the testator devised and bequeathed certain real and personal property to trustees upon trust to apply the income thereof in their absolute discretion, for the support of his "son William and his wife and children, or any of them," or to accumulate the same or any part thereof at their like discretion for the benefit of his children who should become entitled to the corpus of the property under the trust thereinafter contained; and subject to such discretionary power he directed his trustees to pay the income to his son during his life and after his decease to his widow for her life, and after the death of the survivor to hold the corpus and income in trust for the children of his son who should attain twenty-one. The son William had died leaving a widow and one child who had attained twenty-one. The trustees applied on originating summons to get the opinion of the Court as to the effect of the clause for maintenance, and Warrington, J., held that it was limited to the lifetime of the son William and therefore that the widow and son now took absolutely.

BILL OF EXCHANGE-RECEIVABLE BILL-BOOK DEBT"-PROPERTY IN BILL-BILL DELIVERED TO BANKER TO BE DISCOUNTED.

In Dawson v. Isle (1906) 1 Ch. 633 the question for decision was whether a bill of exchange which had been entered in the books of a company the holders thereof as a bill receivable, but which had been subsequently handed to a bank for discount, but which had not in fact been discounted, was a "book debt." The case arose under an agreement for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of certain shares in the company the price of which was to be fixed by certain special provisions inter alia, a clause providing "that the amount of the book debts due to the company (less the discounts) such debts to be taken as good at the amounts standing in the company's books." Warrington, J., following In re Stevens (1888), W.N. 110, 116, held that the bill in question was a book debt, inasmuch as the bill was still the property of the company although it was in the hands of their bankers.

COMPANY-SHARES-ASSIGNMENT OF SHARES-EQUITABLE TITLE -REGISTRATION OF TRANSFER-CONFLICTING EQUITIES

PRIORITY-POSSESSION OF CERTIFICATE OF SHARES.

In Peat v. Clayton (1906) 1 Ch. 659 the plaintiffs were assignees for creditors of all the property of one Clayton. Clay

ton was the owner of shares in a limited company, and the plaintiffs applied to Clayton for the delivery up of the certificates of the shares, but were unable to obtain them. Clayton through his brokers subsequently sold the shares on the stock exchange, and received the proceeds, and executed a transfer of the shares to the purchaser. The purchaser applied to be registered as owner, but the company refused registration and the brokers furnished the purchaser with other shares. The plaintiffs then brought an action against the debtor and the brokers for a declaration that they were equitably entitled to the shares and to be registered as owners. Joyce, J., held that any lien the brokers might have on the shares was only upon Clayton's interest therein, which was subject to the plaintiff's rights, and that the plaintiff not having been guilty of any negligence to deprive them of their equity were entitled to be registered as the owners of the shares.

WILL-LEGACY TO CREDITOR OF LARGER AMOUNT THAN HIS DEBT— SATISFACTION OF DEBT-CREDITOR APPOINTED EXECUTRIX.

In re Rattenberry, Ray v. Grant (1906) 1 Ch. 667. A testatrix gave to her sister a legacy of £400 and appointed her executrix. As the time of the death of the testatrix she owed her sister £150, which carried interest and on which interest had been paid up to her death. Eady, J., held that neither the fact that the legacy was not payable until a year after the death, nor the appointment of the sister as executrix took the case out of the general rule, and the legacy was a satisfaction of the debt.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-CONTRACT BY WIFE FOR NECESSARIES GOODS SUPPLIED ON ORDER OF MARRIED WOMAN-CONTRACT BY WIFE "OTHERWISE THAN AS AGENT" -NON-DISCLOSURE OF AGENCY-MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1893, c. 63, s. 1 (R.S.O. c. 163, s. 4)-RULE 868(ONT. RULES 615, 817.

Paquin v. Beauclerk (1906) A.C. 148 is an important contribution to Married Women's Property Law. It can hardly be said to be entirely satisfactory inasmuch as the House of Lords were equally divided. The facts were very simple, the defendant a married woman living with her husband and with his knowledge and concurrence opened an account with the plaintiffs for

millinery. The husband from time to time supplied his wife with money for paying the plaintiffs' accounts, but ultimately he became insolvent and absconded. The defendant was described as "Mrs." but the plaintiffs did not make any inquiry as to whether she in fact had a husband, and the defendant did not inform them that she was acting as his agent or pledging his eredit. The goods furnished were from time to time charged to the defendant, and such of them as were paid for, were paid for by cheques signed by the defendant. The judge who tried the action gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R. and Mathew and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.,) reversed the judgment on the ground that the defendant in fact acted as agent for her husband and the proper inference from the evidence was that the plaintiffs knew she was so acting, and that consequently her husband alone was liable. In the House of Lords, Lord Loreburn, L.C., and Lord Macnaghten, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the defendant in fact was acting as agent for her husband and it was immaterial whether the plaintiff knew she was so acting or not, and as the Act of 1893 (R.S.O. c. 163, s. 4), only makes a married woman liable where she contracts "otherwise than as agent," she was not liable. Lords Robertson and Atkinson on the other hand thought that the ordinary rule applicable where an agent acts for an indisclosed principal applied, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to treat defendant as the principal debtor. All of their lordships were of opinion that the facts were sufficiently before the Court to entitle the appellate Court to direct judgment under Rule 868, (see Ont. Rules 615, 817), without ordering a new trial, but it is rather a singular fact that two of their lordships concluded that the evidence conclusively established that the defendant was acting as agent for her husband, and the other two, that it conclusively established that she was acting as principal.

