Sir William Hamilton: Being the Philosophy of Perception : an AnalysisLongmans, Green, 1865 - 124 páginas The Statue of Liberty decides to roam the land and visit some of the people she has greeted upon their arrival in the United States, so she steps off her pedestal and takes a walk from sea to sea. |
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Página 52
... sight is per- ception ; but there is nothing in this statement to preclude us from the examination of the process of vision , both physiologically and psychologically ; and if the results of this examination tend to show the ...
... sight is per- ception ; but there is nothing in this statement to preclude us from the examination of the process of vision , both physiologically and psychologically ; and if the results of this examination tend to show the ...
Página 53
... Sight , sight , hearing , hear- ing , -touch , touch ; for each of these is consciousness , and each of these is at the same time capable of a formal investigation . It is possible that Hamilton might reply here , But you fail to see ...
... Sight , sight , hearing , hear- ing , -touch , touch ; for each of these is consciousness , and each of these is at the same time capable of a formal investigation . It is possible that Hamilton might reply here , But you fail to see ...
Página 71
... sight , hearing , & c . , asserting of each and all that the sensible affection may be excited by a variety of stimuli , external and internal , that it does not cease with the pre- sence , and , therefore , does not demonstrate the ...
... sight , hearing , & c . , asserting of each and all that the sensible affection may be excited by a variety of stimuli , external and internal , that it does not cease with the pre- sence , and , therefore , does not demonstrate the ...
Página 77
... sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses . ( Reid's Works , pp . 124 , 829. ) [ Reid himself says ] , upon the whole , it appears that our philosophers have imposed upon themselves and upon us in pretending to ...
... sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses . ( Reid's Works , pp . 124 , 829. ) [ Reid himself says ] , upon the whole , it appears that our philosophers have imposed upon themselves and upon us in pretending to ...
Página 82
... sight of colour , and the appre- hension through sight of extension and figure , are as insepar- able , identical cognitions of identical objects . ( Reid's Works , p . 860. ) The observations of Platner , on a person born blind , would ...
... sight of colour , and the appre- hension through sight of extension and figure , are as insepar- able , identical cognitions of identical objects . ( Reid's Works , p . 860. ) The observations of Platner , on a person born blind , would ...
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Términos y frases comunes
actually admit affection analyse and discriminate analysis of philosophy apodictic appear apprehended Aristotle assert believe cognition colour common sense conceive constitutes cosmothetic idealist Disc doctrine doubt elements error evidence exist extension external reality extracts facts of consciousness faculties Hamil Hegel Hume immediate incognisable inference intuitive inviolable Julius Cæsar Kant Kant's space knowledge known light membrane Meta Micromégas mind and matter modes modification nature nervous ness noumenalism noumenon object of perception once organism original beliefs outer objects papillæ perception proper phenomenal phenomenalist phenomenon PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION posteriori present presentationism primary qualities primary truths principles priori Protagoras quotations reason reference regards Reid Reid's relation relations of ideas relative representationist resistance sciousness secondary qualities SECRET OF HEGEL secundo-primary sensuous sight simple sion Sir William Hamilton subjective SUBORDINATE CONTRADICTIONS suppose testimony of consciousness theory things thought tion touch transcend true unknown whole wholly word
Pasajes populares
Página 111 - Speaking of the perception of the external world — " We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern ; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar.
Página 102 - it is truly an idle problem to attempt imagining the steps by which we may be supposed to have acquired the notion of extension ; when in fact we are unable to imagine to ourselves the possibility of that notion not being always in our possession.
Página 70 - S57b,sq.) 21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness. —Not the former ; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter; for this would turn Perception into Imagination — reduce it from an immediate, and assertory, and objective, into a mediate,...
Página 113 - In this country in particular, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatically proclaim that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflective many ; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves.
Página 119 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Página 72 - That the notion of space is a necessary condition of thought, and that, as such, it is impossible to derive it from experience, has been cogently demonstrated by Kant...
Página 8 - ... accidentally revealed to us through certain qualities related to our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. All that we know is therefore phenomenal — phenomenal of the unknown.
Página 6 - The sum of our knowledge of the connection of mind and body is, therefore, this, — that the mental modifications are dependent on certain corporeal conditions ; but of the nature of these conditions we know nothing.
Página 84 - Thus a perception of the Primary qualities does not, originally and in itself, reveal to us the existence, and qualitative existence, of aught beyond the organism, apprehended by us as extended, figured, divided, &c.
Página 3 - An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition. A mediative cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a representative cognition.