to such things as were under the jurisdiction of the office at the time the surety's engagement was made, and not to things brought under its jurisdiction afterwards. Thus a surety for a collector of customs, on his appointment in 1691, was held not liable for the duties on coals, of which his principal had the collection, but which was first imposed in 1698.*

The lecturer censured the decision in the Irish Society v. Needham, where a bond with a condition that the principal party should pay over to the plaintiffs all rents which he should receive, and the increase and improvement thereof, upon the renewals of the then leases, was held to extend to fines received by the principal; according to which decision a fine was considered as an increase of a rent, whereas more probably improved rents only were intended. Where an engagement of surety is expressed to be on behalf of a particular individual as principal debtor, it is understood as being on his behalf alone, and therefore it will not continue if he takes in a partner.

In like manner, if an engagement of surety is expressed to be on behalf of more individuals than one as principal debtors, who are all specified by name, it is understood to be on their behalf jointly, and therefore will not continue on behalf of the survivors, in case of the death of any of them, unless it expressly appears, and that very clearly, that the continuance of the engagement on behalf of survivors was intended.d

But where the persons, on whose behalf an engagement of surety is made, are described by a particular character, the same rule does not hold, and the engagement may or may not extend to survivors, according to the preponderance of evidence as to the intention of parties.

The obligation of a surety contracted with a particular person as the obligee, extends to that person only, and therefore ceases if he takes in a partner. Thus in Wright v. Russell, the bond in suit was conditioned for A. B.'s fidelity as long as he should continue in the plaintiff's service as abroad clerk. The plaintiff took in a partner, A. B. continued in the same employment, and during the partnership committed the breach of his fidelity for which the action was brought;

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but the court held, that the obligation of the defendant, the surety, was at an end when the plaintiff took in a partner.

On the principle that a trade is not transmissible, but is put an end to by the death of the trader, Lord Mansfield C. J. adjudged that a surety for the fidelity of a clerk was not responsible for a breach of trust upon an employment of the clerk after the death of the trader by his executors.

The engagement of a surety made with several individuals who are specified by name, is understood to be made with them jointly, and therefore it ceases upon the death of any of them, and will not be available against the surety, in respect of the transactions of the survivors.

But a surety bond, or other engagement of surety, may be so framed as to continue for the benefit of future partners. Thus, in Barclay v. Lucas, the court having construed the defendant's engagement as intended to enure to the benefit of the plaintiff's banking house, without reference to the particular persons composing it when the engagement was entered into, held, that a change in the firm did not dissolve the liability of the defendant, the surety. And in Pease v. Hirst, where a joint and several promissory note, payable on demand to order, was given as a security for advances made by the payees to one of the makers for whom the defendant had become a party, it was held, that the note continued as a security for advances made after a change in the firm of the payees, because from its being payable to order, the court inferred, that the parties intended the note to continue as a security to the house of the payees, of whatever persons it might be constituted.

If an obligation is entered into with the obligees with reference to a particular character sustained by them, the obligation ceases when they lose that character.

It is an important question in a large number of cases, whether the security given applies to an existing or past account, or to a future account only; and, if to a future, whether it applies to the first transactions after the commencement of the account, or to any portion of it within the amount to which the surety has confined his liability. With reference to this question, the chief cases reviewed were, Kirby v.Marlborough,m

Barker v. Parker, 1 Term R. 287. h Weston v. Barton, 4 Taunt. 675. i 1 Term R. 291. n. a. k 10 Barn. & Cres. 125. 'Dance v. Girdler, 1 New R. 34. m2 Maule. & Sel. 18.

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b

Williams v. Rawlinson, Mason v. Pritchard, Hargreave v. Smec, Melville v. Hayden, and Kay v. Groves.

