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able Absolute according actually admit affirm appears argument assertion association attributes become belief body Brown called cause cognize color common conceive conception condition consciousness consequently considered deny direct Discussions distinction distinguished doctrine doubt effect elements equally evidence example existence experience express extension external fact faculties feeling finite follows given gives greater ground Hamilton human idea immediate important impossible impression inconceivable inference infinite intuitive kind knowledge known laws Lectures less limited maintain manner Mansel matter meaning mental merely mind mode muscular nature necessary never notion object opinion organ original particular past perceive perception Permanent person philosophers positive possible present Primary principle proposition prove qualities question reality reason reference regard Reid relation relative represent respecting seems sensations sense Sir W space suggested supposed theory thing thought tion touch true truth unknown whole
Página 263 - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Página 133 - Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do : he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures ; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."— (P.
Página 37 - Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities ; mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities, are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena ; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena...
Página 122 - That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.
Página 79 - That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed.
Página 238 - This idea of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what, in Kantian language, is called Perdurability ; something which is fixed and the same, while our impressions vary; something which exists whether we are aware of it or not, and which is always square (or of some other given figure) whether it appears to us square or round, constitutes altogether our idea of external substance. Whoever can assign an origin to this complex conception, has accounted for what we mean...
Página 99 - ... are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability ; and this fact of liberty cannot be...
Página 121 - ... conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being.
Página 228 - Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality is what in this case I call perception.