FATAL ACCIDENT-CONTRACT

THAT DECEASED SHALL HAVE NO

CLAIM QUEBEC CODE, ART. 1056-(R.S.O. c. 166).

Miller v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1906) A.C. 187, though an appeal in a Quebec case, deserves attention because it practically overrules the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reg. v. Grenier, 30 S.C.R. 42. The action was brought under Art. 1056 of the Civil Code of Quebec, which provides that "in all cases where the person injured by the commission of an offence,

or a quasi offence, dies in consequence without having claimed an indemnity or satisfaction his consort and his ascendant and descendant relatives have a right, but only within a year after his death, to recover from the person who committed the offence, or quasi offence, or his representatives, all damages occasioned by such death." Strong, C.J., in Reg. v. Grenier thought that this provision of the code was in effect a mere reproduction of Lord Campbell's Act (R.S.O. c. 166), and that the decisions under that Act were applicable to cases under this section of the code. The Judicial Committee (Lords Macnaghten and Davey and Sir Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson) however have come to the conclusion that there is an essential difference between this article of the code and Lord Campbell's Act, and that under the code a separate and independent cause of action is given to the widow and ascendant and descendant relatives of the deceased, whereas under Lord Campbell's Act the right of action is given to the representatives of the deceased. Their lordships also held that a contract by the deceased with the defendants releasing the defendants from liability in consideration of their being contributors to a sick benefit fund in which the deceased was entitled to participate was not an "indemnity or satisfaction" within the meaning of the code for the accident which occasioned his death. Such indemnity must be something real and tangible.

COMPANY-BY-LAW-CONTRACT-INSUFFICIENT QUORUM PURCHASE STATUTORY POWERS.

Montreal Light & Power Co. v. Robert (1906) A.C. 196 was also an appeal in a Quebec case in which two points are determined by the Judicial Committee (Lords Macnaghten and Davey, and Sir Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson). First, that where a company is empowered by statute to acquire and hold for the purpose of its business real estate not exceeding a specified sum in yearly value, the company acting bona fide is the sole judge of what is required for that purpose, and second, that where a company enter into a contract for the purchase of land and furnish the vendor with a copy of the resolution of the board of directors authorizing the purchase, on the faith of which the contract is entered into, the company cannot afterwards set up that the transaction was ultra vires on the ground that the resoluion was passed by an insufficient quorum.

B.N.A. ACT, 1867, ss. 91, 92, 108-HARBOUR-JURISDICTION OF DOMINION PARLIAMENT TO LEGISLATE-PROVINCIAL CROWN PROPERTY FORMING ᏢᎪᎡᎢ OF HARBOUR-PROVINCIAL FORESHORE.

Attorney-General of B.C. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. (1906) A.C. 204, was an appeal from the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The question in issue was the validity of s. 18a of the Dominion Act 44 Vict. c. 1 (the defendants' Act of incorporation) which purported to grant certain powers of expropriation to the defendant company over certain provincial Crown lands being part of the foreshore. The Dominion Government in pursuance of that section had granted the land in question to the company. The Provincial Court had held that the statute and the grant made in pursuance thereof were intra vires of the Dominion Government, the land in question forming part of a public harbour and as such within the control of the Dominion Government under ss. 91, 92, and 108 of the B.N.A. Act, and the Judicial Committee have affirmed that decision. Their lordships also hold that the terms of the special Act override the provisions of the general Railway Act as to closing streets and that the general Act applies only so far as it is not inconsistent with the special Act.

SHIP-INVALID MORTGAGE-REGISTRATION OF INVALID MORTGAGE OF SHIP RECTIFICATION OF SHIP'S REGISTER.

Brond v. Broomhall (1906) 1 K.B. 571 was an action to rectify a ship's register by expunging therefrom an alleged invalid mortgage, and, considering the vast shipping interests of Great Britain, it must strike most lawyers as a somewhat singular circumstance how extremely few cases regarding the transfer of ships ever come before the Courts, a fact which seems to speak volumes in favour of the system of transfer of such property, a system, we may remark, on which the Torrens system of land tranfer is based. In the present case the plaintiff had signed a blank form of mortgage and handed it to the defendant who, in fraud of the plaintiff, had filled it up as a mortgage to himself to secure a sum which was not in fact owed to him by the plaintiff. Phillimore, J., held that the Court had inherent jurisdiction in such a case to cancel the register, and ordered the mortgage in question to be expunged.