marriage with Mr. Bater, who having apparently grown tired of the lady, instituted the present proceedings to have his marriage with her declared null and void on the ground of the alleged illegality of the New York divorce, but Barnes, P.P.D., held that the New York Court had jurisdiction by reason of the domicil of Mr. Lowe in that state, and that its decree was binding by the law of nations on the Courts of England so long as it remained unreversed, because it affected the status of the parties, and was similar in its nature to a judgment in rem, and this, notwithstanding that the fact of the plaintiff's own adultery had been suppressed; and with this decision the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) agreed. It may be noted that according to the expert evidence the decree of divorce was not liable to be reversed in New York on the ground of the suppression of facts by the plaintiff.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-TRUST FOR SALE-CONDITIONS OF SALE -SALE BY WAY OF UNDER LEASE-LEASEHOLD.

In re Judd and Poland (1906) 1 Ch. 684 was an application under the Vendors and Purchasers' Act. The vendors were trustees for sale of certain leaseholds, which consisted of five separate houses. They offered the property for sale in five separate lots, subject to a condition that if the whole five were sold the purchaser of the largest in value should accept an assignment of the leasehold property as a whole, and undertake to grant underleases to the other purchasers of the lots respectively purchased by them for the residue of the term less one day at an apportioned rent. One of the purchasers objected that a sale in this manner was not authorized by the trust, inasmuch as a trust for sale did not authorize a lease-and Warrington, J., so held, but the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer and CozensHardy, L.JJ.) reversed his decision on the ground that the trustees were carrying out the sale in the way customary where several properties were included in one lease, and though the underlease was technically a lease it was in substance and effect a sale and a decision of Kekewich, J. In re Walker and Oakshott (1901) 2 Ch. 383 was overruled.

PRACTICE-ATTACHMENT FOR DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDER-PERSONAL

SERVICE OF ORDER-PRESENCE OF PARTY WHEN ORDER MADE. In re Tuck, Murch v. Losemore (1906) 1 Chy. 692. An applica

tion was made for an attachment of a defendant for disobedience of an order of Court. The defendant was in Court when the order was made, which required him to pay money into Court within a specified time, and initialled one of the briefs of counsel. He had not been personally served with the order. In these circumstances Warrington, J., held that personal service of the order was unnecessary and granted the attachment; but the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Cozens-Hardy, L.J.) held that the order should have been personally served unless it could have been shewn that the defendant was evading service and for that reason reversed the order of Warrington, J., but it must be noted that Cozens-Hardy, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal expressly says: "It must not for a moment be understood that any doubt is cast by us upon the result of disobeying an order not to do a thing of which notice. can be proved to have reached a defendant. But there is a wide distinction between such an injunction and an order commanding the defendant to do something within a definite time."

ATTACHMENT CONTEMPT DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDER TO PAY MONEY-FIDUCIARY CAPACITY-DEBTOR EXECUTOR DEBTORS' ACT 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 62) s. 4.

In re Bourne, Davey v. Bourne (1906) 1 Ch. 697. The defendant was the executor of an estate of which he was also a debtor, he had been ordered to pay the amount of his debt into Court, and, having failed to comply with the order, an application was made under the Debtors' Act 1859, s. 4, for an attachment. The defendant had, since his appointment of executor, means available for payment, but had denuded himself of his property, and filed a petition in bankruptcy, for the purpose of evading payment. Kekewich, J., granted the attachment, and the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.) affirmed the order. How far the Courts of Ontario have any similar jurisdiction seems questionable; sed vide Pritchard v. Pritchard, 18 Ont. 173.

COMPANY-POWER TO SELL UNDERTAKING FOR SHARES IN ANOTHER COMPANY AND DISTRIBUTE SAME IN SPECIE SCHEME FOR SALE FOR PARTLY PAID SHARES-ULTRA VIRES.

