 | 1859 - 598 páginas
...own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Edward Royall Tyler, William Lathrop Kingsley, George Park Fisher, Timothy Dwight - 1859 - 1136 páginas
...nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 376 páginas
...own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | 1859 - 584 páginas
...own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a- conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 378 páginas
...nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscions subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Orestes Augustus Brownson - 1860 - 562 páginas
...nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 389 páginas
...nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscions subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | James Oswald Dykes, James Stuart Candlish, Hugh Sinclair Paterson, Joseph Samuel Exell - 1861 - 994 páginas
...nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. . . . " The corollary from... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1862 - 528 páginas
...own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1864 - 538 páginas
...own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary ; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But...consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject... | |
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... conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore... 
