ranted the payment of a large ensurance; and if the amount paid for ensurance was lost in one voyage, it was more than made up in the profits of other voyages. [SENATE. spoliations, that could be procured. The journal of Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, continues: "Nor is it conceived that the treaties between the United States and France have undergone a more nullifying operation than the condition of war naturally imposes. Doubtless the congressional act authorizing the reduction of French cruisers by force was an authorization of war, limited, indeed, in its extent, but not in its nature. Clearly, also, their subsequent act, declaring that the treaties had ceased to be obligatory, however proper it might be for the removal of doubts, was but declaratory of the actual state of things. And certainly it was only from an exercise of the constitutional prerogative of declaring war, that either of them derived validity. So that the treaties in question, having had only the usual inoperation, might, without a breach of faith, have the usual recognition." The underwriters and ensurance companies at this time found their greatest harvest. The price of ensurance was raised even greater in proportion than the risk-as high, probably, as fifteen, twenty, and, in some instances, fifty per cent. Now, although these ensurers, standing in the place of the ensured, may have an equitable claim on their behalf upon the foreign nation that should illegally seize the property of a neutral individual, little right have they to exact from their own Government what would amount to an entire cover of the whole risk. If the country should pay the entire loss, so should the country be entitled to the gains of the underwriters. That the underwriters of the time above referred to laid the foundation of immense fortunes, by ensurance of ships and property on the high seas, is abundantly proved by the condition of some of the most wealthy men in the northern States, who have lived, or still are living. These men have accumulated wealth under every treaty that has been made by this Government, procuring indemnity for spoliations; and it is such men, together with other wealthy speculators and corporations, who have bought up these claims for a trifle, who are to be benefited by the passage of this law. There are few poor widows or orphans that will derive advantage from Again, same, (p. 682:) "If the Senate meant, by any portion of the immense sum that the bill appropri- striking out the second article of the treaty, to consider ates. If one ship in three of every ship that sailed had | indemnity as worth nothing, then the business, I prebeen captured, neither were the underwriters nor ownsume, is closed." ers of such ships the losers; for the first received more than the full amount of loss, and the others made greater profits than they could in a time of profound peace, in the advanced price of the merchandise shipped. Mr. President, there is little wonder that these claims, for twenty-five years, should have failed to obtain the favorable report of a committee. Should this bill pass, it need not be matter of surprise if other claims of a similar character should follow them, until it shall appear that the United States, as yet, have just begun to discharge the national debt. How many millions sacrificed by other controversies will the Government be not bound to discharge, if it justly owes the claims provided for in this bill? I shall contend, in the first place, that the controversy with France, giving rise to these claims, terminated in war; and that as war ended all the obligations of prior treaties, so there was on the part of the American Government nothing due to France which could go for a consideration as an equivalent for these claims. The French Government resisted the payment of these claims when they were first presented, on the ground that war had put an end to them. Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, the American negotiators, repeating the declaration of the President of the French commission, in their journal of September 12, 1800, say: "He would sooner resign than sign such a treaty, (as that they proposed,) adding that, if the question could be determined by an indifferent nation, he was satisfied such a tribunal would say that the present state of things was war on the side of America, and that no indemnities could be claimed. The other two commissioners made similar declarations." The same gentlemen, September 13, 1800, say: "The American ministers, being now convinced that the door was perfectly closed against all hope of obtaining indemnities with any modification of the treaties," they proceeded to negotiate without. Now, if the door was closed against all hope, what sacrifice for the claimants did the American Government make by agreeing no further to prosecute them? The treaty of September 30, 1800, was agreed upon as the best for American citizens suffering under French VOL. XI.