being flushed, coloured, or lit by a sensation, or secondary quality, there is perception of this net itself in its primary qualities. This is the ultimate fact-the ultimate that (or). On sense of resistance then, again, these primary qualities of the nervous net (together with the secondary of the same) are transferred to an unknown substrate that resists; and so by continued process of inference there gradually rises around us the formed world.

The mind, then, to Hamilton, though pervading the nervous net that envelops it, perceives this net only when it (the net) is lit by a secondary quality; and even then, be it remembered, not in itself-no, only in its modes, which modes are the primary qualities. These primary qualities-modes of a non-ego; for the nervous net, if on one side within the mind, is on another side without the mind, and in that aspect other than the mind—are transferred by inference to the non-ego beyond the nervous net; what we called the net's net; which ulterior non-ego, or net, is itself inferred on occasion of resistance to the voluntary locomotion of the netted mind.* Thus is it that

*Hamilton certainly figures sensation of secondary and perception of primary quality (though impossibly else than a sequence of first and second both in nature and in time—though quite as much so, indeed, as any sequence of two terms that can be anywhere referred to), as a single organic act; and it is very possible that he would wish to associate with these, and in this act, the element of resistance as well. Such association, at least, might, perhaps, relieve the difficulty as to when and where Hamilton places the first cognition of outness; for cognition of a non-ego that is at once within the mind and without the mind, seems competent rather to otherness than to outness. Thorough outness is, perhaps, hardly possible before resistance. This difficulty, however, probably never occurred to Hamilton.

THE OUTER RESISTANTS.

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Hamilton conceives the mind to arrive at cognition of its entire abode. All knowledge of outer things is but an inferential transference from the netted mind to resistants without. These resistants without, again, are unknown things in themselves actually presented to the netted mind; but they are also only phenomena, in that they are not known in themselves, but only through, first, the primary qualities transferred, so to speak, in to their interiors, and, second, the secondary qualities inferentially transferred on to their exteriors. The former inference, again, to Hamilton, is presentative or noumenal in its validity, while the latter is only representative or phenomenal: that is to say, the resistants he conceives to possess the primary qualities; but they are not, by any means, necessarily even the causes, excitants, or stimuli of the very secondary qualities which by inference of the mind are, as their effects, reflected to them.

Hamilton thus conceives himself surrounded by unknown resistants which, substantiated by the primary qualities and clothed by the secondary, open up into, or rather simply take on, this coloured and variegated universe; and we may now more clearly realise to ourselves the precise burthen and bearing of his presentative phenomenalism, or of his presented phenomenon. Cognition, as only relative (which is simply a matter of course to Hamilton), must be phenomenal, but to this cognition the phenomenon concerned is an actually present other, or to this cognition an external something is actually there, under whatever amount of phenomenal shimmer. A hat may, by design, by

accident, by age, take on this shape, that shape, and a hundred shapes; this colour, that colour, and a hundred colours; but, under every shape, and under every colour (or however phenomenally varied), it may conceivably retain the same substance, and remain the same non-ego, or hat, still. Each of the surrounding, unknown substrates, then, is but such presented phenomenon; noumenal knowledge does not existeven the primary qualities are relative and modified modes (Hamilton's own language); nevertheless, knowledge is not confined to one's own self, to one's own states-it really concerns a non-ego, or non-egos, actually presented. There are outer things that, though unknown in themselves, hold up, through force of the primary qualities, all the variegated colouring of the secondary. Hamilton evidently cannot do without the supporting frames and skeletons of these outer substrates; they are to him what the Anstoss was to Fichte, the plane and planes of reflexion from which there return to the ego-but now as outer and other the ego's own states (the secondary qualities). An outer kernel of support plays a rôle indispensable to Hamilton, and he can see for it no substitute, no surrogate, anywhere else. Had Hamilton, it is true, as we have seen, but understood the relative doctrine, he might have found this substitute, this surrogate, in the space of Kant, in which his own primary qualities are admittedly implied. Had projection, indeed, from within out, of such a spectrum as Kant's space, occurred to Hamilton, he would probably not have hesitated to adopt the simpler, the more comprehensive, the

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OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY.

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more adequate, the more consistent, and the more satisfactory theory. To declare the primary qualities (space) his own state, did not for Kant dispossess these of the advantage they might offer as outer supports. They really, by reflexion, stood around him without, and thus really performed for the secondary qualities the very same function that Hamilton deside

rated in his own unknown substrates.

Certainly the theory is exceedingly ingenious, but it is subjected, at the same time, to a variety of very serious objections. Must we not say, for example, that it is, after all, a beginning at the wrong end? If we are allowed to start at once as accomplished physiologists with the whole anatomy of the nervous system before us, have we not an easy game from the first? And as to that, indeed, are there not always too many physiological elements present to suit interests which concern psychology alone? Had Hamilton deduced his materials, physiological elements included, from any necessary and demonstrated basis, as is now always the indispensable preliminary of philosophy, both objections would fall; but such deduction fails. Then the direct presence of the mind to its own nervous organism must be regarded as a gratuitous assumption, unsupported by proof, and unillustrated by consciousness.

But, supposing this, how is it that the mind is not at once conscious of that which, ex hypothesi, it is directly present to? This would be immediate knowledge, and it is immediate knowledge which Hamilton would establish. Instead of this, how is it that the

mind, to reach the knowledge in question, has still to wait for the addition of yet another element, which would seem rather thus to mediate knowledge?

The problem is, How can the mind know an external object? The first answer is, We have senses by which to smell it, taste it, touch it, hear it, and see it. Yes, is the rejoinder; but analysis and consideration will demonstrate that sense in each of these five modes is adequate to no more than the excitation in the mind of a passion, affection, or subjective feeling, which as in the mind, and occupying the mind, and, so to speak, colouring the mind in a manner nowise distinguishable from that in which a variety of confessedly internal elements, grief, joy, hate, &c., is capable of occupying and, so to speak, colouring the mind-is evidence of its own self, and for its own self, but not possibly of or for anything else beside. A sensation is only intensive, it is only a passion; the mind, for the time, is this passion, and this passion is it there is no hint in it of anything but itself,—there is not the slightest suggestion in it of any transition whatever. Give the mind light only -it fills it, the mind is it, and it is the mind; but what else is there, or what else can it suggest? Give the mind sound only,—is it conceivable that the mind could disjoin it from itself, any more than it could disjoin from itself anger, or hope, or fear? And as it is with these senses (sight and hearing), so also is it with the others. But if it be so with each singly, so also must it be with all together; for no addition of subjective to subjective can ever make an objective—