to what the Courts look upon as a "strike" in this connection. The following definitions may be noted: "A strike may be defined as a simultaneous cessation of work on the part of the workmen, and its legality or illegality must depend on the means by which it is enforced, and upon its objects:" Farrer v. Close, L.R. 4 Q.B. 612. "A combined effort among workmen to compel the master to the concession to a certain demand by preventing the conduct of his business until compliance with the demand:" Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 819. "The act of quitting work; specifically, such an act by a body of workmen, done as a means of enforcing compliance with demands made on their employer. It is applied commonly to a combined effort on the part of a body of workmen employed by the same master to enforce a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or some other concession, by stopping work in a body at a pre-arranged time, and refusing to resume work until the demanded concession shall have been made, and is not necessarily unlawful, and does not necessarily engender a breach of the peace:" Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527, 38 Pac. Rep. 547. "A combination among employees having for its object their orderly withdrawal in large numbers, or in a body, from the service of their employer on account simply of a reduction in their wages, is not a strike within the meaning of the word as commonly used:" Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 327.

POWERS OF REVOCATION IN DEEDS.

Attorneys are frequently called on to draw deeds of family settlement, conveyances by parents to children, or others, in consideration of an agreement to support the grantors during the remainder of their lives, and the like. These transactions are attended with the danger of depriving the grantor of property for which no return is given, a misfortune not contemplated at the time. Sometimes they concern the welfare of persons unfitted to manage their own property, but who, while desiring to prevent dissipation, do not wish to relinquish control over it.

More frequently, however, they involve the entire, or greater part, of the property of aged people, which represents the accumulation of years and on which they must depend for maintenance. Too often such conveyances result in placing the property beyond the control of the grantor, and the grantor at the mercy of those benefitted, or making litigation necessary in a case of misplaced confidence. Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriages of justice shewn by the reports to have so frequently occurred, trust in one's relatives does not abate, and the desire to make family settlements does not decrease; and, notwithstanding the uncertainty of such a course, clients sometimes prefer to dispose of property during their lifetime, rather than direct how it shall be done after their death, believing that their wishes in that regard are less liable to be thwarted by a disposition they, themselves, may make, than by a distribution according to the law of descents, or if only a will, subject as it is to attack, be left to direct.

Is there not a way, known to the law, of protecting such persons, while still making a disposition to their satisfaction? It would seem that they would be amply secured in most instances by the insertion in the deed of a power of revocation. While this protection does not seem to have been universally relied on in this country, judging from the many instances where it was omitted from deeds of settlement without apparent reason, the power to revoke a deed by virtue of a reservation of that right has long been recognized under the law of England. Coke has sanctioned such a power.1

The law in England, by which the same property can be kept in the same family for many years, has, perhaps, caused greater importance to be given in that country than in this to the insertion in deeds of settlement of a power of revocation and appointment to other uses. In fact, the British Courts, in their discussions of the subject, give more attention to the omission of such a power as perpetrating a fraud on the grantor, than to the reservation of such a power as being a constructive fraud on others, or to the validity of such a reservation. Concerning family settlements, they say, that any one taking any advantage under a voluntary

1 Butler's Case, 3 Coke, 25.

deed and setting it up against the donor, must show that he thoroughly understood what he was doing, or, at all events, was protected by independent advice. It has been almost laid down that where there is no power of revocation the deed will be set aside. But later decisions have modified and so construed these cases so that it cannot be said that a voluntary settlement is voidable unless it contained a power of revocation. According to these authorities, the absence of a power of revocation is a circumstance to be taken into account in connection with the other circumstances of the case; the absence of advice by counsel given the grantor as to the propriety of inserting such a reservation stands on the same footing. But these authorities recognize beyond question the validity of such a power in a deed, and our own Courts, when the question has been presented to them, have been inclined to favour this plan for protecting the grantor.

It cannot be said that the grantor does not part with his power or dominion over the property conveyed because he retains a right to annul or revoke the deed. A power of revocation is perfectly consistent with a grant or the creation of a valid trust. It does not in any degree affect the legal title to the property. That passes to the grantee and remains vested, notwithstanding the existence of a right to revoke it. If this right is never exercised according to the terms in which it is reserved, before the death of the grantor, it can have no effect on the validity of the conveyance or the right of the grantee to the property.