--4 Mr. Murray, (p. 662, Senate documents 102,) speaking of the treaty which had just then been executed, says: "Indemnities which were impossible, together with the discussion about the abolished treaties and consular convention, to sleep till a more convenient time." Mr. Murray again, (p. 676:) "But having no power to dispose of what may be considered as a valuable claim for the future, although I do not consider it as worth a quarter per centum," &c. Again, same page: "The absolute want of value in the prospect of indemnities." From these, and other like statements of the negotiators of the treaty of September 30, 1800, which was the most favorable for the United States and its citizens that could be obtained, it is evident that the treaty was negotiated on the basis of a war; that this state of things had discharged the French Government from all obligations to make restitution for captures and seizures, as it had the American Government from similar obligations to France; and that, as a natural consequence, the American ministers considered the prospect of further indemnity to be worth nothing. The character of the negotiation was this: France was willing to consider that war had put an end to all prior treaties, and, of course, to indemnities for their infraction. If the treaties were in force, and indemnities for seizures and spoliations were due to the Americans, so also something was due to France from the United States, for their failure under the treaties. The result proved that no indemnity could be obtained from France, and therefore the negotiation terminated, on the admission of both parties, that, as war existed, so indemnity on all hands was abandoned. Yet, in compliance with instructions from the American Executive at home, the second section of the treaty left the question of indemnity open, or rather evaded the question. That section was in the words following: "ART. 2. The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to agree at present respecting the treaty of alliance of the sixth of February, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of the fourteenth of November, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time; and until they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and convention shall have no operation; and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows." As the treaty was first concluded and ratified by the French Government, including this second article, all the objects of peace and reciprocal intercourse were se cured without giving up any demand of our citizens for spoliations; and, at the same time, an "immense property of our citizens, then depending before the French council of prizes," was secured to American citizens. The treaty or convention, duly signed, was sent to the United States, and submitted by the President to the Senate. The Senate, February 3, 1801, consented to and advised its ratification, provided the second article be expunged, and the following be added: "It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years, from the time of the exchange of the ratification." It was so ratified by the President. Thus altered, the convention was sent back to France, where the First Consul, complaining of the alterations made by the Senate, agreed to ratify it by adding the following clause: "The Government of the United States having added to its ratification, that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, and having omitted the second article, the Government of the French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention, with the addition, importing that the convention shall be in force for the space of eight years, and with the retrenchment of the second article: Provided, That, by this retrenchment, the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article." | After these conditional ratifications, and their exchange, President Jefferson submitted the convention anew to the Senate, who resolved that they considered it as fully ratified. It is most obvious that, in expunging the second article of the treaty, the Senate had no idea of lessening the chance of securing any thing that might be legally due from France to citizens of the United States; and it is equally obvious that, in subsequently tacitly assenting to that article as finally altered by Bonaparte, neither President Jefferson nor the Senate of the United States for a moment considered they were performing an act which should thereafter make the American Government reponsible to individuals for French spoliations. [DEC. 23, 1834. and the Insurgente frigates were also restored; the latter having been lost by substitute. The convention provided for the restoration of public ships taken on both sides-also, that all ships and property captured, and not definitely condemned at the time of the negotia tion, should be mutually restored. The Government of the United States, as stated by Mr. Madison, paid Mr. Pichon, the French minister, on the general account, $140,841 25, and to individual French subjects $74,667 41. (See doc. p. 720.) But France delayed restitution, although solemnly bound by the convention of September 30, 1830, until the claims came to be thought of little value. Applications for payment were often made, and as often denied or evaded. Restitution was indeed made by the subsequent treaty of 1803, by which a title to Louisiana was acquired. This restitution would not, even then, have been made, had it not come in conveniently to France, as a part of the nominal price paid for the cession of that valuable territory. Of this price Bonaparte, deprived as he was of the maratime force to protect it, considered the money actually paid as a full equivalent, without