The liability of the surety in general extends to things which are accessary to the principal debt or obligation, unless he has protected himself by an express contrary stipulation; therefore, interest being accessional, he is liable to pay interest whenever his principal is so. Thus receivers being liable to pay interest, their sureties are entitled to relief only upon payment of the debt and interest: although to this rule there may be exceptions; as for example, Dawson v. Rayner, where the parties interested, knowing that their receiver had become bankrupt, neglected to take steps to pass his accounts for a considerable time afterwards, the Lord Chancellor relieved the sureties without interest.

Costs also being accessional to the debt, the surety is in general liable to pay the costs recovered against his principal.8

In the case of a bond, be the cause of the obligation what it may, or the condition ever so general, the obligor, whether a surety or principal, is not liable beyond the penalty. Francis v. Wilson, i seems an exception to this rule, because the plaintiff obtained an allowance of interest beyond the penalty; but in that case the penal sum was the exact amount of the debt, and therefore was penal only in respect of the form of the obligation, and there was a stipulation for interest upon it.

The subject announced by Mr. Theobald for his next lecture was, "The mode in which the obligation of surety may be extinguished."

student will not make any great mistake, if he should imagine the letter addressed to himself.

"MY LORD,

"I am a young man about to enter into the profession at the head of which you preside with such distinguished eminence, and am desirous of moving in the sphere I am placed in, with as much credit as it will admit of. To gain a competent knowledge of the spirit and principles of the law, must be most essentially necessary to the pure practice of it; and I am now induced by the accounts I have always heard of your lordship's goodness, humbly to request that you will be pleased to honour me so much as to communicate to me the course of

reading necessary to be perused in order

to attain so desirable an end.

"The mind without a guide to direct its exertions, is like a traveller on a pathless desert, bewildered and confused; it proceeds without knowing whither, and perhaps sinks in the pursuit of that which, by timely assistance, it might have attained with pleasure.

"Your lordship will certainly be astonished at my presumption, yet I trust you will not wonder at the reason of it. It is natural for a man eager after knowledge, to wish to take it from the purest source. Common sense pointed out your lordship.

"If your lordship should not consider it beneath your dignity to take notice of this letter, I should have reason to consider it have experienced your condescending goodthe happiest circumstance of my life, to ness. If, on the contrary, you should smile at my folly, or be offended at my presumption, I shall be sufficiently punished by silence and neglect.

"Humbly entreating your lordship's forgiveness for having thus long obtruded on your valuable time I beg leave to subscribe myself

"Your lordship's

Most devoted and
Obedient humble Servant,
ROBERT CRABTREE."

"Halesworth, Suffolk."

The following is Lord Kenyon's answer. " SIR,

"I am afraid you have concluded before this time I decline to answer your letter. To say the truth, I had some suspicion that the letter did not come from a real person; but being convinced of that, I do not delay to write to you. I wish it was in my power to propose any plan that you could rely on. The truth is, that, in the study of the law,

a mass lies before the student enough to deter young minds, and they are left to hazard in which road to proceed.

"I would advise you to read very carefully Blackstone's Commentaries, and if you have the perseverance to go through it two or three times, I believe it would be of great use. After this, you may, perhaps, with some advantage, read Serjeant Hawkins' Abridgment of Coke's Littleton, and then proceed to Coke's Littleton, accompanying that arduous task with reference to the Abridgment I have mentioned, which will point out to you those points of that vast work which are now rather obsolete. When you have done this, you will read the more modern reports; Sir James Burrows', Mr. Douglas', Mr. Cowpers', and the Term Reports; and in Equity the 1st vol. of Equity Cases Abridged, Mr. Cox's edition of Peer Williams, Hawkin's Reports in the time of Lord Talbot, and Precedents in Chancery. By the time this is done, you will be as good a judge as I am how to go on. If you mean to come to the bar, I would advise you to go to some able special pleader'; but you will inform yourself who answers that description, as much ignorance now mixes in that profession. Conveyancing will be learned in the office you are placed in, and by referring to Horsman's or other books of precedents; and the poor law and sessions business from Mr. Const's late book and Burn's Justice.