The argument that the reservation of a power of revocation nullifies the conveyance is answered by the opinion of the Court in the case of Jones v. Clifton.5 That case involved a conveyance by the husband to the wife of certain realty, the deed containing a clause reserving to the grantor "the power to revoke the grant in whole or in part, and to transfer the property to any uses he might appoint, and to such person or persons as he might desig

2 Coutts v. Acworth, Law Rep. 8 Eq. 558; Wollaston v. Tribe, Law Rep. 9 Eq. 44; Everitt v. Everitt, Law Rep. 10 Eq. 405.

3 Toker v. Toker, 3 De G., J. & S. 487; Hall v. Hall, Law Rep. 8 Eq.

430; Phillips v. Mullings, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 244.

4 Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 232; Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N.Y., 10 N.E. Rep. 257; City of Providence v. St. John's Lodge, 2 R.I. 46.

5 Reported in 101 U.S. 225.

nate, and to cause such uses to spring or shift as he might declare." The conveyance was made at a time when the husband was not involved, but subsequently became embarrassed, and was adjudged a bankrupt. The assignee in bankruptcy contended that the deed passed no interest to the wife as against creditors, but was fraudulent as to future creditors, the husband retaining and controlling the use of the property; and further insisted that the power of revocation and appointment passed to the assignee for the benefit of creditors. The Court held that "the right of a husband to settle a portion of his property on his wife, and thus provide against the vicissitudes of fortune, when this can be done without impairing the existing claims of creditors, is indisputable." The Court proceeded also to say: "The powers of revocation and appointment to other uses reserved to the husband in the deeds in question do not impair their validity or their efficiency in transferring the estate to the wife, to be held by her until such revocation or appointment be made. Indeed, such reservations are usual in family settlements, and are intended to meet the ever-varying interests of family connections. So frequent is the necessity of a change in the uses of property thus settled, arising from the altered condition of the family, the addition or death of members, new occupations or positions in life, and a variety of other causes which will readily occur to every one, that the absence of a power of revocation and appointment to other uses in a deed of family settlement has often been considered a badge of fraud, and, except when made solely to guard against the extravagance and imprudence of the settler, such settlements have in many instances been annulled on that ground." In the same case the Court held that the power reserved was not an interest in the property which could be transferred to another, or sold on execution, or devised by will. While the grantor might exercise the power by deed or will he could not vest the power in any other person to be thus executed. Neither was it a chose in action, so as to constitute assets of the bankrupt in the hands of his assignee.

If a voluntary deed is given by a person weakened in body or mind at the behest of one enjoying a confidential relation, the

absence of such a power will impose the burden of proof on the person taking the benefit to shew distinctly an intention to make the gift irrevocable. It has also been contended that a deed containing a power of revocation is in effect a will, and objectionable on that ground. But if an instrument is on its face and in legal effect a deed, and passes a present interest, the power inserted in it does not change its character, notwithstanding the possession of the property conveyed is postponed,' or the enjoyment thereof was not to commence until after the grantor's death.

In a Kentucky case, the Court considered the validity of such a reservation in a deed from a different point of view. Subsequently to the delivery of the conveyance the grantee conveyed a proper deed, a right-of-way through the land to a railroad, which constructed its right-of-way through it. The original grantor then executed a deed of revocation in conformity with the provisions of the deed containing the power. The validity of the revocation was assailed as being, among other things, contrary to public policy for the reason that it would enable the parties to the deed to defeat the rights of the grantee's creditors; in other words, that, after becoming indebted, the grantor by exercising the power of revocation would thereby divest the grantee of property which would otherwise be subject to the claims of his creditors. But this contention was considered untenable, inasmuch as the deed itself was notice to the grantee's creditors of the reserved power. It was also objected, in this case, that the reservation of power to revoke was an attempt to impose a condition subsequent, which was void, under the rule stated by Blackstone10 that a vested estate shall not be defeated by a condition subsequent either impossible of execution, illegal or repugnant. However, the argument did not find favour with the Court.

Under the old rule, a power to revoke a deed might have been exercised by re-entry merely, or now, perhaps, by proper notice

6 Miskey's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 629.

7 President, etc., of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. Rep. 480.

8 Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. Rep. 1089.

9 Ricketts v. R. R. Co., 91 Ky. 221, 15 S. W. Rep. 182, 11 L.R.A. 422.

34 Am. St. Rep. 176.

10 2 Bl. Com. 156.