reconstitution of the upper chamber upon a "popular" basis, but (1) the adoption of the Rosebery principle that the possession of a peerage shall not of itself entitle the possessor to sit, (2) the admission to membership of a considerable number of persons representative of, and selected by, the whole body of hereditary peers, and (3) the introduction of a substantial quota of life or fixed-term members, appointed or elected for their legal attainments, political experience, and other qualities of fitness and eminence. A body so constituted would still incline strongly to conservatism; probably a Liberal ministry would still have to face in it a Unionist majority. But opposition would be less unyielding and less irresponsible than hitherto; and one may believe that, coupled with the changes wrought in powers by the Parliament Act, such an alteration would meet all reasonable demands.

The chief difficulty of the plan would be to determine the basis on which the life or fixed-term members should be chosen. In a country organized, as is the United States, on a federal basis, it is easy to make up a second chamber that will not be a duplicate of the first; the people in small groups can be represented directly in the lower house and the federated states, as such, in the upper. England is not a federal state, and no logical areas for upper chamber representation exist. But, as was the opinion of the Bryce commission, it is not inconceivable that they might be created if, indeed, the old historic counties, or combinations of them, could not be made to serve. Great advantages would arise from a system under which a considerable number of members should be chosen to represent important special groups or interests, including the great professions. The universities, the learned societies, the principal Nonconformist bodies, the chambers of commerce, the manufacturers' associations, the bankers, the medical profession, and even the trade unions, come readily to mind in this connection.1

Prospective Relations of the Two Houses. A body made up on the lines thus indicated would undoubtedly be respectable, capable, and vigorous; and this raises a new question, of which the reformers have not been unmindful. Would not such an upper chamber justly claim equality of rights and powers with the popular house? Could it be kept on the sub

1 For interesting discussions of this principle see L. Bouvier, La représentation des intérêts professionnels dans les assemblées politiques (Paris, 1914), and G. Carrière, La représentation des intérêts et l'importance des éléments professionnels dans l'évolution et le gouvernement des peuples (Paris, 1917).

ordinate plane to which recent legislation has lowered the House of Lords? In other words, would not the application of the representative principle to the chamber lead to an undesired revival of the authority of that body at the expense of the House of Commons? Some years ago Mr. Balfour, in a notable address, warned the lower chamber that this was what would happen; and other voices have been raised, in both of the great parties, to the same effect.

The apprehension seems, however, groundless. In the first place, no legal alteration of the composition or status of the second chamber can take place save by an act of Parliament; and it is inconceivable that the House of Commons would ever approve a measure which restricted its ultimate control in, at all events, the two great fields of finance and administration. In the second place, experience shows that in the long run an upper chamber, no matter what its basis, cannot maintain a parity of power and influence with the lower chamber under a system of responsible, i.e., cabinet, government. The constitution of France seeks to make the cabinet responsible to both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate is an exceptionally capable and energetic body. Yet the Chamber of Deputies enjoys a substantial priority in the actual control of national affairs. The framers of the Australian constitution deliberately provided for a popularly elected upper house, with a view to making it an effective counterpoise to the federal House of Representatives. But the idea failed. To-day a Commonwealth Government recognizes the supremacy of the lower chamber only, and the Senate is a mere debating society.2 In Canada the Senate, likewise, is conspicuously weak.3 The outcome could hardly be otherwise in England. It will not do to say with a recent writer that the cabinet system "is fatal to a bicameral legislature." As is proved by France, there is a legitimate and useful place for a second chamber in a cabinet system of government; and most of the arguments that support a bicameral legislature in the United States are equally applicable in England. But it cannot be denied that, as the above-mentioned writer goes on to say, "whatever the mode of selection or however able its personnel, the upper chamber will continue to play but a subordinate position in political life so long as the principle of the

1 See p. 411.

2 A. B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (Oxford, 1912), II, 633-638.

3 E. Porritt, Evolution of the Dominion of Canada (Yonkers, 1918), Chap. xi.

responsibility of the ministry to the House of Commons endures." As an English authority has said, "a House of Commons, with the majority of the electorate behind it, could not be bitted and bridled by the Peers. . . . The Lords cannot prevent reform, or even revolution, if the electorate is in earnest and has a ministry to its mind." 2

A subordinate position may, however, be a useful position; and it stands to reason that if a second chamber is to be retained at all, it ought to be made up in such a manner as to give it the greatest possible amount of industriousness and intelligence. The uses of a second chamber are to compel delay and deliberation; to make it impossible for a legislature to be swept off its feet by a sudden wave of unreasoning popular opinion; " to serve as an organ of revision, a check upon democracy, an instrument by which conservatism in action may be had, and a means for securing a representation of interests that is not feasible in a single chamber composed of members elected directly by the people." The object, however, is not mere obstruction, such as may arise from inertia, incapacity, or partisanship. It is, instead, serious-minded criticism, deliberation, and revision, with a view to the general welfare rather than mere political exigencies. Properly performed, the function is no less honorable, and hardly less important, than that of initiation, or that of final decision, as performed by the lower chamber. The House of Lords has served the British nation well in the past; if it is wisely reconstructed, its usefulness will increase rather than diminish in the future.4

1 C. D. Allin, "The Position of Parliament," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., June, 1914. Low, Governance of England (rev. ed.), 223.

