to the grantee." However, it would probably be wiser to state in the deed how the power therein reserved might be carried out. The mere fact that the law does not recognize the form of the revocation will not operate to defeat it, if it has been exercised in the manner assented to by the parties. Thus, where a deed provided that a revocation, to be effectual, should be an instrument under seal, acknowledged and recorded, as deeds of land are required to be recorded according to law, a revocation in compliance therewith could not be defeated by the fact that the acknowledgment and recording of such an instrument was not provided for by statute.12 But the act of revocation, to be effectual, must be complete. The interest of a grantor will not be divested by a deed of revocation executed by the grantor in anticipation of a settlement with his creditors, and destroyed by him on failure to effect such settlement.13

Since the nature of the power is to leave to the free will and election of the grantor the question whether it shall or shall not be executed, a Court of Equity will not interfere in a case of non-execution, though the non-execution is caused by accident or mistake. But if the exercise of the power was attempted, and was defective, but the intent to revoke is clear, equity would aid the defective execution.14-Central Law Journal.

11 Ricketts v. R. R. Co., supra. 12 Ricketts v. R. R. Co., supra.

13 Hill v. Cornwall, 95 Ky. 526, 26 S.W. Rep. 540. 14 22 Am. Enc. of Law, 1127.

REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

COMPANY-DIRECTORS-RESOLUTION OF MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS FOR SALE OF UNDERTAKING REFUSAL OF DIRECTORS TO CARRY OUT RESOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDERS.

Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Co. v. Cunninghame (1906) 2 Ch. 34 was an action by the company and by the plaintiff McDiarmid, a shareholder, on behalf of himself and all other shareholders of the company against the directors of the company to compel them to carry out a resolution passed by a majority of the shareholders of the company authorizing a sale of the company's undertaking. The articles provided inter alia that the management of the business of the company should be vested in the directors, and they considered it would not be in the interests of the company to carry out the resolution and refused to do so. Warrington, J., who tried the action dismissed it, and the Court of Appeal (Collins, M,R., and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) affirmed his decision. The articles of association provided that the directors might be removed by a special resolution of the shareholders, and the Court held that so long as they were continued in office their action could not be overruled by a resolution of a mere majority of the shareholders, as that would in effect be transferring to a mere majority of the shareholders the management of the company which, by the articles, was vested in the directors.

LAND TRANSFER-FORGERY-RIGHT OF REGISTERED PROPRIETORS TO INDEMNITY-RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER-PARTIES.

Attorney-General v. Odell (1906) 2 Ch. 47 is an important decision under the English Land Transfer Act. Mrs. Connell was the registered proprietor of a charge on certain land, and her solicitor produced to Odell what purported to be a duly executed transfer of the charge to Odell, which Odell took to the office and registered, and he was entered on the books as the owner of the charge. It was subsequently discovered that the transfer was a forgery, and Mrs. Connell applied for and obtained a rectification of the register. Odell, who had acted bonâ fide, then applied to the Registrar for indemnity, which was granted. An application was then made by the Attorney-General

to rescind the Registrar's order. A preliminary objection was taken that the Attorney-General had no locus standi and that only the applicant for indemnity was entitled to appeal, but this was overruled by Kekewich, J., who held that the Registrar was, on application for indemnity, in a judicial position and that both the applicant and the Crown should be represented before him. On the merits he affirmed the decision of the Registrar, but, on appeal by the Crown, the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling, and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) held that the applicant was not entitled to relief because by presenting the forged transfer for registration he had under the decision in Sheffield v. Barclay (1905) A.C. 392 warranted its genuineness and that by this act on his part (though innocently done) he "had caused or contributed" to the loss within the meaning of s. 7 (3) of the Act of 1897, and therefore was precluded from obtaining indemnity; and (2) had not in fact any transfer under s. 40 of the Act of 1875 from "the registered proprietor of the charge" and consequently had not "suffered loss by the rectification" within s. 7 (4) of the Act of 1897. See and compare Fawkes v. Attorney-General, 6 O.L.R. 490.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEROGATION FROM GRANT-TRESPASSARCHITECT-UNAUTHORIZED ACT OF AGENT-PARTY WALL.

