by which service contracts are ultimately governed," and that "an arbitrator undisturbed by the emotions of the conflict would apply them to the facts before him." This is arbitration by a court, not by a board. The umpire presides over the investigation; two arbitrators are appointed by the employers, and two by the men. These four are a kind of jury. If they cannot agree, the umpire has to make his award. Such a plan is very desirable where there is antagonism and suspicion existing between masters and men. The presence of an umpire must exercise a salutary restraint over both sides, and such arbitrations must necessarily have a great effect in carrying out the object aimed at—namely, the peaceful settlement of these burning questions. There are trades now where any other mode would be impossible. Probably no other plan is so well adapted to the putting an end to a strike or lock

out.

It must be admitted that Mr. Kettle, in elaborating this system, and himself successfully undertaking the difficult office of umpire, has done a work the importance of which cannot be over

estimated. But its uses are temporary and provisional. No institution can be permanent which contemplates a continuous and lasting opposition between labour and capital. The same may be said of the trades unions, which have been well described as "armed peace;" but then they have other functions besides that of resisting and opposing employers, and they are capable of being modified and transformed for the better carrying out of useful and social purposes, as the present antagonism between capital and labour diminishes and dies away. So too with boards of conciliation, which have already shown that they are capable of being employed to promote industrial progress, apart from the more special object with which they were originally established.

Every board of conciliation, as has been said, must have an ultimate appeal of some kind. If it be to an umpire, it is much better, when it is practicable, that he should not attend; that his name should only appear on the title-page of the book of rules, to remind both sides that there is an ultimate appeal to something better than force. The

system of umpires, arbitrators, and advocates on each side, is by no means free from vices and dangers. Generally, each side appoints two arbitrators; these, though perfectly honest, are not always impartial judges, and too often fiery partisans. Indeed, I have known an instance in which, I believe, from peculiar circumstances, the case for the men was actually drawn up by one of the men's arbitrators, after the investigation had begun. Constantly the men's arbitrators go to the investigation simply to get as much as they possibly can for the men. No doubt, war at the arbitration court is better than strikes and lock-outs.

Well-founded fears are entertained lest the legal side of these arbitrations should be increased, and lest all the vices of advocacy, its subtleties and hair-splittings, and the system of winning causes by the suppression of truth, should poison the system and destroy its candour and vigour. The notion is gaining ground that it is desirable that each fresh arbitration should start from the conclusions of the last award.

In the coal arbitrations, this is claimed as a right by the advocates of the miners. Mr. Herschell, in his recent award in the Northumberland coal trade, agrees with the view urged by the representatives of the miners, "that the last award ought, as a rule, to be taken as the starting point," and he further recommends the establishment of a more permanent tribunal, because "a uniform principle would then be applied, and justice would more certainly be done to all parties than if the tribunal is different on each occasion, and is unable to know completely and accurately the principles on which its predecessor proceeded." The error of this legal conception consists in the failure to see that these arbitrations are only temporary expedients, to enable industry to emerge from a chronic state of war, and that giving systematic and permanent form to the continual succession of arbitration struggles is a danger as formidable as the system of strikes. If each arbitration is to be governed by the accumulated results of former awards, we shall have a series of decisions gradually forming a voluminous and unintelligible

library of case law, and a system of refined advocacy. Indeed, the printed reports of the various arbitrations in the coal trade have already assumed a formidable appearance. I should entertain great apprehension that if these ideas were adopted they would prove fatal to arbitration, were it not that I am sure that masters and men will instinctively reject anything of the sort. It cannot be too strongly impressed upon employers and employed, that whatever temporary benefits this kind of arbitration may bring, it is not and cannot be a means of thoroughly reconciling capital and labour.

There is, besides, another source of danger in these courts, a fallacy that would sooner or later lead to serious difficulty, if it were really acted on. It consists in the too absolute conception formed of economical truth. The inevitable consequence of the arbitration court presided over by a legal or judicial umpire, is, that he is by his training instinctively impelled to seek for absolute rules, which he can apply to the disputes that come before him. At law, certain rules are by statute or custom made absolute for the very purpose of easy and precise