including the amount allowed for spoliations under the convention of 1800. He, in fact, "set his own price to his minister (Barbe Marbois) at fifty millions of francs, when the latter succeeded in obtaining of Messrs. Livingston and Monroe sixty millions of francs in cash, besides twenty millions allowed for the spoliations. It was considered, at the time, that all which was gained to the American claimants for French spoliations and seizures in the Louisiana treaty, was to them clear gain. Their claims were believed to be hopeless, and the opposition to the American administration opposed the execution of the treaty on account of the alleged "outrageous price" paid for the territory ceded. In the correspondence relative to the execution of the Louisiana treaty, the twenty millions of francs allowed and paid the claimants are mentioned as "covering all the claims" of the Americans for illegal spoliations and seizures; and in these twenty millions other claims were included than those first comprehended in the list presented by the American minister. (See Talleyrand's letter to Livingston, doc. p. 829.) The act of expunging and otherwise changing the article was performed in the last month of the elder Adams's administration. This first step opened the door Mr. Livingston says sixteen millions would have for another change of the terms of the treaty by Napo- covered "the debts confined to the words of the conleon; and the new administration of Mr. Jefferson, view-vention." Four millions, then, must have been paid to ing even the terms of the altered treaty as highly favorable to American citizens-more favorable, probably, than any new negotiation could open to them-readily seized the opportunity of taking the treaty as it was, rather than to throw all the advantages gained at the mercy of future changes and vicissitudes. Page 698 of the Senate documents, before quoted, the French minister, Talleyrand, repeats, as the suggestion of Mr. Murray, the American minister, that the second article of the convention of September, 1800, was expunged by the American Senate, under the idea that, if retained, it would be "susceptible of producing disquiets in future, by promising nothing but an ulterior and discordant negotiation." And Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. Livingston, before the Senate and President finally assented to the convention, (page 708,) says: "I am authorized to state that the President does not consider the declaratory clause (last introduced by Bonaparte) as more than a legitimate inference from the rejection by the Senate of the second article; and that he (the President) is disposed to go on with the measures due under the compact to the French Republic." The American Government did go on to execute that compact. March 20, 1801, the Secretary of the Navy directed S. Higginson & Co. to restore the Berceau frigate, captured by Captain Little. The Vengeance persons whose claims were not acknowledged by France to be legitimate. Citizen Pichon, the French minister, wrote that cases of capture by the French West India cruisers are included in the fourth article of the treaty, and are ordered to be restored. Barbe Marbois (doc. p. 826) says, "the sum of twenty millions of francs had been determined on in order to extinguish the whole American claim and the interest up to the day of the treaty." The restitution of property under the convention of April 30, 1803, applied to captures of which the council of prizes had ordered restitution—to debts contracted prior to the 30th September, 1800, the payment of which had been claimed of the Government of France, and for which the creditors have a right to the protec tion of the Government of the United States; and it is expressly stated that "it does not comprehend prizes whose condemnation has been or shall be confirmed. Now, it is quite apparent, from the face of these exceptions, that they are precisely such as the French Government never would have paid, if they had been left for negotiation, till doomsday: they were either such as had been adjudicated and condemned for a positive infraction of the laws of neutrality, or else they were such as were captured, tried, and condemned, under an actual state of war between the two nations. It is remarkable that neither in the successive reports, from 1826 down to the present time, of committees friendly to these claims, nor in the elaborate essay of Mr. Walsh's Quarterly Review in their favor, are the indemnities provided for in the convention of April, 1803, mentioned as at all connected with the spoliations and seizures made by France prior to the year 1800. Why this omission? I think I have not mistaken the character of the contest between this country and France prior to the treaty of September 30, 1800. That controversy was, to all intents and purposes, a war. I cannot present a more faithful account of that controversy, and the subsequent events which have given rise to the bill now before the Senate, than by making quotations from the history of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, written by Barbe Marbois, the translation of which was first published in this country in the year 1830. That inflexible republican, like the illustrious Lafayette, equally the friend of his own country and of this Republic, still lives, at the advanced age