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ment to observation in science. Cases in point are contrived to show the evils of the various vices, and the good consequences of the virtues. A cumulative impression is made in favour of the line of conduct that ought to be followed in given situations. The exposition of the mischiefs and the dangers of falsehood, instead of being left to chance occurrences and scattered effects, here a little and there a little, is made more emphatic by gathering together a host of instances, real and feigned, working to one total effect.

For such lessons, a good classification of virtues and vices is a prime essential. The teacher needs to have a clear scheme before him, in order to concentrate his teaching. If the same thing is repeated under various names, the result is mere distraction of mind. The fundamental virtues need to be grasped in the first instance, and to be indicated under their best-known designations: also they should be exemplified in pure and typical instances. The mixed and modified virtues. are then rendered intelligible.

The main disadvantage of the scheme arises from the weak conceptive power of the pupils. Imagined cases of virtue and vice do not always have their full effect, with minds that are little experienced in the ways of the world. It becomes necessary to put the examples in forms that are too unqualified, and that leave defective and one-sided impressions, not easy to be got rid of.

In Ethics, as in other subjects, there may be a desultory treatment, preparatory to the regular and methodical treatment. Instances may occur conveniently by chance, and may be used to make an impression; but then, like cases in law, they must carry their principle on their

face, which requires them to be properly generalized; and this involves the same subtle perception on the part of the pupil as is implied in the understanding of the classified virtues.

A few words on the Classification of the Virtues. The cardinal virtues, in the modern treatment, are Prudence, Probity or Justice, and Benevolence. PRUDENCE is sometimes described as the Duties that we owe to ourselves, but this is not the most suitable expression. Prudence, or self-regarding conduct, stands in a very different position from the two other cardinal virtues: it has the support of our own natural self-seeking impulses. The obstacles to be overcome are want of knowledge, and present impulse. Knowledge is gained in time, and may be aided by teaching; impulse can be to a small extent checked or controlled by guidance, admonition, and representation of future consequences. The important point is, that this is not the region of authority, except in the parental sphere; but the region of friendly advice, information, and assistance. It is the more necessary to attend with rigour to the speciality of the prudential virtue, that we are always prone to assume the air of authority in dealing with those that are in our power: and moreover, there is an easy pretext for making prudence a matter of obligation, inasmuch as, if any man is imprudent in his own affairs, he is likely to fail in some of his duties to others. If a parent is idle, spendthrift, or drunken, his family suffer. Nevertheless, it will be found that there is a gain in persuasiveness, by taking each virtue in its own proper character, in the first instance; and the proper character

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of prudence is the enlightened regard to our own interest. This is the first and easiest conquest over our inherent moral weaknesses. The line to be pursued is special and distinct.

The aspects and departments of Prudence-as Industry, Thrift, Temperance-are all intelligible, and should be kept in view by the teacher, in his scheme of the virtues.

A very great part of Prudence unavoidably concerns our relations with others; for to get the most we can from life, we must behave well to everyone that has the power to help or to thwart us. This social situation. also brings into view our duties properly so-called-Justice and Benevolence; still we must rigidly abstain from entering on these, while our aim is to impress the selfregarding proprieties. The reasons will presently be

seen.

The virtue of Probity, or JUSTICE, ranks first among our social duties or obligations. Justice is the protection of one man against every other man; it is what is embodied in the laws, and enforced by penalties. The promulgation of these penalties, as already remarked, is the primary teaching of Justice. The teaching of the schoolmaster co-operates, by endeavouring to correct in advance the evil dispositions that incur the penalties. The essential idea of Justice is reciprocal good, and reciprocal abstinence from harm. It is the conduct imposed alike upon all, for the advantage of each. Nobody is expected to do more or less than what is prescribed for every member of the society.

The virtue of BENEVOLENCE is something beyond justice. It is doing good irrespective of the social neces

sities that Justice proceeds upon. It is not enjoined by penalties, but recommended to the voluntary choice of individuals. Its chief occasion is distress or privation arising through inequality of fortune, and through the accidents that render individuals unable to support themselves.

Self-sacrifice, devotedness, kindness, pity, compassion, doing good, beneficence, philanthropy-are among the numerous designations for this portion of moral duty. Besides all which, there are certain qualities that seem either to fall under the two other heads or to stand altogether apart, but that really come under the present head. Fortitude, courage, constancy, contentment—are prudential virtues to appearance, but the high praise accorded to them shows that they are supports of Justice and Benevolence; Honesty is a name for probity carried to the length of positive benevolence.

The virtue of Truth is sometimes regarded as an independent virtue; but, in reality, it is an adjunct of the others. It is a remarkably precise virtue: it does not admit of gradations, in the same sense as the others; it is a matter of yea or nay.

These three fundamental virtues cross and re-cross at so many points, that it needs a steady grasp to hold each class firmly according to its essential nature; yet this is what the moral teacher should be able to do, if he is to marshal his resources in the most effective way. A good course of Moral Science should impart this fundamental qualification.

Next to classifying the Virtues, is the correct apprehension of the Motives. There is an equal liability to

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confusion as regards these. The fundamental division is into Self-regarding and Extra-regarding or Social; and as each of these classes readily simulates the other, there is the same necessity for viewing each in its proper character at the outset. Prudence is the area of self-regarding motives: Justice supposes a mixture of the self-regarding and the social: Benevolence is the region of the Social or altruistic regards, pure and proper, together with a certain high and refined class of self-regarding motives, growing out of our social dispositions.

The appeal to the SELF-REGARDING motives follows a line peculiar to itself, which is well understood in oratory. It consists in making apparent the bearings of conduct upon the individual's own welfare; and is to be kept distinct. The virtues of industry, thrift, temperance, devotion to study or to knowledge, have each their reward, which ought to be rendered as palpable and evident as possible. All this is to be clearly distinguished from the social bearings, in order that each one of the forces may attain its full momentum. Moreover, there are many reasons why it is much easier to work upon the selfish feelings of men, than upon the other class.

It is in addressing the SOCIAL MOTIVES that we are chiefly liable to commit mistakes. We are here working upon the exceptional part of the human constitution, the small corner of self-devotion; and we are in constant danger of quitting the narrow road to it, for the broad way of prudential self-regard. We shall not ́succeed in evoking great virtues by teaching and persuasion, unless we can clearly keep before us the social motives, first in their purest type of absolute self-sacrifice, and