work done by the plaintiff for a customer who wanted his carriage horse made fashionable by docking his tail. The defendant counterclaimed for damages on account of the alleged unskilful manner in which the operation was performed. Kentucky is famous for its horses, and the Legislature has not forgotten to enact a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals in general, neither did the Court in question forget the traditions of the state in its care for the noble "houyhnhnmn" in particular, for we note that the presiding judge held that the action could not be maintained as the contract was in violation of the statute. He said: "The statute is both just and humane. That docking is a work of unnecessary cruelty there can be no room for doubt, unless the alleged style customary among fashionable horse owners and approved by them, can be held to justify it. The Court is unwilling to hold that a statute may be repealed by a fad. That it was violated by both plaintiff and defendant seems clear. The horse's tail, as every one knows, is of immense value to him. It is for many purposes his only means of defence. The act of cutting, or docking, is cruel in itself and still more cruel in its consequences. It is too well settled to need citation of authorities that a right of action cannot accrue to a party out of his violation of the law. It is also well settled that where both parties have violated the law the Court leaves them where it finds them, and refuses to give either relief. The case will be dismissed when placed on the trial docket."

Judging from the last issue of the Canada Gazette the morals of the Dominion in respect of the seventh Commandment do not seem to be in a very healthy condition. It contains eight notices of applications for bills of divorce, five by women and three by men. This would not be many in comparison with many other countries, but it is an increasing number, and in a country which boasts of its moral tone, where there is no Divorce Court, and where the proceedings are still troublesome and expensive, even though they have been greatly simplified and methodized by the labour and skill of Sir James Gowan, K.C.M.G., Chairman of the Committee of the Senate which has charge of such matters.

REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

PUBLIC HEALTH-INFECTIOUS DISEASE-HOSPITAL-DISCHARGE OF PATIENT WHILE STILL INFECTIOUS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY.

Evans v. Mayor of Liverpool (1906) 1 K.B. 160 was an action brought against a municipality to recover damages occasioned by the physician in charge of an infectious hospital provided by the defendant municipality, discharging a patient before such patient was free from infection, by reason whereof three children of the plaintiff became infected and the plaintiff was put to expense. The action was tried by Walton, J., who held that the legal obligation of the defendants only extended to providing reasonably skilled and competent medical attendance for the patients, and there was no implied undertaking or obligation on their part that no patient would be discharged until he was free from infection.

HIGHWAY-TRACTION ENGINE-EXCESSIVE WEIGHT-INJURY TO WATER MAIN.

Chichester v. Foster (1906) 1 K.B. 167 was an action by a municipality to recover damages for injury to their water main caused by the defendants driving along the highway a traction engine and trucks weighing upwards of ten tons. A County Court judge who tried the action held that the injury was caused by the excessive weight of the engine, and that the defendants were liable; and the Divisional Court (Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Darling, J.,) affirmed his decision.

POST OFFICE-POSTMASTER-GENERAL

SUBORDINATE POST OFFICE

OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE OF SUBORDINATE PUBLIC OFFICIAL.

Banibridge v. The Postmaster-General (1906) 1 K.B. 178. This was an action against the Postmaster-General for damages occasioned to the plaintiffs by the negligence of a subordinate official of the Post Office Department in filling up an excavation which had been made for the purpose of laying a telegraph cable. The Postmaster-General applied to have his name struck out on the ground that the writ disclosed no liability on his part. Walton, J., refused the application, but gave leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Matthew, L.J.,) granted

the application on the ground that the Postmaster-General cannot be sued in his official capacity for the negligent acts of the subordinate officials of the Post Office Department, because subordinate public officers are also officers of the Crown, and do not stand in the relation of servants to their superior officers.

VENDOR'S LIEN-UNPAID PURCHASE MONEY-SALE OF PERSONAL ESTATE REVERSIONARY INTEREST-PURCHASE BY TRUSTEEINTEREST-ARREARS OF INTEREST, RECOVERY OF-REAL PROPERTY LIMITATION ACT, 1833 (3 & 4 Wм. IV., c. 27) s. 42— (R.S.O. c. 133, s. 17).

In re Stucley, Stucley v. Kekewich (1906) 1 Ch. 67 was an appeal from Farwell, J. The facts were as follows. In 1874 the plaintiff being entitled to the reversion upon the death of his father to a trust legacy of £5,000 under a will of which his father was sole surviving executor and trustee, sold and assigned his reversionary interest in the legacy to his father for £1,500. The deed was expressed to be made in consideration of £1,500 and a receipt for that sum was indorsed, but it was never paid, in fact. In 1900 the father died, whereupon the plaintiff brought the action claiming a vendor's lien on the legacy for the £1,500 and interest thereon from the date of sale. Farwell, J., who tried the action, found that the £1,500 had not been paid, and held that that sum must be applied in reduction of a debt due by the plaintiff to his father at the date of the transfer, but further than that he refused to give the plaintiff relief. It may be observed that the point that the plaintiff was entitled to a vendor's lien for both principal and interest does not seem to have been insisted on before Farwell, J., but that point was urged on appeal to the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.,) and that Court held that the appellant was so entitled, that the doctrine of vendor's lien applied to sales of personalty and that there was no Statute of Limitations affecting the plaintiff's right to recover arrears of interest and, therefore, that the plaintiff was not only entitled to a lien for the principal money, but also for the arrears of interest from the date of sale which were ordered to be paid to him accordingly.