of between eighty and ninety years, to witness the benefits his labors have bestowed on mankind, in being instrumental in ceding to the United States that extensive tract of country. In behalf of the French Government, he was the sole negotiator with Messrs. Livingston and Monroe, of the Louisiana treaty. He says: (p. 234.) "It is necessary to go back a few years in order to understand the object of this important part of the negotiation, [the indemnity for spoliations.] The interests of commerce, colonial settlements, and navigation, have effected great changes in the reciprocal relations of the nations of Europe. The independence of the United States has rendered them stil! more complicated. But such changes are not often remarked by statesmen themselves, till they have committed great faults, by persevering in old errors. [SENATE. privateers, and these agents encouraged them indiscriminately to fall on all flags. They carried their disregard of the rules of justice and the laws of nations so far as to condemn, as lawful prizes, ships that had entered the ports with subsistence and provisions intended for the inhabitants of the islands that they governed. Victor Hughes, one of those colonial rulers, openly professed and put in practice the maxim, that, in time of want, all kinds of provisions are good prize.' The American Government, before commencing hostilities with France, wished to exhaust all pacific measures. It had sent thence ministers (Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry) to the Directory towards the end of the year 1797. On their arrival at Paris, they were circumvented by all sorts of intrigues. Their correspondence is a monument of the base manner in which the French Government at that time managed their political affairs. The most disgraceful cupidity,' they wrote to their constituents, was openly manifested at Paris.' The American commissioners were told that "their Government paid money to obtain peace with the Algerines and with the Indians; and that it was doing no more to pay France for peace.' "This negotiation lasted for six or seven months: it was broken off when it was found impossible to continue it on such erroneous principles. "The animosity was still increasing in 1799; when Congress, renouncing vain attempts at moderation, resolved that all interconrse with France should be suspended; that the treaties had ceased to be obligatory; and that the capture of French vessels was permitted." Thus far the historian distinctly and conclusively states two important facts material to the question of indemnities: The one is, that the alliance (treaties of 1778) was broken by France; the other, that a state of actual war, from the action of Congress, existed between France and the United States. M. Marbois continues: "The Directory, led astray by false notions of the "From the beginning of the Consular Government, situation of the French colonies, had not remarked that a wise policy had put a stop to all reprisals: a conventheir existence depended upon the preservation of a tion had been signed on the 30th September, 1800; but, good understanding with the United States. Instead of according to a stipulation, without which the reconciliare-establishing friendly relations with the American tion would have been impossible, indemnities were to Union, it had, after more than once putting it in jeop. be paid for all prizes unlawfully made. [Mark here the ardy, finally broken the alliance which had been the character of the indemnities, distinguishing those which precious fruit of the policy of the councils of Louis XVI. were unlawfully from such as the French considered Mutual discontent had not yet resulted in direct hostili- properly made.] Ministers had been subsequently inties; but, even in peace, captures were made by priva- terchanged, and the envoy of the United States (Mr. teers bearing the French flag, which became the sub- Livingston) bad calculated on prompt satisfaction. ject of great complaints on the part of the United States. The communications which he addressed to his GovernIt was likewise at this period that the first disasters of ment authorized this hope; but the expectations were the French colonies led to the emigration of many fam- not realized; and, in fact, the finances of France had ilies, who from great opulence had fallen into deep dis- scarcely began to emerge from the chaos in which the tress. Numbers of them took refuge in the United | bad government of the Directory had plunged them. States. Never was hospitality more nobly exercised This part of the convention of 1800, therefore, rethan under these circumstances; never were more sin-mained unexecuted; and this contempt of the most orcere and effectual consolations offered to misfortunes dinary rules of justice carried the general irritation in by a grateful people. This generosity towards refugees, the United States to its greatest height. The President the objects of the persecutions of the Directory, was and his cabinet, compromitted by their moderation, were not regarded by its members as a motive for reconcilia- beginning to make their reproaches heard, and talked tion with the American Republic. They had inherited of doing themselves the justice that was refused them. the animosities of the convention, and the West Indian The American minister at Paris had received