"I heartily wish you success, and that you may deserve it by acting honourably in the prosecution of your profession. "Your humble Servant,

"May 13th, 1793."

"KENYON."

MAINTENANCE OF SUITS. — ANCIENT DISSEISIN.

ALTHOUGH, from the time of Edward I., the feudal system, and all the feelings connected with it, declined very rapidly; yet, what the nobility lost in the number of their military tenants, was in some degree compensated by the state of manners. The higher class of them, who took the chief share in public affairs, were exceedingly opulent; and their mode of life gave wealth an incredibly greater efficacy than it possessed in later times. Gentlemen of large estates and good families, who had attached themselves to these great peers, who bore menial offices in their households, and sent their children thither for education, were of course ready to follow their banner in a rising, without much enquiry into the cause. Still less would the vast body of tenants, and their retainers, who were fed at the castle in time of peace, refuse to carry their pikes and staves into the field of battle. Many

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devices were used to preserve this aristocratic influence, which riches and ancestry of themselves rendered so formidable. Such was the maintenance of suits or confederacies for the purpose of supporting each other's claims in litigation, which was the subject of frequent complaints in parliament, and gave rise to several prohibitory statutes. By help of such confederacies, parties were enabled to make violent entries upon the lands they claimed, which the law itself could hardly be said to discourage. Even proceedings in courts of justice were often liable to intimidation and influence. A practice though ostensibly more harmless, was that of much allied to confederacies of maintenance, giving liveries to all retainers of a noble family; but it had an obvious tendency to preserve that spirit of factious attachments and animosities, which it is the general policy of a wise government to dissipate. This custom had continued from the first year of Richard II., and was unrepealed, though many legal provisions had VII., when it was shortly after ultimately been made against it, until the reign of Henry

abolished.

These associations, under powerful chiefs, were only incidentally beneficial, as they tended to withstand the abuse of prerogative. In their more usual course, they were designed to thwart the legitimate exercise of the king's government in the administration of the laws. Habits of rapine and tumult were prevalent. This was the common tenour of manners; sometimes so much aggravated as to find a place in general history, more often attested by records. During the three centuries that the house of Plantagenet sat on the throne, disseisin, or forcible dispossession of frecholds, makes one of the most considerable articles in the law-books. Highway robbery was from the earliest times a sort of national crime. Capital punishment, though very frequent, made little impression on bold and licentious men, who had, at least, on their side the sympathy of those who had nothing to lose.

These robbers had flattering prospects of impunity. Besides the general want of commu nication, which made one who had fled from his own neighbourhood tolerably secure, they had the advantage of extensive forests to facilitate their depredations and prevent detection. When outlawed, or brought to trial, the worst offenders could frequently purchase charters of pardon; which defeated justice in the moment of her blow. Nor were the nobility ashamed to patronise men of every crime.

REMEDY OF ATTORNEYS IN PARTNERSHIP.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer. Van Sandau and Tindale v. Brown. SIR,

A SENSIBLE letter, entitled as above, appeared in the Legal Observer of the 26th of March, inst. That letter is, in general, accurate in its details; but, no doubt without intending it, the writer has made me appear to have acted harshly to

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Landlord and Tenant.

wards my quondam friend and client: the con trary, however, was the case, for Van Sandau and Tindale's bill of fees was delivered, signed, so long since as May, 1827; payment of the balance sought to be recovered was promised by the defendant, by letters, over and over again, so long since as 1828, and no action was brought until October, 1830, when I was goaded to assert my rights by the gross written insults of the defendant, who (under circumstances which, if detailed, would demonstrate on my part, I will say, more than ordinary zeal for, and attention to, his interest,) thought fit to visit his disappointment on me. I must add, however, that the defendant, Captain Brown, was never my personal friend, but, on the contrary, our acquaintance and connection commenced with the business for which this action was brought, and has been confined to the same business. The second action was not brought until the defendant had every opportunity given him to avoid it.