Bisgood v. Nile Valley Co. (1906) 1 Ch. 747 was an action by the shareholders of a company for an injunction to restrain

the defendant company from selling its undertaking for partly paid shares of another company. The articles of association empowered the company to sell its undertaking for shares in any other company and to distribute such shares in specie among its shareholders. Part of the capital had been issued and fully paid, and the company being in need of more capital, and being unable to get it by the sale of its unissued shares, entered into an arrangement whereby the undertaking was to be sold to another company for partly paid shares of that company of the same number and amount as the fully paid shares of the old company, and it was provided if the old company should go into liquidation before the allotment of the shares of the new company every member of the old company was to be entitled to claim an allotment to himself of one of the partly paid shares of the new company for each share of the old company held by him, and a time limit was fixed for their exercising the option to take such new shares and provision was made for selling and dividing the proceeds of the unaccepted shares. This, Kekewich, J., held to be a mere scheme for compelling the shareholders of the old company to subscribe further capital, or else accept a share of the proceeds of the unclaimed shares of the new company to be ascertained under a scheme which was likely to be unfair to the dissentient members of the old company, and therefore ultra vires, and he granted an injunction. See Fuller v. White, infra.

ADMINISTRATION-PROBATE ACTION-COSTS OUT OF THE ESTATE”

-LIABILITY OF THE REAL ESTATE FOR COSTS OF PROBATE
ACTION (DEVOLUTION OF ESTATES ACT, ONT.).

In re Vickerstoff, Vickerstoff v. Chadwick (1906) 1 Ch. 762 may be briefly noted for the fact that it shews the liability of real as well as personal estate for the costs of a probate action since the Land Transfer Act of 1897 (see Ontario Devolution of Estates Act). The English Act, it is heid by Kekewich, J., makes the real estate as well as the personalty liable for the costs of a probate action; and the same rule will no doubt apply in Ontario in cases of probate, and wherever the grant of administration extends to the realty, so that in the event of a deficiency of the personalty where costs of such proceedings are ordered to be "paid out of the estate" resort may be had to the realty for payment thereof.

Watercourses-Riparian rights-Expropriation-Trespass torts -Diversion of natural flow-Injurious affection-Damages -Execution of statutory powers-Arbitration-Injunction -Mandamus-Construction of statute.

A riparian proprietor whose property has been injuriously affected by the unlawful diversion of the natural flow of a watercourse may recover damages therefor, and may also obtain relief by injunction restraining the continuation of the tortious acts so committed. The powers conferred upon the town council of the town of North Sydney, N.S., by the Nova Scotia statute, 59 Vict. c. 44, for the purpose of obtaining a water supply give them no rights in respect to the diversion of watercourses except subject to the provisions of the fourth section of the Act, and after arbitration proceedings taken to settle compensation for injuries affection to property resulting from the construction or operation of the waterworks. Saunby v. The Water Commissioners of London (1906), A.C. 110, followed.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Drysdale, K.C., for appellant. Newcombe, K.C., and O'Connor, for respondents.

Que.]

[June 12.

WILSON V. SHAWINIGAN CARBIDE COMPANY.

Appeal Jurisdiction - Declinatory exception - Interlocutory judgment-Review of judgment on exception-Practice.

The action was dismissed in the Superior Court upon declinatory exception. The Court of King's Bench reversed this decision and remitted the cause for trial on the merits. On motion to quash a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,

Held, that such motion should be granted on the ground that

the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court might be raised on a subsequent appeal from a judgment on the merits.

Per GIROUARD, J.: The judgment of the Court of King's Bench was not a final judgment and consequently no appeal could lie to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Appeal quashed with costs.

Errol Languedoc, for motion. Aylen, K.C., contra.

Burbidge, J.]

EXCHEQUER COURT.

[March 5.

COPELAND-CHATTERSON v. HATTON.

Patent for invention "Reasonable price"-Infringement resulting from breach of agreement-Infringement by inducing others to infringe.

Section 37 of the Patent Act (R.S.C. c. 61) provides, among other things, that the patentee must, within a certain time after the date of his patent commence and continuously carry on the manufacture of the invention patented in such a manner that any person desiring to use it may obtain it, or cause it to be made for him, at a reasonable price. For the plaintiffs it was contended that such price need not be a money price, but that conditions may be imposed, the value of which may constitute part or the whole of the price for which the thing covered by the invention is sold.

Held, 1. That while there is nothing in the Act to prevent parties from entering into a binding agreement embodying such conditions, the patentee cannot prescribe his own conditions as part of such price and impose them upon all person who may desire to use the invention. The "reasonable price" mentioned in the statute means a reasonable price in money; and for such a price the purchaser is entitled in Canada to acquire the complete ownership of the thing that the patentee is bound to manufacture or permit to be manufactured in Canada.

2. The defendant H., having purchased a binder from the plaintiffs on the condition that it was to be used only with sheets sold or under the plaintiffs' authority, contrary to such condition used in the binder sheets supplied by the defendants