discretion and suppress the report, both for the sake of the Court and the profession. The Eastern Law Reporter and the Nova Scotia Reporter recently publishel a decision by Longley, J., of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, that should have been allowed to rest undisturbed among the files of the Court. The case is that of Nova Scotia Carriage Co. v. Lockhart, E.L.R., p. 78; 7 N.S.R., No. 8. The decision is in effect that a draft drawn and accepted payable to a named bank or order need not be indorsed by the bank in order to be sued on by the drawer, and that the drawer is the holder without any indorsement by the bank. The judge says in his written decision, "I think that the mere placing on the draft the statement, 'Pay to the order of the Union Bank of Halifax,' does not necessitate the indorsement of |