into possession of the premises under an agreement of tenancy dated May 9, 1904, "for a period of twelve months with the option of a lease after the aforesaid time at the rental of £30 per annum. Some time before the expiry of the twelve months the plaintiff demanded delivery of possession on May 9, 1905. The defendant refused to go out and claimed that under the agreement he was entitled to a further lease for the period of at least one year. The judge at the trial so held, and dismissed the action. On appel to a Divisional Court (Kennedy and Lawrence, JJ.) this decision was affirmed, Kennedy, J., however, inclining to the opinion that the defendant might have claimed a lease for his life, Lawrence, J., thought that the words "£30 per annum" shewed that the additional term was contemplated by the parties to be at least for one year.

PARTNERSHIP ASSIGNMENT OF BOOK DEBTS BY ONE MEMBER OF A FIRM-FORGERY OF PARTNER'S NAME-VALIDITY OF ASSIGN

MENT.

In re Briggs & Co. (1906) 2 K.B. 209 although a bankruptcy case involves a point of partnership law of general interest. The facts were simple. One of two partners of a firm executed an assignment of the book debts of the firm in favour of a creditor of the firm to secure a debt, and signed the deed in his individual name, and also (without authority) in the name of his partner. Bigham, J., held that notwithstanding the forgery, the assignment was an effectual transfer of the debts as an equitable assignment because it was within s. 6 of the Partnership Act, 1890, an act or instrument relating to the business of the firm, and done in a manner shewing an intention to bind the firm by a partner, who, by reason of the partnership, had authority to bind the firm. The Partnership Act, though not yet enacted in Ontario, we believe is, on this point, merely declaratory of the existing law of Ontario.

PRACTICE

DISCOVERY PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS REPORT MADE TO PARTIES FOR WHOSE BENEFIT ACTION IS CARRIED ON— NOMINAL PLAINTIFFS.

In Nelson v. Nelson (1906) 2 K.B. 217 the action was brought by cargo owners against shipowners for breach of warranty of seaworthiness. The plaintiffs were insured against loss, and after the commencement of the action the insurers paid the

loss, and the action was thenceforward prosecuted by the insurers' solicitor for their benefit. During the loading of the ship the insurers had procured a report from a surveyor as to the condition of the ship, and the defendants claimed discovery of this document, but Bigham, J., held that they were not entitled to its production, and the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Cozens-Hardy, and Farwell, JJ.) affirmed his decision, the Court distinguishing the case from Willis v. Baddeley (1892) 2 Q.B. 324, because there the actual plaintiffs were really merely the agents of the parties beneficially entitled and on whose behalf the action was brought. Under Ont. Rule 446 it is possible, even in the circumstances of Nelson v. Nelson, that production might be ordered.

TRAMWAY-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGER-RIGHT OF PASSENGER TO

BREAK JOURNEY.

Bastaple v. Metcalfe (1906) 2 K.B. 288 was a prosecution for riding on a tram car without a ticket. The facts were, that the defendant had purchased a ticket entitling him to travel a certain distance, he alighted at an intermediate stopping place, walked a quarter of a mile in the direction of his destination and then got on another tram car, which was performing the same journey, in order to get to the point he might have travelled by the first car. He refused to pay the fare demanded of him on the second car, contending that he was entitled to continue his journey with his original ticket. The justices dismissed the complaint, but the Divisional Court (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Darling, J.) held that he ought to have been convicted, that by alighting from the car, and suffering it to proceed, he had put an end to the contract. The Court, however, was careful not to commit itself to any opinion as to the effect of a passenger alighting for a merely temporary purpose on notice to the conductor.

In Wheatley v. Smithers (1906) 2 K.B. 321 the Divisional Court (Ridley and Darling, JJ.) held that an auctioneer is not a trader, and, therefore, that a member of a firm of auctioneers has no implied authority to bind his partner by the acceptance of a bill of exchange in the firm name.

ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-COLLISION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHIP FOREIGN PUBLIC VESSEL-APPEARANCE ENTERED UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW-EXEMPTION FROM ARREST.

The Jassy (1906) P. 270, was an action in the Admiralty Court for damage by collision against a vessel which was the property of a sovereign state. The vessel had been arrested, and an absolute appearance put in, and an undertaking given to put in bail. Subsequently the chargé d'affaires of the foreign state addressed a letter, in the nature of a certificate, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating that the vessel was the property of such foreign state, and asking that the proceedings against the vessel might be terminated, and stating that the appearance had been put in, and undertaking given, under misapprehension, and a copy of this letter was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Registrar of the Admiralty Court for the information of the President of that Court. The defendants applied to dismiss the action and in the circumstances and notwithstanding the appearance and undertaking Barnes, P.P.D., held that the action must be dismissed.

COLLISION-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-PROSPECTIVE PROFITS.

