life annuities. He had bequeathed his residuary real and personal estate upon successive trusts for a tenant for life and remainderman. Eady, J., held that the actuarial values of the life estate and remainder at the time of the testator's death must be ascertained; and the successive instalments of the annuities, must be borne by the tenant for life and remainderman according to the proportionate value of their respective estates.

COMPANY-DEBENTURES-DEPOSIT OF BLANK DEBENTURE TO SECURE LOAN-REISSUE OF DEBENTURES.

In re Perth Electric Tramways, Lyons v. Tramways Syndicate (1906) 2 Ch. 216. A company having power to issue mortgage debentures. Each debenture was to be under seal in a certain form, and was to be issued to a holder specified therein and registered. The company issued a series of mortgage debentures to secure a loan, but the holder's name was left blank and also the date, and they were not registered. They were deposited with a creditor of the company to secure a loan which was subsequently repaid; and the debentures were returned to the comapny. The question Eady, J., was called on to decide was, whether this amounted to an issue of the debentures so as to preclude the company from re-issuing them, and he held that the deposit of the debentures with the creditor was an issue of them, notwithstanding the omission of the holders' name and date, and, therefore, that it was not competent for the company after repayment of the loan for which they were deposited as security to reissue the debentures, and six of the debentures which had been reissued to a bonâ fide holder for value were ordered to be delivered up to be cancelled.

WILL SATISFACTION SETTLEMENT

COVENANT BY FATHER

ABSOLUTE BEQUEST TO DAUGHTER-AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY
CLAUSE PERSONS DERIVATIVELY ENTITLED ELECTION.

In re Blundell, Blundell v. Blundell (1906) 2 Ch. 222. This was a case turning on the equitable doctrine of election. By a marriage settlement made in 1898 £10,000 (which included a sum of £5,539 secured to the trustees by the covenant of the wife's father) was settled on trusts for the wife, husband and children, the wife taking the first life interest and covenanting to settle after required property to which she might become entitled during coverture on the same trusts. The father died without satisfying the covenant, leaving a residuary estate of £80,000,

one-third of which he bequeathed to the daughter absolutely for her separate use. The question therefore arose whether this put any and which of the parties entitled under the settlement to an election. Eady, J., held that the bequest was a satisfaction of the wife's life interest in the £5,539 secured by the covenant, but not of the interests of any of the other cestuis que trust, notwithstanding that under the after acquired property clause they might become derivatively entitled to the benefit of the bequest. The wife, therefore, he held, was the only person put to election.

WILL-LEGACY-ADEMPTION-RESIDUE TO CHILD AND STRANGERADVANCEMENT TO CHILD.

In re Heather, Pumfrey v. Fryer (1906) 2 Ch. 230 was a case arising under a will, whereby the testator bequeathed a legacy to an adopted child to whom he stood in loco parentis, and also bequeathed his residue between that child and a stranger. Subsequently to the will he made an advance to the child which on the evidence was held not to have been a portion, and the question was whether the advance operated as an ademption of the legacy or share of residue bequeathed to the child, and Eady, J., held that the doctrine of ademption by subsequent portion, is not applicable as between a stranger and a child of a testator, and, therefore, even if the edvance had been a portion it would not have constituted an ademption of either the legacy or the share of residue bequeathed to the child.

COMPANY-PROSPECTUS-DIRECTORS' LIABILITY FOR FALSE PROS

PECTUS CONTRIBUTION-DIRECTORS LIABILITY ACT, 1890 (53 & 54 VICT. c. 64) ss. 3, 5 (R.S.O. c. 126, ss. 4, 6)-LIABILITY

OF ESTATE OF DECEASED DIRECTOR.

Shepheard v. Bray (1906) 2 Ch. 235 was an action by directors who had paid certain claims to persons who had been damnified by an erroneous prospectus issued by the directors of a company, to recover from the estate of a deceased director contribution towards the sums so paid. The action was based on the Directors Liability Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 64) s. 5 (R.S.O. c. 216, s. 6). Actions were brought against the plaintiffs in which they were held liable for these claims, these they satisfied and also those of other parties without suit. Warrington, J., held that the defendants were liable to pay their share of the compensation paid by the plaintiffs to the complainants, to

gether with the latter's costs of action up to judgment, but not the costs of unsuccessful appeals, nor their own costs of such actions.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-COVENANT NOT TO CARRY ON OR BE INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR BUSINESS-SALE ON CREDIT-INDIRECT

INTEREST.