PRACTICE BREACH OF TRUST-FORM OF JUDGMENT AGAINST TRUSTEE JUDGMENT FOR RECOVERY OF MONEY-SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER-ATTACHMENT-RULES 573, 580—(ONT. RULE 837). In re Oddy, Major v. Harness (1906) 1 Ch. 93 a judgment in the ordinary form that the plaintiff do recover against the

defendant certain moneys had been obtained. The defendant was a trustee and the moneys referred to in the judgment were due in respect of the trust estate; in order to enforce the judgment by attachment of the person of the defendant the plaintiff procured an order directing the defendant personally to pay the amount in four days. Buckley, J., who granted the order was subsequently applied to by the defendant to rescind it, which he declined to do, but the Court of Appeal (Williams, Stirling, Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.,) held that the order was wrong, and ought not to have been made, and that the plaintiff having taken judgment in the form he had, could not enforce it by process of attachment, and that where a party seeks to proceed against a trustee by attachment he must be careful to take his order against the trustee in the form which was formerly used in Chancery in such cases.

COPYRIGHT-PROPRIETORSHIP OF COPYRIGHT-LETTER-RIGHT TO OF LETTER- -COPYRIGHT ACT, 1842

PREVENT PUBLICATION

(5 & 6 VICT., c. 45) s. 3.

Macmillan v. Dent (1906) 1 Ch. 101 was an action concerning the right to the copyright in certain letters written by Charles Lamb between the years 1798 and 1810. In 1895 these letters were in the possession of a Mr. and Mrs. Steeds, who in that year sold the copyright therein to the plaintiffs, Smith, Elder & Co., who published them, and in May, 1899, sold the right to publish an edition thereof to their co-plaintiffs, Macmillan & Co. In 1903 the defendant discovered the original letters in question were in the market for sale, and purchased them from the Steeds for £250; the Steeds having previously informed the defendant of the sale of the copyright in the letters to Smith, Elder & Co. The defendant also claimed as assignee of all rights in the letters from the administrator of the estate of Charles Lamb, the writer thereof. In the year 1903 the defendant brought out an edition of Lamb's letters, including those in question, which he copied from the original manuscripts in his possession. The plaintiffs, Smith, Elder & Co., claimed that this was an infringement of their copyright, and they and their co-plaintiffs claimed an injunction and an account of profits and the delivery up of letter press in defendant's possession containing the letters in question. By the Copyright Act, 1842, s. 3, "the copyright in every book which shall be published after the death of its author shall endure for the term of forty-two years from the first publication thereof, and shall be the property of the proprietor of

the author's manuscript from which such book shall be first published and his assigns." Kekewich, J., held that under this section the copyright in the letters was in the Steeds, and that they had validly assigned it to the plaintiffs, Smith, Elder & Co.

PARTNERSHIP SURVIVING PARTNER-PARTNERSHIP REAL ESTATE— MORTGAGE OF PARTNERSHIP REAL ESTATE BY SURVIVING PARTNER-LIEN OF REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PARTNER.

In re Bourne, Bourne v. Bourne (1906) 1 Ch. 113. A sole surviving partner of a firm had mortgaged certain partnership real estate belonging to the firm by way of equitable mortgage, and the question raised before Farwell, J., by the representatives of the deceased partner was whether it was competent for the surviving partner to create a valid mortgage of the partnership realty, so as to give the mortgage priority against the representatives of the deceased partner, and he held that he could and that the mortgagee is not bound to see to the application of the money unless he has notice that it is going to be used for an improper purpose. In this case it appeared that the mortgage moneys had been duly applied to partnership purposes.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-POWER TO INVEST IN "STOCKS, FUNDS AND SECURITIES OF ANY CORPORATION OR COMPANY, MUNICIPAL, COMMERCIAL OR OTHERWISE."

In re Stanley, Tennant v. Stanley (1906) 1 Ch. 131 gives the construction of a will. The trustees were empowered to invest in the stocks, funds and securities "of any corporation or company, municipal, commercial or otherwise." On the part of an infant beneficiary it was contended that this power applied only to corporations or companies formed or registered in the United Kingdom, but Buckley, J., held that it extended to foreign corporations and companies of the kind indicated.

66

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OF 'MONEYS OWING TO ME AT THE TIME OF MY DECEASE"-MONEY ON DEPOSIT AT BANKS.

In re Derbyshire, Webb v. Derbyshire (1906) 1 Ch. 135. Buckley, J., decided that under a gift of "moneys owing to me at the time of my decease" contained in a will, all money standing on deposit to the testator's credit in banks passed to the legatee, whether notice of withdrawal was or was not required.