tion. It would naturally occur to any one that a husband or wife or mother might be greatly shocked to know that a wife, husband or child had been very ill for a day and that a telegram should have been delivered a day sooner, but for the negligence of the agents of the company.

In the recent case of Hamrick v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (N. Car.), 52 S. E. Rep. 252, the Court reiterated the doctrine previously laid down in that State, that in such cases damages may be recovered. It is also worthy of note in this regard that the Supreme Court of North Carolina, has one of the strongest supreme benches of the country the opinions of which are most worthy of confidence and respect. Alabama, Texas and Kentucky are in line with North Carolina, and we predict that this doctrine will become the law generally. Any one who has witnessed the agony of a mother resulting from a delay in a telegram informing her of the serious illness of a child at a long distance from her, would hardly fail to see the wisdom of the policy of the law which regards such suffering as a proper element of damages, for which there should be a recov ery. There is good reason why the mental suffering in the case of delayed telegrams, at least, should be compensated in damages separate and apart from the proof of other injuries for which damages might be allowed arising out of the same matter.

THE BRITISH CRIMINAL APPEAL BILL.

Among those entitled to speak about the merits of the Criminal Appeal Bill there is, on the whole, a remarkable consensus of opinion. It is admitted by most of our correspondents in the many letters which we have received on the subject that the present system of appeal, or the absence of it, is unsatisfactory. Something more is needed than the recognition of a right to have a special case stated. Public opinion has changed much on the subject. It is not convinced by the arguments used by some of our correspondents against assimilating in any way civil and criminal procedure. The public conscience cannot reconcile itself to the existence of the present facilities for appeal

when property, even of a trifling value, is at stake, and the absence of them when life or liberty is the issue. The Lord Chancellor's Bill gives expression to a notable change in public opinion. If it is unlike past measures bearing the same name, it is in part because people do not think quite as they did about these matters. But to correct the present system does not necessarily mean all that the Government Bill proposes. To an unrestricted right of appeal which it would permit both as to law and facts there are solid objections. One is very practical, indicated in the report of some seventy magistrates of the County of London. In normal years about 9,000 to 10,000 persons are convicted at assizes and quarter sessions. Assuming that even one-fourth of those convicted appealed, there would be about 2,000 to 2,500 convictions to be examined. A Court which "reheard" cases could not, on an average, deal with more than two a day-an average probably not put too low in view of the fact that new evidence may be called, and that cases in which "there is money" would generally be argued at inordinate length. This would mean about a thousand sittings of three judges. Taking the judicial year at 200 days, one Court would be engaged for about five years in disposing of a single year's appeals. This would be the paralysis of our judicial system; a result to be avoided only by very greatly increasing the number of judges, or withdrawing the majority of them from civil busi

ness.

To some extent the full effect of this evil might be averted by transmitting a large part of the civil and criminal work of the judges of the High Court to the County Court judges. Such transmission would leave untouched another and a greater evil. Would the verdict of a jury in a criminal trial be under the proposed system as trustworthy as it now is? Would they decide with the full sense of responsibility which is now upon them if they knew that their verdict might be corrected? Is it certain that this innovation, proposed in the interests of mercy, would not in practice increase convictions? Might no juries who now say "We have a doubt; we dare not bring in a verdict of guilty, which is irreversible," be disposed to say "Some one has

committed a heinous crime; the evidence is strong against the prisoner; we will convict, and if we are mistaken the Court of Appeal will set us right?" Is there any certainty that in seeking to correct an evil which is rare we should not introduce one which would be common, and that criminal appeals, becoming frequent, would not gradually deteriorate the verdicts of juries? We say nothing as to other objections.

To the power of revising sentences which the bill proposes to confer there are serious objections. .. A Court of Appeal powerless to revise sentences would lose much of its value. But we contemplate with apprehension the results of such a system if, as is proposed by the bill, the Court is not competent to increase as well as diminish sentences. The convicted offender does by no means now always get his deserts. In these days, at all events, sentences are sometimes over-lenient. To prevent almost universal appeals convicted prisoners must know that they may fare worse above.-The Times.