As, without this explanation, I may appear to have been wanting in good feeling towards a former friend and client, I trust you will give insertion in your next Journal to this letter.

17. Old Jewry, March 28. 1831.

I

am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant, ANDREW VAN SANDAU.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. DILAPI-
DATION.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
SIR,

I BEG to call your attention to a very serious defect in our present law as regards Landlord and Tenant. I mean that branch of it which

relates to the subject of Dilapidation, no relief being afforded to a tenant to stop an action by paying money into court, and I see no good reason why a tenant should not be permitted to tender amends, or pay money into court in this case, as a defendant may in many others, which found in damages only. It has fallen within my experience several times to witness the disposition of a tenant to pay a sum of money to pre vent or stop an action for dilapidations, but from the defective state of the law, he had no opportunity to do so, and in the end a smaller sum was recovered than was offered to purchase peace, and the defendant had of course to pay the costs. I trust this matter is of sufficient importance to call forth an amendment. I remain Sir, Yours very obediently,

15. March, 1831.

W. H. M.

ON THE LAW OF KEEPING DOGS. To the Editor of the Legal Observer. SIR,

I HOPE YOU will continue the practice of giving the public information from time to time on such legal topics as may interest, and which will not have any tendency to perplex them. It is with pleasure that I have noticed several articles

of this nature in your pages, and being willing to further so good a design, I beg to call your at tention to a case just reported in Moody and Malkin's Reports, in which my Lord Chief Justice Tindal has perspicuously stated the exact terms on which the law permits a man to keep a dog for the defence of his property. I allude to the case of Sarch v. Blackburn, 1 Moo. & Mal. 505. S. C. 4 Car. & P. 297., in which an action was brought by a person who, having endeavoured to enter by a back way to a house, had been bitten by a dog belonging to the defendant. The direction of Tindal Č. J. to the jury was as follows:-"There is no case which will exactly apply to this; such cases necessarily depend on their own circumstances, and the question that arises is a very nice one. The plaintiff certainly

is not entitled to recover in this action if he was injured by his own fault. On this you will have to consider, whether he had a justifiable and reasonable cause for being where he was bit, such as would naturally induce him to go there, and would be a justification in an action of trespass brought against him for being there (as it would be as a license in law, if it was a way by which persons used to pass to the house); and whether he was there without notice of his danger. There is no evidence to show why the plaintiff was on the spot in question, whether with a lawful or unlawful object. The law, however, would rather presume a lawful object; and there is no improbability in his having one, for he was on one of the ways to the house itself at mid-day, although certainly it was not the most public and usual way. If he was lawfully there, I do not think the mere fact of the defendant having put up the notice relied on would deprive him of his remedy. The mere putting up of the notice is not sufficient for this, unless the party injured is at least in such a condition as to be able to become cognisant of its contents. The plaintiff could not read, the notice therefore furnished no information to him; and there were no circumstances in the way in which the dog was kept to apprise him be where he was, I see no fault or negligence to of his danger. If, therefore, he had a right to deprive him of his remedy. Still the defendant will not be liable unless he is in fault, unless he knows the character of his dog, which he certainly did in this instance, and unless he keeps putting up the notice does not in this case, I it improperly with that knowledge. The mere think, excuse him. But it is said he has a right to keep a fierce dog for the protection of his property. He certainly has so, but not, in my opinion, to place it in the approaches to his house, so as to injure persons exercising a lawful purpose in going along those paths to the house. If the dog was placed in such a situation that he could injure the plaintiff, ignorant of the notice, and going to the house for a lawful purpose, by a way which he was entitled to use, I think that the defendant would not be protected from this action. On the whole, the only question which I can leave to the jury is, on which side was there negligence? If the plaintiff was negligent, if he was where he ought not to have been, or if he neglected means of notice, he cannot recover; if the defendant was negligent, if he placed the

Sin,

Your's obediently,

A SPECIAL PLEADER.