Cory v. Harrison (1906) A.C. 274 was an action to enforce a covenant not to carry on or be interested in a similar business to that of the covenantee within a certain area. The covenantor carried on a home and export business of a coal merchant. He sold the home business and covenanted not to carry on a similar business within Great Britain or the Isle of Man. He subsequently sold the export business to a company, receiving payment in shares of the company. The company afterwards sold the business to a firm, the purchase money being payable by instalments lasting over several years. The firm having begun to carry on business in Great Britain the plaintiffs claimed that this constituted a breach of the defendant's covenant as he was indirectly interested in the business as a shareholder of the company, the unpaid vendor thereof. The action was dismissed by Joyce, J., and his judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling, and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) and the House of Lords (Lord Halsbury, L.C., and Lords Robertson and Lindley) agreed that the being a creditor of a firm is not being "interested or concerned" in its business, within the meaning of the covenant in question and therefore dismissed the appeal. POLICE-PENSION-APPROVED SERVICE-CONTINUITY OF SERVICE.

Garbutt v. Durham Joint Committee (1906) A.C. 291 was an action by a former police officer to recover a pension under an Act which entitled him to a pension after twenty-five years of approved service. The King's Bench Division (1904) 1 K.B. 522; and the Court of Appeal (1904) 2 K.B. 514 held that this meant twenty-five years' continuous service, but the House of Lords (Lord Loreburn, L.C., and Lords Macnaghten, Davey, James, Robertson, and Atkinson) overruled that decision and held that it need not be continuous.

INSURANCE POLICY EFFECTED BY OWNER OF SHIP FOR ALL PERSONS TO WHOM THE SUBJECT MATTER MIGHT APPERTAININTENTION-RIGHT OF CHARTERER TO BENEFIT OF POLICY EFFECTED BY OWNER-RATIFICATION.

Boston Fruit Co. v. British & F. M. Insurance Co. (1906) A.C. 336. The plaintiffs in this case were charterers of a vessel.

The owners had effected an insurance on the vessel on behalf of themselves and all persons to whom the subject matter might appertain, and the policy contained a collision clause. There was no stipulation between the owners and charterers that the owners should insure for the charterers' benefit. The charterers were found liable to pay damages caused by a collision, and in the course of the litigation in a foreign Court had expressly disclaimed having any insurance. Having paid the damages they now claimed to recover on the policy effected by the owners as being persons to whom the subject matter appertained. It was admitted that the policy was wide enough in its terms to include the plaintiffs, but it was denied that there was any intention to insure for their benefit. In these circumstances the Court of Appeal (1905) 1 K.B. 637 held that the plaintiffs could not recover, and with this conclusion the House of Lords (Lord Loreburn, L.C., and Lords Macnaghten, Robertson, and Atkinson) also unanimously agreed.

RAILWAY-CONTRACT-BREACH OF CONTRACT-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLETION OF

CONTRACT

"ACTUAL COST" DOES NOT INCLUDE INTEREST ON MONEYS EXPENDED.

Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills (1906) A.C. 368 was an appeal from the Cape of Good Hope. The action was brought by Hills, the respondent, against the Government of the Cape to recover under a contract for the construction of a railway. The contract provided that in the event, which happened, of the contract not being completed within a specified time the plaintiff should forfeit to the Government certain percentages which the Government retained out of moneys payable to the plaintiff under two other contracts, and also certain security money lodged with its Agent-General, "as and for liquidated damages sustained by the Government for the non-completion of the line,” and that it should be lawful for the Government to take possession of the incomplete line and pay the balance due in respect of its "actual cost." The Chief Justice of the Colonial Court held that the moneys held by the Government under the two other contracts were held as security only for any damage which the Government might be proved to have sustained by non-completion of the line and as no damages were proved the Government were not entitled to retain the money; and that upon the construction of the agreement the term "actual cost" was meant to

include no more than the money actually paid for materials used and work done by the contractor, and therefore did not include interest thereon as claimed by him and with this conclusion the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (The Lord Chancellor and Lords Davey, Dunedin and Atkinson, and Sir Arthur Wilson) agreed.

CONTRACT-BREACH OF CONTRACT-PENALTY-LIQUIDATED DAM

AGES.

Diestal v. Stevenson (1906) 2 K.B. 345 was an action for breach of contract in which the sole question was whether a stipulation in the contract for a penalty in case of breach was to be regarded as a penalty or as liquidated damages. The contract was for the delivery of coal of different qualities, and the contract provided "penalty for non-execution of this contract by either party one shilling per ton on the portion unexecuted, and the amount of proved loss, if any, on freight actually arranged by us." The action was by the vendee for non-delivery of the coal and the plaintiff claimed that the shilling a ton was a penalty, and might be disregarded in estimating the damage, and that he was entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and the market price at the place of delivery which greatly exceeded the 1s. per ton. Kennedy, J., who tried the action, held that the 1s. per ton was, in the circumstances of this case to be taken as liquidated damages and that the plaintiff was not entitled to anything in excess of that amount.

CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENCY-SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMAN IN THE HOUSE OF HER HUSBAND.

In Rex v. Murray (1906) 2 K.B. 385 the short point decided by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Kennedy, Darling, Jelf, and Lawrance, JJ.) was, that where a person is indicted for larceny of property which was the separate property of a married woman, it was bad to allege in the indictment that the property was that of her husband though it was stolen from his house. The conviction of the prisoner was therefore quashed.