Senator Ferguson has again introduced a bill with reference to the extra judicial employment of judges. This provides that judges appointed to act under a commission issued under the authority of a statute, or under any power possessed by the Governor-in-Council, or by a Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, shall not receive any remuneration in respect of services under such commission, other than salaries payable by law to him as a judge, except such necessary travelling expenses as are actually incurred. Senator Ferguson's previous bill (introduced in 1903) was to prevent a judge acting on a commission such as above referred to. This present bill is a modified provision, and will meet some of the objections to the present practice. We have already expressed our views on this subject.

REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

OF

TRADE UNION-OFFICER WILFULLY WITHHOLDING MONEY UNION ABSENCE OF FRAUD-PENALTY-TRADES UNION ACT, 1871 (34 & 35 VICT. c. 31), ss. 9, 12-(R.S.C. c. 131, s. 12).

Madden v. Rhodes (1906) 1 K.B. 534 was a proceeding before magistrates against a trade union official to recover a penalty for wilfully withholding the money of the union. The applicant applied on behalf of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors, a society registered as a trade union, and the defendants were the trustees of the West End branch of that union. A dispute had arisen between the executive council of the union (which was the general committee of management of the union) and the local branch in respect to the duties and appointment of an officer (not mentioned in the rules) referred to as the out-collector of the West End branch, and the local branch having refused to comply with a resolution of the executive council the latter demanded the resignation of the branch officers, and authorized the appellant to compel the trustees of that branch to deliver up all moneys, etc. The West End branch replied with a resolution that their officials had done nothing to justify the action of the executive council and demanded the withdrawal of the adverse resolution of the council; and failing that, authorized their officers to withdraw the branch from the union. Upon a case stated by the magistrate who dismissed the application the Divisional Court (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Ridley and Darling, JJ.,) agreed with the magistrate, that, no fraud or dishonesty being charged or shewn, the defendants were not liable to the penalty imposed by the Trades Union Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31), s. 12, (R.S.C. c. 131, s. 12), the decision of Barrett v. Markham, L.R. 7 C.P. 405, being applicable.

PAUPER-POOR LAW GUARDIANS-INMATE OF WORKHOUSE-LIA

BILITY OF GUARDIANS TO PAUPER INMATE OF WORKHOUSE FOR
TORT-MASTER AND SERVANT-COMMON EMPLOYMENT.

Tozeland v. West Ham Union (1906) 1 K.B. 538 was an action of tort brought by a pauper inmate of a workhouse against the guardians of the poor to recover damages for tort, in the following circumstances. The defendants were carrying out an enlargement of electric light installation in the workhouse

of which the plaintiff was an inmate, by means of their own servants, the work being done under the supervision of their engineer, a permanent official of the workhouse. The plaintiff was ordered by the labor master to assist, and was put to work on a staging, which owing to its improper and negligent construction gave way causing the plaintiff the injury complained of. The defendants contended that the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant, and that the doctrine of common employment applied and relieved them from liability. The action was tried in the County Court and the plaintiff recovered judgment for £100, and on appeal the judgment was upheld by the Divisional Court (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Ridley and Darling, JJ.). The fact that the plaintiff was acting under compulsion in assisting in the work in the opinion of the Court prevented the application of the doctrine of common employment. In order that that doctrine may apply it is necessary that there should be a voluntary assumption of the risks of the employment; but while conceding the difficulty in applying to public bodies who act by agents, the ordinary rule of law as to the liability of a principal for the acts of his agents, which in some cases is held to be ap plicable and in others not; yet the Court concludes that the result of the cases is that if a public body is doing by their agents. a work connected with their ordinary ministerial or administrative duties, that body will be liable for injury resulting from the commission of a negligent act on the part of a subordinate, while on the other hand it may be relieved from liability from injury caused by a subordinate's neglect or omission to comply with his instructions, he being a proper person for the post he fills. This case was held to fall within the former class of cases.

COUNTY COURT JUDGE-APPOINTMENT OF TWO DEPUTIES.

In King v. Lloyd (1906) 1 K.B. 552 the applicant was not content with the decision of the Divisional Court (1906) 1 K.B. 22 (noted ante, p. 181), but carried the case to the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling and Moulton, L.JJ.). By the County Courts Act the judge may appoint a deputy and the question was whether he could under this power appoint two to act concurrently. The Divisional Court said "no," and the Court of Appeal agree, Moulton, L.J., however, dubitante.