STAMP DUTIES.

LAWYERS' CERTIFICATES.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
Durum! sed levius fit patientiâ,
Quicquid corrigere est nefas.

Hor. Od. xxiv. 1. 1. ver. 19.

In all trades and professions there are many grievances which require remedy, are complained of, grumbled about, and submitted to without resistance. Those who suffer from them, instead of endeavouring to procure their removal by employing the requisite means, content themselves with indulging their dislike and impatience in vain and idle exclamations of condemnation, and are prompt to fix blame any where rather than on their own backwardness to seek redress. I am firmly persuaded that it requires no very diligent search to discover many acts of oppression and injustice, and many instances of gross abuse which have continued and gained strength, principally because the attention of the public has not been called, in a public manner, to their existence, and because those who have the power to rectify them have been the last to hear that there was aught required amendment.

This conclusion (to which my own observation and experience have led me) may possibly be erroneous, but it is one I have acted upon, and intend (with your permission) to act upon in the present instance. The subject I wish to recommend to your notice is the tax paid by lawyers for their certificates; and I shall attempt to show, first, its unequal pressure, and, secondly, to offer some hints for its alteration and melioration.

As the law now stands, the young gentleman who has just completed his articles must, if he commence practice immediately, pay, if in London, 67., if in the country, 47. The same payment must be made for two following years, but, afterwards, the amount must be doubled. Should he, however, from motives of prudence or some other cause, refrain from entering into business for three years, directly on his commencement after that period he will be saddled with the highest duty. No respect is had to the extent of business, or the opportunities of obtaining and improving connection. As a condition precedent, the imposition must be paid; and the hardship it may occasion is never taken into account.

Now, if we consider the reason, propriety, and end of taxes, it will instantly appear that this tax is particularly objectionable, because those whose business is in its infancy pay as much as those who are engaged in the most extensive and lucrative transactions. This is in direct opposition to one of the grand maxims with respect to taxes in general laid down by Dr. Adam Smith in his " Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," viz., that "the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the

support of government in proportion to their respective abilities, that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."* A maxim founded in good sense. Pauper ought not to be expected to hand into the treasury so much as Dives, for the very best of all reasons, viz., that he has not the same portion of good things.

You, sir, as a professional man, must be aware that connection and business are plants of slow growth-that the youthful aspirant after independence by means of professional exertions is often doomed to a severe exercise of patience, and to taste the bitterness of disappointed hope. Many a one who had reason to expect that, at his outset, the word of promise which had previously been liberally dealt out would literally be fulfilled, and that business, various in its nature and sufficient in its extent, with its cares, its pleasures, emoluments and honours, would realise his utmost wishes,-many a one has found himself compelled (with anguish of soul) to acknowledge the vast difference between professions and performance. Generally speaking, some years must elapse before a good business but all this time the attorney can be obtained must pay the same as if he were completely successful.

This cannot be right: what then is the remedy. I would submit one of the two following courses. Either let the tax be proportioned to the extent of profit of the attorney, as, for instance, two per cent. upon its amount t; or, let the lower duty continue to be paid for a much longer period than three years, say ten. The first of these plans would be by far the most equitable. I am, however, very sensible many objections would be raised against it, though I flatter myself I could satisfactorily answer them all. The other course would, in some measure, afford relief, and, rather than have no alteration, I would say, Grant us that.

I could expatiate largely on this subject, and the circumstances connected with it, but shall refrain, because I well know that those for whose consideration this article is intended will anticipate me in every respect. As an attorney, I feel anxious for the welfare of the department to which I belong, and with which my interest is identified. If I can in any way serve my brethren it will be my pride and pleasure to do it; and I have only to add, the gratification I experience in finding my endeavours so well seconded by your powerful and unremitting aid. I remain, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,
G.