REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES. DEED ALTERATION AFTER EXECUTION-IMPERFECT EXECUTIONFILLING UP BLANKS IN DEED-ALTERATION IN DATE-IMMATERIAL ALTERATION. In Crediton v. Exeter (1905) 2 Ch. 455 the only point involved was whether a deed which was executed by certain of the parties to it on or about 21 October, 1899, (the date in the testimonium clause, except the year, being at that time left blank) was invalidated by reason of the year being struck out and the date "twenty-sixth day of January, 1900," being inserted on the subsequent execution of the deed by another of the parties thereto on that date. Eady, J., held that the alteration was immaterial and did not invalidate the deed, the rule in Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 266, having been modified by the later decision of Aldous v. Cornwell (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 573. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENT ON DECEASED WORKMAN -WIDOW (FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT, R.S.O. c. 166, s. 3.) Coulthard v. Consett Iron Co. (1905) 2 K.B. 869 was an action brought by the widow of a deceased workman to recover damages for the death of her husband by accident while engaged in the defendants' employment, and the only question was whether the plaintiff was at the time of the deceased's death dependent on her husband's earnings. It appeared that the plaintiff had lived with her husband and been maintained by him from her marriage up to June, 1904, when being out of work he left her and never afterwards contributed to her maintenance. Her only means of subsistence thereafter consisted of her earnings from casual work and the charitable gifts of relatives, and she was a week in the workhouse. About three weeks before his death which cecurred in October, 1904, he obtained employment with the defendant and was earning wages. The widow stated that she was expecting him back every day to provide a home. The County Court judge found that she was dependent on her husband's earnings at the time of his death and entitled to compensation, and the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., and Romer, and Mathew, L.JJ..) affirmed his decision. N.W.T.] REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES. Dominion of Canada. SUPREME COURT. [Nov. 27, 1905. ANDREAS v. CANADIAN PACIFIC RY. Co. Negligence-Finding of jury-Evidence. A., as administratrix, brought an action against the defendants, claiming compensation for the death of her husband by negligence and alleged in her declaration that the negligence consisted in running a train at a greater speed than six miles an hour through a thickly peopled district, and in failing to give the statutory warning on approaching the crossing where the accident happened. At the trial questions were submitted to the jury, who found that the train was running at a speed of 25 miles an hour, that such speed was dangerous for the locality and that the death of deceased was caused by neglect or omission of the company in failing to reduce speed as provided by the Railway Act. A verdict was entered for the plaintiff and, on motion to the Court en banc to have it set aside and judgment entered for defendants, a new trial was ordered on the ground that questions as to the bell having been rung and the whistle sounded should have been submitted to the jury. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada to have the verdict at the trial restored and the defendants, by cross-appeal, asked for judgment. Held, IDINGTON, J., dissenting, that by the above findings of the jury the defendants were exonerated from liability on the other grounds of negligence charged, as to which they had been properly directed by the judge, and the new trial was improperly granted on the ground mentioned. Held, also, that though there was no express finding that the place at which the accident happened was a thickly peopled portion of the district it was necessarily imported in the finding given above; that this fact had to be proved by the plaintiff and there was no evidence to support it; and that, as the evidence shewed it was not a thickly peopled portion the plaintiff could not recover and the defendants should have judgment on their cross-appeal. Ford Jones, for appellant. G. Tate Blackstock, K.C., for respondents. Quebec.] [Nov. 29, 1905. PERRAULT v. GRAND TRUNK RY. Co. Railways-Farm crossings-Board of Railway CommissionersJurisdiction-Appeal. Orders directing the establishment of farm crossings over railways subject to the Railway Act, 1903, are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada. The right claimed by the plaintiff's action, instituted in 1904, to have a farm crossing established and maintained by the railway company cannot be enforced under the provisions of 16 Vict. c. 37 (D.), incorporating the company. An application to have the appeal quashed on the grounds that the cost of establishing the crossing demanded, together with the damages sought to be recovered by the plaintiff, would amount to less than $2,000, and that the case did not come within the provisions of the Supreme Court Act permitting appeals from the Province of Quebec, was dismissed. Lafleur, K.C., and P. H. Coté, K.C., and Beckett, for appellants. Beaudin, K.C., and J. E. Perrault, for respondent. Province of Ontario. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Mulock, C.J. Ex., Anglin, J., Clute, J.] SMITH V. TRADERS BANK. [Nov. 22, 1905. Practice-Striking out pleadings-Final order-Interlocutory order-Rule 261. Appeal from an Order in Chambers of the County Court judge of the County of Bruce, striking out certain paragraphs of the statement of defence under Rule 261, upon the ground that they disclosed no reasonable defence to the plaintiff's claim. Held, 1. The order was in its nature final and not merely interlocutory, and an appeal lay under R.S.O. 1897, c. 55, s. 52. While the order stood it disposed of the right of the defendants to set up or have the benefit of any defence which the facts alleged in their pleading would afford them, and was a final adjudication against them upon this portion of their alleged rights; and the defendants should not be deprived of the right to appeal merely because an adjudication, in its nature final, had been made by an order in form intermediate. 2. The jurisdiction conferred by Rule 261 may not be invoked for the excision of a portion of a pleading. It is only when the entire pleading discloses no reasonable ground of action or answer that this rule applies. C. A. Ross, for defendants, appellants. Kilmer, for plaintiff. Meredith, J.] CARTWRIGHT v. NAPANEE. [Nov. 27, 1905. Municipal corporations-By-law-Electrical works-Motion to quash-Irregularity. The jurisdiction to quash by-laws on motion conferred upon a judge of the High Court by Municipal Act, 1903, s. 378, ought, generally speaking, to be exercised in every case of an illegal bylaw which cannot be validated. In the case of an invalid by-law which can be cured, again generally speaking, the jurisdiction ought to be exercised when the irregularities which render it invalid affect or might have affected the passing of it, but ought not to be exercised when they could not. Motion to quash a by-law of the defendants, providing for the construction of electric light works and debentures for that purpose, upon the ground that the Municipal Act, 1903, s. 569 (5), had not been complied with, inasmuch as there had been only publication in four weekly issues of a weekly paper, instead of publication for one month as required by the section. Held, that this was a substantial objection, but that the by-law was within the category of invalid ones which could become validated, and inasmuch as the application seemed really made solely in the interests of a company, the business of which, if continued, would be injured by the business to be done by the municipal corporation, under the by-law, and it was clear the applicant had not been in any way prejudiced or affected by any irregularity in the proceedings, and there had been many months' delay in launching the present motion, and the by-law would undoubtedly again be passed if now quashed, and extensive proceedings and operations had been begun under it-the case was one for letting the curative provisions of the Act operate, and declining to exercise the jurisdiction to quash. Held, also, that the same considerations applied to the objection based on the omission to give notice of the appointment of a day for finally considering the by-law in Council, as required by s. 569 (5). Middleton, for the motion. Bruce, K.C., and Harrington, K.C., for defendants. Falconbridge, C.J.K.B., Street, J., Britton, J.] PHILLIPS v. CITY OF BELLEVILLE. [Jan. 9. Municipal corporation-Sale of lands of-Sale to other than the highest bidder-Reason actuating alderman-Good faith. Appeal by the above corporation from the judgment of MAGEE, J., upon re-trial of this case pursuant to the judgment of the Divisional Court, 9 O.L.R. 732, in order to ascertain the reasons which actuated the minds of the members of the above corporation in selling real estate of the corporation to a person other than the highest bidder, with a view to pronouncing upon the sufficiency of those reasons, which the said Divisional Court held it was the duty of the Court to do. Held, that the Court should not attempt to decide the question upon so doubtful and elusive an enquiry as that of the respective weights that the different aldermen may have given to the various reasons on which they have acted, and it was sufficient if the Court found (1) that the council acted in perfect good faith, and (2) that they had reasons before them which they might reasonably have considered sufficient to justify their action, which the Court had found in this case upon the evidence at the said re-trial. Mikel, for City of Belleville. Armour, K.C., for plaintiff. Porter, K.C., for Caldwell. Full Court.] Province of Nova Scotia. SUPREME COURT. ANDERSON v. PHINNEY. [Dec. 18, 1905. Vendor and purchaser-Possession under agreement to purchase -Liability to pay interest-Equitable relation of parties. Defendant purchased a lot of land from A. for the sum of $1,140 under an agreement in writing by the terms of which A. |