Willoughby, Government of Modern States, 318. Classic discussions of the uses of a second chamber include J. S. Mill, Representative Government (London, 1862), Chap. xiii, entitled "Of a Second Chamber," and John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (Boston, 1787). The latter work will be found in C. F. Adams [ed.], Works of John Adams (Boston, 1851), IV, 270-588. The relative advantages of the unicameral and bicameral systems are clearly set forth in Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 427–440.

Im

The literature of the subject of second chamber reform in England is voluminous and only a few of the more important titles can be mentioned here. The subject is discussed briefly in Lowell, Government of England, I, Chap. xxii; Moran, English Government, Chap. xi; Low, Governance of England, Chap. xiii; and H. W. V. Temperley, Senates and Upper Chambers (London, 1910), Chap. v. portant books include W. C. Macpherson, The Baronage and the Senate; or the House of Lords in the Past, the Present, and the Future (London, 1893); T. A. Spalding, The House of Lords: a Retrospect and a Forecast (London, 1894); J. W. Wylie, The House of Lords (London, 1908); W. S. McKechnie, The Reform of the House of Lords (Glasgow, 1909); W. L. Wilson, The Case for the House of Lords (London, 1910); and J. H. Morgan, The House of Lords and the Constitution (London, 1910). Of these, the first is one of the most forceful defenses and the second

M

one of the most incisive criticisms of the upper chamber that have been written. A brief review by an able French writer is A. Esmein, La Chambre des Lords et la démocratie (Paris, 1910). Among articles in periodicals may be mentioned H. W. Horwill, "The Problem of the House of Lords," in Polit. Sci. Quar., Mar., 1908; E. Porritt, "The Collapse of the Movement against the Lords," in N. Amer. Rev., June, 1908; ibid., "Recent and Pending Constitutional Changes in England," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., May, 1910; J. L. Garvin, "The British Elections and their Meaning," in Fortnightly Rev., Feb., 1910; J. A. R. Marriott, "The Constitutional Crisis," in Nineteenth Cent., Jan., 1910; J. B. Firth, "A Real Second Chamber," in Fortnightly Rev., Nov., 1917; and A. Williams, "The Requisite Second Chamber," in Contemp. Rev., Nov., 1917. A readable sketch is A. L. P. Dennis, "Impressions of British Party Politics, 1909-1911," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., Nov., 1911; and the best accounts of the Parliament Act and of its history are: Dennis, "The Parliament Act of 1911," ibid., May and Aug., 1912; May and Holland, Constitutional History of England, III, 343-384; Lowell, Government of England (rev. ed., New York, 1912), I, Chap. xxiiia; Annual Register for the years 1910 and 1911; M. Sibert, "Le vote du Parliament Act," in Rev. du Droit Public, Jan.-Mar., 1912, and "La réforme de la Chambre des Lords," ibid., July-Sept., 1912. A book of some value is C. T. King, The Asquith Parliament, 1906-1909; a Popular Sketch of its Men and its Measures (London, 1910).

CHAPTER X

PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATION

Sessions: the Opening of a Parliament. It is required by law (a succession of "triennial acts," beginning in 1641) that Parliament shall be convened at least once every three years; on account of the pressure of business and, in particular, because of the custom which forbids granting control of the army and voting supplies for a period longer than one year, meetings are, in point of fact, annual.1 A session ordinarily begins near the first of February and continues, with brief adjournments at holiday seasons, until August or September. The two houses must invariably be summoned together. Either may adjourn without the other; but the king can force an adjournment of neither. A prorogation, which brings a session to a close, and a dissolution, which brings a parliament to an end, must be ordered for the two houses concurrently. Both take place technically at the command of the king, actually upon the decision of the cabinet. A prorogation is to a somewhat indefinite date, which is determined later by the proclamation of a new session; and, like a dissolution, but unlike an adjournment, it terminates all pending business.

At the beginning of a session the members of the two houses gather, first of all, in their respective chambers. The commoners are thereupon summoned to the chamber of the Lords, where the letters patent authorizing the session are read and the Lord Chancellor makes known the desire of the crown that the Commons proceed to choose a Speaker. The commoners withdraw to attend to this matter, and on the next day the newly elected official, accompanied by the members, presents himself at the bar of the House of Lords, announces his election, and, through the Lord Chancellor, receives the royal approbation. Having demanded and received a guarantee of the "ancient and undoubted rights and privileges of the Commons," the Speaker and the members then retire to their own quarters, where the

1 See, in this connection, J. G. Randall, "The Frequency and Duration of Parliaments," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., Nov., 1916.