Betts v. Pickfords (1906) 2 Ch. 87 was an action by tenants against landlord for an injunction to restrain an alleged trespass. The plaintiff's leased certain premises from the defendants which adjoined other premises occupied by the defendants. By the terms of the lease the plaintiffs were bound to erect a warehouse on the demised premises according to approved plans, which shewed that the back wall was to contain certain windows overlooking the defendants' premises. In order to make room for the warehouse the defendants pursuant to a collateral agreement, removed the end of a building which stood partly on the demised premises and partly on the defendants' own premises, but by verbal agreement with the plaintiffs' architect made without the plaintiffs' authority certain stanchions and roof beams. were left projecting over the demised premises which were built into the warehouse wall which was entirely on the demised premises. Subsequently the plaintiffs were called on by the municipal authority to block up the windows in this wall on the ground that by the projection of the stanchions and roof beams from the adjoining premises into the wall it had become "a party wall" within meaning of the London Building Act, 1894,

The plaintiffs thereupon brought the present action to compel the defendants to disconnect their building from the wall, and it was held by Kekewich, J., that they were entitled to the relief claimed; on the ground that during the continuance of the term the plaintiffs were entitled by implied grant to an unqualified right to the access of light to the windows in question, and that the agreement made by the architect was beyond the scope of his authority and was not binding on the plaintiffs and that the user of the wall by the defendants as a party wall was a derogation from their grant.

WILL GIFT TO TESTATOR'S SON AND HIS CHILDREN-REVOCATION BY CODICIL OF GIFTS TO SON-EFFECT OF REVOCATION ON CHILDREN'S INTERESTS.

In re Whitehorne, Whitehorne v. Best (1906) 2 Ch. 121. A testator by his will gave certain benefits to his son G. and after his death for his children; and by a codicil reciting his reasons for dissatisfaction with his son G. he revoked all provisions in his will for his benefit, and directed his will to be construed as if G.'s name had not appeared therein, and by the same codicil he gave a legacy of £500 in trust for the children of G. at twenty-one or marriage, and for their maintenance in the meantime; and the effect of this codicil on the disposition of the will in favour of the children of G. was what Buckley, J., had to determine, and he held that the revocation of the gift to G. did not affect the gift made by the will to his children, but that such gift was accelerated by the codicil, and that the children were consequently entitled both to the benefis given by the will and also to the legacy bequeathed by the codicil.

COMPANY

PROSPECTUS MISSTATEMENTS OMISSION PROPERTY PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED NON-DISCLOSURE DIRECTOR —LIABILITY-COMPANIES ACT, 1900 (63 & 64 VICT. c. 48) s. 10—(6 Edw. VII., c. 27, s. 5(G) (ONT.)—“SUB-PUR

CHASER.

Brookes v. Hansen (1906) 2 Ch. 129 was an action against the director of a company for omitting to disclose particulars of property proposed to be purchased by the company as required by the Companies Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 48) s. 10 (6 Edw. VII., c. 27, s. 5(g) (Ont.). It was conceded that the prospectus had been issued bonâ fide and that there was no intentional fraud on defendant's part. It appeared by the evidence that in

May, 1901, an agreement was entered into whereby one Wheeler sold certain patent rights to the African Patent Rights Company for £15,000, and that by a second contract made in June, 1901, the African Patent Rights Co. agreed to sell to one Wheeler as trustee for the South African Super-Aeration Co. the same patent rights for $58,500 and only the second contract was referred to in the prospectus. It was contended that the company was a sub-purchaser within the section and the particulars of the prior contract should have been stated; but Joyce, J., held that there was no obligation to disclose the amount paid by the company's vendor for the property however comparatively small, nor however recent the purchase, and that the South African' Company was not a sub-purchaser within the meaning of the section. And as a general rule he considers that a company is not to be regarded as a sub-purchaser unless it has to pay purchase money to some one other than its own vendor.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT BY LESSOR TO REPAIR-DEMISED PREMISES BECOMING WORN OUT.

Torrens v. Walker (1906) 2 Ch. 166 was an action by a tenant against his landlord to recover damages for breach of a covenant to repair. The demised premises were 200 years old, and in the year 1905 the front and back walls had become so dangerous that the municipal authority notified the tenant that they must be rebuilt. The notice was sent to the lessor who had covenanted that he 'would at all times during the term keep the outside of the premises in good and substantial repair. At the time the notice was given the walls had become so worn out by old age that they were incapable of repair. Nothing was done and the municipal authority in pursuance of its statutory powers caused the two walls to be taken down which left the premises uninhabitable. Warrington, J., held that the lessor was not liable because no liability arose on the covenant until notice was given to the lessor of the want of repair, and at the time the notice was given the walls had ceased to be repairable, and the landlord was not under his covenant liable to rebuild walls which had fallen to decay through old age.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-AGREEMENT OF TENANCY, TERM UNDEFINED

CONSTRUCTION.

Austin v. Newham (1906) 2 K.B. 167 was an action of ejectment by landlord against tenant. The defendant had entered