The Racine (1906) P. 273 was an action in the Admiralty Court to recover damages for a collision, and the only question discussed is the measure of damages. The plaintiff's vessel, which was totally lost, was, at the time of the collision, proceeding from a home port under a charter to a foreign port, and was thence to proceed under charter to another port, and thence under charter home. The Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling, and Moulton, L.JJ.) affirming Barnes, P.P.D., held that the measure of damages was the value of the ship at the date when she would have accomplished the homeward voyage together with such sum as would represent the profits which would have been realized from the three successive charters, less a reasonable percentage for contingencies.

ADMIRALTY DAMAGE BY FIRE TO CARGO "BY REASON OF FIRE" -MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT. c. 60) s. 502 (1) WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS.

The Diamond (1906) P. 282 was an action brought by the plaintiffs against shipowners for breach of warranty of seaworthiness. Owing to the negligence of the crew in overheating a stove a fire broke out on board the defendant's ship and the

plaintiffs' goods were injured. The plaintiffs alleged the ship was unseaworthy, in that the stove was placed too near to a bulkhead, and that as the defendant must be taken to be privy to the position of the stove he could not claim the protection of s. 502 (1) of the Merchants Shipping Act, 1894, which protects the owner of a British sea-going ship from liability for loss happening "without his actual fault or privity," "by reason of fire on board the ship." The plaintiffs also claimed that the damage to their goods was principally caused by smoke and water used to extinguish the fire, and that this was not damage "by reason of fire" within the statute; but Deane, J., held that the defendant was entitled to the statutory protection, because the stove was perfectly safe if properly used, and therefore the vessel was seaworthy, and the defendant was not actually concerned in or "privy" to the negligence of the crew, and that the injury caused by smoke and water was occasioned by reason of fire within the statute.

CHARITABLE BEQUEST-BEQUEST FOR BELL-RINGING

ERECTION OF

TOMBSTONES FOR PENSIONERS "PUBLIC CHARITIES AND IN-
STITUTIONS OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES FOR THE PUBLIC ADVAN-

TAGE" TO BE SELECTED BY TRUSTEES-UNCERTAINTY-(R.S.O.
c. 333, s. 6).

In re Pardoe, McLaughlin v. Attorney-General (1906) 2 Ch. 184. A testatrix bequeathed (1) £200 to the vicar and wardens of a church, the income to be distributed annually at Christmas, as to £1 to the ringers of the church who should ring a peal of bells on the anniversary of the restoration of the monarchy; (2) £700 to the vicar and wardens of a church, the income to be applied inter alia in erecting tombstones to pensioners who should die in a certain almshouse and be buried in the churchyard; (3) and she bequeathed her residuary real and personal estate to trustees in trust to pay and distribute the same among "such public charities and institutions, or for such charitable purposes for the public advantage" as the trustees should think fit. All of these were held by Kekewich, J., to be valid charitable bequests.

COMPANY-GENERAL MEETING-POWER OF DIRECTORS TO POST

PONE GENERAL MEETING.

In Smith v. Paringa Mines (1906) 2 Ch. 193 the simple point determined by Kekewich, J., is that the directors of a joint stock

company, in the absence of express authority in the articles of association, have no power to postpone a general meeting of shareholders regularly convened.

APPOINTMENT-REMOTENESS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.

In Re Thompson, Thompson v. Thompson (1906) 2 Ch. 199, Joyce, J., had to deal with the question of the validity of an appointment made pursuant to a will whereby a testator gave his residuary estate to his wife for life, and after her decease upon trusts for the benefit of his brother Charles and his present and future issue, as his wife should appoint. The wife appointed the property in trust for Charles for life, and after his death for all his children who had attained or should attain 25 if born in her lifetime, or 21 if borne after her death. Charles had nine children only, all of whom were born in the lifetime of the testator and all of whom attained 25 before the death of the appointor. Joyce, J., held that upon the appointment taking effect, it was certain that within the limits of the law against perpetuities, not only would the persons to take be ascertained, but their interests would be vested and the amount of their shares fixed; and consequently that the power of appointment was validly exercised.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER TITLE

YEARS OLD.

RECITAL IN DEED TWENTY

In re Wallis & Grout (1906) 2 Ch. 206 was an application under the Vendor and Purchasers Act, and the question was whether the vendor was justified in refusing to produce any evidence of title prior to a deed made in 1882, which recited that by a first mortgage the premises were granted to the mortgagee (the grantor in that deed) to the use of his heirs and assigns "as therein mentioned." Eady, J., held that, notwithstanding the recital, the purchaser was entitled to require the vendor to deduce a forty years' title.

TENANT FOR LIFE-REMAINDERMAN-COVENANT TO PAY ANNUITIES CAPITAL AND INCOME—APPORTIONMENT-TESTATOR'S

LIABILITIES.

In re Dawson, Arathoon v. Dawson (1906) 2 Ch. 211 was a question as to the relative liability of a tenant for life and remainderman to satisfy a liability of their testator. The liability in question arose under a covenant by the testator to pay certain