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faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. All that we know is therefore phenomenal— phenomenal of the unknown. The philosopher speculating the worlds of matter and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed, resembles Æneas contemplating the adumbrations on his shield; as it may equally be said of the sage and of the hero,—

'Miratur ; Rerumque ignarus, Imagine gaudet.' [Then follow testimonies to the truth of this doctrine from Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebræus, Melanchthon, Julius Cæsar Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Bacon, Spinoza, Sir Isaac Newton, and Kant. Of these we quote the following:-] Protagoras: Man is [for himself] the measure of all things.' Boethius: 'Omne quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium, natura cognoscitur.' And (Meta. i. 61), ‘Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis.' Leo Hebræus: 'Cognita res a cognoscente, pro viribus ipsius cognoscentis, haud pro rei cognitæ dignitate recipi solet.' Scaliger: Nego tibi ullam esse formam nobis notam plene et plane: nostramque scientiam esse umbram in sole [contendo].' And (Meta. i. 140): Sicut vulpes, elusa a ciconia, lambendo vitreum vas pultem haud attingit: ita nos externa tantum accidentia percipiendo, formas internas non cognoscimus.' Bruno: 'Ita etiam, neque intellectus noster se ipsum in se ipso et res omnes in se ipsis, sed in exteriore quadam specie, simulacro, imagine, figura, signo.' Bacon: 'Informatio sensus semper est ex analogia hominis non ex analogia universi; atque magno prorsus errore asseritur sensum esse mensuram rerum.' Spinoza: Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum quibus corpus afficitur. Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.' Kant: In perception everything is known in conformity to the con

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NOUMENALISM AND PHENOMENALISM DEFINED. 9

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stitution of our faculty.' [Hamilton adds:] And a hundred testimonies to the same truth might be adduced from the philosopher of Koenigsberg, of whose doctrine it is, in fact, the foundation.' (Disc. pp. 643-647.)*

On the question of accuracy here, the reader must understand that he has no room to doubt. Both series of statement occur in Hamilton, and both are perfectly co-extensive and equally precise. Of both, too, the quoted specimens might have been indefinitely augmented, although a tithe of either-so far as conviction is concerned-would probably have sufficed. Neither, if the facts are certain, have we any more reason to doubt the contradiction they involve. The appeal in the one series is not more certainly to common sense, than that in the other is to the philosophers, and the burthen of the one is not more surely noumenalism than that of the other is phenomenalism.

We may remark that we use these terms, noumenalism and phenomenalism, by preference to any others; for, since Kant, they are those that most accurately define the point at issue. To know a noumenon is to know a thing in itself, or as it is; to know a phenomenon is to know a thing in another, or as it seems. This is the distinction concerned, and on its very edge, apply to it what terms we may.

It is the alternatives, then, of this distinction that are equally asserted by Hamilton, and it is on the resultant contradiction that we are now engaged. The first series, for example, runs thus:

In perception, the thing itself is presented to, and viewed by, the mind, face to face-it is not held up or

*The italics in the above are also Hamilton's own.

mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation. Perception is an immediate and presentative knowledge-it is not mediate or representative-it is intuitive of the non-ego, of matter, of the object in itself, and not in or through something numerically different from itself. Mind and matter are known as existent, immediately and in themselves. Knowledge and existence are convertible. The object known and the reality existing are identical. The external reality itself is the one and only object of perception, and it is known in itself and as existing.

The second series, again, runs thus:

The object known is not known as it is, but only as it seems-existence is not known absolutely and in itself-observation and experience afford mere appearances-nothing is known and nothing is but those phases of being which stand in analogy to our faculties -whatever we know is not a simple relation but a sum-we know only qualities, phenomena-all that we know is but phenomenal of the unknown-existence absolutely and in itself is to us as zero-things in themselves are incognisable their existence is incomprehensible, and is only indirectly and accidentally known.

In short, with relation to perception, according to the first series, the external reality—or what is called the unknown reality-is itself, and in itself, and as it is, or as it exists, immediately and intuitively (or face to face) presented to the mind. According to the second series, again, the reality itself is not only admittedly called unknown, but it admittedly is unknown unknown in itself, unknown as it is, unknown as it exists (presented to the mind, there

THE CONFUSION NOT INADVERTENT.

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fore, one would suppose, not only not immediately, not intuitively, not face to face, but simply not at all); and leaving room, consequently, for no knowledge in its, or any, regard that is not of the nature of mere seeming, mere appearance that is not indirect, accidental, and phenomenal-that is not indirect, accidental, and phenomenal only of what is unknown, incognisable, incomprehensible. Lastly, just to clinch certainty itself here, Hamilton himself, in defining the representationist not to know things in themselves but only in a vicarious phenomenon, would seem directly to identify the position of the representationist with what we can only name his own second position.

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It seems, too, but to add the last touch to contradiction here, to observe that Hamilton's action in all this cannot be regarded as wholly inadvertent, but must be considered as at least in some degree conscious. 'To obviate misapprehension,' he says (Disc. p. 54), we may parenthetically observe'-and the parenthesis occurs in the midst of a profession of the strictest noumenalism-'that all we do intuitively know of self, &c., is only relative,' &c.* Evidently, therefore, it is not without a certain consciousness that Hamilton scruples not to fling into a single heap the terms of both alternatives at once, or rather even to correct and explain the strict language of noumenalism by the no less strict language of phenomenalismplacing the latter, indeed, as but the defining surrogate of the former. Now we cannot say that our general sense of contradiction, or that our surprise, is in any

* See quotation at p. 6, but consult original also.

degree weakened by our perception of this consciousness of Hamilton. Rather, on the contrary, our sense of contradiction and our surprise are thereby very much increased; and this, while we experience in addition both discomfort and offence-discomfort and offence, namely, in consequence of the confusion introduced into well-founded and long-established distinctions by what at least seems the arbitrary caprice of a single individual. Nevertheless, this consciousness of Hamilton being admitted as a fact, our general position is necessarily changed. It becomes our duty, namely, to inquire into Hamilton's actuating reasons, which reasons may be found in the end-despite the confusion that may result-to reconcile contradiction and establish their object.

Why, then, has Hamilton, at the same time that he holds all our knowledge to be phenomenal only, unequivocally asserted presentationism as well?

This question we shall consider presently. It will be well, however, to dwell a moment on some subordinate contradictions which, present with, are not unillustrative of, the main one.

Of these the first concerns again Hamilton's alreadymentioned consciousness of this main contradiction itself. On this we have to make clear to ourselves that we know of this consciousness only in that we have seen Hamilton expressly cross the two series, or in that we have seen him expressly apply the one in interpretation of the other. This is conclusive as regards a consciousness of the fact of the action; it is inconclusive as regards any consciousness of what the

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