orders to possessions were the victims of them. These colonies, make this discontent known, and his notes were drawn prosperous in time of peace, are exposed to all sorts of up with a firmness to which Bonaparte was not accus. calamities as soon as the war breaks out. Their inter- tomed. If one of the continental Powers of Europe course is interrupted; a parent state, weak at sea, can had dared to employ similar language, the invasion of neither supply them with provisions nor export their its territory would have been the consequence." * produce, and is most frequently incapable of defending "As the notes of Mr. Livingston, the American ministhem. If they resort to neutrals, this relaxation of the ter, remained unanswered, the injured merchants and prohibitory system habituates the colony to privileges ship owners lost their patience, and murmured against which make them look on the return of peace with in- their Government. The enemies of France in the difference. The Directory, in order to maintain their United States, attentive to the general discontent, hoped prohibitory laws, had permitted the local authorities to to avail themselves of it, in order to force the Union into provide for the preservation of the colonies by arming an alliance with England." Here it will be observed that the sole object of complaint by the "injured merchants" was the non-execu tion of the convention of September 30, 1800, leaving it plainly to be inferred that, at this time, they did not think of asking further indemnities than that convention provided. The writer goes on to detail the events which accompanied the shutting up the port of New Orleans, producing strong excitement in the Western States, and creating an anxiety to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi on the part of the United States, of the one side, and the perilous condition of this French colony in case war should break out and render it an easy prey to the British maritime superiority, on the other side. Events were impending on both sides which rendered it not less desirable that the United States should acquire than that France should dispose of the territory of Louisiana at much less than what has since proved to be its value. Accordingly, at the same time Mr. Jefferson and his cabinet were taking secret measures to purchase a part of Louisiana, and Mr. Monroe was sent to aid in the purchase, Bonaparte was urging his minister to make propositions, and force the sale to the United States of the whole right France possessed in the territory. [DEC. 23, 1834. ments. But the American negotiators agreed that, if there was any difference, the amount rather exceeded than fell short of the claims, and the French plenipotentiary gave assurances that in no case should this excess be claimed by France. Thus the respective demands were easily agreed to." Again: (p. 311.) "The First Consul had followed, with a lively interest, the progress of this negotiation. It will be recollected that he had mentioned fifty millions as the price which he had put on the cession; and it may well be believed that he did not expect to obtain so large a sum. He learned that eighty millions had been agreed on; but that they were reduced to sixty by the reduction stipulated to be previously made for the settlement of the debt due by France to the Americans. Then, forgetting or feigning to forget the consent that he had given, he said with vivacity to the French minister: I would that these twenty millions be paid into the treasury. Who has authorized you to dispose of the money of the State? The rights of the claimants cannot come before our own.' This first excitement was calmed as he was brought to recollect that he had previously consented to treat for a much smaller sum than the treasury would receive, without including the twenty millions indemnidoes not leave one any thing to desire: sixty millions for an occupation that will not perhaps last but a day. I would that France should enjoy this unexpected capital, and that it may be employed in works beneficial to her marine."" The historian continues: (p. 277.) "The conferty for the prizes. It is true,' he said, the negotiation ences began the same day between Mr. Livingston and M. Barbe Marbois, to whom the First Consul confided this negotiation. But the American minister had not the necessary powers. He had resided at Paris about two years. The first object of his mission had been indemnities claimed by his countrymen for prizes made by the French during peace." That is, indemnities under the convention of September 30, 1800. In the mean time, Mr. Monroe had arrived, bringing full powers to negotiate. As it is my object to confine myself to the subject of indemnities as much as possible, I omit a relation of conferences about prices offered and asked for the territory. The author proceeds: (p. 303.)! "The convention of the 30th September, 1800, had for its object the securing of reciprocal satisfaction to the citizens of the two States, and the preventing, as far as possible, of any thing that could, for the future, affect their good understanding. We there find the principle, the wisdom and the legality of which only one nation in the world disputes, that free ships make free goods, although they are the property of an enemy. B "A special promise had been given to pay the debts arising from requisitions, seizures, and captures, made in time of peace; but the execution of the agreement had not followed the treaty. For two years and a half the minister of the United States had been reiterating his reclamation, and demanding in vain the reparation of these losses. "The cession of Louisiana afforded the means of realizing promises that had been so long illusory. The Americans consented to pay eighty millions of francs, on condition that twenty millions of this sum should be assigned for the payment of what was due from France to the citizens of the United States. "The two ministers fixed this condition of an indemnity at twenty millions of francs, and they propably expected that they would be required to state the grounds of the estimate, in order that they might be discussed, and a reduction effected. But no opposition was made, and it was instantly agreed that the amount should be deducted from that of the eighty millions. The intention of extinguishing all former claims was sincere on both sides. The round sum of twenty millions was evidently an estimate formed on reasonable conjectures, and could not be an absolute result established by docu If we regard the statement of M. Marbois as containing the facts, we must believe it to be the merest chance in the world that the American merchants ever did receive the indemnity of twenty millions of francs. Napoleon Bonaparte, to the last moment of his life, while he was at war with the rest of Europe, would not have taken that sum out of his treasury to pay these claims. Sixty millions of francs, the sum paid into the French treasury, was all Bonaparte would have asked for Louisiana. The twenty millions paid was so much money of the American people generously and gratuitously bestowed by their Government, for which the underwriters, and others who profited by the boon, are scarcely disposed to thank us; and they would even wink this sum out of sight in their eagerness to grasp more for claims whose foundation, to say the least, is extremely doubtful. But, Mr. President, if there was the least room to doubt that war had put an end to all right of indemnity from France, it will be easy to show that the United States never first violated any engagement with France in a manner that claimed from us an indemnity. I see it asserted in a newspaper of this city, copied from a Boston newspaper, expressing the feelings probably of some of those interested in these claims, that, "thirty-four years ago, our own Government sold to the French Government a great amount of claims of our own citizens on France, for indemnity, and received pay for them, and released France from all obligations to pay the claimants, whose demands were acknowledged to be just by both nations." In the first place, I deny that this Government ever sold to the French Government the claims of our citizens. This Government had done its whole duty to the claimants; it had pressed the claims as far and as long as it was bound to do; and if at length it agreed to press them no further, it was to procure indemnity, not for itself, but for others, and many of the self-same claimants; which indemnity otherwise would have been utterly hopeless, and lost to them for ever. To the declaration that this Government received payment for these claims, I answer that if no claims of citizens of the United States against France had existed, it is quite certain the United States would have procured as good a treaty with France as that of the convention of September 30, 1800; and that France would have laid in no claim whatever for an alleged infraction of prior treaties on our part. It is said these demands were acknowledged to be just by both nations. The Quarterly Review says: "The French Government did not deny the justice of these demands; they even offered to make arrange ments to compensate the losses; but they had claims upon the Government of the United States, which they insisted upon taking into consideration, and they refused to enter into any agreement, unless these claims were provided for. I have no where seen evidence that France at any time conceded these claims to be just. The statements of the Quarterly Review are fallacies. Was not the refusal to pay them--was not the first ratification of the treaty, with the second article, by Bonaparte, which made no provision for payment, tantamount to a denial and a rejection of these claims? To be sure, France would have no objection to making provisions for the payment of just such a sum as the American Government might ask for these claims, provided the United States would agree to pay France an equal or greater sum for alleged infractions of prior treaties; and this is the whole amount of concession which France has ever made to these claimants. If these claims, as preferred against the United States, possess any merit, it is that the United States have received of France for them an equivalent. That equivalent is alleged to be the discharge by France of the prior obligations contained in the sundry recited treaties. One gentleman [Mr. WEBSTER] says that, "by a treaty of the United States, the Government of the United States, for a valuable consideration, released France from these claims;" that the United States were relieved from "onerous stipulations of the treaties of alliance and commerce with France of 1778;" that "these claims were relinquished for considerations which were valuable to the people of the United States;" that these claims were "released as a set-off against the infractions of the treaties of alliance and commerce with France." Another Senator [Mr. PRESTON] says this claim on the American Government "is irresistible," because, by the aid of the release of the claims on France, the American Government extricated itself from the most embarrassing circumstances;" that "this Government offered three times the amount of this bill to be relieved;" that "we have used the property of these people for purposes of the Government;" that "we have used the money for State purposes." A third Senator [Mr. SHEPLEY] says he "can prove that the Government might have obtained reparation for these claims of France, if it had chosen to do so;" that payment was not obtained "because France set up counter claims for alleged violations of her treaty of alliance;" that "there cannot be found a more perfect set-off than in the set-off of these two claims." [SENATE. Mr. President, I will proceed to show that there was no infraction of the treaties by the United States; that there were no "onerous stipulations" violated by this Government; and, by consequence, that there was no "valuable consideration" ever received by the United States as a set-off against these claims. "Pacificus," No. 2, written by Alexander Hamilton, (and surely gentlemen will consider him good authority,) in justification of President Washington's proclamation of neutrality of April, 1793, says: (Federalist, p. 561.) "The alliance between the United States and France is of the defensive kind. In the caption of the treaty it is denominated a treaty eventual and defensive.' In the body, article second, it is called a defensive alliance. The words of that article are as follows: The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in matters of Government as of commerce.' "France, then, being on the offensive in the present war, and our alliance with her being defensive only, it follows that the casus federis, or condition of our guarantee, cannot take place; and that the United States are free to refuse a performance of that guarantee, if demanded.” tee. General Hamilton contends that even if the war with Great Britain had not been an offensive war on the part of France, the United States, under the peculiar circumstances, would not have been bound by the guaranIn favor of this position he says: (p. 570.) "We may learn from Vattel, one of the best writers on the law of nations, that, if a State which has promised succors finds itself unable to furnish them, its very inability is its exemption; and if the furnishing of succors would expose it to an evident danger, this is also a lawful dispensation. The case would render the treaty pernicious to the State, and therefore not obligatory. But this applies to an imminent danger threatening the safety of the State. The case of such a danger is tacitly and necessarily reserved in every treaty." Taking this quotation from Vattel to be sound doctrine, it would be difficult to discover where were the "onerous stipulations" from which the United States obtained a discharge by not consenting to prosecute claims which the American ministers had, in repeated instances, pronounced to be hopeless and of no value. Even Mr. Madison, in his letters of "Helvidius," who espoused the side of the republican party at that time, in opposition to, and in answer of, the same letters of Hamilton, and took the ground most favorable to France, did not contend that the United States had violated the guarantee in the treaty of alliance by abstaining from the protection of the possession by France of her West India islands, &c. Indeed, it does not appear, either here or elsewhere, that France, at any time, specifically demanded the performance of the guarantee; and, without such demand, it is abundantly evident no obligation was violated. What was complained of by the republicans, who were friendly to the French revolution at the time, was the spirit of hostility to that revolution, and the partiality for the Powers arrayed against France, then contending single-handed, which was evinced by some of the leading members of the existing American administration. "Veritas," a writer in the National Gazette, of June, 1793, speaking of Washington's proclamation of neu The Senators may all rest assured that, if these claims had never existed, in negotiating the treaty of September 30, 1800, France never would have thought of preferring a claim for any infraction of her treaties of alliance and commerce. Neither if these claims had not been made, should we ever have heard that the contest subsequent to the act of Congress declaring the treaties at an end was not war to all intents and purposes.trality, says: Why, Congress, by a solemn act, declared the treaties of alliance and commerce to have been at an end; and yet gentlemen, to make out any plausibility to these claims on the United States, are obliged to declare those treaties to have been in force. "As the proclamation has not the most distant allusion to the treaties existing between France and the United States, there is room for surmising that those treaties, from which we have long enjoyed important advantages, are now to be considered of no obligation; |